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The essays presented here are the outcome of research carried out by 
most of the members of IFILNOVA (Institute for Philosophy at the New 
University of Lisbon) in 2016. 
The IFILNOVA Permanent Seminar has as its theme for the next 
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In this paper I want to question the feasibility of the distinction be-
tween agent-neutral and agent-relative values, and explore an alterna-
tive method of understanding value in terms of Alan Thomas’s distinc-
tion between non-relational and relational intrinsic value. I shall then 
briefly suggest that these observations can lend support to value pri-
macy: the idea that talk of value cannot be reduced to talk of the rea-
son-giving force of other (perhaps non-evaluative) properties.1 I shall 
begin by explaining how Thomas Nagel drew the distinction between 
the agent-neutral and agent-relative in terms of both reasons and values.
1.  Agent-Relativity and Agent-Neutrality: A Value-Based 
Theory of Reasons
The clearest statement of the distinction between the agent-neutral and 
agent-relative can be found in Nagel’s account of reasons for action in 
The View from Nowhere:
If a reason can be given a general form which does not include an essential ref-
erence to the person who has it, it is an agent-neutral reason. For example, if it is 
a reason for anyone to do or want something that it would reduce the amount of 
wretchedness in the world, then that is a neutral reason. If on the other hand the 
general form of the reason does include an essential reference to the person who 
has it, it is an agent-relative reason. For example, if it is a reason for anyone to do 
or want something that it would be in his interest, then that is a relative reason. 
(Nagel 1986: 153–154)
1 I want to make it clear from the outset that I have no intention of settling any-
thing in this paper. The idea is simply to outline a position I find plausible, and to 
demonstrate how such a theory lends support to the primacy of value.
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In a nutshell, agent-neutral reasons are said to be reasons for anyone 
and everyone, for instance, the general reasons there are for us all to 
donate money to charity or look after the environment. Such reasons 
are said to ‘depend on what everyone ought to value independently of 
its relation to oneself’ (Nagel 1991). If some act, event, or circumstance 
is said to have agent-neutral value, then anyone has reason to promote 
its occurrence, or at least desire that it happen. Agent-relative reasons, 
on the other hand, are said to be reasons only for particular individuals 
or groups; the special reasons there are for each of us to look after our 
own interests, or the interests of our family and friends, etc. If some 
act, event, or circumstance is said to have agent-relative value, then 
only some particular agent or groups of agents have reason to want and 
pursue it because it is related to them in the right way – it is valuable 
for that individual. For instance, everyone’s life is considered to possess 
both agent-relative and agent-neutral value. We each have agent-relative 
reasons to care about our own lives (because our lives are valuable for 
us) as well as having agent-neutral reasons to care about the lives of 
others (because the lives of all individuals have intrinsic or absolute 
value). In this sense one-and-the-same act, event, or circumstance can 
often be understood as having both agent-relative value for someone in 
particular, or as having agent-neutral value simpliciter, or absolutely.
2. Understanding Agent-Neutral Value
Christine Korsgaard noted there is some ambiguity surrounding this 
notion of agent-neutral value or good-absolutely. In her examination 
of Nagel’s distinction, she considers two approaches to understanding 
agent-neutral value. The first approach she calls ‘objective realism’:
An agent-neutral value might be a value that is not relative to what agents actually 
value. According to this interpretation, the goodness of, say, my happiness, has 
what G. E. Moore called an intrinsic value, a property that is independent either 
of my interest in promoting it or yours. It provides a reason for both of us the way 
the sun provides light for both of us: because it’s out there, shining down. And 
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just as the sun would exist in a world devoid of creatures who see and respond to 
light, so values would exist in a world devoid of creatures who see and respond to 
reasons. (Korsgaard 1996: 278)
On this Platonic or Moorean view, one comes to value something 
when one perceives or discovers its value empirically. Consequently, 
agent-neutral values are understood as fundamental; agent-relative val-
ues are generated by, or derived from agent-neutral ones (Nagel 1970: 
vii; Korsgaard 1996: 278). On a second approach, agent-neutral value 
is understood in terms of its intersubjectivity:
[A]gent-neutrality does not mean independence of agents as such, but neutral 
with respect to the individual identities of agents. On this reading values are inter-
subjective; they exist for all rational agents, but would not exist in a world without 
them. (Korsgaard 1996: 278)
Given this intersubjective account, agent-relative value is fundamental; 
agent-neutral values are constructed out of agent-relative values when 
agents recognise and come to share each other’s ends.
Before considering where Nagel’s position fits in with these ap-
proaches, it is worth looking at G. E. Moore’s form of objective realism 
in some more detail, particularly his argument against what is now un-
derstood as agent-relative value. Moore infamously rejects the idea of 
agent-relative value qua some sui generis evaluative property:
What, then, is meant by ‘my own good’? In what sense can a thing be good for me? 
It is obvious, if we reflect, that the only thing which can belong to me, which can be 
mine, is something which is good, and not the fact that it is good. When, therefore, 
I talk of anything I get as ‘my own good,’ I must mean either that the thing I get 
is good, or that my possessing it is good. In both cases it is only the thing or the 
possession of it which is mine, and not the goodness of that thing or that possession. 
[…] In short, when I talk of a thing as ‘my own good’ all that I can mean is that 
something which will be exclusively mine, as my own pleasure is mine (whatever be 
the various senses of this relation denoted by ‘possession’), is also good absolutely; 
or rather that my possession of it is good absolutely. (Moore 1903: 99)
Now, some take this position to amount to the claim that talk of what 




nonsensical (Kraut 2007: 70). However, the more plausible interpreta-
tion of Moore’s argument is that the idea of some kind of sui generis 
agent-relative evaluative property is nonsensical, for goodness, itself, is 
not a relational property. Consequently, talk of agent-relative value, or 
‘good-for x’ can only ever be talk of good-absolutely which stands in a 
certain relation to a particular agent. Goodness or value is a metaphys-
ically simple, non-natural property which belongs to things which are 
good.
Moore’s view aside, Korsgaard’s favoured position is intersubjec-
tivism. Nevertheless, she insists there is some ambiguity as to whether 
Nagel shares this position or is, rather, committed to some kind of ob-
jective realism (Korsgaard 1996: 279–282). However, when understood 
correctly, it is clear that Nagel’s position is more akin to the intersubjec-
tivist position, whereby values are understood as objective in the sense 
that they are normatively real.
As we saw in section 1, Nagel advances a value-based theory of 
reasons where the presence of a reason for action is explained by the re-
lation in which an action stands to some valuable state of affairs, yet for 
Nagel the idea of some kind of Platonic or Moorean objective realism 
is misguided. For Nagel, evaluative judgements depend on judgements 
about the presence of particular reason-constitutive considerations, and 
the objectivity and reality of value is fundamentally grounded in the 
conception of a practical agent. Thus, values arise from and are ana-
lysed in terms of the conception of a good reason for action:
Values are judgments from a standpoint external to ourselves about how to be 
and how to live. Because they are accepted from an impersonal standpoint, they 
apply not only to the point of view of the particular person I happen to be, but 
generally. They tell me how I should live because they tell me how anyone should 
live. (Nagel 1986: 135)
What appears odd, however, is that Nagel’s objection to reductive ac-
counts of normativity more generally is stated explicitly in terms of 
values rather than reasons:
If values are objective, they must be so in their own right, and not through reduc-
ibility to some other kind of objective fact. They have to be objective values, not 
objective anything else. (Nagel 1986: 139)
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Nevertheless, for Nagel this does not amount to a reduction of values 
to reasons; the relationship he envisages between reasons and value is 
one of direct correspondence or equivalence; there is an asymmetrical 
dependence relation between value and the grounding of reasons in the 
sense that valuable acts, events, or states of affairs are said to provide 
agents with a reason to promote them. It is in this sense that values are 
said to be normatively objective, for to objectify them under a non-nor-
mative criterion would be to reduce them to some other objective fact, 
for instance, a psychological fact such as a desire which is said to ex-
plain the presence of a reason.2 Consequently:
Normative realism is the view that propositions can be true or false independently 
of how things appear to us, and that we can hope to discover the truth by tran-
scending the appearances and subjecting them to critical assessment. What we 
aim to discover is not an aspect of the external world, called value, but rather 
just the truth about what we and others should do and want. (Nagel 1986: 139 
[emphasis added])
Agents, then, do not discover reasons for action that exist independent-
ly of their pre-existing subjective motivational states and interests, but 
rather, taking up an objective standpoint allows objectivity to bear on 
their will, which can alter and constrain those motives that are already 
present. These considerations are, as such, the seeds of our moral the-
orizing. Objectivity and realism in ethics, then, is not analogous to the 
sense found in theoretical reasoning or empirical Moorean realism. 
Nagel offers a practical account of objectivity and a normative realism 
disanalogous to theoretical reasoning in the sense that we do not arrive 
at new beliefs that include ourselves as components; rather we arrive at 
an extended set of values and normative judgements from a centreless 
and impersonal standpoint of objectivity.3
2 Though one may agree that values are not reducible to the non-normative without 
thinking that values = reasons.
3 Importantly, the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative value does 
not map onto the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. Nagel stresses that there is a sep-
arate metaphysical question concerning the manner in which reasons vary in their 
externality or independence from human concerns. He acknowledges the fact that 
most of the apparent reasons visible from our personal standpoint are intimately 
connected with our first-personal interests and desires, yet it seems that many of 
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3. Three Kinds of Agent-Relativity?
Nagel’s aim in The Possibility of Altruism was to show that all personal 
agent-relative reasons had to have an agent-neutral counterpart4 (Nagel 
1970: vii). Nevertheless, he eventually succumbed to the idea that there 
are agent-relative reasons (and values) that are too idiosyncratic to be 
subsumed under a suitable agent-neutral counterpart, so he allowed for 
the existence of certain agent-relative reasons (and values) so long as 
they were tolerable from an agent-neutral perspective. These agent-rel-
ative reasons were said to fall into three categories. Firstly: reasons of 
special obligation. These are reasons stemming from the value of the 
personal/familial relationships we have with others, for instance, the 
agent-relative reasons I have to look after my own family and friends. 
Secondly: reasons of autonomy. These reasons are grounded in the val-
ue of an agent’s personal projects or goals, for instance, my ambition 
to climb Kilimanjaro. And, thirdly: reasons of deontology. These are 
reasons stemming from an agent’s special concern with his or her own 
actions, for instance, reasons not to kill innocent people, tell lies, etc.
Now, although orthodox, the idea that deontological reasons are 
agent-relative is somewhat controversial (cf. McNaughton & Rawling 
1991; Portmore 2013). Remember, the idea is that agent-relative rea-
sons track agent-relative values, yet it is far from clear how the disval-
ue of, say, killing an innocent person is ‘agent-relative’ in the required 
the objects of such interests and desires have an intrinsic value or a goodness in 
themselves, independently of how it is valued, or the satisfaction an agent may 
derive from valuing such objects, i.e. that some values are not reducible to their 
value for anyone. Admittedly, Nagel is unsure how to establish the existence of 
such values, but seems to regard the aesthetic value of the Frick Collection as a 
prime example of an object of external interest. Nevertheless, contra to Moore’s 
beautiful world, which retains its value without sentient beings, Nagel wants to 
avoid the ‘implausible consequence’ that the Frick Collection somehow retains 
its ‘practical importance’, even if humanity were destroyed (Nagel 1986: 153).
4 Incidentally, Nagel regarded the argument of The Possibility of Altruism as in-
timately related to Moore’s infamous argument against the egoist’s notion of 
agent-relative value or personal goodness although, on Nagel’s understanding, 
ethical egoism is a theory primarily concerned with reasons for action rather than 
the good (Nagel 1970: 86).
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sense. Granted, there is a sense in which not killing an innocent person 
is good-for-me, but it is simply odd to say that this is what makes the 
killing of innocents bad. Nevertheless, it certainly seems fitting that 
the value of one’s personal/familial relationships, personal projects, or 
goals can fittingly be described as ‘agent-relative’, i.e. ‘good-for’ par-
ticular individuals. Though, again, as Korsgaard has noted, this seems 
to mischaracterise the phenomena.
4. Korsgaard on Ambitions and Special Obligations
Korsgaard refers to reasons of autonomy as ‘ambitions’. For Nagel, the 
agent-relative value of one’s ambitions provide agents with agent-rela-
tive reasons to do things, yet the normative force of these reasons does 
not extend beyond the agent for whom they are ambitions: no one else 
has a reason to, say, help me climb Kilimanjaro, and I have no reason to 
help you achieve your ambitions (Nagel 1986). Korsgaard rightly insists 
this is mistaken:
Suppose it is my ambition to write a book about Kant’s ethics that will be required 
reading in all ethics classes … Following Nagel’s analysis, we will say that this 
ambition is agent-relative … But this way of describing the situation implies a 
strange description of my own attitude. It suggests that my desire to have my book 
required is a product of raw vanity, and that if I want to write a good book, this is 
merely a means to getting it required [in all ethics classes.] … So the structure of 
this ambition is not:
(1) I want my book to be required reading (where that is an agent- relative end);
(2) therefore: I shall write a good book (as a means to that end); but rather:
(1)  Someone should write a book on Kant good enough that it will be required 
reading (where that is an agent-neutral end);
(2) I want to be that someone (agent-relative motive). (Korsgaard 1993: 287–288)
The same observation extends to reasons of special obligation:
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The structure of reasons arising from love is similar to that of reasons of ambition. 
I think that someone should make my darling happy, and I very much want to be 
that someone. And others may have good reasons to encourage me in this. But if 
I try to prevent someone else from making my darling happy, or if I suppose that 
my darling’s happiness has no value unless produced by me, that is no longer an 
expression of love. Again, it is a very familiar perversion of it. (Korsgaard 1991: 
211) 
The structure of ambitions and obligations is more complex than Nagel 
allows, then. Rather than a self-interested desire for an object, or a de-
sire to realize something you think is good-for-you, an ambition is the 
desire to stand in a special relationship to what is good, agent-neutrally 
(intersubjectively). It may well be some type of ‘agent-relative’ element 
that has the motivating force, i.e. it is my ambition to climb Kiliman-
jaro, and my daughter whose care I must prioritize, but this desire is 
not the source of my reason. It is here that Korsgaard’s intersubjectiv-
ism becomes apparent. In offering you my reasons I am offering you 
the ‘familiar voice of humanity, not the voice of alien idiosyncrasies’ 
(Korsgaard 1996: 290). Subsequently, the value of our ambitions and 
personal obligations is not, as the objective realist would have it, intrin-
sic, but rather an expression of the interest in other agents or humanity. 
Qua intersubjectivist, an agent first understands himself as simply an 
agent among many, and then attempts to understand and share the ends 
of others. The objective realist works in the opposite direction. He must 
first see if he can share another’s ends, and then decide what relation-
ship he wants to have with others. Korsgaard regards this as a mistake: 
‘We should promote the ends of others not because we recognize the 
value of those ends, but rather out of respect for the humanity of those 
who have them’ (Korsgaard 1996: 279).
5. A False Dichotomy?
With regard to the nature of value, for Korsgaard there are only two 
possibilities: either all value is accounted for in terms of some mind-in-
dependent Moorean objective realism, placing it in no relation to the 
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subjective interests of agents whatsoever (objective realism), or it is 
explained in terms of intersubjectivism, where the interests of rational 
agents enter into the very analysis or content of value itself in the sense 
of rendering all values relational, i.e. the value of an object of moral 
concern obtains ‘in its relation to the subject’ (Korsgaard 1996: 279). 
However, this leaves Korsgaard committed to the implausible idea that 
all values are extrinsic values, as their existence depends solely on a 
process of construction by rational agents.
Following Alan Thomas, we can refer to this importation of rela-
tionality into the very content of value as relationality in value (Thomas 
2006: 48). It is this peculiar notion which seems to fuel the idea of 
agent-relative value: that an agent’s apprehension of value somehow 
constitutes it, i.e. the idea that the value of my ambition to climb Kil-
imanjaro is essentially mine is what constitutes it being valuable. This 
idea seems confused. Indeed, it is more than plausible that you (or an-
yone) can grasp the value of my ambition to climb Kilimanjaro in the 
same manner as you can grasp the value of your ambition to, say, play 
the piano. For Thomas, the very notion of agent-relative value points 
towards a more interesting distinction between relational and non- 
relational intrinsic values.
A value is both intrinsic and relational when it stands in an asym-
metrical constitutive relation to a subject. In this sense, the value of my 
ambition to climb Kilimanjaro can only be accounted for by making 
reference to whom the project is valuable. However, unlike Korsgaard’s 
intersubjectivism, these relational values can be both relational and in-
trinsic:
[Relational intrinsic] values do not derive their value from the relations to any 
object outside their nature (extrinsically); it is, rather, that it is in their nature to 
be values or disvalues in so far as they stand in a certain constitutive relation. 
(Thomas, unpublished)
The key point to note is that this kind of relationality is not ‘agent- 
relativity’ in the Nagelian sense. Of course, the value of my climbing 
Kilimanjaro is essentially relational, but this is not explained by the fact 
that it is valuable for me, Jamie Buckland. Analogously, take the disval-
ue of pain. Of course the pain I feel when I stub my toe on the coffee 
table is bad in so far as it is my pain, qua my mental state, but this 
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is not what constitutes its disvalue; ‘mineness’ cannot function as the 
metaphysical grounding of the value of pain qua mental state. The rela-
tionality concerns the metaphysical relationality of value (the value is 
constitutively the value of a subject), as opposed to Korsgaard’s peculiar 
phenomena of relationality in value. 
At this point it might be objected that Thomas’s notion of rela-
tional intrinsic value is simply a truism. But this is avoided by the fact 
that there are also non-relationally valuable states of affairs whose value 
obtains simply by virtue of their intrinsic properties, i.e. the value of 
these non-relationally intrinsically valuable states of affairs can be ex-
plained without making reference to the relational states of a subject. 
For instance, Thomas is happy to identify the notion of a non-relational 
intrinsic value with Moore’s idea that a beautiful world obtains with-
out sentient subjects. However, unlike Moore’s view, Thomas’s idea is 
merely a micro-level claim because, as a whole, value itself is related 
to human interest via a doctrine of presupposition. Again though, this 
raises the concern that non-relational intrinsic values simply collapse 
back into relational intrinsic value or even extrinsic value.
The issue is complex, but a response ties into the wider sensibili-
ty theorist’s position that values are anthropocentric, but, nonetheless, 
real, so the relation between value and human interest is one of presup-
position: ‘there is a sense in which value as a whole stands in relation to 
human interest. But this relation does not enter into the analysis of val-
ue itself’ (Thomas 2006: 48). The relationality of inherently relational 
(but intrinsically valuable) values, then, must be distinguished from the 
deeper, presupposed perspectival relationality found within our evalu-
ative judgements:
Our relationship to value exhibits different kinds of relativity. One obvious case 
is that evaluative judgements deploy concepts that exhibit perspectivalness. Our 
peculiarities as a class of judgers enter into the possession conditions for the 
concepts that are deployed in our evaluative judgements. The metaphysical idea is 
that certain classes of judgeable contents are only available to judgers of a certain 
kind. But it is important to realise that in such an account this deep relativity to 
our metaphysical point of view does not enter in to the very content of the judge-
ments we make, making them explicitly indexical in their very content. The rela-
tivity is rather presupposed, so that we can, from a standpoint of engagement with 
our conceptual scheme, make judgments that are, from our perspective, plainly 
true. (Thomas 2006: 47–48)
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The idea that our relation to value is presupposed sheds further light on 
the distinction between metaphysical debates about the relationality of 
value, and the separate phenomenon of the relationality in value that 
besets Korsgaard. The problem with Korsgaard’s analysis is that the re-
lationality of value has become part of the very nature of value itself – it 
has become relationality in value. In keeping this distinction separate 
the door is opened for those who wish to defend a metaphysical account 
of certain intrinsic values as constitutively relational without them be-
ing either relative or extrinsic or even instrumental.
6. Value Primacy
How, then, does the foregoing lend support to the primacy of value; the 
idea that talk of value cannot be reduced to talk of the reason-giving 
force of non-evaluative properties?
As we saw above, for both Nagel and Korsgaard the idea of 
Moorean objective realism is misguided: evaluative judgements depend 
on judgements about the presence of particular reason-constitutive con-
siderations. In this sense, the objectivity and reality of value is grounded 
fundamentally in the conception of a practical agent; values arise from 
and are analysed in terms of the conception of good reasons for action. 
This idea can be understood as a precursor to what has now become 
known as the ‘buck-passing’ theory of value, namely because Nagel’s 
normative realism ‘passes the buck’ from evaluative talk to the ground-
ing of practical reasons for action, i.e. goodness is not a reason-ground-
ing property itself, but is reducible to the reason-giving force of other 
properties, to quote Scanlon:
Goodness is not a single substantive property which gives us reason to promote 
or prefer the things that have it. Rather, to call something good is to claim that it 
has other properties (different ones in different cases) which provide such reasons. 
(Scanlon 1998: 11) 
However, the sensibility theorist’s account of value offered above ex-
plicitly rules out passing the buck because evaluative attitudes cannot 
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be characterized without ‘ineliminable reference to the values that 
these attitudes bring into view’ (Brewer 2006: 157 [emphasis added]). 
In following Thomas by understanding the metaphysical status of val-
ue as both anthropocentric, yet real, value is cited ‘irreducibly and in-
eliminably in the best explanation of our formulation of moral beliefs’ 
(Thomas 2006: 48 [emphasis added]; Wiggins 2002: Ch. IV, V). This 
is, essentially, a phenomenological appreciation, and irreducible to the 
recognition of reasons for action.
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Intersubjectivity and Freedom in Merleau-Ponty’s 
Phenomenology of Perception
Luís Sousa
In this article, I intend to show that Merleau-Ponty’s conception of free-
dom is essentially tied to his view of the human subject as socially situat-
ed: that is, that it presupposes his views on the intersubjective dimension 
of subjectivity. In other words, I will show that in his view sociality is not 
an impediment but rather a condition of freedom. In this regard, his posi-
tion contrasts starkly not only with modern philosophy’s prevailing con-
ceptions of autonomy (perhaps with the exception of Hegel) but also, and 
in particular, with Sartre’s view on freedom. Very roughly, Sartre equates 
being a subject with freedom and this, in turn, with self-determination 
in the sense of independence from others. Freedom is thus an essentially 
individual feature and other subjects are viewed as hindrances to it. For 
Merleau-Ponty, freedom is also tied to subjectivity – to the fact that we 
are in some sense subjects. It is only insofar as we are subjects that we 
are free, but our subjectivity is not opposed to our social nature for true 
subjectivity presupposes sociality.
For reasons of space, this investigation will focus on the Phenomenol-
ogy of Perception although, as with many other topics in Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought, the same ideas are developed in other works.1 For this same rea-
son, I will put to the side the problem of how far Merleau-Ponty develops 
his thought beyond this early articulation in subsequent works.
In the first section, I will briefly touch on the relevance of the prob-
lem of intersubjectivity not only to the way in which Merleau-Ponty 
conceives of the specificity of phenomenology but also to the problem 
1 See, for example, the essay ‘Cézanne’s Doubt’ from Sense and Non-Sense, which, 
despite what its title suggests, has freedom as its primary topic. On intersubjec-
tivity, see for example the lecture ‘The Child’s Relation with Others’ from Child 
Psychology and Pedagogy: The Sorbonne Lectures 1949–1952.
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of subjectivity. In the second section, I will provide a close reading 
of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological analysis of intersubjectivity. I 
will show that, contrary to what is sometimes claimed, the notion of 
body-subject does not solve the problem of other minds on its own; 
moreover, Merleau-Ponty does not claim this. He thinks there is a grain 
of truth in solipsism even if that position misunderstands and mis-
states the issue. This grain of truth corresponds to the privileging of 
the first-person perspective over the perspective of others. In the fourth 
section, I will show that, despite this privilege, subjectivity is not only 
socially situated but presupposes intersubjectivity. In the fifth section, 
I will introduce Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of freedom. Much of his 
account of freedom is built on his critique of Sartre. I will show that, 
although Merleau-Ponty does not deny freedom, unlike Sartre he views 
it as crucially tied to the agent’s factical and social situation. In the sixth 
section, I will show that Merleau-Ponty’s account of class consciousness 
is a good example of how action can be socially propelled and at the 
same time free. Finally, in the seventh and final section, I will conclude 
by providing an overview of how Merleau-Ponty brings his accounts of 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity to bear on the topic of freedom.
1.
The Phenomenology of Perception, inasmuch as it is a phenomenology, 
is an attempt to present a conception of subjectivity that is opposed to 
all empiricist conceptions in a broad sense – that is, opposed to any at-
tempt to explain away subjectivity in favour of third-person processes. 
At the same time (and this arguably constitutes the novelty of Merleau- 
Ponty’s work in comparison to his predecessors), the Phenomenology of 
Perception is a radical critique of the Cartesian, and even the Kantian, 
view of subjectivity. 
That Merleau-Ponty contrasts his position on subjectivity with 
the modern tradition’s preferred account is particularly relevant here. 
One of Merleau-Ponty’s main goals, indeed perhaps his central goal, is 
to show that the phenomenological point of view should be carefully 
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distinguished from the modern point of view with which it is often con-
flated. Merleau-Ponty views intellectualism and idealism as the main 
traits of modern philosophy. By contrast, he sees the ‘phenomenolog-
ical point of view’, which he associates with his reading of Husserl’s 
later philosophy and Heidegger’s existential phenomenology, as over-
coming the modern intellectualist-idealist trend in philosophy.
Merleau-Ponty understands the phenomenological point of view 
as an overcoming of the intellectualist-idealist point of view in part be-
cause of the status each grants to subjects other than oneself. In his 
view, Descartes’ and Kant’s theories of subjectivity, if brought to their 
ultimate conclusions, leave no place for ‘other subjects’. If the Carte-
sian conception is true, if my nature is that of a thinking substance from 
which everything bodily and material is excluded, my only distinguish-
ing feature is the bare ‘I think’. But this ‘I think’, the cogito, cannot 
serve to individuate me, and thus on this assumption there is no point in 
talking about other souls beyond my own (except maybe God’s). Kant, 
for his part, thinks of the subject as the ultimate centre of thought and 
conceptual activity. In his view, we cognize the subject not as it is in 
itself, as a noumenon, but only as it appears in time, as a phenomenon – 
that is, as an ‘empirical subject’. Since the transcendental subject is the 
ultimate condition of all cognition and cannot itself be cognized, all 
other possible subjects are only objects for it. For this reason, Kant con-
ceives of the plurality of subjects as a plurality of empirical subjects. 
The transcendental subject as such cannot be identified with someone in 
particular and contradicts the possibility of another transcendental sub-
ject, for there is, ex hypothesi, only one ultimate condition of thought, 
and this lies within me as the one and only transcendental subject. Thus, 
although Kant does not put it precisely this way, the transcendental sub-
ject, the subjective correlate of nature, is essentially one, transcending 
the plurality of empirical subjects that appear within nature. 
In a way that is related to their views on the nature of subjectivity, 
empiricism and intellectualism present seemingly opposed ontological 
accounts of the world. Whereas empiricism tends to be a materialist the-
ory of reality, intellectualism corresponds to an idealist point of view in-
asmuch as it traces reality back to some kind of subjective construct. For 
Merleau-Ponty, however, both approaches share the assumption that reality 
is ultimately intelligible, and the project of absolute knowledge is at least 
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ideally conceivable (even if it turns out, as with Kant, to be impossible for 
us humans). For this reason, the phenomenological point of view – which 
includes phenomenology’s novel account of subjectivity – will bring with it 
a completely new way of looking at the world, a new ontology.2 
As I said, Merleau-Ponty understands phenomenology, and in particu-
lar the work of Edmund Husserl, as presenting or at least strongly suggest-
ing a view of subjectivity that is opposed to that favoured by the intellec-
tualist-idealist tradition. It is true that Husserl’s conception of subjectivity 
seems to have affinities with both Descartes’ and Kant’s conceptions. And 
it is perhaps no mistake that Husserl calls his own brand of idealism ‘tran-
scendental idealism’ (although he tries to distinguish it from Kant’s ver-
sion). This notwithstanding, Merleau-Ponty sees implied in Husserl’s work, 
especially in its final phase, a conception of the subject as temporal, embod-
ied, finite and historical – a view that contrasts sharply with the intellectu-
alist, idealist, Cartesian conception.3 
2.
Merleau-Ponty’s main discussion of intersubjectivity in the Phenom-
enology of Perception can be found in the chapter ‘Others and the 
Human World’.4 From the outset, when we take a look at the context 
2 For this reason, I believe that Merleau-Ponty’s project was, from its very begin-
nings, concerned with ontology. Ontological claims appear not only in his last, 
unfinished, work (The Visible and the Invisible) but also in the Phenomenology of 
Perception, however much they may have developed over time.
3 As is now widely known, much of Husserl’s most relevant work was published 
after Merleau-Ponty’s death. Although Merleau-Ponty was one of the first visitors 
to the Husserl Archives at Louvain, the material which is now at our disposal 
gives us a much more complete picture not only of Husserl’s thought but also of 
its development throughout the years. However, I will not be concerned here with 
the accuracy of Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Husserl. For our purposes, what 
is important is that Merleau-Ponty understands his own position as laying out 
what was already implied in what he viewed as Husserl’s position.
4 Discussions on this chapter and the topic of intersubjectivity in Merleau-Ponty can 
be found in Barbaras (2004: 19ff., 239ff.); Carman (2008: 134ff.); Dillon (1988: 
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in which the chapter appears, we see that it is preceded by ‘The Thing 
and the Natural World’. The sequence of chapters and Merleau-Ponty’s 
introductory remarks in the chapter on intersubjectivity suggest that he 
may entertain the idea that there is a ‘natural world’ independent of the 
so-called ‘cultural world’. However, although Merleau-Ponty deals with 
the natural world before and independently of the cultural world, it is 
likely that, for the most part, this is done only for the sake of presenta-
tion. For Merleau-Ponty, although there is a natural world, the world in 
which we find ourselves from the day we are born is already cultural, 
social and historical through and through, and it is only by abstraction 
that we can think of it as purely natural.5 (It should be noted that I add 
the predicates ‘cultural’ and ‘historical’ to ‘social’ here because the for-
mer depend on sociality.) 
The view that the natural world is already given to us as a social 
world is not even a particularly original position. Heidegger had already 
contended that the world is essentially a social world – that is, that oth-
ers are always already there with me in the world, such that we never 
find ourselves in a private, solipsistic world.6 Our world is already filled 
with others, even when they are not factically present.7 They are there, 
for example, whenever we perceive a tool as a tool, or any kind of arte-
fact as an artefact. (The reason for this is not only that we did not invent 
or make the tool ourselves but also that the tool was fashioned with 
reference to a normal-sized human body.) It is arguable that most of the 
ideas put forward by Heidegger in this regard can already be found, al-
beit in a different language, in Husserl. For example, we find in Husserl 
the idea that even natural things like trees are not given to us as private 
phenomena. Rather, we perceive them as public phenomena, as things 
that are in principle perceptible to others as well.8 Merleau-Ponty, too, 
believes that we find the other embedded in things of culture, even when 
113ff.); Hass (2008: 100ff.); Langer (1989: 97ff.); Matthews (2002: 89ff.); Priest 
(1998: 179ff.); Romdenh-Romluc (2011: 130ff.). 
5 On the idea that for Merleau-Ponty the natural world is not independent of the 
intersubjective, cultural world, see Langer (1989: 97ff.).
6 See Heidegger (1962: §§25–7).
7 See Heidegger (1962: §26).
8 On this idea, see Zahavi (2003: 110).
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factically there is no one beside us.9 Whenever I find traces of human 
action, even from the distant past, I encounter the other.
These introductory remarks are enough to show that the phenom-
enological approach to intersubjectivity significantly transforms the 
philosophical problem of others as it is usually understood. From a phe-
nomenological point of view, there is no sense in asking whether the 
world is my world only or also a world of others, a social world. The 
world is already given to me as a social world; it is therefore pointless 
to ask whether there are in fact others besides me, or whether others 
perceive and act in the world in which I find myself. Others are facti-
cally given to me along with my world, such that only by abstraction 
can we think of a solipsistic world. This is not to say that there is no 
phenomenological problem concerning others, for there is in fact such 
a problem. Since others are already given to me along with the world, 
phenomenology tries to make explicit the meaning of the other: what 
it means for me to encounter another I, and what the different forms of 
community and sociality mean. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, although the other is given to me 
along with the world in the form of cultural artefacts, it is given 
through a ‘veil of anonymity’ (PhP 363 [405]).10 In order to character-
ize the anonymous way in which the other is given to me through cul-
tural objects, Merleau-Ponty relies on the French pronoun ‘on’ (one). 
This is an obvious nod to Heidegger’s notion of das Man,11 which the 
latter describes as referring to everyone and no one in particular, to 
the anonymous other who is along with me in the world. For Mer-
leau-Ponty, the anonymous givenness of the other presupposes the 
broader problem of knowing how the other, who is supposed to be 
an ‘I’ like myself, can be externalized in the form of cultural objects 
and behaviour. Merleau-Ponty even uses the Hegelian expression ‘ob-
jective spirit’ (PhP 363 [405]) to refer to the way human behaviour 
appears in the form of things. 
9 See Romdenh-Romluc (2011: 131).
10 PhP refers to the Phenomenology of Perception. Page numbers are from the most 
recent English translation by Donald Landes. The original pagination, which is 
also reproduced in Landes’ translation, appears in square brackets. Quotations are 
from Landes’ translation, except where indicated.
11 See Being and Time, §27.
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Since cultural things can always be traced back, in one way or an-
other, to human behaviour, we are ultimately referred back to the ques-
tion of how the other can be manifested through her body. This is what 
Merleau-Ponty means when he says that the body is the ‘first cultural 
object’ (PhP 406), not because it should be compared to a mere thing, 
even if a cultural one, but instead because it is the primary locus of 
behaviour, ‘the place’ where human behaviour shows itself. Thus the 
question becomes: how can a person, someone endowed with intelli-
gence and freedom, manifest herself through her body?
Merleau-Ponty tries to deconstruct this problem by appealing to his 
theory of the body as laid out in the first part of the Phenomenology of 
Perception. In brief, Merleau-Ponty contends that the objective body – 
i.e. not only the body as seen from the third-person point of view, but 
in particular the body as a bundle of mechanisms and processes – is an 
abstraction. The body as it is immediately given to us, the body as we 
live it, the lived body – and also, as we will see, the body of the other 
as it is concretely given to us – is not an object among objects; it is not 
a mere thing that happens to be controlled by the mind. What phenom-
enological analysis of the way I live my body (for example by moving 
it in space) reveals is that my body has a special kind of intentionality; 
it partakes of the sense-giving activity usually ascribed to the mind, ex-
pressing meaning of itself not only through movement but also through 
perception and language. 
The conception of the body as a lived body significantly trans-
forms the problem of how I can access another through his body. For the 
objective view is, in this regard, exactly symmetrical to the intellectual-
ist-idealist view mentioned above. Both the materialist and the idealist 
conceive of the body as a bundle of third-person processes. When we 
hold this view of the body, perception of the other becomes extremely 
problematic. Since the objective body displays no meaning, no intelli-
gence – in sum, no subjectivity – we are allowed to question whether 
a mind lies behind the body of the other, that is, to question whether 
the other is in fact an other or just a meaningless body that deceives 
me into thinking it is a subject, an ego, just like myself. On the other 
hand, according to Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the body as a lived, 
subjective body, there is no problem concerning the existence of selves 
other than mine for the body expresses meaning of itself, and it does 
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not make sense to ask about the existence of a mind or soul behind 
the body’s meaningful behaviour. In Merleau-Ponty’s approach, I have 
access to the other quite directly: I see him behave in meaningful ways, 
I read emotions off his face, I hear him convey thoughts and feelings 
through language, etc.:
If I do not learn within myself to recognize the junction of the for-itself and the 
in-itself, then none of these mechanisms that we call “other bodies” will ever 
come to life; if I have no outside, then others have no inside. (PhP 391 [431])
One of the traditional philosophical arguments for explaining how 
I come to know about the existence of other minds (and thus other 
selves) beyond my own is the analogy argument. According to this ar-
gument, I implicitly ascribe mind and subjectivity to others in order to 
account for behaviour that I perceive in myself as a manifestation of 
mental states. Merleau-Ponty rejects this type of argument outright. 
First, he claims that it is empirically false. Children, for example, rec-
ognize others and their behaviour in a quite immediate way well before 
they are able to engage in this kind of reasoning. They perceive the 
body of the other and its intentions as being internally related to their 
bodies’ intentions. (Merleau-Ponty observes that when a person pre-
tends to bite a baby’s hand, the baby immediately opens her mouth, rec-
ognizing without express comparison the relation between the adult’s 
mouth as an ‘organ for biting’ and her own.)12 In fact, contemporary 
neuroscience has even reinforced and confirmed Merleau-Ponty’s in-
sight into this matter. Since the discovery of mirror neurons, we know 
that our brains come equipped with inborn capacities to recognize and 
empathize with others.13 
However, Merleau-Ponty also has a priori grounds for rejecting the 
analogy argument. Indeed, this rejection can be viewed as a corollary of 
his broader theory of subjectivity, mind, body and intentionality. Suffice 
it to say that all reasoning by analogy presupposes an explicit compari-
son between myself and the other, but for this comparison to take place 
 
12 See PhP 368 [409].
13 On the possibility that Merleau-Ponty foreshadowed the discovery of mirror neu-
rons, see Carman (2008: 138).
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the other must somehow be previously given to me as an other, for 
otherwise I have no basis for drawing an analogy between us. In sum, 
the analogy argument already presupposes what it is trying to explain.14
The upshot of all this is that there is no absolute distance between 
myself and the other. Merleau-Ponty’s main point in this respect is that 
if I were absolutely transparent to myself – that is, if I were nothing but 
a purely transcendental subject or a Cartesian cogito – the possibility 
of another subject like myself would remain quite unintelligible to me. 
However, before I come to regard myself as a cogito, before I am able to 
reflect and say to myself ‘I think’, I am already thrown into the world by 
way of my body. For Merleau-Ponty, I can never analyse and thoroughly 
rationalize this primitive relation to the world. Merleau-Ponty even calls 
this an ‘ancient pact’ (PhP 265 [302]) between my body and the world. 
It is this primitive relation to being, or to the world by virtue of being a 
body, of being my body, that Merleau-Ponty sometimes calls (making 
his own use of Heidegger’s and, of course, Sartre’s terminology) ‘exist-
ence’, ‘transcendence’ or ‘being-in-the-world’.
Insofar as I am a perceptive body, I always find myself already 
thrown into the world. This bodily, perceptive, pre-personal self is in 
some sense other than myself considered as a personal subject capable 
of saying ‘I’. According to Merleau-Ponty, there is no true correspond-
ence between the reflective self, the self as subject in the Cartesian 
and Kantian sense, and the self as a pre-reflective body-subject in the 
world. Paradoxically, it is the lack of correspondence between these 
14 Taylor Carman (2008: 138) claims that Merleau-Ponty’s critique of the analogy 
argument can be read as directed at Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity, at least 
as it is presented in the Cartesian Meditations. But Husserl’s position is not as 
cut and dried as Carman would want us to believe. Husserl rejects the idea that 
what he calls the ‘apperception’ of the other is achieved by any kind of inference, 
and in my view this is exactly what Merleau-Ponty is trying to convey with his 
critique of the analogy argument. It is true that Husserl holds that the greatest 
difficulty concerning apperception of the other is that the other is never given to 
me as an ego; were he so given to me, he would not appear as an other – that is, as 
different from me. But as we will see, Merleau-Ponty agrees with this Husserlian 
position as well. For an interpretation of Husserl’s analysis of intersubjectivity 
that presents him as much closer to Merleau-Ponty, see Zahavi (2003: 112ff.). 
On Husserl’s influence on Merleau-Ponty’s account of intersubjectivity, see also 
Dillon (1988: 114ff.).
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selves that makes the other possible for me. If I am in some sense an 
other to myself, then the possibility of other subjects, and namely of 
other body-subjects, becomes intelligible. It is also for this reason that 
Merleau-Ponty speaks of my access to the other as a ‘sort of reflection’ 
(PhP 367 [409])15 (an analogue to the relation between the reflecting 
ego and the pre-personal ego):
Others can be evident because I am not transparent for myself, and because my 
subjectivity draws its body along behind itself. (PhP 368 [410])
Another way to put this is the following. If the world as a whole does 
not lie transparently before me, if I am nothing but a certain point of 
view on the world, then my perspective is not wholly discontinuous 
with other perspectives. Just as the different parts of my body display a 
pre-reflective unity among themselves (which Merleau-Ponty calls the 
body schema), a unity which is prior to them and determines their value 
and sense, the possibility of the point of view of the other is prefigured 
in my own. I form a sort of systematic unity with others that precedes 
all thought and rationality – a unity that ultimately corresponds to the 
world itself. In other words, my point of view is related to other possible 
points of view just as my different successive perspectives are related to 
each other. The possibility of a foreign perspective is already suggested 
by the fact that there is always more of the world for me to see:
In fact, the other person is not enclosed in my perspective on the world because 
this perspective itself has no definite limits, because it spontaneously slips into 
the other’s perspective, and because they are gathered together in a single world in 
which we all participate as anonymous subjects of perception. (PhP 369 [410–11])
There are issues, however, concerning how to interpret this unity. If it 
is such that I cannot distinguish between myself and others, it cannot 
be used to account for intersubjectivity; ex hypothesi, there would be no 
distance between us in such a unity, and therefore no intersubjectivity in 
the strict sense. Perhaps this is why Merleau-Ponty will say (see the next 
 
15 That my original relation to the other is made possible and prefigured by the struc-
ture of my self-consciousness was already shown by Husserl. On this, see Zahavi 
(2003: 113).
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section below) that his account of the lived body is not sufficient to ac-
count for intersubjectivity and to preclude every form of solipsism. More-
over, it can be argued (based in particular on the lecture ‘The Child’s Re-
lation with Others’ from Child Psychology and Pedagogy: The Sorbonne 
Lectures 1949–1952) that Merleau-Ponty holds that my primary relation 
to others is one of identity, and that only later do I develop a sense of 
being an individual self in opposition to them. This is also the core of Dil-
lon’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s early stance on intersubjectivity 
(1988: 120ff.). Nevertheless, I have doubts about whether this position 
can in fact be ascribed to Merleau-Ponty based only on what he says in 
the Phenomenology of Perception. In this text, it seems that, although I 
form a systematic unity with others in the sense that they complement 
my perspective on the world, there are also differences between us, such 
that I pre-reflectively know that my perspective differs from theirs. I will 
expand further on this pre-reflective sense of self in the next section.16 
3.
As surprising as it may be, what we have said thus far is far from the 
whole story when it comes to Merleau-Ponty’s take on the problem of 
intersubjectivity. First, just as it is my body that, through its ‘ancient pact 
with the world’, discloses the other, this other is not disclosed to me as 
a ‘personal being’, a ‘subject’ in the Cartesian or Kantian sense. Parallel 
to the anonymous character of myself as body-subject, the other is dis-
closed only as a body-subject, not as another ‘I’ considered as a personal 
being. This is what Merleau-Ponty’s talk of the anonymous subject, of 
the ‘one’ (on), was meant to hint at. Thus, there remains a fundamental 
and inescapable asymmetry between myself and others. I can never live 
the point of view of the other as such; for that, I would have to stand to 
the other in the very relation in which he stands to himself, that is, to 
be him, in which case he would cease to be an other. What is more, for 
Merleau-Ponty there is even a grain of truth in solipsism:
16 For a discussion of this issue, see also Zahavi (2014: 78ff., 85ff., 203ff.).
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The difficulties of perceiving others are not all the result of objective thought, and 
they do not all cease with the discovery of behavior, or rather, objective thought 
and the resulting unicity of the cogito are not fictions, rather, they are well-found-
ed phenomena, and we will have to seek their foundation. (PhP 373 [414])
Although it might seem that Merleau-Ponty is falling back into the apo-
riae of the intellectualist position, it is important to stress that this im-
pression is mistaken. Intellectualism, if followed through in a manner 
consistent with its own principles, leads to the idea that there can ulti-
mately only be one subject. We saw that, according to Merleau-Ponty, 
one of phenomenology’s defining traits in contrast with the intellectu-
alist tradition is precisely that at its roots it is open to the possibility of 
other subjects. We are confronted with others as a matter of fact; the 
problem concerns what this situation means: ‘consciousnesses present 
the absurdity of a solipsism-shared-by-many, and such is the situation 
that must be understood’ (PhP 376 [417]). 
When he seems to endorse a form of solipsism, Merleau-Ponty 
wants to draw attention to the privilege of the first-person perspective. 
I am undeniably present to myself in a way that others can never be, at 
least for me. This self-presence is not necessarily that of the subject who 
is able to reflect and say of its representations that it is he who thinks 
them. For example, there is an undeniable self-presence even in unre-
flecting perception. I am pre-reflectively aware of my own perception 
and of its being my perspective on the world. This is what is at stake 
when Merleau-Ponty deals with what he calls the ‘tacit cogito’, in op-
position to the Cartesian cogito, which he also calls the ‘spoken cogito’ 
(PhP 421ff. [461ff.]). This notion can easily be read as Merleau-Ponty’s 
version of what Sartre calls the pre-reflective cogito. Sartre introduces 
this notion in Transcendence of the Ego and then, later, in Being and 
Nothingness, where it plays a pivotal role. With the notion of pre-reflec-
tive consciousness, Sartre showed that there is no contradiction between 
the fact that each of us is originally present to herself or himself in a 
pre-reflective way and the fact that this self-presence can be entirely 
pre-personal17.
17 Sartre’s conception of ‘pre-reflective consciousness’ was recently adopted by Dan 
Zahavi, who makes extensive use of it in his numerous writings. (See, for exam-
ple, Zahavi 2005).
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That we have a “pre-reflective” or “tacit” cogito through which we 
are always already pre-reflectively open to others – a cogito which is 
somehow prior to the “Cartesian cogito” in the sense that it is a con-
dition of our being able to explicitly reflect on ourselves – is why we 
cannot read Merleau-Ponty’s account of intersubjectivity as relying ex-
clusively on the idea of a primordial identity with others (pace Dillon 
1988). Indeed, appealing to this primordial identity does not solve the 
problem of intersubjectivity so much as prevent it from arising as a 
problem in the first place. Phenomenologically, we cannot escape the 
fact that our world is a social world. This means that others are always 
already here with me. My self-presence is always presence to the world, 
and others are disclosed along with that world regardless of how we 
are to account for this disclosedness. Merleau-Ponty expressly endorses 
Husserl’s thesis that ‘transcendental subjectivity is an intersubjectivity’ 
(see PhP 378 [419]). For Merleau-Ponty, this means, roughly, that the 
other is a condition or presupposition of my ability to reflect and take 
myself as a transcendental subject. Here, the other refers not to a fac-
tically existing other but to the world’s social horizon. Along with sub-
jectivity and world, this horizon has been opened once and for all, and 
for this reason we cannot escape from the other in much the same sense 
that, for Merleau-Ponty, we cannot escape the world. We cannot cease 
to situate ourselves in relation to this horizon of otherness. 
In other words, although solipsism not only exists as an abstract 
philosophical thesis but also has genuine phenomenological roots in the 
distinction between the way the other is given to us and the way each of 
us is given to ourselves, it does not understand itself adequately. Solip-
sism does not understand that what it says belies the situation it wants to 
express. Solipsism asserts that I am the only existent self. Not only does 
the solipsist’s need to assert this contradict her own assertion – a well-
known critique – but, Merleau-Ponty would add, she can also only pre-
tend to take refuge in herself in opposition to others, because she finds 
herself already pre-reflectively surrounded by others in a social world.
The truth solipsism wants to express, although it does so in an 
inadequate way, is the fact that we are essentially free with regard to 
others. We will see below that, for Merleau-Ponty, freedom refers to 
the fact that I can never be totally pinned down by how others perceive 
me or by the situation in which I find myself. It is up to me to accept it, 
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make it my own, or transform and even escape from it. It is because I 
dispose of an unrestricted power to deny my situation and, correlatively, 
am always open to new ways of being that I can never be totally iden-
tified with my public ways of being. The same is valid for the other: 
even when we are sure of having experienced his innermost core, it is in 
principle always possible that we might be deceived in this respect. The 
other always manages to slip away beneath his most persistent character 
traits, such that the potential for misunderstanding him is unavoidable. 
Merleau-Ponty’s point, however, is that the possibility that we may be 
fundamentally wrong about someone does not entail any kind of sol-
ipsism because it does not annul what I above refer to as the world’s 
social horizon. Being wrong about others (and, Merleau-Ponty would 
add, being wrong about things) only means that I must replace a certain 
view of someone or something with another, but the fact that I am in a 
world – a world I share with others – cannot itself be escaped:
As soon as existence gathers itself together and engages in a behavior, it appears 
to perception. And like every other perception, this one affirms more things than 
are grasped in it: when I say that I see the ashtray and that it is over there, I pre-
suppose a complete unfolding of the experience that would have to go on indefi-
nitely, and I open up an entire perceptual future. Likewise, when I say that I know 
someone or that I like him, I am aiming at an inexhaustible background beyond 
his qualities that indeed might one day shatter the image that I adopt of him. This 
is the price for there to be things and “others” for us, not through some illusion, 
but rather through a violent act that is perception itself. (PhP 378–9 [419–20])
At some point, Merleau-Ponty suggests the possibility that freedom 
from others may be realized by escaping our social world and choosing 
a secluded life in complete independence, treating them as mere natural 
things instead of other subjects (PhP 377 [418]). However, according to 
Merleau-Ponty, what this extreme possibility shows is that this kind of 
life always has the form of a flight from the world (in this case, a flight 
from the social word) and for that reason presupposes it. In general, 
solitude is only possible by reference to possible communication with 
others (PhP 376 [417]). I can only be or feel alone with reference to a 
possible being with others. If solipsism were actually true, the solipsist 
would never feel lonely, for loneliness already presupposes an original 
openness to others: 
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we must say about the experience of others what we have elsewhere said about 
reflection: that its object cannot absolutely escape it, since we only have a notion 
of the object through that experience.18 Reflection must, in some way, present the 
unreflected, for otherwise we would have nothing to set against it, and it would 
not become a problem for us. Similarly, my experience must present others to me 
in some way, since if it did not do so I would not even speak of solitude, and I 
would not even declare others to be inaccessible. (PhP 376 [417]; trans. modified)
4.
I will now try to summarize Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of sociality 
and the consequences of his view. What does it mean to say that sociali-
ty is an unavoidable horizon of our being in the world? We are not born 
into a private world without others, a world we must step out of in order 
somehow to reach them. We are always already with others in the world. 
However, this being with others is not the same as having a cognition or 
representation of them. We are already with others before we are able 
to turn them into objects of cognition. In the same sense that I am my 
body before I come to know my body as an object (as I move it around 
in space, for instance), intersubjectivity is a relation that precedes all 
cognition and knowledge. As we will see below (section 5), this does 
not entail that I can be reduced to a function of my social environment. 
If that were so, the privilege of my first-person perspective – the fact, 
 
18 I have modified Landes’ translation at this point. I replaced ‘through reflection’ 
with ‘through that experience’. Landes took the French ‘par elle’ in the original 
text to refer to ‘reflection’ instead of ‘experience’, and thus rendered the phrase 
‘through reflection’. Although the original French is ambiguous, in my view it 
only makes sense if ‘elle’ refers to ‘experience’ for the sentence expresses the 
idea that reflection can only put into question or even revoke our pre-reflective 
notion of the other, because the latter is in fact given to us pre-reflectively. In other 
words, reflection by itself could never have come up with the idea of an other if 
it were not given to it beforehand in a pre-reflective way. (Incidentally, the older 
English translation of Phénoménologie de la perception by Colin Smith also uses 
‘through that experience’.)
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that is, that there is only society, a social life and world for someone – 
would be forever lost:
Thus, we must rediscover the social world, after the natural world, not as an object 
or a sum of objects, but as the permanent field or dimension of existence: I can 
certainly turn away from the social world, but I cannot cease to be situated in 
relation to it. Our relation to the social, like our relation to the world, is deeper 
than every explicit perception and deeper than every judgment. It is just as false 
to place us within society like an object in the midst of other objects, as it is to 
put society in us as an object of thought, and the error on both sides consists in 
treating the social as an object. (PhP 379 [420])
Intersubjectivity is not a mere relation of being; at least by the time 
of the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty maintained the 
phenomenological assumption that all being must be being for me 
(even if I am taken as a body). Rather, it can be characterized as the 
kind of relation I entertain with what characterizes me as a fact, with 
my ‘facticity’. This relation stamps my relation to the world with 
the mark of finitude but at the same time functions as a condition 
of the possibility of my openness to that same world (the paramount 
example of which is, of course, my body insofar as it opens me to 
the world). 
Relying on Husserl, Merleau-Ponty often uses the term ‘operative 
intentionality’ (fungierende Intentionalität)19 to characterize this pre-re-
flective, primordial relation to the other (but also to the body, time, 
space, etc.) in contrast to the kind of intentionality that is typical of 
cognition, that is, that posits its object explicitly before consciousness. 
The ‘object’ of ‘operative intentionality’ dwells ambiguously in my per-
ception, simultaneously present and absent. Operative intentionality is 
relevant in this context because it is the condition of the possibility of 
act-intentionality – that is, of explicit cognitive acts. 
Merleau-Ponty’s middle path between objectivist and idealist ac-
counts of intersubjectivity can be summarized in the following idea: I 
can only know sociality, culture and history because my point of view 
of the world is itself social, cultural and historical. In other words, I only 
have access to social, cultural and historical phenomena from my own 
19 See, for example, PhP lxxxii [18], 440–1 [479–80], 453 [492], 472 [510].
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particular social, cultural and historical perspective or point of view, 
whether I make this explicit to myself and others or not.
To the extent that it is an inescapable horizon of experience, the so-
cial world, much like the natural world, can never be adequately given to 
us in perception, and thus always remains on the fringe. It is essentially 
characterized as both a presence and an absence: a presence because I 
am in fact open to others and live in a social ‘space’, an absence because 
when I try to make clear to myself what the other is, how she is given to 
me, her innermost core always escapes me. 
Intersubjectivity is thus an intrinsically paradoxical phenomenon. 
Merleau-Ponty does not shy away from this seemingly puzzling conclu-
sion. In his view, phenomenology’s task is not to solve the paradox but 
to make us aware of it. This is not to say that he does not try to ground 
the paradox of intersubjectivity in an ultimate condition of its possi-
bility, but when he does so he is not so much attempting to solve the 
paradox as to link it to an ultimate fact about us. The latter is, according 
to Merleau-Ponty, our temporal being. 
This is not the place to go into Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
of time. Suffice it to say, for him, following Heidegger, the sense of 
being must be read from that of time. Although time is always centred 
on an ever-changing present, its past and future dimensions reveal the 
same sort of presence-absence that characterizes the phenomenon of 
the other. If all being is ultimately temporal, if I am nothing but time, 
the fact not only that I am aware of others but also that my perspective 
is somehow informed by theirs is made intelligible. If to be temporal 
is essentially to exist outside oneself, if the present moment opens to 
a past before I was born and a future that will extend beyond my life, 
it is less puzzling that we are thrown into a social world we did not 
create – a world that, at the same time, presupposes a point of view 
from within it, from which it is possible to get a grip on it (much like 
every past and future presupposes a present from which they come 
into perspective, while at the same time the present presupposes all 
past moments and must make space for all subsequent, impending 
moments). In other words, what Merleau-Ponty will try to show in the 
chapter on temporality is that the temporal structure of the self lies at 




Most of the features that show up in Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of inter-
subjectivity are central to his account of freedom.20 In the first place, 
Merleau-Ponty believes that we are free beings. The fact that we are 
free is, for him, closely connected to the fact that we are self-aware 
creatures, that is, subjects, and for this reason the precise nature of this 
freedom depends on the kind of subjectivity we have. This is why a 
book that is purportedly on ‘perception’ can close with a chapter on 
‘freedom’: its main topic is actually the kind of subjects we really are.
Merleau-Ponty’s endorsement of freedom is very much entailed 
by his rejection of empiricism. Empiricism is, among other things, 
the philosophical doctrine according to which perception can be ex-
plained away by third-person accounts of processes in the organism; it 
is therefore no surprise that Merleau-Ponty comes to view empiricism 
as being closely connected to determinism. According to this doctrine, 
everything we do is fully determined by its causal antecedents such that, 
having acted one way, we could not have acted differently (given these 
antecedents). Against determinists, Merleau-Ponty sides with the cham-
pions of freedom in the sense that he, too, holds that actions stem from 
self-aware creatures that can thus be held accountable for them. And 
yet, although Merleau-Ponty criticizes the empiricists, his real target 
in the chapter on freedom is a certain conception of freedom, of what 
it means for us to be free, which he sees as embodied in Sartre’s Being 
and Nothingness.
Here I will not give a reading of the whole chapter on freedom; 
nor will I enter into detail on Sartre’s own conception of freedom. 
My main aim is, rather, to show that one of Merleau-Ponty’s main 
points of contention against Sartre’s conception lies precisely in the 
role played by the intersubjective dimension of the self in his concep-
tion of freedom.
According to the intellectualist-idealist conception of freedom 
(which Merleau-Ponty seems to identify with Sartre), we are in principle 
20 For discussions on Merleau-Ponty’s account of freedom in the Phenomenology of 
Perception, see Langer (1989: 133ff.) and Priest (1998: 150ff.).
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free whether we are explicitly aware of it or not, whatever we do and 
whatever our circumstances. Intellectualism pays no regard to our fac-
tical situation and views the subject as a pure, self-determining con-
sciousness. In particular, for Sartre consciousness (or what he calls the 
‘for-itself’) is a nothing, meaning that it cannot be determined as this 
or that by something outside itself. (The for-itself is, in Merleau-Pon-
ty’s view, another version of Descartes’ cogito or Kant’s transcendental 
subject, although Sartre characterizes it as pre-reflective.) Although the 
human being comes to regard herself as having qualities, permanent 
dispositions and character traits, she does this insofar as she does not 
live up to the nothing she is in her innermost core as consciousness. For 
example, whenever I regard myself as having determinate proprieties, 
I am looking at myself as if I were another; I objectify myself. In oth-
er words, according to Sartre’s perspective, what I am for others, the 
for-others (pour autrui), negates my freedom.
Merleau-Ponty starts by pointing out that this conception of freedom 
is self-contradictory and self-undermining. First, since according to this 
conception each one of us is in his innermost core ‘nothing’ and thus 
free, we are all equally free; the slave who is resigned to his situation is 
as much a slave as he who breaks his shackles and sets himself free (PhP 
461 [500]). Each one of our actions is free on this account; each manifests 
the same amount of freedom, and none is more deserving of this title 
than any other. For Merleau-Ponty, this conception of freedom causes us 
to lose sight of one particular feature of our natural concept of freedom, 
rendering it extremely counter-intuitive. There are some important cases 
where we feel that freedom, rather than being ready-made or innately 
part of us, is something for which we must strive, and thus some sort of 
achievement. In Sartre’s view, ‘[t]he idea of an acquisition is rejected in 
the name of freedom, but then freedom becomes a primordial acquisition 
and something like our state of nature’ (PhP 461 [500]). More than this, 
however, if freedom were actually how Sartre conceives it, freedom could 
not be made worldly; that is, it could not appear outwardly in our actions: 
‘Since we do not have to bring freedom about, it must be the gift granted 
us of having no gift, or that nature of consciousness that consists in not 
having a nature, and in no case can it be expressed on the outside or figure 
in our life’ (PhP 461 [500]). 
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In Merleau-Ponty’s view, Sartre’s conception of freedom entails, 
furthermore, that I am at any moment able to pursue a different course 
of action to that in which I am presently engaged – that, at bottom, 
both my past and present circumstances and actions should be a matter 
of indifference when it comes to my absolute freedom since outside 
of myself nothing can determine me to action. This view disregards 
the fact that my past and present circumstances influence what I go on 
to do, that intentional activity stretches across time. Because of this, 
actions are only possible if time is not a mere sequence of instants, if 
my present action lives off the past, if what I did or decided moments 
ago lingers in what I go on to do (even if this ultimately entails giving 
up on a given project). The fact, for example, that I started writing this 
article early in the day and have been writing ever since might serve as 
a motive for me to carry on writing to the extent that it strengthens my 
self-confidence and my will to finish it. But it could equally serve as 
a motive for stopping; my early start explains my now being tired and 
supports the notion that I have surely done enough for the day. In either 
case, my earlier activity will impact my future choice. Had I instead 
decided to go out this morning and enjoy the beautiful outdoors, this 
would have played an equal role in explaining my subsequent behav-
iour: my guilt upon coming home might have motivated me to work 
through the night, or it might have discouraged me to the point of post-
poning work until tomorrow.
This touches on a central aspect of Merleau-Ponty’s view on free-
dom. Freedom, like subjectivity in general, always presupposes a given 
starting point as it were – a given factual situation in relation to which 
the subject must decide, either by endorsing or refusing it. Decisions do 
not happen in a vacuum, as in Sartre’s account (at least as Merleau-Pon-
ty reads him). The subject always already finds herself in a certain con-
text and social and cultural factors play a role in determining the field 
of possible action. Freedom can only exist in the interplay between an 
agent and her situation.
Given this critique, Merleau-Ponty tries to answer a possible ob-
jection from the Sartrean (or indeed idealist) side. The objection is that 
even though I always already find myself in a given factical situation, 
this situation has sense only for me, for all value and sense ultimately 
comes from me and thus I am not constrained by any situation except 
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those that I myself have ‘created’ (a version of this imagined objection 
can be found in PhP 463–4 [502]).
Merleau-Ponty does not deny that sense and value exist only for 
me, but everything hinges on what ‘me’ refers to in this sentence. There 
is a sense in which the way things appear to me depends on what Mer-
leau-Ponty sometimes calls my personal being or self, that is, my free 
and explicit projects, my ‘explicit intentions’ (PhP 464 [503]). In rela-
tion to the project of writing this paper, my laptop appears conducive 
and serviceable; it is more to me than a material thing endowed with 
objective properties (being black in colour, solid, etc.). When we dis-
cussed the problem of intersubjectivity, however, we saw that the self 
can also refer to my pre-personal body-subject. In this sense, things 
depend on me as well – a mountain appears objectively impassable to 
me not because of some project or other that I entertain but in relation 
to my body (and to the body of every normal-sized human being).21 This 
can be said to be the main lesson of the Phenomenology of Perception, 
this time applied to the topic of freedom: although it is true that in some 
sense the world is dependent on the self, this self is not a free-float-
ing transcendental subject or cogito but rather inhabits the world that it 
constitutes. As a consequence, I, considered as a reflective, transparent, 
personal self, did not create the world or situation in which I find my-
self. There are objective limits to my freedom, limits that are not of my 
choosing and that do not depend on my explicit valuations and projects.
6.
Merleau-Ponty applies his views on freedom (which stem directly, 
or so it seems, from a critique of Sartre’s conception) to his views 
on history and Marxist theory. Although our main focus here is not 
 
21 The example of the mountain appears in Merleau-Ponty’s text (PhP 464 [503]) 
although it comes originally from Sartre (see Being and Nothingness 481ff. [page 
numbers refer to the English edition]). Unsurprisingly, their respective analyses 
differ in important respects.
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Merleau-Ponty’s views on these themes, it is in the framework of his 
discussion of class consciousness that most of his more detailed views 
on the relation between sociality and freedom appear. 
Concerning the problem of how class consciousness comes to 
pass, Merleau-Ponty’s main contention is that it does not arise from 
the objective economic situation; that is, it is not something bound to 
happen as soon as certain objective conditions are met, and thus should 
not be viewed in a deterministic way. This means that class conscious-
ness and its possible outcome, the proletarian revolution, are in a sense 
the product of human subjectivity and freedom. But this does not mean 
(again contra Sartre, who embodies the kind of intellectualist position 
Merleau-Ponty rejects) that the proletarian revolution is a permanent 
possibility, independent of actual life conditions in a given society. For 
the intellectualist who endorses an idea of absolute freedom, it is as if I 
could at any moment choose to be a ‘proletarian’ or ‘bourgeois’, while 
I ‘for-myself’, to use Sartre’s terminology, remain nothing. In sum, as 
is always the case when it comes to Merleau-Ponty’s way of dealing 
with philosophical problems, both the objectivist-empiricist and the 
intellectualist-idealist account of class consciousness and proletarian 
revolution are revealed to be inadequate. As he himself writes, ‘ideal-
ism and objective thought equally miss the arrival of class conscious-
ness, the first because it deduces actual existence from consciousness, 
the other because it derives consciousness from actual existence, and 
both of them because they are unaware of the relation of motivation’ 
(PhP 473 [511]). 
While I am not specifically concerned here with Merleau-Ponty’s 
account of class consciousness, it is interesting to see what this account 
tells us about his views on intersubjectivity and freedom. Contrary to 
Sartre’s account, social position and economic situation matter to the 
emergence of class consciousness. However, they matter not insofar as 
they are represented in a purely intellectual and detached manner, but in-
sofar as they are lived by me. It is my concrete life conditions as they are 
lived and felt by me that may give rise to class consciousness. Merleau- 
Ponty’s point, in this respect, is very much the same as the point he 
makes in the chapter on intersubjectivity (see section 4 above). Before I 
take up a position regarding, say, class struggle (and as a presupposition 
of this decision), I am already socially and economically situated. I exist 
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as a factory worker, a teacher, a business executive, an academic, etc. 
This does not mean that my concrete existence infallibly determines the 
position I ultimately take in my life. I may very well decide to abandon 
corporate life in favour of voluntary work in Africa. But this decision is 
only possible because it is preceded by corporate life and all that goes 
with it, and my serving as a volunteer only makes sense if understood 
as called for, as motivated, by my previous way of life. 
For Merleau-Ponty, my life displays sense (or, as the other meaning 
of the French sens has it, direction) that can only be lived and that does 
not follow from taking an explicit position on it. This sense or direc-
tion of my life, which includes the way I identify (or fail to identify) 
with others around me, is not something that I can represent or know 
explicitly. It is, according to my interpretation, yet another instance of 
operative intentionality (see section 4). To illustrate the kind of sense or 
direction life has, comparisons with the lived body are once again inev-
itable: just as my body displays a special kind of intentionality by being 
engaged in motor activities (playing piano, or tennis, or even opening a 
door), such that if someone were to ask me how to do what I am doing, 
I would find it difficult to explain and would ultimately simply tell her 
to practise it herself, so, according to Merleau-Ponty, life exhibits an 
analogous phenomenon of sense: a sense that can only be recognized 
through the activity, which in this case is life itself. 
For Merleau-Ponty, this spontaneous sense or direction of life can 
be felt as a common destiny among people. In his example of the devel-
opment of class consciousness, workers come to view their respective 
existences and destinies as being tied to those of all other workers and 
opposed to those of exploiters – a sense of things which might be pow-
erful enough to ground a future proletarian revolution. The latter is not 
an end posited in advance and is not a conscious choice.
The fact that life can assume this collective sense is a presuppo-
sition of the very possibility of historical truth and sense, according to 
Merleau-Ponty. History is revealed as having the same structure as indi-
vidual life inasmuch as it is an interchange between given social situa-
tions and the way individuals embody or transform them. Even though 
the sense of history sometimes seems to be determined exclusively by 
the will and actions of powerful individual figures and leaders, such as 
Napoleon, their actions must somehow be related to the sense already 
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prefigured in collective history. If history were the mere outcome of 
the volition of free individuals, it would display no sense or direction. 
The idea of distinct periods or cycles would be absurd; anything could 
happen at any time, depending on the groundless will of certain indi-
viduals (PhP 474 [513]).
At the same time, whenever Merleau-Ponty talks of the sense or di-
rection of a community of people, and thus the sense or direction of his-
tory, it should be kept in mind that this sense or direction must be lived 
by the individuals who comprise that people, even if in a non-reflective 
or ‘operative’ sense, and that the sense of history should not be mistak-
en for a necessary (Hegelian) progression towards some predetermined 
end. Moreover, according to Merleau-Ponty, both at the individual and 
the collective level, the sense of life is by its very nature multivocal. Since 
events can always be seen from multiple perspectives, and since there is 
no absolute perspective given that each of us grasps the world from our 
own point of view, what the sense of history is in each case depends on 
whose perspective we are talking about. To take the previous example, the 
bourgeois does not identify with the workers’ interests and demands, and 
nor is his sense of his life bound up with the proletarian revolution. Given 
human freedom, this does not preclude his joining the workers’ strug-
gle, as often happens, but it makes it less likely. At the individual level, 
since the sense or direction of life is essentially lived, and for this reason 
also ambiguous, it is always possible to be mistaken about it. Moreo-
ver, our temporal nature, the fact that life is always in some sense open, 
that at every passing moment the sense of my life must be reconfigured, 
means not only that I can be wrong about myself but that the possibility 
of changing the course of my life is essentially open to me.
7.
To conclude, I will try to bring together some loose ends and take another 
look at the argument as a whole, further developing some of its points. 
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Merleau-Ponty, as much as Sartre, links freedom to subjectivity.22 
At bottom, this idea derives directly from Kant’s notion of spontaneity. 
Spontaneity has a theoretical and a practical dimension. Theoretically, 
it is manifested in our ability to think ourselves as the subject of our 
thoughts (the transcendental subject); practically, it is manifested in our 
capacity to be autonomous, free agents. What is essential to this view 
is the idea that we can rise above the realm of nature in both a cognitive 
and a practical sense. Sartre’s conception of subjectivity – that is, his 
concept of the ‘for-itself’ (pour-soi) – again takes up Kant’s notion of 
spontaneity inasmuch as the for-itself equates to our intrinsic reflectiv-
ity and our non-determinacy as subjects: the idea that, as subjects, we 
cannot be determined by being (by the in-itself). According to this view, 
we are ‘nothing’ and can thus be said to be free.
Up to this point, Merleau-Ponty would not object to this view of 
ourselves as spontaneous in the relevant sense – that is, as both cognitive 
and practical beings. The problem for Merleau-Ponty lies, rather, in the 
way our spontaneity, and thus also the nature of our subjectivity, is to be 
understood. As mentioned above (see section 3), I read him as endors-
ing Sartre’s notion of pre-reflective consciousness as a major advance in 
comparison to intellectualist conceptions of subjectivity: the subject’s 
inherent reflectivity does not require an explicit act of reflection; we are 
usually ‘for ourselves’ without performing any explicit act of reflection, 
any explicit ‘I think…’, and thus what I call our inherent reflectivity as 
subjects is implicit, or, to use Sartre’s term, ‘pre-reflective’. In other 
words, consciousness is by its nature always self-consciousness in a 
sense that does not require the self to attend explicitly to itself as such 
(and this is why I deem it ‘inherently reflective’).
What Merleau-Ponty objects to in Sartre’s conception of the cog-
ito lies in the strict opposition Sartre establishes between it and his 
other major category of being, the ‘in-itself’. For Merleau-Ponty, the 
strict opposition and mutual exclusion between the ‘in-itself’ and the 
‘for-itself’ lies at the root of Sartre’s failure to account adequately for, 
among other things, intersubjectivity and freedom. There must be some 
 
22 See, for example, the following passage, where freedom is intrinsically linked to 
subjectivity: “My freedom, that fundamental power I have of being the subject of 
all of my experiences … ” (PhP 377 [418]).
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sort of mediation between the ‘in-itself’ and the ‘for-itself’ to the effect 
that the former can be seen as in some sense included in the latter.23 
Merleau-Ponty’s main thesis in this regard is that the for-itself (the sub-
ject) cannot be set apart from his factical situation. In other words, the 
for-itself is the for-itself of his body, his tradition, his culture, etc. Ac-
cording to Merleau-Ponty, none of these ‘factors’ is essentially opposed 
to the ‘for-itself’. On the contrary, the ‘for-itself’ is only ‘for-itself’ 
– that is, a perspective on the world, or, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, a 
certain grip on the world because he himself is an embodied creature. 
He is socially, culturally and historically situated and this in such a way 
that only in an abstract sense can the ‘for-itself’ be set apart from these 
features, which make up what we have been calling his ‘facticity’. Not 
only is his ‘facticity’ not essentially opposed to his being a subject, to 
being-for-itself, but it is, in truth, its condition.
Applied to the problem of intersubjectivity and freedom, Merleau- 
Ponty’s point is that I can only set myself apart from others (and thus be 
free of them) because I always already find myself situated in relation to 
them. Put in more Sartrean terms, the ‘for-itself’ can certainly be con-
ceived as ‘negation’ and ‘nothingness’, but as a determinate negation. 
I am not an absolute nothingness, in which case I would be absolutely 
free. My nothingness always ensues from the negation of being (of the 
body, nature, others) and for that reason essentially presupposes it:
The central phenomenon, which simultaneously grounds my subjectivity and my 
transcendence toward the other, consists in the fact that I am given to myself. I 
am given, which is to say I find myself already situated and engaged in a physical 
and social world; I am given to myself, which is to say that this situation is never 
concealed from me, it is never around me like some foreign necessity, and I am 
never actually enclosed in my situation like an object in a box. My freedom, that 
fundamental power I have of being the subject of all of my experiences, is not 
distinct from my insertion in the world. I am destined to be free, to be unable to 
reduce myself to any of my experiences, to maintain with regard to every factual 
situation a faculty of withdrawal, and this destiny was sealed the moment that my 
transcendental field was opened, the moment I was born as vision and as knowl-
edge, the moment I was thrown into the world. (PhP 377 [417–8])
23 It is this lack of mediation that Merleau-Ponty would later, in his Adventures of 
Dialectics, identify as Sartre’s main mistake. See especially p. 142: ‘Contrary to 
appearances, being-for-itself is all Sartre has ever accepted, with its inevitable 
correlate: pure being-in-itself.’
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The fact that I am socially situated does not preclude my freedom; it 
is a condition of my freedom. My actions are never the outcome of 
absolute freedom or absolute determinism. For Merleau-Ponty, this is 
a false dilemma. Instead, my actions can be said to be motivated by 
my factical situation, but I am no less free for it. In this regard, my 
situation is only decisive insofar as it is freely lived by me. 
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The plural role of emotions in Ethics: the case  
of ethical dilemmas
Dina Mendonça and João Sàágua 
This paper identifies a plurality of roles for emotions in practical reasoning 
by examining how different ethical approaches enable the recognition of the 
role of emotions in decision-making. By using ethical dilemmas we show 
how emotions appear in Intuitionism, Utilitarianism, and Deontological 
Ethics. The analysis reveals that emotions can appear in different places: 
sometimes as motivational forces, other times as ends-in-view, sometimes 
as overarching contextual modes, and finally that they are sometimes rea-
sons for action and at other times they are causes for actions. In addition, 
we argue that the most recent developments of philosophy of emotions 
demand a more complex perspective about emotions and that the impact 
of emotions in ethics should take into consideration layers of emotions 
(Mendonça 2013). We conclude that the issues raised reinforce Bernard 
Williams’ claim that our notion of rationality is incomplete without emo-
tions and sentiments for ‘it would be a kind of insanity never to experience 
sentiments of this kind towards anyone, and it would be an insane concept 
of rationality which insisted that a rational person never would’ (Williams 
1981: 29), and suggest a series of future issues to be explored which would 
further explain the connection between values and emotion as to do justice 
to a more complete and rich notion of rationality.
1. General motivation
Almost any reflection about emotion reveals their complex structure 
and the complex connections with other aspects of the mind and action. 
Philosophers, psychologists and neuroscience try again and again to 
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provide a picture of the impact of emotional experience to untangle the 
rich reality of feelings and emotions and to provide a good taxonomy 
of the emotional phenomenon. The issue is far from settled and some 
theorists of the emotion field have established that it is not possible to 
find a definition that includes all emotions for they ‘vary so much in a 
number of dimensions – transparency, intensity, behavioral expression, 
object-directedness, and susceptibility to rational assessment – as to 
cast doubt on the assumption that they have anything in common’ (De 
Sousa 2014: 6). Nevertheless it is possible to identify some common 
traits. One of these is that emotions have an ambivalent position with 
regard to their role for certainty and action. As Peter Goldie pointed out, 
though we ‘are inclined to say that emotional experience can sometimes 
tell us things about the world that reason alone will miss’ (Goldie 2004: 
249), it is also the case that ‘we are inclined to say that our emotions can 
and do profoundly distort our view of things: in anger or jealousy, for 
example’ (Goldie 2004: 249). That is, sometimes emotions seem to be 
the source of certainty as when, for instance, a strong gut feeling sensa-
tion tells us what course of action to take even though the evidence does 
not add up in a secure way to give us that certainty; however, at other 
times, emotions are the source of deception and self deception as when, 
for instance, fear can turn every detail into an indication of danger or 
when loving someone blinds the one in love to aspects that everyone 
clearly recognizes as undesirable. 
We think that finding the ways to understand the normative force 
of emotions within the rich and complex world of emotions may pro-
vide some clues to a better understanding of this ambivalent stance 
of emotional reality. Thus, this paper aims to provide a general pic-
ture of the various ways in which emotion can appear in action and 
decision-making so as to provide a first step to grasp their normative 
force to better disentangle their ambivalent nature. We begin by out-
lining three templates for Ethical Theory (Intuitionism, Utilitarianism 
and Deontological Ethics) and show how contemporary research has 
made it clear that a good understanding of rationality is incomplete 
without including the experience of sentiments and emotions. Then we 
suggest that by looking at an ethical dilemma we can better see how 
the different ethical templates understand the role of emotions in deci-
sion-making. We go on to explore the trolley problem and imagine how 
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different ethical positions reveal different roles for emotions in order to 
grasp the overwhelming richness of the impact of emotion on decision- 
making. Finally, we indicate that understanding the role of emotion in 
decision-making requires the need to integrate emotional complexity. 
The notion of emotional reflexivity revealed in emotional layers high-
lights that the ambivalence of emotions may be better understood once 
emotional complexity is introduced. We conclude by pointing out 
several future work directions for the benefit of both Ethics and Philos-
ophy of Emotions.
2. Three templates for Ethical Theory
Ethics, as a philosophical discipline, is populated with theories, some 
more ‘in’ than others; in a sense every philosopher of Ethics worthy of 
her/his name has her/his own theory. Among other things, these theories 
are supposed to address ‘big’ moral questions – e.g. What is the right 
thing to do? What is an adequate theory of good? – and to frame and, 
if possible, to solve moral dilemmas (e.g. the Trolley Problem, about 
which more below). It is uncontroversial and well known that this myr-
iad of theories can be grouped, if we ascend to a more abstract level, in 
families of theories. For the present purposes we are going to considerer 
three such families and give a conceptual snapshot of them. This will 
allow us further in this paper to suggest what the different roles are that 
emotions can play within each family, and this, in turn, will illuminate a 
bit more the philosophical DNA of what each family is. The three fam-
ilies we are going to considerer can be named as follows: Intuitionism, 
Utilitarianism and Deontological Ethics. It is clear to us that these three 
families by no means exhaust the actual families of ethical theories on 
the philosophical scene. For reasons we are not going to enter into, in 
order to make the snapshot of each family we will concentrate on the 
‘Right’ instead of on the ‘Good’.
Faced with a situation or with a prospect of an action with moral 
import, Intuitionism states that your most powerful tool to cope with 
it is your moral intuition. This moral intuition is as natural to mankind 
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as, say, reasoning or perception, and like these two it can also be edu-
cated. So, for instance, if you are preparing yourself to perform action 
A with moral import, then (unless you are hampered) you know from 
that moment on if this is a right or wrong action to perform. This is a 
very powerful starting point for the theory since there is large empirical 
evidence and cogent philosophical arguments (into which we are not 
going to enter) that support the relevance of moral intuition in practical 
decisions with moral import. Two of the most salient problems faced 
by this family are: (1) possible conflicting moral intuitions associated 
with moral situations (for instance: you may have the intuition that you 
should do A, but also the intuition that you should do B, A and B being 
incompatible; or you may have the intuition that doing A is both right 
and wrong); (2) context or even individual sensitiveness of the ‘moral 
intuition faculty’ (not every culture, much less each individual, has the 
same moral intuitions, not even the same individual at different times 
of his life).
Faced with a situation or with a prospect of an action with moral 
import, Utilitarianism states that you should always maximize pleasure 
and minimize pain for all concerned, perhaps allowing for: (a) a ‘bonus’ 
relative to the ones who are closer to you (e.g. if you can only save one 
drowning person, save your daughter, not the young girl near her that 
you are not acquainted with); (b) an adjustment within different pleas-
ures (arguably, some pleasures/pains are more worthy to have/ more 
pressing to avoid than others); and (c) some prudential judgments on 
your practical reasoning (while fostering actual pleasure, consider if 
it does not jeopardize future ones). One of the most salient problems 
faced by this family is: possible justification of impingement of great 
pain on a smaller number of people to enhance the pleasure of a larger 
number of people (e.g. slavery, and see below the Trolley Problem).
Finally, faced with a situation or with a prospect of an action with 
moral import, Deontological Ethics states that you should always freely 
act according to your duty, and for the sake of it and nothing else (e.g. 
not to be praised by others, or not to be caught doing some illegal ac-
tion). Kant, who is the father of this family, stated this maxim in differ-
ent ways, with the two most interesting statements of it being (roughly): 
to act in such a fashion that your acting might be considered a universal 
rule; and, in your acting never consider the others as means but always 
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as ends in themselves. (Note that the latter statement ‘kills’ immediate-
ly the Utilitarian view.) Two of the most salient problems faced by this 
family are: (1) possible conflicting moral duties applied to the same 
action or situation (you can easily adapt the examples just given to illus-
trate the akin problem for Intuitionism); and, (2) possible sensitiveness 
of moral duties (the same examples given for Intuitionism apply here 
mutatis mutandis).
All the three families, it is clear, try to make sense in three different 
even incompatible ways of our moral experience and moral actions. Let 
us now turn to the emotions side and see what is going on there, and 
then try to connect both as we suggested at the beginning of this section.
3.  Rationality is incomplete without emotions  
and sentiments
It has become more and more visible that our conception of rationality 
falls short if we do not include how feelings, emotions and sentiments 
make part of it. Though traditionally the capacities for deliberation and 
judgment have been taken as more rational than the capacity for emo-
tion, and consequently ‘any other mental state (such as the emotions) 
that conflicts with the outcomes of deliberation and judgment must ipso 
facto be irrational’ (Helm 2000: 4), it is by now completely clear that 
Reason is no longer in opposition to Emotion. That is, the present state 
of affairs is now such that everyone would totally agree with Williams 
when he writes that our notion of rationality is incomplete if we do not 
include such sentiments in rationality for ‘it would be a kind of insanity 
never to experience sentiments […] towards anyone, and it would be an 
insane concept of rationality which insisted that a rational person never 
would’ (Williams 1981: 29). Thus, the last ten years of development of 
emotion theory have enabled the settlement that emotions are crucial 
for rationality even though they may at times come apart and ‘present 
one with inconsistent perspectives on the world’ (Helm 2000: 9). Nev-
ertheless, it is still not clear what such a complete picture looks like 
because we cannot obtain this more complete picture simply by adding 
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emotions to our notion of rationality. It requires a reconceptualization 
of rationality and how cognition incorporates and interacts with emo-
tion and a good understanding of emotions themselves. Ultimately, it 
will also need an explanation of the long historical legacy of thinking of 
emotions as opposed to reason because the final integrated picture will 
have to provide an insightful explanation as to why emotions appear to 
be sometimes in conflict with some thought processes. 
One way to contribute to the reconceptualization of rationality in 
light of the developments in emotion theory is to consider the role of 
emotions in decision-making. We think dilemmas are promising be-
cause we can place the response of a specific theoretical position and 
then verify what added insight is given by looking into the role of emo-
tion so as to provide a way to see the role emotions play in decision 
for action. We have chosen the dilemma of the Trolley problem, first 
introduced by the philosopher Phillippa Foot (1978), because of the 
way it reveals crucial aspects of the way consequences and principles 
interact in face of moral dilemmas in which both possible alternatives 
imply a tragic outcome. We do not aim to offer a detailed defense of a 
specific answer to the dilemma, nor to fully point out what the differ-
ent answers to the different trolley problem situations reveal about the 
guiding principles that guide us in moral situations. Instead, we simply 
show that the three identified ethical templates give insufficient answers 
to the dilemma such that Ethical Intuitionism fails and the other two ap-
proaches provide answers with irreconcilable aspects for their theoreti-
cal structure, and then list the different ways in which emotions appear 
to play a role in the dilemma within each Ethical template. The point is 
to argue as ‘Taylor suggests that one’s emotions are somehow central, 
but exactly how is left unclear.’ (Helm 2000: 3), and that even though 
we may not exactly be certain as to the impact of emotions in decision- 
making we are sure they have an impact which is part of rationality and 
not in opposition to it. Examining the way emotions appear in face of 
an ethical dilemma increases our theoretical awareness of the plural 
positions emotions can take in decision-making.
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4.  Emotions in Dilemmas: Trolley Problem and the  
phenomenology of hesitation 
In his 1985 article entitled ‘The Trolley Problem’, Thompson describes 
the dilemma in the following way: 
‘Suppose you are the driver of a trolley. The trolley rounds a bend, and there come 
into view ahead five track workmen, who have been repairing the track. The track 
goes through a bit of a valley at that point, and the sides are steep, so you must 
stop the trolley if you are to avoid running the five men down. You step on the 
brakes, but alas they don’t work. Now you suddenly see a spur of track leading 
off to the right. You can turn the trolley onto it, and thus save the five men on the 
straight track ahead. […] Is it morally permissible for you to turn the trolley?’ 
(Thompson 1985:1395) The description of the dilemma comes with a second hy-
pothetical case in which you have to imagine yourself to be a surgeon, a truly 
great surgeon. Among other things you do, you transplant organs, and you are 
such a great surgeon that the organs you transplant always take. At the moment 
you have five patients who need organs. Two need one lung each, two need a kid-
ney each, and the fifth needs a heart. If they do not get those organs today, they 
will all die; if you find organs for them today, you can transplant the organs and 
they will all live. But where to find the lungs, the kidneys, and the heart? The time 
is almost up when a report is brought to you that a young man who has just come 
into your clinic for his yearly check-up has exactly the right blood-type, and is in 
excellent health. So, you have a possible donor. All you need do is cut him up and 
distribute his parts among the five who need them. You ask, but he says, ‘Sorry. 
I deeply sympathize, but no.’ (Thompson 1985: 1396)
What the problem and the second hypothetical case raise is a refinement 
of the issues surrounding the Trolley Problem when it was first suggest-
ed by Foot and brings forth the question ‘Why is it that the trolley driver 
may turn his trolley, though the surgeon may not remove the young 
man’s lungs, kidneys, and heart?’ (Thompson 1985: 1396).
Of course there is an expanding body of experimental evidence 
showing that people make choices for (at least in part) unknown reasons, 
and then make up reasonable justifications while remaining unaware of 
the gap between their real motivation and their ex-post rationalization 
(T. Wilson: 2002) and, with regard to the role of emotion in moral di-
lemmas, experts have mostly identified the role of moral emotions as 
crucial elements that take part in the final decision outcome.
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For example, in ‘An Experimental Investigation of Emotions and 
Reasoning in the Trolley Problem’ Lanteri, Chelini & Rizzello found 
that ‘the immediate responses may be traced to moral emotions as op-
posed to moral reasoning’ (Lanteri, Chelini, & Rizzello 2008: 793). 
They conclude their paper stating that, ‘humans probably have a set of 
hard-wired moral emotions immediately triggered by some features in a 
choice situation – for instance, among others, personal-moral features’ 
(Lanteri, Chelini, & Rizzello 2008: 801). 
We would like to build upon their effort and examine what oth-
er emotional input can be identified in face of a dilemma using the 
three ethical templates described above. Of course we know that all 
three theoretical positions can take up more complex identities than the 
ones we described. For instance, Utilitarian can also take the form of 
rule-utilitarianism. However, for the purpose of this paper it is sufficient 
to take up the proposed three templates and explore how Intuitionism, 
Utilitarianism and Deontological Ethics bring forth different ways in 
which emotions can play a role in decision-making, and establish what 
are the differences that can make a difference in the normative role of 
emotional processes. 
When faced with the Trolley Problem, intuitionists recognize that 
intuitions about the dilemma change depending on how the case is pre-
sented such that notions of intention, proximity or the general framing 
modify the given intuitions about the right thing to do (Stratton-Lake 
2011: 15–18). When we add to ethical intuitionism the insight of emo-
tions, we capture one way to ground the self-evident nature of basic 
moral propositions and understand how moral emotions ground what 
is intuitively grasped and stand as a non-inferential judgment (Roeser 
2006: 38). As Sabine Roeser writes, ‘[w]e can understand emotions as 
fulfilling the role of non-inferential judgments or intuitions’ (Roeser 
2006: 42) and even though not only emotions are required to focus on 
what is morally relevant, emotions are normative judgments such that 
‘[p]aradigmatically, moral intuitions are emotions’ (Roeser 2006: 42). 
In addition, emotions provide the space for empathy and sympathy 
when emotions give rise to different moral emotions in different people 
because they provide the arena to establish a dialogue in which each 
party gives examples and draws analogies as to promote in the other a 
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similar emotion to share the emotion and intuition regarding the case in 
hand (Roeser 2005: 83).
Utilitarianism deals with the Trolley dilemma by using their 
maxim that we should always act so as to produce the most amount 
of happiness for the greatest number of people. The outcome is im-
possible to maintain for the one principle, which is supposed to guide 
all human action, asks that the surgeon remove the organs of one pa-
tient to save all the others and consequently offers an answer that goes 
against the best judgment. Utilitarianism is well known for how its 
single maxim can imply a justification of a great pain to some in the 
name of the happiness of many, and how this asks the Utilitarian to 
find a way to acknowledge the feelings of respect for persons giving 
rise to something similar to a moral intuition suggested in the first eth-
ical template. So though we would assume that the role of emotions 
for Utilitarianism is the end result and consequence of the feeling of 
happiness, the confrontation with the dilemma reveals that the feeling 
of respect for persons also needs to be taken into account. Thus the 
greatest number of people also requires incorporating other feelings 
and the feeling of happiness is not an isolated emotional experience. 
The insight for philosophy of emotion is that when an emotional order 
is the end in view, it necessarily incorporates other emotional aspects 
that must be coordinated in order to avoid the self-effacing change 
(Stoker 1976).
In contrast with Utilitarianism, when a Deontological ethics takes 
up the Trolley Problem the action is taken to be more important than 
its consequences. Within this frame of work, to act morally one must 
follow the rules and the action must be such as to be according to the 
maxim that you can also will that it would become a universal law (to 
use Kant’s first formulation of the Categorical Imperative) and it looks 
like feelings and emotions have no possible role to play. It is common 
to take this reading of deontological ethics: it is in clear contrast with 
the utilitarian position where the emotional mark of Happiness (overall 
Happiness) dominates the decision with regard to the emotional input 
for decision-making such that we could say that in decision-making 
it is the foreseen possible emotional outcome that dictates the role of 
emotion in rationality. However, if you follow Greenspan you can take a 
deontological position and argue that emotions play more than one role 
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in ethical deliberation and that, just as intuitionists who integrate emo-
tions argue, there is a normative role of emotion reinforcing and favor-
ing reasons motivating action (Greenspan 2011: 43). The overall picture 
of this interpretation of deontological ethics implies that principles do 
not stand on their own since they are motivated by emotional input, 
leaving the theory also open to the self-effacing charge and arguing for 
an unsustainable position. 
Nevertheless, one interesting aspect of Greenspan’s work is her 
departure from the widespread assumptions that a stress on the role 
of emotion is essentially Humean (Greenspan 2011: 44) and how she 
argues that emotions play two roles in ethics: first, emotions supply 
moral judgments with motivational force and secondly, that emotions 
stand as sources of reasons. As Greenspan explains, when someone is 
treated unjustly, feeling upset if the injustice goes unchallenged is not 
only a reason for the state of emotional discomfort carries normative 
implications (Greenspan 2011: 45). Greenspan writes, ‘[t]he fact that 
one is uncomfortable about something counts in itself as a reason for 
action – action to prevent the feeling from continuing – apart from any 
properties attributed to its object. So an appropriate emotion, besides 
having an evaluative component that reflects a practical reason, can add 
as a further reason a criticism, from the agent’s standpoint, of her own 
state of feeling. The fact that she is in a state of discomfort is norma-
tive insofar as it actually counts against her failure to act to relieve it, 
whether or not the discomfort or her recognition of it also serves as a 
motive.’ (Greenspan 2011: 45) That is, emotions can appear elements 
that reinforce reasons and have a causal force while at other times they 
stand as independent reasons (Greenspan 2011). 
The presentation of the three possible ethical postures in face of 
the Trolley Problem reveals that emotions can play a plurality of roles 
and the complete description of their impact in ethics is too wide for the 
scope of this paper. We want to propose that the recent developments of 
philosophy of emotions indicate that the fact that emotions also come 
in layers (Pugmire 2005, Jäger & Bartsch 2006; Mitmansgruber et al. 
2009; Mendonça 2013; Jäger & Bänninger-Huber 2014; Norman & 
Furnes 2014; Howard 2015), which is not directly contemplated by any 
of the ethical positions explored, is decisive for a good understanding of 
the role of emotions in ethics.
The plural role of emotions in Ethics: the case of ethical dilemmas 63
5. Reflexivity of emotions
Previous work has shown that meta-emotions cannot be handled as a 
special case of emotion because reflexivity modifies the nature of our 
emotional world. (Mendonça 2013) The reflexivity of emotions is such 
that one emotion about another changes the meaning and value of the 
first-order emotion such that being angry about being sad and being 
proud of being sad ends up being a completely different emotional 
experience of sadness. Since ‘meta-emotions necessarily have an im-
pact on the value of the first-order emotion […] This means that when 
we feel a meta-emotion, its object (the first-order emotion) changes 
and with it also changes the emotional experience.’(Mendonça 2013: 
394) In addition the added significance brought by the meta-emotion 
is not a simple addition to the meaning of the first-order emotion but 
has a transformative effect because the ‘information obtained with the 
description of meta-emotions is not simply a matter of having more 
information about the experience; the extra knowledge we get from 
meta-emotions may change the meaning of the experience altogether.’ 
(Mendonça 2013: 394) This means that the inclusion and recognition of 
the role of meta-emotions in decision-making and deliberation may en-
able us to make sense of the earlier suggestion that sometimes emotions 
work as causes of actions and other times as reasons for actions, such 
that emotional input in decision-making may be the result of refinement 
of meta-emotional processes.
Though psychologists and philosophers usually illustrate meta- 
emotions as strategies for healthy emotional regulation, there is no 
trait in reflexivity that guarantees this and consequently, the relation-
ship between emotions and meta-emotions can be far more complex 
and negative than the usual positive regulative connections (Howard 
2015: 11–15). That is, though reflexivity does not come necessari-
ly with a positive self-corrective direction, just like thinking about 
thinking does not, it is a privileged ground for instances of regula-
tory mechanisms and just as thinking about thinking can guide and 
correct thinking, emotions about emotions can refine and correct 
feeling. Thus, the meta-emotional mark may be the crucial item to 
explain why there is a sense in which people are and feel responsible 
64 Dina Mendonça and João Sàágua 
for their emotions even though it is also the case that people are not 
always in control of their emotional experiences. 
Concluding Remarks and Future Work Directions
The general picture provided by the exploration of the place of emo-
tions in the different ethical templates shows that emotions appear in 
different places in decision-making. Thus, the way emotions play a role 
in moral judgment indicates that some kind of version of sentimental-
ism is needed in ethics to do justice to the way emotions contribute to 
our ethical decisions (Avramova & Inbar 2013: 170). However, a com-
prehensive view needs to include insight from different ethical theories 
so as to grasp the full variety of roles for emotions. We have shown 
that emotions appear as follows: 1) emotions can be non-inferential 
judgments such as intuitions and be the normative judgments indicating 
what is the right action in a moral situation; 2) emotions can be the nec-
essary base for sympathy and dialogue with people who have different 
judgments about a moral situation; 3) emotions can appear as the goal 
and consequence to obtain (happiness) and this is different from other 
emotional outcomes of a specific moral action; 4) emotions can provide 
the needed motivational force such as feelings about values, a sentiment 
of respect for the moral law, and when this is taken into account it is 
crucial to differentiate emotions that appear as causes connected to the 
descriptive realm of moral action or appear as reasons connected to the 
normative realm of moral action (for example, anger may be a reason 
to demand justice (reason) while it can also be a cause for an unjust 
behavior (cause)); and finally 5) the emotional layer can modify by re-
inforcing or erasing the force of a first-order emotion. 
We think that this plurality of possibilities and added complexity 
of layers of emotions is at the heart of the ambivalent role of emotion 
in decision-making and that further research into the plurality of roles 
will ultimately provide a clearer understanding of the normative force 
of emotion. Thus, we would like to suggest some follow-up research 
directions raised by the analysis undertaken that constitute added steps 
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towards a clearer picture of the normative role of emotions which would 
show how emotions are one of the ways rationality is guided by values.
First, it would be important to further explore how emotions stand 
as reasons, building on Davidson’s distinction between reasons and 
causes and following Michael Brady’s arguments that emotions stand 
as a source of reasons and rationality in general (Brady 2013). When 
an agent runs away out of fear within a moral situation, the agent is at 
the mercy of an emotion in a causal mode and fear here can only be 
described within the descriptive realm. However, imagine that the same 
agent feeling fear does not run away but acts in caution both postponing 
taking up an action as much as possible while at the same time gath-
ering the most amount of information about the situation. In this case 
the action of suspension of action seems to be grounded on fear as a 
reason for caution and one can easily state the general norm that in case 
of fear one ought to act in a cautious manner, while it is impossible to 
state a norm that says that in case of fear one ought to run away as fast 
as possible for in some instances the dangerous situation asks for not 
running away. The double possibility of the place of emotions is impor-
tant to seriously take up the neo-sentimentalist proposal for it provides 
a way to understand that arguing for the importance of emotions for the 
right action does not mean that all emotions can be subsumed under this 
description. It is perhaps much harder to establish which ones can be in-
cluded but, however, the above analysis suggests that only emotions that 
can be described under the normative realm can be morally integrated 
and that it is important to identify that the same emotion can be taken 
within the descriptive realm without annihilating its normative force. 
Second, the acceptance of the complexity given by the reflexivity 
of emotion proves once again that the impact of emotion on ethics goes 
beyond that of its valence and appeals to a sense of emotional coherence 
that can be best analyzed in the notion of character. Thus it would be 
crucial to explore how virtue ethics deals with ethical dilemmas such 
as the Trolley Problem and if it stands up to the charge of falling into a 
similar self-effacing position (Pettigrove 2011). Finally, this will ask us 
to verify in what way this understanding of the role of emotions in eth-
ics has an impact on the education of emotion and the use of education 
of emotion for moral education.
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Third, the provided analysis clearly asks for an evaluation of the 
pertinent connection between emotions and values. One possible way 
to uncover the links of the hierarchy of values implicit in people’s moral 
choices is to explore a phenomenology of hesitation in face of mor-
al dilemmas similarly to the way Cooke explored a phenomenology 
of error and surprise by comparing the work of Peirce, Davidson and 
MacDowell (Cooke 2011) in order to better understand the role of sur-
prise within the cognitive experience of error. Likewise, it is possible 
to draw a phenomenology of hesitation built upon the reflection about 
a dilemma in order to better understand the various roles of emotion in 
decision-making and in which way emotions give emphasis to this or 
that value when people face moral decisions in which they hesitate. A 
phenomenology of dilemmas and hesitation may further explain how 
the connection of emotion and character is tied to our understanding of 
emotional depth and do justice to the way in which emotional depth is 
connected to excellence of character (Pugmire 2005) and healthy feel-
ings (Dewey 1887). Since dilemmas offer a privileged field to analyze 
the role of certain specific moral emotions such as regret, compassion 
and anger, it would be interesting to explore the suggestion that moral 
emotions represent a desired pattern of emotional structure about other 
ethical situations. In addition, it may also provide a good interpretation 
to the way people face dilemmas in daily life that, though they may not 
have the dramatic edge of the trolley problem, may feel similar to those 
who experience them. 
In conclusion, when we examine the role of emotions in ethical 
dilemmas by ethical templates, it becomes clear that though emotions 
occupy a plurality of roles they have a normative function when they 
appear as reasons for action. A better understanding of their reflexive 
nature and how it influences and changes the way in which they can 
work, sometimes as causes and other times as reasons, will provide a 
clearer account of their normative force. Ultimately, we think that this 
normative trait of emotion is partly responsible for the structured for-
mat of the plurality of values in which rationality is embedded. Thus, 
the level of coherence or incoherence and the internal conflicts that 
can occur in decision-making within a plural conception of values can 
never be fully understood without an integration of the place and role 
of emotions. More importantly, we can never attain a complete image 
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of emotion without investigating the decisive factors that make them 
sometimes function as reasons for action. In sum, Ethics is incomplete 
without a good understanding of emotion just as Philosophy of Emo-
tions is deficient if it does not incorporate the way emotions function as 
reasons in decision for action. That is, at the core of a better understand-
ing of rationality there is an on-going demand for a better understand-
ing of the role of emotions in decision-making. 
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John McDowell on practical rationality – is he  
(really) talking about us?
Susana Cadilha
1.
In what follows I shall try to give an account of John McDowell’s con-
ception of practical rationality, using for the most part his collection of 
articles Mind, Value and Reality (1998). My overall aim is to argue that 
McDowell’s conception of human practical rationality is not in line with 
what we know about the way we think and act. Not being representative/
typical of people like us, real agents, it is not, I think, a realistic con-
ception.
I will give particular attention to two papers McDowell wrote argu-
ing against two other famous philosophers – Philippa Foot and Bernard 
Williams: ‘Are moral requirements hypothetical imperatives?’ (1978) 
and ‘Might there be external reasons?’ (1995). There he tries to answer 
the following question: what does it mean to say that someone has a 
reason to act in a specified way? Williams (1981) famously argued that 
there are only internal reasons, meaning that one only has reason to do 
whatever practical reasoning,1 starting from one’s existing motivations, 
1 Williams presents no restricted account of practical reasoning, though – a prac-
tical reasoning is more than the mere discovery that some course of action is the 
means to an end; it is ‘a heuristic process, and an imaginative one’ (Williams 
1981: 110). ‘A clear example of practical reasoning is that leading to the con-
clusion that one has reason to ᶲ because ᶲ-ing would be the most convenient, 
economical, pleasant etc. way of satisfying some element in S [the agent’s subjec-
tive motivational set] …. But there are much wider possibilities for deliberation, 
such as: thinking how the satisfaction of elements in S can be combined, e.g. by 
time-ordering; where there is some irresoluble conflict among the elements of S, 
considering which one attaches most weight to … ; or, again, finding constitutive 
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may reveal that one has reason to do.2 It is not that one has only reason 
to do what in a way satisfies some element in one’s subjective motiva-
tional set, but that those elements govern the practical reasoning leading 
up to the conclusion that one has reason to do something.
McDowell, on the other hand, defends that there are external 
reasons – that there are reasons to act unconnected with our existing 
motivations. How do people acquire such reasons? How do they start 
believing that there is a reason to act in a certain way, if there is no con-
nection whatsoever with the subject’s motivational set? In order to be 
an external reason, that reason must have been there all along, so that in 
coming to see it, the agent must be arriving at a proper consideration of 
the matter. How come we manage to get things right?3 
Let us focus on a typical domain of practical rationality – the ethi-
cal domain. According to Williams, ethical reasons are internal reasons; 
according to McDowell they are external reasons. This means there are 
ethical reasons for us to do something even if we are not able to see 
them and there is no practical reasoning or deliberative path that can 
take us there. The question is: how can we get things right, as would 
the virtuous person?4 How do we come to believe there is a reason for 
acting in a specified way and how can we acquire a new motivation by 
getting things right? 
McDowell is not purely Kantian – he does not say that the agent 
is able to get things right because he is able to deliberate correctly, i.e. 
through a pure rational procedure. He clearly states that ‘the transition 
to being so motivated is a transition to deliberating correctly, not one ef-
fected by deliberating correctly’ (McDowell 1998: 107). No pure ration-
al procedure would make us consider the matter aright – for instance, 
solutions, such as deciding what would make for an entertaining evening, granted 
that one wants entertainment’ (Williams 1981: 110). ‘Imagination can create new 
possibilities and new desires’ (Williams 1981: 105).
2 It is important to notice that according to Williams’s interpretation it is not re-
quired that the agent is actually motivated to do what he has reason to do.
3 By deliberating correctly, Williams would say. If there were external reasons, 
there would be a procedure of correct deliberation that gives rise to a motivation, 
but is not controlled by nor connected to the agent’s existing motivations.
4 McDowell follows Aristotle and his virtue ethics – he thinks the most important 
thing in ethics is to be the right person (the well-educated one). The virtuous per-
son is the measure of the right action, and not the other way around.
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seeing that we should give back the wallet some passer-by has dropped. 
But that does not mean there is no reason to do that, and I would be 
able to see it if I was the right kind of person. If I had a proper ethical 
upbringing, I would have my eyes opened to some reasons I otherwise 
cannot see. As with someone who had not the benefit of an artistic edu-
cation and hence cannot properly enjoy the experience of a work of art, 
someone who has not been properly brought up cannot see the reason 
why he should give back the wallet. But that reason exists (it is an ex-
ternal reason) – and ‘it might take something like a conversion to bring 
the reasons within the person’s notice’ (McDowell 1998: 107).5 
Getting things right – figuring out which ethical reasons there are – 
is then a matter of ‘tuning up’ our moral perception. What distinguishes 
a virtuous person (who can clearly see what should be done) from a 
non-virtuous one is not that the former has different motivations – she 
simply sees things differently. 
This is what leads us to McDowell’s most controversial theses. If 
acting correctly is just a matter of seeing/perceiving correctly, any mor-
al fault will be a cognitive fault. This means that if I am not able to do 
the right thing (for instance, to give back the wallet I just found), it is 
not because I lack motivation to do it, but only because I lack the knowl-
edge that it is the thing to be done. The difference between an honest 
and a dishonest person is not that they have different motivations or 
interests; rather, that difference lies exclusively in their ways of perceiv-
ing their circumstances. Thus, it would not be possible for two people 
to have exactly the same understanding of the circumstances and yet see 
different reasons to act. 
Briefly, then, according to McDowell, it is a person’s understand-
ing of how things are that gives her a reason for action. And if I were 
the right person, I would see the right reasons to act.6 Moral reasons, 
5 ‘In moral upbringing what one learns is not to behave in conformity with rules of 
conduct, but to see situations in a special light, as constituting reasons for acting; 
this perceptual capacity, once acquired, can be exercised in complex novel cir-
cumstances’ (McDowell 1998: 85).
6 McDowell is a moral particularist: there is no rule or criterion to define what the 
right action is; it will always depend on the particular context. The virtuous per-
son is the one who knows how to act in each occasion, who is sensible enough to 
distinguish the particular features of each situation. As I said before, the virtuous 
one is the measure of the right action. 
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in particular, have no direct link with the agent’s existing motivations 
or interests; there is no need, in addition to her understanding of the 
relevant facts, for the agent to care about the situation, meaning that 
some desire would function as an independent and extra help in order to 
motivate her. Her belief does that on its own.7 
The problem is, of course, a Humean one – is it possible for a pure-
ly cognitive state (a view of how things are) to entail some disposition 
to act, or to make the action attractive to its possessor? Hume would put 
it like this: does reason motivate?
McDowell would simply say that to assume that cognitive and co-
native/affective states have distinct existences is just a Humean dogma. 
Similarly, we do not have to take for granted that the world is, in itself, 
‘motivationally inert’.
My worries about this view, I must say, have less to do with the 
worldview it presupposes than with the picture of mankind this view 
leaves us with. Are we really like that?
According to this view, there is no possible situation in which 
someone has the relevant understanding of the situation (say, that the 
thing to do is to give back the wallet) and is not motivated to act accord-
ingly. Thus, believing that giving back the wallet is the thing to do nec-
essarily entails wanting to do it (if the agent A thinks there is a reason to 
ᶲ in a particular case Y, then he must be willing to ᶲ in Y).8
7 This is how T. Nagel puts it: ‘That I have the appropriate desire simply follows 
from the fact that these considerations motivate me; if the likelihood that an act 
will promote my future happiness motivates me to perform it now, then it is ap-
propriate to ascribe to me a desire for my own future happiness. But nothing 
follows about the role of the desire as a condition contributing to the motivational 
efficacy of those considerations’ (Nagel 1979: 29–30).
8 This is usually referred as motivational internalism: ‘The names ‘internalism’ 
and ‘externalism’ have been used to designate two views of the relation between 
ethics and motivation. Internalism is the view that the presence of a motivation 
for acting morally is guaranteed by the truth of ethical propositions themselves. 
On this view the motivation must be so tied to the truth, or meaning, of ethical 
statements that when in a particular case someone is (or perhaps merely believes 
that he is) morally required to do something, it follows that he has a motivation for 
doing it. Externalism holds, on the other hand, that the necessary motivation is not 
supplied by ethical principles and judgments themselves, and that an additional 
psychological sanction is required to motivate our compliance’ (Nagel 1979: 7).
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My doubts about this intellectualist account are the following: 
does that description really match the way people are, and act? Is it 
really the case that I don’t give back the wallet just because I don’t 
know what the thing to do is (I just have the illusion that I know)? 
Closely related with this is the description McDowell presents of the 
virtuous agent’s moral psychology: the virtuous person simply does 
not need to weigh reasons, because once he sees what is the thing to 
do, every other contrary reason that he might have simply vanishes – 
‘the dictates of virtue, if properly appreciated, are not weighed with 
other reasons at all, not even on a scale that always tips on their side. 
If a situation in which virtue imposes a requirement is genuinely con-
ceived as such, according to this view, then considerations that, in the 
absence of the requirement, would have constituted reasons for acting 
otherwise are silenced altogether – not overridden – by the require-
ment’ (McDowell 1998: 90).
It seems that McDowell has in mind some kind of ideal agent, not 
a real one. But it is a kind of ideal with no particular function attached, 
because there is no way to teach a non-virtuous man to become virtuous 
and hence no definite way to get closer to that ideal. And what about 
akrasia? According to this view it seems impossible that someone may 
act contrarily to his best judgment. If the akratic person knows he is not 
acting as virtue demands, then most likely he conceives the circum-
stances of his action as the virtuous person would conceive them. But 
then, if acting correctly is just a matter of perceiving the matter correct-
ly, there is no room left to akrasia – if someone conceives the situation 
as the virtuous person does, then he would know what to do and any 
other considerations that might constitute reasons for acting otherwise 
would simply be silenced. 
The only solution available to McDowell is simply to posit that 
the incontinent person’s understanding of a situation does not match 
that of a virtuous person.9 But in that case, the mere conceptual possi-
bility of akrasia vanishes. If there cannot be a perfect match with the 
way a fully virtuous person conceives the circumstances of his action, 
 
9 ‘The way out is to attenuate the degree to which the continent or incontinent 
person’s conception of a situation matches that of a virtuous person’ (McDowell 
1998: 92).
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then an akratic action is conceptually impossible since it is never the 
case that someone acts contrarily to his best judgment; people behave 
differently just because they have different understandings of what is 
to be done. 
In a nutshell, what I am arguing is that, while not being a pure Kan-
tian, still McDowell inflates the agent’s rationality by stating that if the 
agent thinks he has a (moral) reason to do X, then he wants/is motivated 
to do X. What I say is that we are not like that: sometimes, we really 
think that we must do X, or that we have reason to do it, but still we want 
to do something else. 
If Hume has a minimalist conception of practical rationality (it 
has only an instrumental role, one of finding the right means to attain 
a given end), McDowell stands to blame for the opposite excess, as-
suming the intellectualist position that practical knowledge necessarily 
entails motivation to act; that the agent must want to do what he has a 
reason to do. Neither of these seems to give an accurate account of how 
rationality and desire combine in order to originate action. If it is true, 
on the one hand, that we can rationally deliberate about ends and not 
only about means (that desires are subject to rational criticism), it is also 
true, on the other, that there is no guarantee that the agent’s motivation 
will always align with the agent’s reasons, or that the agent necessarily 
wants to do what he thinks is the best to do.
2.
So far I have been defending that McDowell gives an inflated account 
of practical rationality and thus he is not actually speaking about real 
agents, people like us. 
Connected with that thesis, there is another way in which I think 
McDowell shows his alignment to that classical philosophical concep-
tion of mankind according to which human beings are the exemplars 
of rationality and autonomy. In fact, McDowell thinks that man is a 
creature who stands apart from animals by virtue of his powers of self- 
control, reasoning, and reflection – that there is a clear line that separates 
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the human from the animal way of living.10 This is because McDowell 
draws a very sharp distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual, 
cognitive agents and thinkers. 
Continuing to think about the ethical domain, it is easy to see how 
McDowell is prone to recognize the autonomy of any normative do-
main such as the ethical one. There is an is-ought gap and no commu-
nications allowed. That means that moral matters are purely conceptual 
and rational matters – thinking what we should do is a rational ability 
only humans have, and any descriptive or psychological aspect of man 
is pulled apart from that ability. I mean: the instinctive tendencies we 
share with other animals do not determine that conceptual and rational 
ability; and that rational ability cannot be explained in a way that is not 
itself rational.11
My doubts are the following: is it really the case that when it comes 
to moral matters our ‘first nature’ traits are simply overridden? That we 
get rid of all of our natural determinations? That with the ‘onset of rea-
son’, as McDowell puts it, the practical tendencies that are part of our 
first nature simply vanish? My opinion is that it is not very plausible to 
think, with McDowell, that there is an abrupt chasm between biologi-
cally determined creatures, on the one hand, and creatures moved only 
by reasons, on the other. Our rational and conceptual abilities do not 
override our animal nature. 
It seems clear to me that only rational beings are capable of elabo-
rate moral systems and sophisticated forms of moral thinking. Sophis-
ticated forms of moral thinking imply conceptualization and abstract 
 
10 ‘…we do not fall into rampant Platonism if we say the shape of our lives is no lon-
ger determined by immediate biological forces. To acquire the spontaneity of the 
understanding is to become able, as Gadamer puts it, to “rise above the pressure of 
what impinges on us from the world” (Truth and Method, p. 444) – that succession 
of problems and opportunities constituted as such by biological imperatives – into 
a “free, distanced orientation” (p. 445)’ (McDowell 1994: 115–116).
11 ‘Moral education enables one to step back from any motivational impulse one 
finds oneself subject to and question its rational credentials. Thus it effects a kind 
of distancing of the agent from the practical tendencies that are part of what we 
might call his first nature. … If the second nature one has acquired is virtue … 
[its] dictates acquired an authority that replaces the authority abdicated by first 
nature with the onset of reason’ (McDowell 1998: 188).
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reasoning. After all, besides being capable of feelings of outrage in face 
of asymmetry and unfairness (this is an inequity aversion that we share 
with non-human primates),12 we are also able to design sophisticated 
constructs such as theories of justice. The ability to morally evaluate 
that characterizes us at this point in our development involves the ability 
to pose what philosophers usually refer to as the ‘normative question’: 
think about what should be the case, question the assumptions and the 
consequences of action. Now, this is not an automatic behavior or an 
instinct. This fully developed ability to think morally is what character-
izes us as moral beings. What seems questionable is to conceive of no 
continuity whatsoever between one thing and another and to sustain that 
our ability to think morally is of a fundamentally different nature, which 
keeps us irremediably apart from the ‘mere’ dispositions and feelings of 
non-linguistic animals. What seems questionable is the idea that being 
a moral agent has to do with ability for conceptual thinking, but not 
also with the ability to repudiate certain asymmetries in situations. It 
seems plausible to say that there is a link between this fully developed 
capacity we exhibit today and the intuitions and dispositions probably 
exhibited by our ancestors. My point is this: because we are linguistic 
beings, capable of conceptual and abstract thinking, we come to a level 
of sophistication in terms of moral thinking that allows us to think in 
terms of reasons, and to develop theories that allow the justification of 
moral positions before the members of the community who also have 
the ability to discuss them. But the fact that we have reached this level 
does not mean that the ability to assign value to items in the world, 
and perhaps the content of some evaluative positions, may not have 
been influenced and shaped by factors other than rational reflection. 
It seems to me legitimate to think that there was evaluation and value 
assignment before there was a rational capacity for justification. This 
basic capacity to experience items in the world as things requiring cer-
tain reactions or counting for certain reactions precedes a linguistically 
mediated reflective ability to pose the normative question. So, because 
we are sophisticated creatures we can take a step back with respect to 
these primitive evaluative dispositions or intuitions and not follow them 
 
12 See De Waal & Berger (2000) and Brosnan & De Waal (2003).
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compulsorily; but the fact that we are reflective creatures who can take 
that step back does not entail that such dispositions cannot yet influence 
our moral judgments.
Another thing which is difficult to believe in is the thesis that our 
rational and conceptual capacities are completely untainted by other 
aspects of our psychology. If we take a careful look, for instance, at 
some experiments on moral psychology,13 we may be able to see that it 
is not the case that our moral judgments always arise out of data manip-
ulation and further rational deliberation. Rather, what we usually define 
as a moral judgment may after all have its basis in a ‘gut reaction’ and 
may not be an expression of propositional knowledge. When faced with 
certain types of morally innocuous transgressions (like using a national 
flag to wipe the floor, or drinking a glass of water after having spat in it), 
people show the same kind of reactions that moral transgressions elicit 
(they are thought of as being universally wrong, of a non-contingent 
and mandatory nature, their wrongness independent from authority), 
even though they cannot find a reason to do so. This appears to bring 
moral judgments close to a certain kind of affective response in which 
reflection over propositional contents plays little or no role at all.14
These experiments are in line with numerous experimental studies 
that represent the core of cognitive psychology, and that rest on the 
hypothesis that most of our judgments result from the triggering of fast 
and frugal heuristics, and not from deliberative processes. It is not ab-
surd to think that the same happens with moral judgments: they result 
from heuristics and many of them are automatic.15 (This does not mean 
moral reasoning has no place, but it looks like its main function is that 
of a post-hoc rationalization – it is useful to justify previous intuitions 
or whenever a conflict between moral intuitions arises). In fact, in many 
different areas of research it has been found that people make evalua-
tions (as to whether an event/object is good or bad, for instance) imme-
diately, unintentionally and without awareness that they are doing it, so 
 
 
13 Cf. Haidt et al. (1993); Haidt & Bjorklund (2008); Greene et al. (2001).
14 See also Nichols and Folds-Bennett (2003).
15 One of the simplest heuristics studied in this field is that which makes us imme-
diately agree with and positively value what is said by people we like.
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it may be the case that ‘what we think we are doing while consciously 
deliberating in actuality has no effect on the outcome of the judgment, 
as it has already been made through relatively immediate, automatic 
means’ (Bargh & Chartrand 1999: 475). It is not absurd to think that 
the influences of heuristics and biases uncovered in recent cognitive 
psychology are widespread in everyday ethical reflection.
So, it might be the case that human beings are not paragons of 
rationality and autonomy. But if we stick to McDowell’s theory of prac-
tical rationality, it is clear that the capacity that determines, in a given 
situation, what matters about that situation and that enables us to evalu-
ate it, is a conceptual conscious ability that only rational animals possess 
(it is the result of being initiated into a ‘conceptual space’, as McDowell 
puts it). In a practical syllogism – that can be used to deliberate or to 
organize an agent’s reasons for action – a judgment determining which 
feature of the situation matters constitutes one of the premises. And 
it is also clear that the actions through which we manifest our moral 
character must be chosen; even if McDowell grants, following Aristotle, 
that virtuous action is the result of habit, we must not understand that 
as happening out of instinct or inertia – on the contrary, virtue requires 
that ‘specially human capacity for discursive thought’ (McDowell 1998: 
39). But if we consider virtue-ethical ideals of practical rationality in 
light of the model of human cognition now emerging, we realize that 
moral behavior is not immune to cognitive biases and that it does not 
always flow from reflectively endorsed moral norms or robust traits of 
character like virtues. Rather, we see that minor situational influences 
(such as ambient noise, or the fact that someone is in a hurry) determine 
moral behavior.16 In fact, various experiments in social psychology re-
vealed that subjects were much more likely to help someone in need if 
they had just found a dime, or are not in a hurry, or if the ambient noise 
was at normal levels. Circumstantial and morally irrelevant factors in-
fluence moral behavior in a decisive way, and can also influence the way 
we perceive the situation as an occasion for ethical decision. And it is 
extremely relevant that those cognitive biases or response tendencies 
are beyond the reach of individual practical rationality.
16 Cf. Isen & Levin (1972); Darley & Batson (1973); Mathews & Cannon (1975). 
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It thus seems as though not only McDowell’s conception of moral 
abilities but also his idea that it suffices to believe that X is the thing to 
do in order to be motivated to do it are not in line with what we know 
about the way we are and think. It is possible to simply argue that real 
agents are defective practical reasoners, but in that case we need to 
admit that there is a distance between the picture of human cognition 
that applies to virtuous people and the model of human cognition now 
emerging in the cognitive sciences that applies to everyone else. And 
how useful and illuminating can that be? 
My point in this paper was just to argue that from a philosophical 
perspective, no less than from an empirical one, McDowell’s account of 
practical rationality is not realistic, since it seems to ignore features that 
are determinative of us as human agents.
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Rules and personal changing
Regina Queiroz
Introduction
Even if Cavell (1990) admits the socio-political nature of rules, those 
who suffer political and social injustices see themselves as excluded and 
not represented by the rules of society. Consequently, since the exist-
ing rules neither represent them nor allow them to expose the political 
injustices, thus satisfying their claim to justice, people are voiceless 
and unable to show how certain institutions are unfair. A persons’ re-
covery of their voice depends on a personal changing, understood as a 
miracle. Prior to a subjective judgment without rules, formulated in a 
conversation of justice (Cavell 1990), this personal changing seems to 
correspond to the private approach to rules depicted by Wittgenstein in 
Philosophical Investigations (1953). 
Although we acknowledge the contribution of Cavell’s exegesis of 
Wittgenstein to expose the existential issues underlying Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy (Cavell 1969, 1979, 1990; see Mulhall 1994, 2007) in ad-
dition to his original interpretation of Wittgenstein’s private language 
argument (Cavell 1969, 1979, 1990; see Mulhall 1994, 2007), we ar-
gue that any personal changing requires the mediation of political rules, 
following criteria, even though these rules are in the end abnormal 
rules. We recognize the research on Wittgenstein and Cavell (Bernstein 
1981; Conant, 2005; Eldridge 2003; Fleming & Payne 1989; Hammer 
2002; McGinn 2004; Mulhall 1994). However, neglecting neither that 
research on Wittgenstein and Cavell nor Cavell’s original interpretation 
of Wittgenstein’s private experience, the relationship between the pri-
vate language arguments and the miraculous personal changing has not 
received enough attention.
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We are also aware of the widespread disagreement on Wittgen-
stein’s private language arguments (e.g. Baker and Hacker 1985; Can-
field 1986; Cavell 1979; Hacker 1990; Kenny 1984; Malcolm 1977; 
1989; Mulhall 2007; Nielsen 2008) and on rule-following (Cavell 1990; 
Cook 1965; Fogelin 1976; Kripke 1982; McDowell 1984). Neverthe-
less, our main aim is not to provide a personal judgment on those chal-
lenging and proficient interpretations of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of 
language. Our main aim is to use Wittgenstein’s main intuitions and 
concepts embedded in his later philosophy of language for the under-
standing of some political life issues, namely the understanding of in-
dividual and political changing. Thus, in spite of the controversy about 
the explicit political content of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language 
(Pitkin 1972), and also acknowledging that some authors have already 
given that contribution (Bloor 1997; Cavell 1979, 1990; Holt 1997; Pit-
kin 1972; Taylor 1992; Temelini 2015; Tully 1989), we aim to show that 
personal changing requires the mediation of political rules, following 
criteria, even though these rules are in the end abnormal rules. 
From these premises, in the first section we will present Cavell’s 
description of the miracle of changing, explaining its emergence from 
Cavell’s existential exegesis of Wittgenstein’s private language arguments. 
In the second section we present some of Wittgenstein’s arguments 
against the private language argument as well as Cavell’s perspective 
on the private experiences issue, and we argue that no personal chang-
ing can dispense with political criteria and rules. We also distinguish 
normal from abnormal rules. We conclude that no one changes without 
explicit or implicit rules framed by criteria. 
Following Cavell’s use of Ibsen’s play, A Doll’s House (1879 
[1981]), we also illustrate our arguments by using the same play.
1. The Miracle of Changing 
Even if Cavell (1990) admits the socio-political nature of rules, those who 
suffer political and social injustices see themselves as excluded and not 
represented by the rules of society. Consequently, since the existing rules 
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neither represent them nor allow them to expose the political injustices, 
thus satisfying their claim to justice, people are voiceless and unable to 
show how certain institutions are unfair. Recovering their voice on justice 
depends on a subjective judgment without rules, formulated in a conver-
sation of justice (Cavell 1990). 
In spite of the linguistic nature of that judgment, Cavell argues 
that ‘unless something is shown’ (Cavell 1990: 117) the conversation of 
justice ‘cannot go on – there is nothing to say’ (Cavell 1990: 117). Since 
victims face an unquantifiable personal misery and social and political 
injustice – ‘right is not assertible’ (Cavell 1990: 12) – the recovery of 
any political right depends on an inner changing process, understood as 
the ‘miracle of changing’ (Cavell 1990: 111). In the context of reflec-
tion on the drama of consent, the analysis of which is beyond the scope 
of our article, Cavell makes use of Ibsen’s character in his 1879 master-
piece A Doll’s House (1879 [1981]) to illustrate this miracle.
Described as resentful, outraged, dishonoured, and a woman 
shamed by her husband, Torvald, Nora has truly lost her way and is una-
ble to show how unfair the institution of marriage is that treats ‘a grown 
woman, a wife and mother, as a child’ (Cavell 1990: 114). Indeed, in the 
play, Nora Helmer once secretly borrowed a large sum of money so that 
her husband could recuperate from a serious illness. She never told him 
of this loan and has been secretly paying it back in small instalments 
by saving from her household allowance. The man from whom Nora 
borrowed the money, Nils Krogstad, threatens to reveal Nora’s crime, 
and when Torvald discovers that Nora has forged her father’s name, he 
is ready to disavow his wife even though she had done it for him. He 
declares that Nora is immoral, unfit to be a wife and mother, and says 
he will continue to be married to her in name alone. When Nils says that 
he no longer wants to blackmail the Helmer family, Torvald rejoices, 
declaring that they are saved. He then says that he forgives Nora and 
that he still loves her as his little ‘caged song bird.’ This is a startling 
wake-up call for Nora Helmer. In a flash, she realizes that Torvald is not 
the loving, selfless husband she had once envisaged. She also comes to 
understand that their marriage has been a lie, and that she herself has 
been an active part in the deception. She then decides to leave her hus-
band and her children in order to find out who she truly is. 
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Although Cavell’s evaluation of Nora’s decision as a claim for po-
litical justice is not consensual – Nora’s rejection of sacrifice and op-
pression and her subsequent leaving of her husband and three children 
has been seen as the expression of an unprincipled, abnormal, neurot-
ic, irresponsible, egoistic, deceitful, manipulative and immoral woman 
(Templeton 1989, 1997) – her internal changing is exhibited by external 
and nonverbal signs. For example, contrary to her daily routine, instead 
of going to bed and taking off her fancy clothes, Nora reappears wearing 
her outdoor clothes, signalling that she is free and released from de-
ception (e.g. being imprisoned by unfair social and political rules and 
seeing herself as an accomplished person). 
In fact, since Nora’s nineteenth-century political context required 
women to sacrifice personal liberty and accept paternalistic treatment 
(Langås 2005; Templeton 1989; Yuehua 2009), the claim for a woman’s 
personal liberty could be neither heard nor justified under political and 
social rules. Also, in the face of the main sacrificial and paternalistic 
rules of Nora’s society, her final decision could not avoid being seen as 
anything but unreasonable, if not irrational, for whoever would benefit 
from unfair rules. Additionally, seen as a priori orders (Cavell 1979, 
1990), the consequences of which are ‘confined and scored’ (Cavell 
1990: 115), rules prevent understanding the quest for the personal re-
covery of voice. 
Thus, the existence of someone completely excluded from the 
(outside) current (social and political) rules (Cavell 1990) along with 
an underestimation of the rules does not allow an understanding of the 
social contribution to personal changing.
In her turn, as a resentful, outraged, dishonoured and shamed wom-
an, Nora has lost her way and cannot achieve an autonomous change. 
Corresponding to Cavell’s understanding of Wittgenstein’s picture of 
thinking, i.e. ‘one of moving from being lost to oneself to finding one’s 
way, a circumstance of personal disorder, a defeat not to be solved, but 
to be undone’ (Cavell 1990: 21), Nora has lost her way. The existence of 
someone who has lost their way also implies that the political depres-
sion could not be overcome by reference to internal principles either, 
thereby preventing an autonomous personal changing. Consequently, 
both exclusions, from the social and the political self, entail personal 
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changing to be guided neither by external nor by internal rules (Cavell 
1990). It is understood as a miracle. 
2. Miracles and private language 
Wittgenstein makes explicit references to miracles (Wittgenstein 
1965:10–11, 1980: 45; see also Phillips 1993). There is also a philo-
sophical controversy about Wittgenstein’s religious belief (Barret 1991; 
Cook 1988; Diamond 2005; Moore 2005; Nielsen 2001; Malcolm and 
Winch 1993; Phillips 1993; Winch 1988). In Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
miracles are inherently senseless events and he explicitly says: ‘For all 
I have said by shifting the expression of the miraculous from an ex-
pression by means of language to the expression by the existence of 
language, all I have said is again that we cannot express what we want to 
express and that all we say about the absolute miraculous remains non-
sense’ (Wittgenstein 1965:11). And he adds: ‘I see now that these non-
sensical expressions were not nonsensical because I had not yet found 
the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality was their very es-
sence. For all I wanted to do with them was just to go beyond the world 
and that is to say beyond significant language’ (Wittgenstein 1965:11).
However, the fact that miracles are beyond significant language 
does not mean that they have no place in Wittgenstein’s philosophy even 
if, controversially, some have shown the importance of ineffability in 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy (Conant 2000; Moore and Sullivan 2003; 
Diamond 2005; Hacker 1986; McGinn 1999; Mulhall 2007). 
From the ineffable perspective, the communication of a miraculous 
inner changing translates the senseless miraculous event into a mean-
ingful one. Nevertheless, since the miracle of changing corresponds to 
an inner personal event – which is firstly an inner personal changing – 
its individual communication can correspond to Wittgenstein’s de-
scription of private experiences (Wittgenstein 1953: §§ 243–315). In 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy private experiences are also senseless expe-
riences (Wittgenstein 1953: §§ 243–315). However, contrary to mira-
cles, whose essence is to be senseless and ought to remain senseless 
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(Wittgenstein 1965), private experiences are senseless and ought to 
be challenged as they result from an absurd private quest for meaning 
(Wittgenstein 1953: §§ 243–315).
Indeed, in spite of the disagreement over Wittgenstein’s arguments 
about private language, and along with its undoubted complexity and 
elusiveness (see Baker & Hacker 1985; Canfield 1986; Cavell 1979; 
Hacker 1990; Malcolm 1977; Mulhall 2007; 1989; Nielsen 2008), 
by associating the search for meaning as ‘a [purely] mental state’ 
(Wittgenstein 1953: § 180), the private approach supposes that agents 
immediately understand the meaning of their thoughts, feelings and acts 
(Wittgenstein 1953: §§ 246–8, 251, 272, 280, 294, 358). For example, 
though not neglecting the differences and similarity between Wittgen-
steinian and Kantian philosophy (see Engel 1970; Glock 1997; Mosser 
2008), in the purely theoretical domain there is in Kantian philosophy 
no immediate access to our inner representations – they are always me-
diated by the a priori forms of sensibility, time and space (Kant 1787 
[1968]). Nonetheless, in the practical domain, the exclusion of sensibil-
ity entails the immediate order of human practical reason. Dispensing 
with the mediation of space and time, the forms of sensibility, in the 
practical Kantian domain the inner rational rule commands immedi-
ately and unconditionally (Kant 1785/6 [1968], 1788 [1968]). Like any 
private experience, the immediate and unconditionally commanding 
rules correspond to private rule-following. This supposes that it suf-
fices to immediately grasp the mental image of the private human soul 
(Wittgenstein 1953 § 205; see also § 265) and also to immediately be-
have in accordance with it (or to follow it) (Wittgenstein 1953: § 352; 
see also McDowell 2002; Kripke 1982). 
 However, from Wittgenstein’s perspective ‘[it] is not a hocus-po-
cus which can be performed only by the soul’ (Wittgenstein 1953: 
§ 454). In reality, when refuting the hypothesis of private feelings and 
thoughts under the broader criticism of the existence of a private lan-
guage (Wittgenstein 1953: § 265; see also §§ 56, 271; II, xl, p. 207), 
Wittgenstein argues that from the private approach to feelings and 
thoughts agents are not able to remember the connection between the 
images and feelings (e.g. pain). This incapacity is more troubling when 
viewing the ambiguity of the aspect of the image – ‘The concept of an 
aspect is akin to the concept of an image’ (Wittgenstein 1953: §§ II, xl, 
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p. 213). As well as the image of the duck-rabbit (Wittgenstein 1953: 
§§ II, xl, p. 194) and that of the triangle (Wittgenstein 1953: §§ II, xl, 
p. 200) – the duck-rabbit can appear as duck and rabbit, and the triangle 
as a triangular hole, a solid or a geometrical drawing – individuals see 
the image of the pointing finger as if it were pointing to two different 
directions. The incapacity to remember the connection between the men-
tal image and lack of the connection between the immediately grasped 
mental image and the forms means that people are not able to distin-
guish between competing images of thoughts, feelings and acts, nor to 
identify and understand them. For example, in the private approach to 
rules, the lack of connection between the mental image and the rule’s 
order means that the agents are unable to identify the regular order of 
the rule, i.e. the regularity of the rule itself (Wittgenstein (1953: §§ 227; 
see also §§ 208, 223, 225), or to distinguish the right from the good ap-
plication, thereby preventing agents from following the rule.
Wittgenstein clearly argues that ‘The essential thing about private 
experience is really not that each person possesses his own exemplar, 
but that nobody knows whether other people also have this or some-
thing else’ (Wittgenstein 1953: § 272; see also 269). Moreover, besides 
the intersubjective obscurity of the private experience, the private thing 
cannot be exteriorizable. Wittgenstein’s approach to private experience 
goes further and sustains that when the intersubjective understanding is 
lacking, there is nothing to be exteriorized – ‘[The] private exhibition is 
an illusion’ (Wittgenstein 1953: § 311; see also §§ 376, 377, 378, 382, 
347) or chimera (Wittgenstein 1953: II, xi: 27; see also 81, 97, 177). 
For example, a private rule prevents others from understanding if and 
how the agent is following a rule (e.g. is obeying or disobeying the rule) 
because there is nothing to understand. ‘It is not possible to obey a rule 
‘privately’ (Wittgenstein 1953: § 202). 
Accordingly, accepting that private exhibitions are illusions or chi-
meras, when instead of going to bed and taking off her fancy clothes, 
Nora reappears with her clothes signalling her inner changing, not only 
could the others understand it as the exteriorization of her inner chang-
ing, but also even she would not understand what she was doing, i.e. 
what was happening inside her. Nora returning with her outdoor clothes 
would be an arbitrary and senseless gesture not only for Torvald but 
also, and mainly, for herself. For instance, the incapacity to remember 
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the connection between the mental image and lack of the connection be-
tween the immediately grasped mental image and its exhibition allows 
for neither identifying (understanding) nor communicating the personal 
changing. 
It is true that Wittgenstein’s reflection on language, mainly on 
rule-following, explicitly mentions the experience of the immediate 
grasping of the meaning of a word in accord with a use (Wittgenstein 
1953: §§ 138, 139, 191, 197) to understand the whole thought in a flash 
(Wittgenstein 1953: § 319) and to ‘grasp the rule’ (Wittgenstein 1953: § 
155, 179, 184, 321, I, 176). For example, occurring during the applica-
tion of rules, suddenly grasping the rule corresponds to the awareness 
of the (right) direction to follow. For instance, someone can be in doubt 
about the direction to take when suddenly the agent realizes under that 
‘Now I know how to go on’ (Wittgenstein 1953: § 179), i.e. ‘I know or 
understand how to follow the rule’. 
Nonetheless, Wittgenstein asserts: ‘‘What happens when a man 
suddenly understands?’ – The question is badly framed. If it is a ques-
tion about the meaning of the expression ‘sudden understanding’, the 
answer is not to point to a process that we give this name to. – The ques-
tion might mean: what are the tokens of sudden understanding; what 
are its characteristic psychical accompaniments?’ (Wittgenstein 1953: 
§ 321; see also 155, 179; see Addis 1999; Hunter 1977). Lacking these 
tokens, the non-assertible internal miracle of changing, together with 
the purely mental and private experience of grasping this change, allows 
understanding neither the images of thoughts, feelings (Wittgenstein 
1953: § 243–315), or rules (Wittgenstein 1953: § 202) nor their signif-
icant exteriorization. 
As Wittgenstein clearly puts it: ‘An ‘inner process’ stands in need 
of outward criteria’ (Wittgenstein 1953: §§ 243, 272, 280, 294), i.e. 
without external, intersubjective and public criteria the inner private 
image is mute, and the private image is meaningless. The outward 
criteria, which address the problem of the communication of our per-
sonal (but not private) experiences (Wittgenstein 1953 §§ 380, 378), 
require a valuable justification for one’s own and others’ criteria, 
making individual experiences common (Wittgenstein 1953: § 378). 
Notwithstanding their oracular formulation in Philosophical Investi-
gations (1953) – there are only five allusions to the concept of form of 
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life (see Wittgenstein 1953: §§ 19, 23, 241, II, i, p. 174 e II, xi, p. 226 
e) – Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language established the agreement 
on forms of life as the last criterion allowing common individual ex-
periences. Thus, regardless of the debate on the nature of those forms 
(e.g. unity (Garver 1990) vs. plural (Haller 1988); linguistic (Garver 
1990), biological (Hunter 1968) or anthropo-socio-cultural (Comet-
ti 1996)), as criteria, customs, institutions and practices allow us to 
communicate our internal experiences. Accordingly, personal chang-
ing communication depends on criteria. 
3. Criteria and the fantasy of the private language 
Nevertheless, Cavell also refuses the fantasy of the private language 
argument – it underlies ‘the wish to deny the publicness of language’ 
(Cavell 1979; 351). As a fantasy, a private language ‘can be understood 
as an attempt to account for, and protect, our separateness, our unknow-
ingness, our unwillingness or incapacity either to know or to be known 
[and its failure] signifies: … that nevertheless there is no end to our 
separateness. We are endlessly separate, for no reason’ (Cavell 1979: 
369; see also 461). A private language denies the ineradicable gap (or 
separateness) between the self and the others, and the self itself (Cavell 
1979, 1990; see Mulhall 1994). 
From this perspective, which affiliates Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
to the existential philosophical tradition of Pascal (Cavell 1969), Kier-
kegaard (1969, 1979, 1990) and Camus (1969), and without mentioning 
the tension relationship between the claims of publicity and expressive-
ness (Cavell 1979; see Mulhall 1994), Cavell stresses Wittgenstein’s 
appeals to criteria. These assess the public value of people’s words to-
wards others and themselves (Cavell 1969, 1979, 1990), allowing them 
to overcome the denial of separateness. Therefore, although people are 
irremissibly separated, they can share the public content of their words. 
The appeal to criteria corresponds then to a claim of community be-
cause we have to prove to others that we are not wrong, or that our per-
sonal convictions neither isolate us from the others, nor from ourselves 
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(Cavell 1979, 1990). The appeal to criteria is also a claim of rationality 
because the ‘intelligibility of others to himself or herself, and of him-
self or herself to others’ (Cavell 1990: xxxi; see also 1979) is based 
on a rational speaking. Also, to be rational implies the ability to speak 
for oneself from a requirement of mutuality. For example, when Nora 
explicitly decided to abandon her husband she was challenging nine-
teenth-century social and political institutions and customs or criteria 
that defined the ‘right or the good woman’ as a woman who sacrifices 
herself for her husband (Langås 2005; Templeton 1989; Yuehua 2009). 
Nora’s final decision later referred to a new criterion (e.g. the right and 
the good woman is a free person), which allows justifying to herself 
and to society why she cannot maintain support for an institution that 
fostered her irresponsibility and dependence. 
Although Cavell is seriously committed to the claim for community 
since the search for criteria (reasons or explanations) comes to an end – 
Cavell’s (1979, 1990) exegesis of Wittgenstein emphasizes the fact that 
‘Explanations come to an end somewhere.’ (Wittgenstein 1953: §1; see 
Cavell 1979, 1990) – human communication towards others and oneself 
always risks disagreement, incomprehension, obscurity, scepticism and 
absurdity (e.g. ‘I fail to manifest our criteria accurately or that the other 
fails to read them accurately’ (Cavell 1979: 477)). Indeed, although a 
private language is a fantasy, refusing individuals’ separateness, and 
criteria challenge this fact, allowing the publicity of experiences, it 
does not mean that criteria fulfil absolutely the gap between persons, 
i.e. that the publicity of ‘images’ is exempt from disagreements, misun-
derstandings and conflicts (e.g. the conflict between persons’ claim of 
expressiveness, the claim of community and rationality, the inner and 
the outer, the self and the others (Cavell 1979). 
Moreover, in spite of the complex relationships between the personal 
inner self and the outer others, and even the complex relationship between 
the self itself (Cavell 1979, 1990; see Mulhall 1994, 2007) or the double 
opaqueness – towards others and towards oneself – the underestimation 
of rules does not allow understanding the social contribution to personal 
changing, as stated above. Indeed, viewing that the claim of community 
and reason is seen as a radical subjective experience for publishing inner 
thoughts or feelings – ‘the soul’s investigation of itself’ (Cavell 1979: 15) 
– Cavell dissociates rules from personal explanations or reasons in this 
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investigation. ‘The soul’s investigation of itself’ would be challenged by 
a guiding rule, mainly when someone lost their way. As also stated above, 
seen as a priori orders (Cavell 1979, 1990), the consequences of which 
are ‘confined and scored’ (Cavell 1990: 115), rules prevent understanding 
the quest for the personal recovery of voice. 
Nevertheless, admitting that rules are not forcibly a priori (Witt-
genstein 1953 §§ 68, 84, 94), one may not dissociate personal changing 
from rules, even if abnormal (moral) rules. Moreover, besides the fact 
that there is no criterion for defining criteria (Wolgast 1964), the una-
voidable criteria are also not immediately and internally followed by in-
dividuals. Otherwise we would translate the structure of the private ex-
perience into the relationship between agents and forms of life. For that 
reason, even if, as Cavell (1979, 1990) has clearly asserted, criteria are 
in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language the judges of rules’ applica-
tion (Wittgenstein 1953: §§ 56, 185, 692), challenging the private expe-
rience of rules – application of rules requires criteria that offer reasons 
for choosing them and for establishing their public validity (Wellman 
1962) – the search for criteria is not dissociated from the establishment 
of rules. More accurately, the common agreement or understanding on 
forms of life, which distinguishes the wrong from the right rules’ ap-
plication, cannot be verified without that application. Thus, beyond any 
concrete rule application in a concrete case (e.g. the rule of remaining 
in a marriage that requires sacrifice for women in the nineteenth century 
in Europe), political criteria (e.g. equal liberty) can be seen as a pious 
vote or an empty concept. We argue then that persons cannot communi-
cate (their change) without a (common and agreed) rule (Brown 1988; 
Johannessen 1988; Tymoczko 1984) following criteria (Canfield 1974). 
4.  The social scope of personal changing: the role  
of criteria and rules 
Seen as socially transmitted and customary normative injunctions or 
immanently normative dispositions, rules are prescriptive and are un-
derstood by analogy with the obedience of an order (Wittgenstein 1953 
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§§ 202, 228, 230) in spite of the distinction between right and wrong 
rule, and since rules are differently applied, one may distinguish be-
tween abnormal and normal rules (e.g. the student rule of natural num-
bers written as integers 1, 0, 3, 2, 5, 4 (Wittgenstein 1953 § 143; see 
also 141, 142)). Following logical consistency, this abnormal rule is 
also based on a shared form of life. Otherwise it would not be a rule. 
Thus, neither does the abnormality of rules forcibly entail the refusal of 
any rule, nor is an abnormal ambiguous rule a senseless (private) rule. 
For example, albeit in the context of the nineteenth century, Nora’s rule 
to leave her marriage can be seen as an abnormal rule. This rule is not 
forcibly senseless. The fact that in the nineteenth century political leg-
islation could hardly include a woman abandoning her husband did not 
refute that human history was full of similar decisions, and there was 
still a shared moral agreement on human liberty and equality (Locke 
1679 [1960]; Kant 1787 [1968]). 
Furthermore, in spite of the different meaning of criteria in Witt-
genstein’s philosophy (Albritton1959; Canfield 1974; Cavell 1979, 
1990), one may not dismiss the fact that before A Doll’s House was 
written by Ibsen in 1879, political philosophy had already stressed the 
universal value of human dignity (Kant 1787 [1968]) and the univer-
sality of human rights (Locke 1679 [1960]). So, in spite of explicit dis-
criminatory statements, for example against women (e.g. Kant’s (1784 
[1968]) judgment on the avoidance of liberty by the ‘fair sex’), its start-
ing principles (or criteria) were, and are not, compatible with human 
discrimination (e.g. gender or discrimination). For that reason, although 
current political society was still not ordered under there being equal 
political rights for every human being, it does not mean that there is not 
a shared moral understanding of the refusal of women’s treatment as 
foolish children. The abnormal rule did not lack a criterion, i.e. a reason 
or explanation for its use. 
However, the political (and ethical) value of the rule ‘leave the 
cage of dolls’ depends on different criteria. For instance, under the crite-
rion ‘the right or the good woman is a woman who sacrifices herself for 
her husband’, ‘leave the cage of dolls’ can be seen as an unprincipled, 
irresponsible, egoistic and immoral rule. Conversely, under the criterion 
‘the right or the good woman is a free and autonomous woman’, ‘leave 
the cage of dolls’ can be seen as a fair rule. Similarly, the rule ‘remain 
Rules and personal changing 95
in the cage of dolls’ can be seen under ‘the right or the good woman is a 
free and autonomous woman’ as an unprincipled, irresponsible, egoistic 
and immoral rule and a moral one under the criterion ‘the right or the 
good woman is a woman who sacrifices herself for her husband’. For 
that reason, besides constituting what Cavell names the argument of the 
ordinary (Cavell 1979, 1990; see Mulhall 1994, 2007), Nora’s repudia-
tion and acceptance of criteria always entails the choice of rules. Choice 
of rules shows that they are not forcibly a priori limiting the personal 
free quest for a personal voice. Consequently, rules do not limit person-
al liberty nor can personal change following criteria be understandable 
or exteriorizable beyond concrete, even if abnormal, (moral) rules. 
Moreover, since ‘The more abnormal the case, the more doubtful 
it becomes what we are to say’ (Wittgenstein 1952 § 142), and even 
Nora’s decision has almost become uncontroversial – at least in certain 
places in the world – one may not neglect the ‘amount’ of doubt and 
misunderstanding surrounding someone who, in the nineteenth cen-
tury, decided ‘to leave the cage of dolls’ and to live according to the 
Kantian principle (or criteria) of an equal and free human being (Kant 
1785/6 [1968]). Nonetheless, and in spite of the social frame of rules, 
the ‘amount’ of doubt and misunderstanding does not dismiss personal 
responsibility. Applying rules is in Wittgenstein’s philosophy an intrin-
sically personal act – ‘Don’t always think that you read off what you say 
from the facts; that you portray these in words according to rules. For 
even so you would have to apply the rule in the particular case without 
guidance’ (Wittgenstein 1953 § 292).
Applying a rule without guidance can entail applying an abnormal 
rule under a criterion. For example, the rule ‘leave the cage of dolls’ 
could be understood as an abnormal rule under a moral criterion for 
women i.e. ‘the right or the good woman is a free and autonomous 
woman’. Therefore, from our perspective, there is no conflict between 
politically depressed and deprived persons lacking any political rule, 
and cruel and despotic persons following unfair political rules. Howev-
er, there is the conflict between two rules (e.g. the rule of fairness and 
the rule of inequality), which one may say from Wittgenstein’s point of 
view is the conflict between a normal and abnormal rule. 
It is true that Wittgenstein asserts that ‘Not only rules, but also ex-
amples are needed for establishing a practice. Our rules leave loop-holes 
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open, and the practice has to speak for itself.’ (Wittgenstein 1969 §139). 
For example, when children are learning a practice, since they do not 
know the names yet, teachers ought to make use of examples (Wittgen-
stein 1953 §§135, 208, 210). But the fact that the learner can dispense 
with explicit references to rules does not mean that practices are anarchic 
or anomic (Wittgenstein 1969 §139) nor that rules (and criteria) are al-
ways explicitly formulated (Canfield 1974). 
In sum, since rules are not prior to their application, the process 
of the inner changing is encompassed by the establishment of a rule 
under a criterion (e.g. women ought to leave their marriages when their 
husbands do not treat them as ends in themselves (Kant 1785/6 [1968]). 
Accordingly, we cannot change without explicit or implicit (Wittgen-
stein 1969 §95) rules framed by criteria, i.e. any personal change results 
from the public co-evaluation under a guiding rule. 
Conclusions
Even if we acknowledge the contribution of Cavell’s exegesis of Witt-
genstein to expose the existential issues underlying Wittgenstein’s phi-
losophy, we stress the social and public frame of any search for personal 
changing. Inspired by Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, we argued 
that any personal changing requires the mediation of political rules, fol-
lowing criteria, even though these rules are in the end abnormal rules. 
We also argued that although criteria do certify the public content of 
those rules, criteria and rules are not immediately followed by individ-
uals. Customs are embedded in societies’ rules and institutions are sys-
tems of rules (Rawls 1971). 
From these premises we concluded that individual changing results 
from a guiding public rule even if it is an abnormal public rule. We can-
not change without explicit or implicit (Wittgenstein 1969 § 95) rules. 
Future research could explain the changing of political rules under 
the Wittgensteinian concept of ‘seeing-as’. Future research could also 
reassess the understanding of a personal judgment without rules under 
Kant’s (1790 [1968]) theory of taste judgment. Explicitly articulated by 
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Cavell (1990), the Kantian approach to rules and judgments can also 
offer sound arguments to the endless claim for justice. 
Finally, future research could also clarify the political consequenc-
es of erasing the tragic dimension of politics and further the already ex-
isting reflection on the relationship between the philosophical thought 
of Wittgenstein and Nietzsche (e.g. Bowls 2003; Cavell 1990; Williams 
1993). Instead of a political consensus on rules and criteria, the tragic 
dimension of our political existence warns us about the unavoidable gap 
between an ideal fair society and the current political injustices (Cavell 
1967, 1997) and our political responsibility to demand a decent and fair 
human society.
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The Ethico-Political Dimension of Foucault’s Thought
Marta Faustino
1. Introduction
Influential scholarship has criticized Foucault for not offering a posi-
tive account of ethics. More moderate readings find it difficult to rec-
oncile his earlier views on power, society and subjectivity with the 
concern with ethics and politics expressed in the final period of his 
thought. Together with his analyses in the 1970s of the mechanisms of 
social control and normalization in modern societies – analyses which 
seem to leave little room for any consistent idea of human freedom, 
autonomy or sovereignty – his criticisms of humanism, rationality and 
universalism have frequently been used to build an image of Foucault 
as a quasi-nihilistic thinker in whose view no satisfying ethics can 
ever be realized. And yet, if there is something that characterizes Fou-
cault’s work as a whole – and not only his later writings, in which 
ethical questions are most evidently present – it is his constant chal-
lenging of settled values and beliefs about ourselves and the social 
world surrounding us. As Richard Lynch puts it, ‘Foucault challenges, 
questions, criticizes, and ‘dereifies’ social norms, structures, and in-
stitutions; he calls into question our presuppositions about society and 
individuals, including ourselves. Foucault disconcerts us in much the 
same way as Socrates disconcerted his fellow Athenians in the agora 
2400 years ago’ (Lynch 2016: 3). In Foucault’s own view, this critical 
function, which lies at the heart of his understanding and practice of 
philosophy, indeed derives from the Socratic injunction ‘Take care 
of yourself ’, which he interprets as a call to ‘[m]ake freedom your 
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foundation, through the mastery of yourself ’ (ECS: 301)1. Foucault 
remains one of the few philosophers of his time to genuinely incorpo-
rate this injunction and we find resonances of it throughout his entire 
work. In fact, if we view ethics as concerning not obedience to certain 
codes of behaviour or compliance with specific systems of values and 
beliefs, but rather, in Foucauldian terms, the relationship between the 
self and itself and the way it constitutes itself as the subject of its own 
actions, then Foucault’s thought is ethical through and through, and 
his late focus on the ethics of care of the self is nothing but the apex 
of his entire philosophical endeavour. 
This paper aims to contribute to a recent trend in Foucault studies 
that is currently bringing to light the deep ethical and political dimen-
sions of Foucault’s thought.2 Although I focus on his works from the 
1980s – namely the second and third volumes of The History of Sex-
uality (The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self) and the lecture 
course on The Hermeneutics of the Subject, together with interviews 
and short essays from the same period – my aim is to highlight top-
ics that, while explicitly thematized in the last period of his thought, 
also shed light on the ethical and political significance of his phil-
osophical project as a whole, demonstrating the continuity of these 
later writings with his earlier works from the 1960s and 70s. Through 
analysis of Foucault’s emphasis on the technologies of the self as a 
possible means of mastery over oneself (2), his encouragement of the 
reestablishment of an ethics of the self as a practice of freedom and 
liberation (3), and his ethical ideal of an aesthetics of existence (4), 
I hope to make apparent both Foucault’s lifelong ethical and political 
engagement with the challenges of his time and his use of philosophy 
as a weapon of resistance and promotion of individual governance, 
freedom and liberation (5).
1 Abbreviations are used for references to works of Foucault and Nietzsche. Cf. 
references at the end of the article.
2 See, for example, O’Leary (2002), Harrer (2005), Kelly (2013), Simons (2013), 
Koopman (2013), Smith (2015), and Lynch (2016).
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2. The Technologies of the Self
In a seminar delivered at the University of Vermont in 1982, Foucault 
identifies four types of technologies of practical reason through which 
individuals acquire self-knowledge and self-understanding while at the 
same time submitting to a certain form of domination that transforms 
their conduct and attitudes: technologies of production (which allow 
individuals to produce things); technologies of sign systems (which al-
low individuals to use meaningful signs and symbols); technologies of 
power (which determine the individual’s behaviour, submitting and ob-
jectifying it to certain ends); and technologies of the self (which allow 
individuals to produce certain changes in themselves in order to realize 
individual ends) (cf. TS: 225). Even though these technologies ‘hard-
ly ever function separately’, and Foucault’s declared aim is ‘to show 
their specific nature and their constant interaction’, his focus has mainly 
been the last two in an attempt to build ‘a history of the organization of 
knowledge with respect to both domination and the self’ (TS: 225). In 
the same seminar, however, Foucault himself recognizes that he might 
have overstressed the impact of technologies of power and domination 
in modern societies, resulting in an unbalanced, asymmetrical and re-
ductive view on power (idem). In the late period of his writing, he seeks 
precisely to re-establish this balance by bringing to the fore ‘the inter-
action between oneself and others’ and ‘the technologies of individual 
domination, in the mode of action that an individual exercises upon 
himself by means of the technologies of the self’ (TS: 225). 
These ‘technologies of the self’, a form of training and modifica-
tion of individuals which Foucault explicitly opposes to the technolo-
gies of power or domination that occupied him for most of his produc-
tive life, are described as techniques that ‘permit individuals to effect 
by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number of 
operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way 
of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state 
of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality’ (TS: 225; cf. 
UP: 10–11). Thus, even though it does not correspond to a completely 
new interest for Foucault, instead representing a shift in focus to a prob-
lem that concerned him ‘for more than twenty-five years’ (TS: 224), 
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this late turn to the technologies of the self does indeed add complex-
ity to his accounts of social order and subjectivity, dispelling possible 
(mis)readings of his thought. More concretely, Foucault’s criticism of 
disciplinary power and social control gave way to a renewed concern 
with ethics as ‘care of the self’ and with the means by which people 
can, despite those oppressive and disciplining powers, offer resistance 
by governing, creating and shaping themselves. Considering the whole 
picture, subjects are thus far from being ‘formless, conditionable crea-
tures’, to use Honneth’s expression (Honneth 1991: 199), dominated 
by trans-subjective systems of micro-powers that oppress, control and 
discipline them, but are rather individuals who cope (or at least can 
cope) with those oppressing external forces in order to fashion their 
lives and selves. 
The Greek and Latin tradition of epimeleia heautou (care of the 
self), to which Foucault devotes a major part of his late work, is a para-
digmatic example of the full realization and embodiment of these ‘tech-
nologies of the self’ as an ‘art of living’ (tekhnē tou biou), or a ‘govern-
ment of oneself’ (cf. UP; CS; HS). Particularly striking to Foucault in 
this tradition of thought is how ethics was conceived in total independ-
ence of any kind of institutional, juridical, authoritarian or disciplinary 
structure (GE: 260) and was thus unassociated with any attempt to nor-
malize the population (GE: 254). Stoic ethics, for example, was neither 
universally imposed nor applicable to all: ‘it was not a question of giv-
ing a pattern of behavior for everybody. It was a personal choice for a 
small elite’ (GE: 254).3 The injunction to take care of oneself was, to be 
sure, a commandment that was fully ingrained in Greco-Roman culture 
and thus cannot be conceived as a pure individual initiative or creation, 
free of any kind of external influence or power. In this sense, Foucault 
stresses the extent to which practices of the self were models that were 
‘proposed, suggested, imposed upon [the individual] by his culture, his 
society, and his social group’ (ECS: 291). What is at stake here is there-
fore not the opposition between purely autonomous self-constitution 
and a coercive heteronomous model of subjectivation, but rather the 
3 Cf. also GE (271): ‘In antiquity, this work on the self with its attendant austerity is 
not imposed on the individual by means of civil law or religious obligation, but it 
is a choice about existence made by the individual. People decide for themselves 
whether or not to care for themselves’. 
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significant distinction between a completely passive subject, who is 
simply the product of micro external powers exerted over him, and a 
relatively active subject who, among and despite those external powers, 
can still emerge as an ethical subject and be actively engaged in his own 
self-constitution. 
The passivity and activity of the subject are not contrasting ele-
ments; they are complementary perspectives in Foucault’s later concep-
tion of subjectivity since both refer to different forms of constitution 
(or ‘objectification’) of the subject.4 In this sense, it seems legitimate to 
argue that Foucault’s so-called ‘ethical turn’ constitutes a development 
and complexification of – rather than a break with – his earlier views on 
subjectivity.5 Throughout his work, Foucault repeatedly rejects, proba-
bly under the influence of Nietzsche,6 the idea of the subject as a sub-
stance (which is completely different from rejecting the concept of the 
subject altogether): the subject is not a substance but a form, and this 
form is fluid, flexible and changeable, ‘not primarily or always identical 
to itself’ (ETS: 290). Thus, subjects are indeed ‘formless, conditiona-
ble creatures’, but in a fundamentally different sense from the idea ex-
pressed by Honneth: they are formless and conditionable because they 
do not have a fixed, eternal, unchangeable, monadic essence and are 
thus subject to modification or molding by everything with which they 
are in contact and to which they are related – be it an external coercive 
structure or a model they voluntarily apply to themselves.7 In this sense, 
the ascetic practices that characterize the ancient culture of the self, 
 
4 See SP (326–327), where Foucault describes the ‘three modes of objectification 
that transform human beings into subjects’, the last of which is ‘the way a human 
being turns him- or herself into a subject’.
5 This is Sebastian Harrer’s position. He argues that ‘there is a ‘conceptual continu-
ity’, rather than a break, between Foucault’s earlier works on normalizing power, 
and his later works, on ethical self-constitution’ since ‘‘fabrication’ and ‘self-con-
stitution’ are but two aspects of subjectivation’ (Harrer 2005: 75). See also Kelly 
(2013), Simons (2013), Koopman (2013) and Smith (2015: 145).
6 On Nietzsche’s conception of subjectivity, see Constâncio, Branco & Ryan 
(2015).
7 Cf. AE (50–51): ‘… the subject is constituted through practices of subjection, or, 
in a more autonomous way, through practices of liberation, of liberty, as in Antiq-
uity, on the basis, of course, of a number of rules, styles, inventions to be found in 
the cultural environment’. 
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for example, are also disciplinary practices; the fundamental difference 
lies in the fact that it is the subject himself who voluntarily decides to 
submit himself to them in an attempt to govern himself, or to become 
master of himself.8 
Foucault’s later conception of ethics and subjectivity thus implies 
the rejection of both the model of a pure autonomous constitution of 
the subject, independent of any power relations, and the model of a 
completely heteronomous subject, fully determined by them. As Daniel 
Smith puts it, ‘ethical practices are of course saturated with power re-
lations … But it is not true, either, that the subject is totally determined 
by external influences; not in the sense that there is always a point of 
absolute freedom hidden deep within us that cannot be completely sub-
jected to power, but rather that the self, in addition to being influenced 
by outside forces, also affects itself’ (Smith 2015: 145). Foucault’s late 
acknowledgment of the possibility of a power relation of the self over 
the self (that is, the possibility that individuals become masters of their 
own processes of subjectification) rules out ‘the reductionist idea of a 
one-sided rule of force’ that Honneth, among others, too simplistically 
ascribes to his social theory.9
3. The Ethics of the Self as a Practice of Freedom
In one of his last interviews, Foucault explicitly claims that freedom is 
the ontological condition of ethics or, in another formulation, that eth-
ics is the conscious practice of freedom (cf. ECS: 284). This statement 
might seem paradoxical when one considers one of the most persistent 
criticisms of his thought – namely, the apparent incompatibility between 
his supposed conception of power and any idea of human freedom or 
 
8 On this topic, see Harrer, (2005).
9 For a discussion of Honneth’s criticism of Foucault (and Nietzsche), see Con-
stâncio/Faustino (forthcoming). See also Kelly (2013) and Ingram (2006) for a 
defence of Foucault against Habermas’s criticism, which in this respect is similar 
to Honneth’s.
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autonomy. This widespread criticism is, however, based on a common 
misinterpretation of his notion of power, which, in the same interview 
from 1984, Foucault laments and tries to correct: 
… the claim that ‘you see power everywhere, thus there is no room for freedom’ 
seems to me absolutely inadequate. The idea that power is a system of domination 
that controls everything and leaves no room for freedom cannot be attributed to 
me. (ECS: 293)
Such a view cannot be attributed to Foucault because, once again fol-
lowing the track laid by Nietzsche, his conception of power necessari-
ly involves the ideas of relation, resistance and thus also freedom. Far 
from being incompatible with the omnipresence of power, freedom 
is rather the very condition of the possibility of power – that is to 
say, of relations of power.10 For Foucault, just as for Nietzsche, every 
human relationship, be it personal, amorous, sexual, political, social, 
economic, institutional or educational, is a relation of power in the 
sense that it always involves one person’s trying to dominate and con-
trol the conduct of the other. But since this power is always relational 
and the same aim can be found in the other party, power relations are 
necessarily mobile, modifiable, unstable and reversible. The possibil-
ity of change and reversion is the very essence of a power relation: 
‘If one of them were completely at the other’s disposal and became 
his thing, an object on which he could wreak boundless and limitless 
violence, there wouldn’t be any relations of power’ (ECS: 292). This 
means, first of all, that power relations require at least a certain degree 
of freedom on both sides.11 This applies even to situations where the 
power equilibrium is clearly unbalanced and asymmetrical: power can 
only be exerted if the dominated party still has the slightest ability to 
revert the situation – for example, at the limit, by killing himself or the 
 
10 Cf. ECS (291): ‘I scarcely use the word power, and if I use it on occasion it is 
simply as shorthand for the expression I generally use: relations of power.’ See 
also SP (340–342).
11 In this sense, Foucault explicitly inverts the position that is often ascribed to him: 
‘I refuse to reply to the question I am sometimes asked: ‘But if power is every-
where, there is no freedom.’ I answer that if there are relations of power in every 
social field, this is because there is freedom everywhere’ (ECS: 292).
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domineering party. Secondly, however, this also implies that any pow-
er relation necessarily involves resistance: ‘in power relations there is 
necessarily the possibility of resistance because if there were no pos-
sibility of resistance (of violent resistance, flight, deception, strategies 
capable of reversing the situation), there would be no power relations 
at all’ (ECS: 292). Agonism thus lies at the very heart of Foucault’s 
conception of power; the entire net of power relations is characterized 
by ‘permanent provocation’, which is at the same time ‘mutual in-
citement and struggle’ (SP: 342). There are, of course, cases of states 
of domination which remain ‘blocked’ or ‘frozen’ for a long period 
of time, where the degree of freedom of the oppressed person(s) is 
extremely limited and narrow, but even in such rare cases, resistance 
is there, even if only as a possibility: ‘In such cases of domination, be 
they economic, social, institutional, or sexual, the problem is knowing 
where resistance will develop’ (ECS: 292).12
Foucault distinguishes practices of freedom from practices of lib-
eration, which might be needed to make practices of freedom possible 
– in cases of strong political, cultural or social states of domination, for 
example – but are not in themselves sufficient to produce acceptable, 
satisfying lives. Thus, the ethical question is not ‘what do I have to 
liberate myself from?’ but rather ‘how can I practice my freedom?’, or 
‘what can I do with my available freedom?’ (cf. GE: 276; ECS: 282–
284). The Greco-Roman tradition of the care of the self is once again 
Foucault’s model in this regard. For the Greeks, freedom was equivalent 
to non-slavery: to be free meant not being the slave of another person, 
city, ruler or one’s passions and appetites. The care of the self was a 
particular means of properly practising freedom – that is, of knowing 
oneself, shaping oneself, overcoming oneself and becoming master of 
oneself: ‘with respect to oneself one establishes a certain relationship 
of domination, of mastery, which was called arkhē, or power, command’ 
(ECS: 286–287).13 In this sense, the particular ēthos of the care of the 
12 For an excellent account of Foucault’s conceptions of power, freedom and re-
sistance, see Simons (2013). See also Allen (2013) for a retrospective view on 
Foucault’s notions of power and subjectivity.
13 Note that concern for oneself does not imply neglecting others, but merely in-
volves acknowledging the ethical priority of caring for oneself over caring for 
others. Taking care of oneself is required if one is to take good care of others and 
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self was itself a form of conversion of power, or ‘a way of limiting 
and controlling power’ (ECS: 288), a form of resistance to the dangers 
not only of slavery but also of abuse of power. It is in this sense that, 
inspired by the ethics of concern for the self, Foucault rejects both the 
possibility of a society freed from all oppressive or repressive structures 
and the impossibility of active resistance to them: 
The idea that there could exist a state of communication that would allow games 
of truth to circulate freely, without any constraints or coercive effects, seems 
utopian to me. […] I do not think that a society can exist without power rela-
tions, if by that we mean the strategies by which individuals try to direct and 
control the conduct of others. The problem, then, is not to try to dissolve them 
in the utopia of completely transparent communication but to acquire the rules 
of law, the management techniques, and also the ēthos, the practice of the self, 
that will allow us to play these games of power with as little domination as 
possible. (ECS: 298) 
Thus, contrary to authors like Sartre, Foucault does not view power as 
evil in itself; as a necessary component of any relationship, it is also a 
condition of the possibility of things like love and passion, education 
and transmission of knowledge, parenting, medical practices, and so 
on (cf. ECS: 298–299). The problem is the possible abuse of power and 
authority, especially by the state and its totalizing institutions, which, 
according to Foucault, can only be controlled through new forms of 
subjectivity and the renewal of an ethics based on practices of the self 
and freedom. This, in his view, is the crucial point of struggles for polit-
ical rights and against abusive forms of government (cf. ECS: 299). Be-
cause in Foucault’s view our current challenge is not simply to ‘discover 
what we are’ but also to ‘refuse what we are’, we need, in his words, 
‘to imagine and to build up what we could be to get rid of this kind of 
political ‘double bind’, which is the simultaneous individualization and 
totalization of modern power structures’ (SP: 336).
to be a good ruler, citizen, husband, father or friend: ‘a person who took proper 
care of himself would, by the same token, be able to conduct himself properly in 
relation to others and for others. A city in which everybody took proper care of 
himself would be a city that functioned well and found in this the ethical principle 
of its permanence’ (ECS: 287).
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4. The Aesthetics of Existence
A last major point of inspiration for Foucault from the ancient tradition of 
the concern for the self was how the choice to take care of oneself was to 
a great extent motivated and informed by the wish to live a beautiful life 
or, in Foucault’s preferred formulation, to create oneself as a work of art 
and establish what he calls an ‘aesthetics of existence’ (cf. GE: 261, 262).14 
In other words, what characterizes this ethical tradition in contrast to later 
religious or juridical frameworks is that one decides to submit to certain 
rigid and austere moral codes not out of blind respect or obedience to the 
(rational, divine or civil) law, but out of individual concern for oneself and a 
personal choice to acquire an ēthos or way of being that is ‘good, beautiful, 
honorable, estimable, memorable and exemplary’ (ECS: 286; cf. also GE: 
266–268, 271). Even though Foucault rejects the idea that this Greco-Ro-
man model might offer a plausible alternative to the institutionalization of 
modern ethics,15 he believes we can nevertheless learn something from it: 
We don’t have to choose between our world and the Greek world. But since we can see 
very well that some of the main principles of our ethics have been related at a certain 
moment to an aesthetics of existence, I think that this kind of historical analysis can be 
useful. For centuries we have been convinced that between our ethics, our personal eth-
ics, our everyday life, and the great political and social and economic structures, there 
were analytical relations, and that we couldn’t change anything, for instance, in our sex 
life or our family life, without ruining our economy, our democracy, and so on. I think 
we have to get rid of this idea of an analytical or necessary link between ethics and other 
social or economic or political structures. (GE: 261)
Despite his general academic and descriptive tone and his reluctance 
to provide ‘solutions’ (cf. GE: 256), Foucault often expresses his 
14 For criticism of Foucault’s overemphasis on the aesthetic (compared to the thera-
peutic) character of the Hellenistic schools, see Ure (2007).
15 Cf. GE (256): ‘I am not looking for an alternative; you can’t find the solution of 
a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other 
people.’ As Paul Veyne (1993: 2) puts it, ‘Foucault’s affinity with ancient morality 
is reduced to the modern reappearance of a single card in a completely new hand: 
the card of the self working on the self, the aestheticization of the subject, in two 
very different moralities and two very different societies.’ 
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admiration for this Hellenic model of self-creation and his yearning 
for its rebirth in modern societies:16 
The idea of the bios as a material for an aesthetic piece of art is something that 
fascinates me. […] What strikes me is the fact that, in our society, art has become 
something that is related only to objects and not to individuals or to life. That art 
is something which is specialized or done by experts who are artists. But couldn’t 
everyone’s life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art 
object but not our life? (GE: 260–261)
In conceiving the possibility and desirability of an ‘aesthetics of existence’, 
Foucault admittedly comes again very close to Nietzsche’s own conception 
of ethics and subjectivity, as expressed in Daybreak and The Gay Science, 
for example.17 In a well-known passage from the latter, Nietzsche claims:
To ‘give style’ to one’s character – a great and rare art! It is practiced by those who 
survey all the strengths and weaknesses that their nature has to offer and then fit 
them into an artistic plan until each appears as art and reason and even weakness-
es delight the eye. (GS:290)
Nietzsche opposes the ‘strong and domineering natures’ who devote 
themselves to the ‘long practice and daily work’ of aesthetic self-culti-
vation to ‘the weak characters with no power over themselves who hate 
the constraint of style’ (GS: 290). The ideal, which both Nietzsche and 
Foucault borrow from the Hellenistic schools, is the exercise of ‘a perfect 
mastery over oneself’ (GE: 259). A further point of agreement (equally 
inspired by the ancient tradition of the care of the self) between Nietzsche 
and Foucault is that the practice of cultivating one’s self involves creation 
and creativity rather than knowledge and the discovery of a supposed 
essence. That is, cultivating one’s self is a matter not of discovering one’s 
true or authentic hidden self but rather of creating it, shaping it, ‘giv-
ing style’ to it. Explicitly acknowledging the affinity between Nietzsche’s 
view and his own in this regard, Foucault claims that ‘from the idea that 
16 On the ‘aesthetics of existence’ as Foucault’s positive alternative to ‘ethics in its 
canonical forms’, see Smith (2015). See also Veyne (1993) and Davidson (2006) 
for Foucault’s own appropriation and use of Greek ethics.
17 On the influence of Nietzsche on Foucault’s aesthetic conception of ethics, see 
Ansell-Pearson (1991, 2015).
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the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical conse-
quence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art’ (GE: 262). Whereas 
Nietzsche illustrates this process with the image of a ‘gardener’ who cul-
tivates his drives ‘as productively and profitably as a beautiful fruit on a 
trellis’ (D: 560), Foucault uses the metaphors of a governor, the head of 
an enterprise, a head of household, and ‘a sovereign against whom there 
would no longer be revolts’ (GE: 272). According to Foucault, this idea of 
perfect governance of oneself remained the central focus of ancient ethics 
for centuries, until the advent of Christianity.18 
If the culture of the self (whose ‘golden age’ Foucault identifies in 
the first and second centuries A.D.) did not disappear with Christianity, 
it was nevertheless appropriated, displaced and put to different uses in 
the new religious framework. More concretely, ‘the problem of ethics as 
an aesthetics of existence [was] covered over by the problem of purifi-
cation’ (GE: 274), and the self, which had been previously the material 
for the crafting of a work of art, became something to be deciphered and 
renounced, just as concentration on one’s self was opposed to God’s will, 
conceived as a serious obstacle to the soul’s salvation (cf. GE: 271; HS: 
250). Foucault sees Christianity as one of the biggest causes of the ob-
scuration and neglect of the tradition of the care of the self in modern 
societies. Under the influence of the Christian message of altruism and 
self-denial, we became used to the idea that self-love is wrong and that 
care for oneself is a despicable form of egoism. As a consequence, we 
tend to look somewhat suspiciously on a form of morality that revolves 
around notions like ‘caring for oneself’, ‘devoting oneself to oneself’, 
‘withdrawing into oneself’, and so on (cf. HS: 12–13). Another cause 
of the obliteration of this tradition of thought is the ‘history of truth’, 
which is related to what Foucault calls the ‘Cartesian moment’ (cf. HS: 
14, 17ss.). Very succinctly, Descartes symbolizes the movement that, in 
the modern age, requalified and prioritized the principle ‘know yourself’ 
over ‘care for your self’ by placing self-evidence at the foundation of 
philosophical inquiry and making knowledge independent of spiritual 
transformation. The care of the self, which had until then been the very 
foundation of philosophy, was thereby disqualified and philosophically 
18 This goal of perfect governance of the self is equivalent to ‘a sort of permanent 
political relationship between self and self’ (GE: 272). Political metaphors for the 
self are also abundant in Nietzsche; see, for example, BGE (12, 19).
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discredited (cf. HS: 14). For these reasons, Foucault believes, the care 
of the self was ultimately neglected and ‘left in the shadow’ by Western 
thought ‘in its reconstruction of its own history’ (HS: 12).
Despite the episodic reappearance of an aesthetics of existence in 
the Renaissance and in nineteenth-century dandyism19 – and also the 
successive philosophical attempts to reconstitute an ethics of the self 
by, among others, Montaigne, Stirner, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (cf. 
HS: 251) – Foucault suggests that we ‘have hardly any remnant of the 
idea in our society that the principal work of art in which one must 
apply aesthetic values, is oneself, one’s life, one’s existence’ (GE: 271). 
There is also no real care of the self today, at least not in the organized 
and dominant way characteristic of antiquity, which leads Foucault to 
deny that ‘we have anything to be proud of in our current efforts to re-
constitute an ethic of the self’ and to suspect that ‘we find it impossible 
today to constitute an ethic of the self’ (HS: 251–252). Nevertheless, 
Foucault believes that the constitution of a new ethic of the self ‘may be 
an urgent, fundamental, and politically indispensable task’ since ‘there 
is no first or final point of resistance to political power other than in the 
relationship one has to oneself’ (HS: 252).20
5. Philosophy as a Weapon of Resistance
In one of the late interviews quoted above, Foucault agrees that an im-
portant function of philosophy has always been to warn of the dangers of 
power, adding that ‘philosophy is that which calls into question domina-
tion at every level and in every form in which it exists, whether political, 
19 On Baudelaire’s dandysme, see for example WE (312): ‘Modern man, for Baude-
laire, is not the man who goes off to discover himself, his secrets and his hidden 
truth; he is the man who tries to invent himself. This modernity does not ‘liberate 
man in his own being’; it compels him to face the task of producing himself.’ 
20 In an interview from 1984, Foucault tempers this by claiming that the relation-
ship of the self to the self is not the only possible point of resistance to political 
power: rather, the relationship of the self to itself is essential to his concept of 
‘governmentality’ which, in turn, ‘makes it possible to bring out the freedom of 
the subject and its relationship to others’ (ECS: 299–300).
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economic, sexual, institutional, or what have you’ (ECS: 300–301). Fou-
cault consistently pursues this aim throughout his work, even if its strong 
ethical and political significance was not brought to the fore until the final 
period of his thought. If the most challenging philosophical, ethical and 
political task nowadays is to ‘refuse what we are’ (SP: 336) through the 
establishment of new practices of subjectivity and a new ethics of the self, 
then Foucault’s writings, in particular his warnings against modern disci-
plinary power and his presentation of alternative modes of self-constitu-
tion, were to a great extent meant to function as a powerful catalyst in this 
regard.21 In effect, to warn of the dangers of power and call into question 
domination at every level is at the same time to promote individual liber-
ation and freedom – a role with which Foucault identified significantly: 
My role – and that is too emphatic a word – is to show people that they are much 
freer than they feel, that people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes which 
have been built up at a certain moment during history, and that this so-called 
evidence can be criticized and destroyed. To change something in the minds of 
people – that’s the role of an intellectual. (TPS: 10)
In the same interview, Foucault adds that one of his most important 
aims has always been to show how our most familiar landscapes are not 
necessary or universal entities but rather a product of very complex po-
litical and social processes which have been forgotten (TPS: 11). Bring-
ing them to light is both the first step in overcoming them and Foucault’s 
particular contribution in this regard. Thus, Foucault’s analyses in the 
1970s on the coercive and oppressive nature of modern disciplinary so-
cieties are far from expressing a spirit of consent or resignation: within 
limits, resistance to disciplinary power is possible, and Foucault’s gene-
alogical work aims to contribute precisely to this aim. In this context, it 
seems appropriate to quote Veyne’s description of Foucault’s philosoph-
ical activity, following his endorsement of Jean-Claude Passeron’s char-
acterization of Foucault as a ‘warrior in the trenches’ (Veyne 1993: 2): 
Despite what the justificatory or self-protecting philosophers assert, the spectacle of 
the past brings to light no reason in history other than the struggles of men for some-
thing that is undoubtedly neither true nor false but that imposes itself as truth to be 
told. If this is so, a philosophy has only one possible use, which is making war: not 
21 See Kelly (2013) and Koopman (2013).
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the war of the day before yesterday, but today’s war. And for this, it has to begin by 
proving genealogically that there is no other truth of history but this combat. […] To 
be a philosopher is to make a diagnosis of present possibilities and to draw up a strate-
gic map – with the secret hope of influencing the choice of combats. (Veyne 1993: 6)
As Veyne stresses in the same text, as a genealogist the philosopher 
cannot claim that he is right and all others wrong; he can only show 
that others are wrong in claiming that they are right (Veyne 1993: 6). 
Accordingly, Foucault’s aim is not to substitute certain truths for others, 
but rather to destroy the validity of accepted truths by showing their 
contingency and arbitrariness, thereby opening a space of freedom for 
individual self-criticism, liberation and creativity.22 As a genealogist, 
his focus might be the past; as a warrior, it might be ‘today’s war’. As a 
philosopher, however, his target is and must remain the future: ‘the cri-
tique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis 
of the limits imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of 
going beyond them’ (WE: 319). In other words, his genealogies of the 
formation and constitution of the modern subject are at the same time a 
provocation and challenge for future change and self-transformation.23 
By constantly challenging acquired truths and beliefs, by questioning 
our common values and customs, by calling attention to the dangers of 
domination by our disciplines and institutions, by constantly discon-
certing us with regard to our relation to ourselves and our social and 
political surroundings, and finally, by giving us, in the last period of his 
22 Cf. TPS (11): ‘All my analyses are against the idea of universal necessities in hu-
man existence. They show the arbitrariness of institutions and show which space 
of freedom we can still enjoy and how many changes can still be made’.
23 On the two layers – the formation and self-formation of the subject – of Foucault’s 
ethical project, see Koopman (2013), who convincingly argues that ‘Foucault’s 
ethical writings are […] located at the hinge between a history of the formation 
of the subject and the possibility of the future transformation of the subject. […] 
For ethics, as a first-order practice of emplaced activity rather than a second-order 
discourse on such activity, requires both the backward-looking historical gaze in 
which we discern the inheritance that bears on present ethical action and also the 
forward-looking, future-oriented hope in virtue of which that inheritance is pro-
ductively transformed with the resources furnished us by our present. Foucault’s 
ethics explicitly takes up the relation between these tasks as we face them in our 
present.’ (Koopman, 2013: 526) On Foucault’s philosophy as a contribution to 
self-transformation, see also O’Leary (2002: 140 ss.).
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thought, a lively example of a different way of relating to ourselves and 
acquiring governance and sovereignty over ourselves, Foucault does in-
deed promote a sort of awakening and an inspiration to change: urging 
us to become masters of our own processes of subjectification and con-
tributing to individual liberation. Seen in this light, it seems undeniable 
that there is a strong continuity in Foucault’s work and that it does fulfil 
the profoundly ethical Socratic imperative, which, in his view, has char-
acterized philosophy from its very beginnings (cf. ECS: 301). 
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Some notes on Rawls’ critique of Kant’s  
comprehensive moral philosophy
António Marques
‘Justice as fairness is a theory of our moral sentiments as manifested 
by our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium.’ (John Rawls, 
A Theory of Justice, 20, 120)
One of the most striking features of the Rawlsian theory of justice 
developed in his late work is expressed in the claim that it is a political 
theory and not a kind of religious, metaphysical or moral doctrine. One 
may think that in the whole of his work Rawls maintains the same cen-
tral idea, expressed in the following terms: ‘Since there is no reasonable 
religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine the affirmed by all citizens, 
the conceptions of justice affirmed in a well ordered society must be a 
conception limited to what I shall call “the domain of the political” and 
its values’1. Nevertheless this is a statement that seems to contradict 
much of explicit argument developed in his A Theory of Justice (TJ), 
where typically moral values, such as equality and self-respect are de-
fined as most important primary goods. In fact as soon as one looks at 
the formulation of the first principle, which proposes an equal distribu-
tion of liberty, it seems that we are facing a theory based upon moral 
maxims and an egalitarian stance about moral values. But at the same 
1 Rawls (1996: 199, 38). In our view the Rawlsian understanding and criticism 
of Kant´s moral philosophy as a kind of constructivism is critical in PL, not so 
much in A Theory of Justice. The rejection of the Kantian moral philosophy in 
PL, labelled as comprehensive doctrine, is in sharp contrast with the place that is 
reserved to the former in his early work. By this move Rawls intends to give an 
entire political status to theory, since only the agreement on political principles 
can solve conflicting comprehensive views inside a pluralist society. ‘The fact of 
a plurality of reasonable but incompatible comprehensive doctrines – the fact of 
reasonable pluralism – shows that. As used in Theory, the idea of a well-ordered 
society as fairness is unrealistic’ (Rawls 1996: xix). 
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time, in his 80s and 90s writings Rawls dismisses such qualification and 
claims that a correct conception of justice must avoid any confusion 
with other conceptions of the world of the kind mentioned above. In 
this context the confrontation with the moral and political philosophy 
of Kant is of central importance. It is not a overstatement the claim that 
it is just this confrontation that allows Rawls to design his theory as a 
political construction and to differentiate it from perhaps the strongest 
moral philosophy, that is the practical philosophy of Kant. In what fol-
lows I´ll insist in the notion that Rawls’ political philosophy contains 
moral grounding elements, despite his defense of a pure procedural 
method without any comprehensive element and claim that Kant´s mor-
al philosophy not only doesn’t ground his own political philosophy, but 
also that it is not a constructivism of the sort Rawls claims it is2. 
In order to understand the Rawls argumentation about the political 
nature of his theory and the correspondent critique of comprehensive 
doctrines, one needs to clarify the primacy of politics over morals in the 
period of PL. This is only possible if we first evaluate the moral status of 
his early theory. So let’s first briefly consider the qualification of egali-
tarianism to Rawl’s theory, which seems to be evident or unproblematic 
if applied to the first principle of his A Theory of Justice (TJ), precisely 
the equality principle of justice3. It is a fact that though Rawls defends 
the priority of the principle of equal liberty, he considers also instances 
of unequal liberty without violation of the first principle. But typically 
situations of unequal liberty show up for the sake of liberty itself, since 
precedence of liberty means that liberty can be restricted only for the 
sake of liberty itself’ (Rawls 1996: 39, 244). It is interesting that Rawls 
justifies eventual situations of unequal liberty with a formulation de-
rived from the principle of difference. He remarks in the same passage 
of TJ that ‘basic liberties may either be less extensive though still equal, 
2 Of course many philosophers have noted the difficulty related to the moral or 
political status of Rawls’ theory. For example Bernard Williams says that ‘the sup-
posedly political conception, then, is still a moral conception, one that is applied 
to a certain matter under certain constraints of content’ (Williams 2005: 2).
3 In Rawls (1973: 86, 60-1), the first statement of both principles reads: ‘First: each 
person to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with 
a similar liberty for others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advan-
tage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all’. 
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or they may be unequal. If liberty is less extensive, the representative 
citizen must find this a gain for his freedom on balance; and if liberty 
is unequal, the freedom of those with lesser liberty must be better se-
cured . In both instances the justification proceeds by reference to the 
whole system of the equal liberties’. Anyway the second principle, by 
contrast with the first one, doesn’t seem to pose questions in relation to 
equality and comprehensive issues, just because in it what is at stake is 
that the differences among individuals are justified if the distribution of 
socio-economic goods don’t damage the expectations of the worst off. 
Anyway, as it has been remarked, inequality or even growing inequality 
is not incompatible with the fulfillment of those expectations4.
Coming back to the theory of justice as a political theory with-
out moral grounds, the question is if it simply operates as a procedural 
method by which equal and free citizens agree on certain principles of 
justice. Allegedly Rawls doesn’t introduce moral intuitions in his theo-
ry, that is, features, which typically belong to what he calls ‘comprehen-
sive’ elements. By ‘comprehensive’ doctrines Rawls understands those 
that operate with moral, religious or some kind of metaphysical values. 
From the point of view of a theory of justice a comprehensive concep-
tion is to be avoided, since it is not a conception of forms of life or of 
the most important virtues that should determine our whole existence. 
A theory of justice is, say, an austere political conception of the princi-
ples and avoids to be overloaded by any sort of metaphysical, religious 
or moral elements. 
In what follows we have to take into consideration, first the charac-
terization of the original position (OP) as a device of procedural justice 
that on Rawl’s view should not integrate any moral intuition, second the 
interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy as a moral constructivism. 
As already mentioned neither the justice as fairness is exempt of moral 
4 Watson (2015) makes the following point: ‘The “Rawlsian” position of favour-
ing the least advantage may sound quite radical. However it is not far removed 
from the statements of politicians who argue for income tax cuts on the basis 
that these would stimulate economic activity and hence increase revenue that 
could be used to raise the incomes of the poorest among us. As this argument 
illustrates, there is nothing intrinsically egalitarian about the Rawlsian objec-
tive?’ (Watson 2015: 13).
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intuitions, nor Kant’s moral is constructivist at least in the way Rawls 
understands it.
To the first point, as it is well known, Rawls’ theory begins by pre-
senting a situation (OP), where reasonable individuals choice principles 
in order to a just distribution of what he calls a set of ‘primary goods’. 
What is required to the parts is a capacity of rational choice, subjected 
to certain rules of impartiality (veil of ignorance), and a sense of justice 
in order to fairly distribute those goods. In that position persons under 
reasonable or fair conditions will select certain principles of justice. 
As mentioned above it is largely accepted that in the original position 
individuals don’t operate with any moral intuitions whatsoever. The fact 
that the parties have a capacity or sense of justice5 doesn’t mean that 
they are motivated by moral convictions, that is, a real comprehensive 
understanding of society and its values6.
Nevertheless Rawls sees the parts in the original position as 
possessing a sense of justice and the inclusion of such a sense in the 
structure of rational choice. So a correct description of the OP seems 
to contradict a picture that represents it completely deprived of com-
prehensive moral motivations. The question is whether in the real pro-
cess of designing the institutions of justice, the sense of justice starts 
to work only after the identification of the principles. This is a basic 
problem that deserves going deeper in it. Referring explicitly to the 
central place of the sense of justice, Rawls says that it shows itself in 
two ways. ‘First, it leads us to accept the just institutions that apply to 
us and from which we and our associates have benefited’ and secondly, 
5 Rawls (1973: 86, 567-577; 1996: 19). In the same passage of PL, Rawls refers to 
‘two moral powers’: sense of justice, that is the capacity to understand, to apply, 
and to act from the public conception of justice and a capacity for a conception of 
the good.
6 Samuel Freeman comments at this point: ‘In the original position they (the par-
ties) are not moved by moral considerations (e.g. to do what is just or fair, or make 
a morally right decision) or by benevolence toward other parties; nor are they 
directly concerned with other’s developing their capacities for justice except in 
so far as it benefits themselves. They are uninterested’ in that they are indifferent 
to one another under these extraordinary circumstances of choice in the original 
position’ (Freeman 2007: 168). Interestingly, Thomas Nagel characterizes both 
principles in the following terms: ‘The first principle is a principle of strict equal-
ity, and the second a principle of permissible inequality’ (Nagel 2003: 66).
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‘a sense of justice gives rise to a willingness to work for (or at least not 
to oppose the setting up of just institutions’ (Rawls 1973: 72, 474). So 
there is no doubt that the sense of justice is a fundamental force in the 
building and preservation of just institutions. Furthermore it seems that 
it is when individuals act against the principles of justice, the process of 
full moral development begins, namely it is when persons violate some 
rule directly tied to the principles that moral feelings as guilty, shame 
or repentance show up: ‘When we go against our sense of justice we 
explain our feelings of guilt by reference to the principles of justice … 
The complete moral development has now taken place and for the first 
time we experience feelings of guilt in the strict sense; and the same is 
true of the other moral emotions’ (Rawls 1973: 72, 474). 
The main idea here is that moral feelings and moral life in general 
takes form by reference to the principles of justice what enforces the 
conception of an OP including ‘sense of justice’, despite the absence 
of its moral content (Rawls 1996: 97). Rawls makes the point that indi-
viduals develop their moral forces just because they coincide with the 
content of the principles of justice, which is the same to say that these 
ones don’t have a logical and chronological primacy over moral princi-
ples. ‘Individuals in their role as citizens with a full understanding of 
the content of the principles of justice may be moved to act upon them 
largely because of their bonds to particular persons and an attachment 
to their own society’ (Rawls 1973: 475; my italics). So on must recog-
nize that in the TJ the question about the moral content of the principles 
is not so much an ambiguous one, just because individuals are defined 
as moral persons. It is clear that in the initial situation I represent myself 
and the others as moral persons with a sense of justice. Nevertheless 
in PL he insists that the theory is not comprehensive and repeatedly 
vindicates and emphasizes the status of its unique political not moral 
characteristic. It is not without saying that Rawls is totally aware of the 
difficulty of conceiving persons (the kind of persons in the OP) who at 
the same are not entitled with any moral or metaphysical powers7. 
7 Rawls (1996: 29): ‘I remarked earlier that the idea of the original position and the 
description of the parties may tempt us to think that a metaphysical doctrine of the 
person is presupposed (...) To rebut claims of this nature requires discussing them 
in detail and showing that they have no foothold. I cannot do that here’.
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In order to accomplish the aim of designing a well-ordered powers 
should be only political, and this is what is necessary for individuals to 
operate in the OP. So from a political point of view, persons in order to 
operate in the OP are enough entitled with freedom: citizens are con-
ceived as thinking of themselves as free in three respects: first as having 
the moral power to have a conception of the good, second as self-au-
thenticated sources of valid claims, that is, claims on their institutions, 
and third as they view themselves and the other as capable of taking 
responsibility for their ends (Rawls 1996: 29-33). These are political ca-
pacities that are supposed to be exempt of any comprehensive element. 
The question now consists in making this assumption compatible 
with the idea of a pure procedural conception of justice, which char-
acterizes the OP and its nature as it is clearly assumed in the later PL. 
A procedural method means first of all that no fundamental principles 
or set of principles are established as the starting and fixed moment of 
a theory. If the TJ is set upon a procedural stance, then confusion with 
any kind of comprehensive doctrines is avoided just because in this pro-
cedural move there is no fixed metaphysical elements. In both, TJ and 
PL Rawls refers to the OP as ‘a case of procedural justice’ distinguished 
from a ‘perfect procedural justice’. The last one is commonly illustrated 
by the division of a cake, in which the concerned individuals are re-
quired to divide a cake without knowing the order of choice. Under this 
procedure an outcome is generated , which is just, whatever the outcome 
may be. Pure procedural justice is different in the sense that the parties 
don’t specify from the beginning any set of principles and they arrive 
to a deliberation by measuring the all reasons in balance. What guides 
their deliberation is the consideration of mutual interests in a situation 
of reciprocal action. Furthermore guidance by mutual interest expresses 
a contractualist agreement or a justified mutual agreement, to which 
Rawls refers to as a ‘reflective equilibrium’. This state is achieved as far 
as no one has enough reasonable reasons to reject the other’s justified 
point of view. It is not always clear whether a reflexive equilibrium state 
is negotiated among parts, but at least there is reciprocal consideration 
of points of view. Accordingly Rawls states that justice as fairness is not 
procedurally neutral.
This is a view that can be shared by another contractualist authors, 
namely Thomas Scanlon who proposes a contractarian perspective of 
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wrong and right, which is structured upon the principal idea that what 
is good is what can be justified to others on grounds that they, if appro-
priately motivated, could not reasonably reject’8. What is relevant in this 
notion is that all points of view are articulated in a whole on the basis 
of a reasonable justified motivation. The moral life in this scanlonian 
perspective is a permanent process of reciprocal and interactive rea-
sonable justification. This is very near of the structure of the OP, but in 
the case of Scanlon his contractualism doesn’t exclude a central moral 
motivation.
Rawls conceives a pure procedural method on the basis of a reflex-
ive equilibrium, in which each personal point of view reaches an agree-
ment with all concerned individuals based in rational justification. Only 
then it is possible to represent a real, not utopic consensus, which Rawls 
refers to as an overlapping one. Only then it is also possible to conceive 
a true contractualist agreement without the threat of comprehensive el-
ements. Seemingly all this conceptual structure that integrates the OP 
(perhaps one should clarify the differences between the TJ and PL in 
respect the OP, but this is particular hermeneutical task that cannot be 
carried out here) operates only at a political level and in his late writings 
Rawls designates such dynamic conceptual network, whose unique aim 
is to formulates the principles of justice, as a ‘constructivism’. 
This leads us to the discussion of Kant’s moral philosophy. In fact, 
as already mentioned, the best point of view to get a clear perspective 
of the place of the moral element in Rawls philosophy would be the dis-
cussion of Kant’s philosophy as a ‘moral constructivism’ in the terms of 
Rawls himself. In his view the contrast between his political construc-
tivism and that of Kant’s moral is the right standpoint to evaluate the 
role, if any, of the moral element in the original position. When we use 
the word ‘constructivism’ applied to a theory or doctrine what do we 
8 Scanlon (2000: 5). Scanlon is aware that he needs go deeper in his notion of rea-
sonable justification that no one could reject. This implies substantive judgments 
and claims made in specific practical situations. See Scanlon (2000: Ch. 5). Fur-
thermore in the words of Scanlon, ‘This gives us a direct reason to be concerned 
with other people’s point of view: not because we might , for all we know, actually 
be them, or because we might occupy their position in some other possible world, 
but in order to find principles that they, as well as we, have reasons to accept’ 
(Scanlon 2000: 191).
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mean by that? What kind of description of that doctrine are we pointing 
to? In Kant the starting moment of his moral system is the proof of 
the existence of a moral law, the ‘fact of reason’ as the first grounding 
act of practical rationality. And if one proceeds rightly from that initial 
moment, subjects can build a system of rights, duties and virtues, which 
is the object of the second part of his ‘Doctrine of Virtues’ exposed in 
his last systematic work on the foundations of law and morality, The 
Metaphysic of Morals. It seems that it is in this sense it would be fair to 
qualify or at least to refer to a sort of constructivism in Kant’s morals. 
Another problem consists in saying that it can endorse a political con-
structivism, to which we’ll refer to later.
In fact, with special emphasis in PL, Rawls sees the Kantian mor-
al philosophy as a moral constructivism, from which his own political 
philosophy clearly separates itself. In this work he states that the first 
difference is that Kant’s practical philosophy is comprehensive since it 
is based upon an ideal of autonomy ‘for all life’ (Rawls 1996: 99). As 
a deeper meaning of ‘autonomy’ it is meant that the order of moral and 
political values are made or constituted by the work of practical rea-
son. However this conception of autonomy of practical reason doesn’t 
give the basis of justification for a genuine ‘public basis of justification’ 
(Rawls 1996: 99)9, since it seems to dispense each person to enter in 
agreement with other. In Rawls words, Kant’s constructivism ‘is deep-
er and goes to the very existence and constitution of the order of val-
ues. This is part of his transcendental idealism’ and adds that ‘Political 
Liberalism must, of course reject Kant’s constitutive autonomy; yet his 
moral constructivism can endorse political constructivism as far as it 
goes’ (Rawls 1996: 100). Anyway the Kantian fact of reason and the 
correspondent ‘constitutive autonomy’ of the moral person cannot be 
considered an adequate starting ground to the genuine political con-
structivism, without any comprehensive intrusion.
9 In his ‘Reply to Habermas’, Rawls refers to the notion of ‘public justification’ as 
the existence of an overlapping consensus in a society where reasonable citizens, 
embedded in different comprehensive views, can ‘judge from within their reason-
able comprehensive doctrines that political values are very great values to be re-
alized in the framework of their political and social existence, ans a shared public 
life on terms that all reasonable parties may reasonable be expected to endorse’ 
(Rawls 1996: 393).
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At this point of the Rawlsian argumentation, one has to ask if there 
is such a thing as a moral constructivism in Kant and if there is, if it cor-
responds to that kind of constructivism claimed by Rawls. Furthermore, 
if the answer is negative, one must ask if the kind of moral constructiv-
ism that Kant offers us with, ‘can endorse political constructivism’. As 
far as Rawls associates the notion of constructivism with other elements 
of justice as fairness, like ‘pure procedural justice’, ‘reflexive equilibri-
um’ and ‘overlapping consensus’, a constructivist method is generated 
by practical rationality and provides a set of grounding criteria or proce-
dures for the set up of a ranked network of values and institutions, what 
he calls the ‘basic structure’ of a society, like the constitution and some 
other fundamental institutions. In fact one must say that there is a kind 
of a constructivist method in late Kant’s moral philosophy, but not the 
kind of one that claimed by Rawls10. Assuming that any constructivism 
starts from some first material to other concepts and rules, these are not 
to be inferred from the former. In Kant’s view construction is a move-
ment of the reason, either theoretical or practical, that proceeds by syn-
thetic amplification. Under his understanding of practical reason this 
would be an a priori amplification, in the sense that one proceeds from 
some basic geometrical structure and goes on adding other properties 
that are nor simple deducible from the initial material. In the case of 
moral practical reason, the first structure is the existence of a self-coer-
cive moral internal law, which corresponds to the very concept of duty. 
This is the initial and starting point to the construction of other a priori 
figures of duty, that Kant pretends to amplify in a network of what he 
calls a ‘doctrine of virtue’. So he notes that ‘the principle of the doctrine 
of virtue goes beyond the concept of outer freedom and connects with 
it, in accordance with universal laws, an end that it makes a duty. This 
principle is therefore synthetic’ (Kant 1996a: 526, Ak. 6: 396)11. It is 
10 Onora O’Neill remarks that ‘it is far from clear that Rawls’s fundamental strategy 
of justification is Kantian. Like Kant, Rawls does not appeal to individual prefer-
ences, or to a notional hypothetical social contract, or to an independent order of 
moral values. But unlike Kant, Rawls basic approach to justification is apparently 
coherentist’ (O’Neill 2004: 23).
11 In this work Kant presents what can be seen as a complete scheme of duties of 
virtues, in fact the outcome of his synthetic method, which starts from internal 
law of duty to a net work of ‘virtues of duty’.
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interesting how Kant understands duties as so many ends that can and 
must be balanced one against each other. But there we stand on a do-
main clearly separated from the political one. Kantian moral construc-
tivism, as it can be understood in The Metaphysics of Morals, doesn’t 
cross whatsoever or contribute to the first principles of a just society or 
of a state of law. As it is well known the grounding moment of a politi-
cal society from Kant’s contractualist point of view doesn’t require any 
moral powers of the citizens, but only an intelligent choice of coexist-
ence principles. Kantian contractualism has a mere political basis and 
is of a more Hobbesian sort than it is generally thought. As he famously 
states in his essay on perpetual peace ‘the problem of establishing a 
state, no matter how hard it may sound, is soluble even for a nation of 
devils (if only they have understanding) … Such problem must be solu-
ble. For the problem is not the moral improvement of human beings but 
only the mechanism of nature, and what the task requires one to know 
is how this can be put to use in human beings in order so to arrange the 
conflict of their unpeaceable dispositions…’ (Kant 1996b: 335, Ak. 8: 
366). This Hobbesian statement means also that in Kant´s political phi-
losophy the boundaries between moral and philosophy are pretty clear 
and that if one wants to design some articulation between both domains, 
it must be made taking into account that neither morals grounds poli-
tics, nor the last one grounds the former. This is an important reminder 
for anyone (as Rawls), who claims for a political philosophy without 
comprehensive interferences. Kant made the same claim but at the end 
his track leaded him to a place quite near of Hobbes. 
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Moral Choice without Moralism
Erich Rast
A moralist is a pedant who insists on conforming to strict moral rules in 
each and every case. This attitude is often a symptom of ‘moral tyran-
ny’, which arises ‘…when the claim to superior knowledge of good and 
evil lacks justification’ (von Wright 1963: 189). Both attitudes can lead 
to a rejection of the underlying moral codes and undermine morality 
in general. How can a decision maker act morally without becoming a 
moralist?
In this article, I will address one aspect of this question from a 
purely decision-theoretic perspective by giving a tentative answer to a 
narrower and more specific question: What constitutes a moral deci-
sion, provided that in a given decision situation a set of morally relevant 
attributes can be identified and that these attributes do not automatically 
and unconditionally override all non-moral attributes? To answer this 
question in a decision-theoretic setting, I propose a theory with lexi-
cographic thresholds that allows a decision maker to deviate from the 
prescription made implicitly by the morally relevant attributes when-
ever the stakes are low, but requires the decision maker to follow the 
morally relevant attributes when the stakes are high. Conditions are laid 
out under which a decision is morally acceptable (or, in short, ‘moral’) 
in this setting. The approach is based on the assumption that the deci-
sion making methodology is principally adequate for making moral de-
cisions and is in principle compatible with much of what has been said 
in the literature on Practical Reasoning. Albeit controversial, this view 
will not be challenged here but rather supposed for the sake of this ar-
ticle. However, I believe that another assumption needs to be explained 
in more detail, namely the one that moral attributes do not uncondi-
tionally outrank non-moral attributes. In deontic logic a distinction is 
often made between actions that need to be done (required/obligatory 
actions; actions that are one’s duty), actions that are permissible and 
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actions that are forbidden. Using these distinctions as a basis, the thesis 
boils down to the claim that a course of action that one is permitted to 
do may sometimes outweigh a course of action that one ought to do if 
not much is at stake from a moral point of view. Another, in my point 
of view better, way of putting this is based on Meinong’s distinction of 
value classes. He classifies values into four categories: meritorious (ver-
dienstlich), correct (correct), merely excusable (zulässig) and inexcusa-
ble (verwerflich), where the first two are good and the last two are bad. 
According to this taxonomy, some courses of action may be excusable 
in the sense of being morally permitted despite the fact that they may 
be judged morally bad because their prudential value outweighs their 
moral badness. The goal of the following sections is to formulate condi-
tions for such excusable courses of action that allow one to distinguish 
morally acceptable from morally unacceptable decisions, and for this 
purpose thresholds will be introduced. Which threshold is the right one 
in a given situation, however, is a substantive moral question that I will 
not attempt to answer in general.
There are some known criticisms that I would like to exclude be-
fore going into the details. Decision theory has often been criticized for 
its purported inability to deal with moral dilemmas. The example of a 
resistance fighter torn between obligations to his country and to his sick 
mother is often given (Sartre 1946), and another type of such a dilemma 
may concern long-term choices between different ways of life. If such 
dilemmas exist, then by definition no account of practical reasoning 
whose outcome is supposed to be an action, choice of action or an inten-
tion to act can resolve them, and so with respect to such cases practical 
reasoning theories like those of Broome (2002) and Horty (2012) are 
in the same boat as decision theory. A genuine moral dilemma has by 
definition no rational ‘solution’ and since this article is concerned with 
the morality of decisions in situations in which a rational decision can 
be made, these types of examples need not be considered further in 
what follows.
In the remainder of this article, first a brief overview of rational deci-
sion making is given in Section 1. Then, in Section 2, conditions are laid 
out for classifying decisions as moral or not given that morally relevant 
attributes have been identified. These include unipolar thresholds, then 
bipolar thresholds are introduced to more adequately represent disvalue, 
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and later the changes needed to deal with uncertainty are discussed. The 
discussion is rounded up in Section 3 in which the connections of the 
proposal to existing work in decision making and to utilitarianism are 
addressed.
1. Rational Choice
The rational decision making tradition and accounts of practical reason-
ing in moral philosophy have diverged at some point in the history of 
ideas, and various factors may have contributed to this unfortunate de-
velopment: What was formerly called Welfare Economics has dropped 
much of the welfare aspect from its domain of inquiry, the deontic tra-
dition has always been predominant in moral philosophy, and much of 
the recent work in axiology has focused on special problems of value 
incommensurability and parity rather than the question of what makes 
a choice moral.
In order to make this article more or less self-contained, aspects of 
the decision making perspective on rational choice will be briefly laid 
in the following paragraphs insofar as they are relevant for the topic 
of moral decision making, although limitations of space will only al-
low me to scratch the surface (and there is a dangerous iceberg below). 
Readers familiar with standard additive decision theory may skip this 
section. The proposal itself and how it relates to the standard weight-
ed-sum account will be laid out in Section 2.
Among the many topics that cannot be addressed in such a brief 
survey is the question of the rationality of decision making principles 
themselves and Expected Utility Theory in particular. This question 
has been addressed by a vast variety of authors starting with Ramsey 
(1931), von Neumann & Morgenstern (1947), Savage (1954), Debreu 
(1959) and Fishburn (1970). See Eisenführ et al. (2010) for a modern 
introduction to applied decision theory, Keeney & Raiffa (1976) for a 
more technical overview and Bouyssou et al. (2010) for details.
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1.1 Decision Making Under Certainty
The key notion of decision theory are preferences. Among several al-
ternatives a decision maker has preferences which reflect his values: 
one alternative might be better than another or they might be just as 
good. So as to be able to talk about the morality of decisions to act, we 
must assume that moral rules can give rise to corresponding preferences 
between action alternatives. For example, killing someone for selfish 
motives is considered murder unless the circumstances are exceptional 
such as self-defence or wartime. When a decision maker contemplates 
two hypothetical alternative courses of action and one of them involves 
murdering someone while the other does not, then avoiding murder 
should be preferred from a moral point view. In other words, avoiding 
murder has a higher value than not avoiding it. So does avoiding loss 
of life in general, but notice that these two alternatives are also com-
parable; it is commonly presumed that avoiding murder is preferable 
to avoiding mere loss of life. None of this should be controversial, yet 
the claim that all kinds of alternatives and aspects thereof are compara-
ble is, of course, not so innocuous and has been attacked from time to 
time. See for instance the discussion in Chang (1997). But as mentioned 
above, moral dilemmas that lead to genuine value incommensurability 
shall not be considered and we focus on the decision-guiding aspects 
of values. Under this premise, some standard assumptions about the 
preference relations can be made. First of all, they are complete, i.e. a 
decision maker either prefers one alternative over the other or considers 
them equally good.
To get a fully-fledged decision theory many more assumptions are 
needed. Generally, it is presumed that preferences can be described by 
value functions whose outcome is a numerical value. These numerical 
values can be compared with each other, reflecting the point of view 
that the decision maker can decide for any two courses of actions which 
one has a higher value than the other. In other words, if a ≽ b says 
‘alternative a is preferred to b or the decision maker is indifferent 
about the alternatives’ (weak preference), then there is a continuous 
value function v(.) such that v(a) ≥ v(b) iff. a ≽ b. This fairly strong 
assumption is also made by the subjective expected utility theory of 
Savage (1954) and must be taken with a grain of salt. It implies that 
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preferences between alternatives are transitive, that there are no princi-
pally incommensurable values and that parity (Chang 2002; Gert 2004; 
Rabinowicz 2008) can be disregarded as well. Depending on how the 
values of individual attributes are combined into an overall valuation, 
there are also a number of further, more technical conditions. If they are 
combined by adding them, the attributes must be mutually preference 
independent. Other modes of combination such as multilinear models 
(Keeney & Raiffa 1993), generalized additive independence (Gonzales 
& Perny 2004) and multiplicative models (Krantz et. al. 1971) impose 
less strong conditions.
Not all of the standard assumptions about preferences need to be 
made for choice-guiding actions. For example Fishburn (1991) uses 
non-transitive preferences and Hansson (2001: Chapter 2) replaces tran-
sitivity by weaker conditions (‘top transitivity’ and ‘weak eligibility’). 
However, for the purpose of this article I will stick to so-called additive 
models for simplicity. This means that in addition to some more techni-
cal conditions, preferential independence and difference independence 
need to be presumed. These conditions state that a comparison between 
two attributes does not depend on other attributes. To put it more pre-
cisely, preferential independence states that if there are two alternatives 
a, b that differ only in attribute i and there are two other alternatives a', b' 









then a ≽ b if and only if a' ≽ b'.1 Difference independence is an even 
stronger condition that says that in the same scenario with two prefer-
ences that only differ in one attribute a decision maker will be indiffer-
ent between the choice of shifting from a to b and a choice of shifting 
from a' to b'. If these conditions and a few more technical ones are ful-
filled, additive value functions express preferences between alternatives 
by aggregating the values of their individual attributes. In a model with 
n attributes, the overall value of an alternative is their weighted sum 
v a w v a
i
n




, where wi represents the relative weight of an attribute 
 
1 Other, more technical conditions such as restricted solvability and the Archime-
dean principle differ slightly between the case with two and three or more attri-
butes but I suppress these details in what follows. Details can be found in Keeney 
& Raiffa (1993), pp. 104–117, Eisenführ et al. (2010), pp. 125–155, and Krantz 
et al. (1971) for the mathematical underpinnings.
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(in comparison to the other attributes), v
i
 is the value function of the 
i-th attribute and a
i
 is the value of the attribute. The alternative with 
the highest value is the one recommended for rational choice; if there 
are more than one with a highest value, which might of course happen, 
then the decision maker is indifferent about them and may choose as she 
likes or attempt to refine the model to decide between these alternatives.
Someone who is less familiar with these kinds of models might 
ask why a value function is used instead of just directly using values 
for the respective attributes. To motivate this feature, it is instructive to 
take a glimpse at the related field of Consumer Theory in economics. 
In this theory each alternative is taken as a bundle of goods, and it is 
generally assumed that under normal circumstances the more of a good 
one has in a bundle while the amount of other goods is kept fixed, the 
higher will be the value of the bundle. Two bananas and an apple are 
worth more than one banana and an apple. In addition, however, it is 
often claimed that the Principle of Marginal Utility2 holds, which has 
been confirmed empirically for some domains.3 According to this prin-
ciple, under normal circumstances the overall value of a good decreases 
in relation to other goods in a bundle the more units of the good one 
possesses. Consider the innocuous example of someone who has one 
banana and is willing to swap it for two apples. If the same person 
had twenty bananas, she might be willing to swap three bananas for 
one apple. The value of bananas in comparison to apples has dropped 
from two times an apple to one third of an apple. To model such cas-
es, cardinal value functions are needed instead of purely ordinal ones; 
in addition to the ordinal information given by qualitative preferences, 
these represent information about preference intensities and allow for 
a comparison of preference differences. For simplicity, take the apple 







(1)=0.2. Following the example, suppose 
2 This principle was first formulated by Gossen (1854) as a characteristic (Merk-
mal) of all human pleasure (Genuss) in the context of a purely pleasure-utilitarian 
foundation of economics and later strongly criticized by purporters of the Marxist 
labour theory of value.
3 See for example Inglehart (1990) for the value of economic growth in societies, 
Liu (2003) for the quality of marital sex and Horowitz (2007) for general experi-
mental results.
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now that v vb a20 0 3
1
3
20( ) ≈ ≈ ( ). . To ensure that the banana value function 
does not violate the Principle of Marginal Utility, a third point is need-
ed; suppose v
b
(10) = 0.28 is this point. Given these premises, the value 
function may be described by a quadratic function v x xb ( ) = − −1 2 0 0354. .
obtained by curve fitting; it is concave, monotonically increasing, has 
limit 1.2 and satisfies the Principle of Marginal Utility.
Note that there may be some applications in moral decision making 
with cardinal value functions for which it makes sense to presume this 
principle and some for which it does not. For example, one might argue 
that in the evaluation of a young delinquent’s misdemeanours the differ-
ence between the first and the second consecutive petty theft ought to 
count more than the difference between the twelfth and thirteenth such 
cases. On the other hand, consider the virtue-utilitarian value of polite 
actions per day such as opening a door for someone else or cheering 
someone up. Perhaps someone believes that ten such actions a day are 
optimal but twenty of them are just as good as one. After all, it is possible 
to be too polite. In that case v(1)=¼, v(10)=1, v(20)=¼ .4 Similar cases 
also occur in consumer theory, where economists sometimes try to avoid 
them for technical reasons by only considering the increasing part of the 
function. I will not presume the principle in general in what follows and 
the account works for cardinal and ordinal value functions alike.
1.2 Decisions under Risk
While the focus of this article is on decision making under certainty, 
some remarks about decisions under risk and uncertainty seem to be ap-
propriate as decision theory is usually applied in contexts with risk and 
uncertainty and this might hold in particular for moral decision mak-
ing. Risk is generally dealt with by presuming the axioms of Expected 
Utility Theory of von Neumann & Morgenstern (1947). Omitting most 
4 Again, the function may be approximated. For example by polynomial curve 
fitting v x x x( ) = − + −0 108 2 269 1 9112. . .  is obtained. It would of course also be 
possible to abstract from the subjective optimum and find a general ‘politeness 
value function’ with a parameter for the turning point, but since the example is a 
bit contrived this matter shall not be pursued further.
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of the details and the (formal) justification of their approach, an addi-
tive decision model under risk can be obtained from the one laid out 
previously by defining a probability over the alternatives under consid-
eration and then computing the expected utility of the alternatives in a 
way that is very similar to decision making under certainty. Instead of 
speaking of a value function, it is customary to speak of a utility func-
tion that must satisfy the same requirements as a value function. Taking 
a a an= …1, , 〈 〉…a1, ,  as a vector of attributes like before, we may define a con-
sequence as a tuple 〈 〉p aj j,

 (1 ≤ ≤ j m) and take each alternative to 
have m consequences. The subjective expected utility of an alternative a 




n w u aj j i j i j i( ) = = = ( )∑ ∑1 1 , , .,  in such a model.5
It is important to bear in mind that under risk a utility function 
fulfils two roles that are not clearly separable from each other. On one 
hand, it represents a value function, which might for example exhib-
it the non-linearity exemplified by the Principle of Marginal Utility. 
On the other hand, it may also represent the risk attitude of a decision 
maker. Suppose the decision maker’s value function v is linear, i.e. has 
a straight line as a graph. That means that a change by any positive 
amount of an attribute has the same value no matter how much of it 
was already present. For example, getting four bananas is worth the 
same to the decision maker whether he already has four of them or none 
of them. If that is the case, a concave utility function represents risk 
aversion. It is easiest to see this by looking at bets with losses. Consider 
a 50/50 bet a with a win of 8 apples and a loss of 4. The expected val-






4 2v v( ) + −( ) = . Take another bet b with the same 







16 2v v( ) + −( ) = . Concavity of the utility function implies that 
u(a) > u(b). Hence, the decision maker is more willing to take bet a 
with a possible loss of 4 apples than the more risky bet b with a pos-
sible loss of 16 apples. A similar argument shows that a convex utility 
 
5 The notation and terminology differs slightly from that of Savage (1954), whose 
setting is more general than the one presented above. For what follows, the differ-
ences do not matter.
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function implies that the decision maker is risk prone unless he already 
exemplifies the Principle of Diminishing Marginal Utility to a very high 
degree.6 As laid out by Schoemaker (1982), the fact that the two func-
tions of expected utility, subjective valuation versus risk attitude, are 
often not clearly kept apart in the literature has led to confusion. The 
following sections will focus on decision making under certainty and 
therefore avoid these problems.
2. Moral Decision Making
Let us return to the initial question of how to classify decisions as 
moral in a way that does not simply give moral absolute priority over 
other considerations. The goal is to find conditions for what makes a 
decision moral without taking only moral aspects of a decision situa-
tion into account. It seems obvious that such an approach must involve 
a threshold at one place or another; the decision maker is allowed to 
deviate from moral rules to some extent, but not when it matters and 
not too much.
Before going on, a flawed account needs to be addressed because 
it might seem intuitively appealing at first glance. What about the claim 
that a decision maker ought not deviate from the prescriptions of under-
lying moral rules ‘too often’? This is not a good option. A highly im-
moral decision maker may make moral decisions most of the time. What 
matters in the end is what is at stake with each decision and not how 
often similar decisions over the same types of action are made. In an 
overall consequentialist approach what is at stake is determined by po-
tential wins and losses, and a theory that discriminates between different 
stakes will at some point involve either thresholds or special functions 
over the outcomes. The threshold view is simpler and, as I believe, the 
adequate way to make the moral decision process permeable and ‘soft’.
6 Arguably, it is harder to find examples of this attitude than in the converse case of 
diminishing marginal utility.
142 Erich Rast
2.1 The Unipolar Threshold View
If a moral component can be distinguished from a non-moral compo-
nent in decision making in a given situation, then certain attributes of 
alternatives must be morally relevant while others are not. What counts 
as morally relevant and not is a matter of the underlying moral theory. 
In a broadly-conceived deontic setting, the morally relevant attributes 
are those governed by a moral rule or norm. For example, the attribute 
‘number of lives lost’ of a consequence of some alternative course of 
action is morally relevant because, notwithstanding certain exception-
al circumstances, minimizing loss of life might be considered a moral 
obligation or one’s duty. In contrast to this, the attribute ‘pleasure of 
taste’ concerns what von Wright (1963) calls a hedonic good and from 
a deontic perspective does likely not have moral significance.7 It falls 
into the category of prudential value. On the other hand, from the per-
spective of a classical utilitarian, hedonic goodness might very well be 
morally relevant for its contribution to the overall welfare of a group. 
This difference illustrates the dependence of moral relevance on the un-
derlying moral theory, and the precise nature of this connection is an 
open problem. Moreover, it seems often reasonable to assume that one 
and the same attribute can be morally relevant in one instance and ir-
relevant in another, and this issue is closely related to the previous one. 
Since it would go far beyond the scope of this article to address these 
problems here, I will assume in what follows that certain persons with 
moral expertise, such as perhaps ethics committees, can decide between 
morally relevant and irrelevant attributes in a given choice situation.8 
Under this assumption, let us write M to denote the set of morally 
relevant attributes and N for the set of other attributes. A table that depicts 
 
7 There might be a rule, however, stating that no one is permitted to needlessly 
deprive someone else of personal pleasure. However, it seems striking that this 
must be based on some threshold as well since there are many situations in which 
it is customary and legitimate to deprive people of pleasure – think for instance 
about work, which is rarely always fun. Notice further that methods for finding a 
balance of power and distinctions like that between positive and negative rights 
might be needed.
8 Which account of morality is the right one is a decidedly moral question for any-
one but an extreme moral relativist.
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the relevant parts of a value function over alternatives and attributes 
will from now on be called a decision table. Such a table may be said to 
rationally ground a decision if the decision maker acts according to it. 
Only rationally grounded decisions are considered from now on.
To tackle the problem we are dealing with, let me first introduce 
the concept of dominance and then lay out a similar concept for moral 
attributes. An alternative a dominates an alternative b if and only if
w v a w v bi i i i i i( ) ( )  for all i and for at least one j, w v a w v bj j j j j j( ) > ( ). 
Dominated alternatives can be discarded since at least one alternative is 
always preferred to them. The idea is now to introduce a similar concept 
for moral versus other attributes. A decision matrix is fully moral if and 
only if for all alternatives a, b the following condition holds:








∑ ∑( ) > ( ) ( ) > ( ) (1)
A decision maker whose decisions always satisfy (1) never makes any 
moral mistakes, is a perfect moral decision maker and perhaps also 
a moral tyrant in the sense laid out above. There is something eerily 
wrong about such a person. Since the antecedent holds for arbitrary 
alternatives, non-moral values only play a role in her decision if the 
weighted sums of the moral attributes in the antecedent are exactly 
equal, i.e. if the alternatives have exactly the same moral consequences. 
Otherwise they can be discarded. The moral attributes absolutely dom-
inate the non-moral attributes.
It might be tempting to reply that a decision maker acts morally 
as long as most decisions satisfy (1), but as mentioned in the beginning 
of this section, this kind of reply is not acceptable without further elab-
orating the role of the stakes. A murder cannot be excused by the fact 
that the murderer acts morally most of the time, even though this fact 
might count in his favour in court. So it seems that the condition must 
be relaxed in another way. One solution is to stipulate, as an additional 
constraint, that the sum of the moral attributes of the first alternative in 
the antecedent must be higher than a certain threshold. In other words, 
we are looking for conditions to further narrow the set of attributes 
that is morally relevant in general down to a smaller set of attributes 
that are morally relevant in a particular decision situation based on the 
values of the attributes in question. A decision matrix is moral relative 
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to global threshold α if and only if the following condition holds for all 
alternatives a, b:








∑ ∑ ∑( ) > ( ) > ( )α , a) > ( )v b .thenv ( (2)
However, this condition will only work as desired as long as it can be 
ensured that any value of an attribute or combination of attributes that 
is considered morally relevant exceeds the threshold. Not only is it hard 
to conceive how a reasonable moral theory could provide such a thresh-
old, but it would also be problematic to elicit such a joint feature of 
attributes from a person or expert panel. It seems more reasonable to 
stipulate thresholds for individual attributes instead. A decision matrix 
is moral relative to thresholds α
i
 if and only if the following condition 
holds for all alternatives a, b:






α. . ( ) > ( ) > ( )
∈ ∈
∑ ∑





is the threshold of the i-th attribute a
i
. If just one moral attrib-
ute exceeds the threshold, then the whole set of moral attributes be-
comes relevant.
This principle seems to reflect the way in which a person’s actions are 
often judged retrospectively, for example in court or public opinion, and 
incorporates a certain virtue-ethical stance. For example, when someone 
is accused of a crime, judges and plaintiffs sometimes take into account 
moral aspects of additional motives, for instance whether the crime has 
been committed out of need or sheer selfishness. The goal is hereby to de-
termine the character of the accused and the final verdict hinges to some 
extent on this assessment. Despite being common practice, this method 
seems questionable for the present, more general purpose. If a threshold 
plays the role of determining moral relevance, it seems that an attribute 
below the threshold ought not enter moral considerations, or otherwise it 
is no longer clear what the threshold actually does.
By varying the condition slightly, a more appropriate evaluation 
method can be obtained. Let T be the set of thresholds in the model 
indexed in the same way as the set of moral attributes, and let Ma
T 
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denote the set of indices i of attributes of alternative a in M such that 
wi vi (ai) > αi. The antecedent condition is then relativized to this set. A 
decision matrix is selectively moral relative to a set of thresholds T if 
and only if the following condition holds for all alternatives a, b:










≠ ∅ ( ) > ( ) ( ) > ( )
∈ ∈
∑ ∑ , . (4)
In this condition, only moral attributes whose values exceed their respec-
tive threshold are considered relevant in a specific decision situation. 
Once these attributes have been identified, they are weighed against other 
moral attributes in the set.
To get an idea of how this condition works, consider the follow-
ing trivial example. Suppose Bob is contemplating whether he should 
steal his cousin’s chocolate bar and suppose, furthermore, that he does 
not fear reprimand because his cousin does not keep track of his huge 
inventory of chocolate bars. Let feature 1 be an artificial measure that is 
higher when no chocolate is stolen.9 On the other side of the equation 
is Bob’s personal pleasure, represented by feature 2. For simplicity, all 
weights are taken to be 1 in this and the following examples and the 
threshold of the moral attribute 1 in this example is α
1
=0.3. Suppose the 
following matrix represents his decision:
a b
1 – not steal 0.4 0.2
2 – personal pleasure 0.2 0.6
Moral sum 0.4 0.2
Total sum 0.6 0.8
As a rational decision maker, Bob decides to steal the chocolate bar. 
Determining whether his decision is morally permitted is straightfor-
ward. First, mark all rows with moral attributes. This is the first row in 
this example. Compute their ‘moral sum’ in each column and under-
line the highest values in the moral sum row. In this case the winner 
 
9 A better way to model this situation will be laid out in the next section. For the 
time being, you may, for example, assume that any value above 0.38 indicates that 
no good has been stolen. 
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is a with value 0.4. Second, compute the total sum and underline the 
highest values in that row too. In this case, the winner is b with value 
0.8. Evaluation: If a value is underlined in a total sum column and not 
in the corresponding moral sum column, then the decision is non-mor-
al; otherwise it is moral. This is just in ordinary terms what Condition 
(4) says. Using this procedure, it becomes apparent that Bob’s decision 
in the above example is non-moral. In virtue of being non-moral, the de-
cision is also immoral in this case because a morally preferable course 
of action was available and could have been taken.
One might think that there is an easier way to evaluate such an 
example. Instead of summing up the values of moral attributes, as con-
dition (4) prescribes, one might replace the antecedent by individual 
comparisons, i.e. all moral attributes must satisfy wi vi (ai) > wi vi (bi) in 
the antecedent. This modified principle would, however, predict that any 




Moral sum 1.0 1.0
Total sum 1.0 1.0
In this example two different moral attributes outweigh each other. Con-
sequently, any of a or b ought to be just as good from a moral point of 
view, which is correctly predicted by Condition (4) and the corresponding 
informal evaluation procedure outlined above. The shortcut version does 
not make the correct prediction here as it only takes into account the re-
lations between individual moral attribute comparisons and the total sum.
A final abstract example illustrates a mixed case with three alterna-
tives and motivates our talk about decision tables as opposed to actual 
decisions. These tables encode additional information that may some-
times turn out to be useful for an assessment.
a b c
1 0.7 0.2 0.4
2 0.3 0.7 0.3
3 0.2 0.5 0.7
Moral sum 0.9 0.7 1.1
Total sum 1.2 1.4 1.4
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The rule predicts that a decision based on this table is immoral because 
there are two highest values in the total sum row, but only row c has a 
corresponding highest moral sum. However, if the decision maker were 
to actually choose alternative c his choice would be morally impeccable 
on purely consequentialist grounds. However, the underlying table is, at 
least, problematic from a moral point of view as he could just as well 
have chosen alternative b. Even if the decision maker actually chose c, 
he might not have done so for the proper motive. For example, he could 
have made the choice by throwing a coin. This example shows that mor-
al applications of decision theory need not be solely consequentialist in 
nature even when they involve the weighing of alternatives that repre-
sent different possible courses of action.
2.2 The Bipolar Threshold View
The above way of laying out decision problems is clumsy to say the 
least. In the first example, an artificial attribute ‘not steal’ is used to ex-
press the moral value of not stealing instead of expressing the disvalue 
of stealing something. The reason for this was that the thresholds were 
formulated for positive values. If a moral attribute’s value exceeded a 
threshold, the value was considered morally relevant. Simple additive 
models may also include negative values, but then the threshold view 
must be adjusted. The resulting model is bipolar as it distinguishes be-
tween negative and positive values. Let the set Ma
T contain index i if and 
only if (Case 1) α
i
 is a positive threshold and wi vi (ai) > αi, or (Case 2) 
α
i
 is a negative threshold and wi vi (ai) < αi. Apart from this, no further 
changes are needed and Condition (4) remains intact. 
With this adjustment, disvalues with a corresponding negative 
moral threshold can be used. Although the change is minimal, its con-
ceptual relevance is huge as now the theory may be used to express 
positions like Negative Utilitarianism. For example, one might believe 
that it ought to be allowed to cause small amounts of harm to persons 
without the harm becoming morally relevant. Everyone does this al-
most every day, for example when arguing or having a bad day, and 
people are not always harmed for the sake of a greater good. It would 
amount to moral tyranny to consider any kind of harm done to a person 
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morally reprehensible. After all, not many executives of a company can 
do their job properly without occasionally causing displeasure among 
their employees. What matters is whether the amount of pain exceeds 
a certain threshold, which is described by the bipolar threshold view. 
Negative Utilitarianism has been attacked by Smart (1958) and recently 
by Ord (2013), who gives an excellent overview of the main arguments 
against it. While the details of this debate are beyond the scope of this 
article, it is noteworthy that this particular version of what Ord calls 
‘Lexical Threshold View’ fares better than most other variants of nega-
tive utilitarianism. Ord considers the sudden change in evaluation once 
a threshold is reached implausible for small, perhaps even arbitrary in-
crements of disvalue and constructs a form of sorites paradox against it 
(his ‘Continuity Argument’). I believe Ord’s argument does not speak 
conclusively against the above version of the threshold view but would 
like to leave this matter for another occasion.10
2.3 Dealing with Stakes
Let me finally address the role of stakes in decision making under risk 
and uncertainty very briefly. The bipolar threshold view does not re-
quire many modifications in this setting. Basically, wi vi (ai ) must be re-
placed by pj wi, j ui (ai, j )in the above conditions. The threshold is applied 
to the weighted outcome times the probability of the occurrence of a 
consequence. Although Savage (1954) has shown, within a different 
yet sufficiently similar setting, that some intuitively plausible principles 
governing preferences and subjective plausibility imply that the factors 
pjj
m
=∑ 1  indeed constitute, and so subjective expected utility theory as 
a whole is derivable from few, intuitively compelling principles, there 
10 There is a strong argument against any view that rejects lexical threshold utili-
tarianism while endorsing classical utilitarianism. From a purely formal point of 
view, it seems possible to translate a threshold model into the classical approach 
by choosing suitable utility functions of potentially unusual shape. If that line of 
thinking is correct, as I believe it is, then thresholds are merely a convenient way 
of making decision boundaries explicit, which is what makes them useful for the 
purpose of moral decision making.
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are legitimate concerns about moral implications of always using ex-
pected utility. What is sometimes treated as a risk might in reality be 
based on some form of epistemic uncertainty. In that case, the Precau-
tionary Principle might dictate that maximal losses ought to be mini-
mized. According to this so-called Maximin method, instead of mul-
tiplying a weighted utility with a probability, the alternative with the 
smallest loss is the most preferable one. It seems that this method could 
be justifiable for moral attributes on moral grounds alone as long as the 
risk in question really is uncertainty in disguise.11 There are other de-
cision principles such as Minimax with Regret to consider if the stakes 
are high and some form of uncertainty is at play. It would go beyond the 
scope of this article to enter this debate, but I cannot see any principal 
obstacles that would keep us from adjusting the bipolar threshold view 
to such alternative decision principles, and conditions like (4) seem to 
be applicable to these as well.
Concluding Remarks
Several conditions for evaluating the morality of a decision on the basis 
of given sets of morally relevant and non-relevant attributes and cor-
responding thresholds have been investigated in a (simplified) deci-
sion-theoretic setting. Among these the bipolar threshold view of Con-
dition (4) turned out to be the most general and adequate. Once moral 
attributes and their thresholds have been identified, this condition could 
be used to give moral advice. For example, in a group decision making 
process, a team of ‘moral experts’ could provide the value functions and 
thresholds for moral attributes, which may then be combined during an 
argumentative decision making phase with the outcome of a preference 
 
11 One might argue that this problem just concerns the possibility of incorrect mod-
elling, yet prescriptive theory ought to be based on the assumption that the mod-
elling is correct. However, if the stakes are high enough, a ‘Meta-Precautionary 
Principle’ might no longer be clearly discernible from the normal one.
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elicitation process of another group consisting of experts, such as pub-
lic health professionals, about the specific application domain.
Although this suggestion must be taken with a grain of salt in 
light of the simplifying assumptions mentioned in Section 2, it is worth 
noting that most of the known criticism of these assumptions apply to 
decision theory in general and have already been addressed in great 
detail in the seminal literature. For instance, worries about preferential 
independence, completeness and transitivity of the underlying prefer-
ences are addressed by Fishburn (1991), Hansson (2001) and in contri-
butions to Bouyssou et al. (2010), and a number of alternatives to the 
additive decomposition of value functions such as multilinear models, 
multiplicative models and generalized additive decomposition have 
been on the table for a long time. Within this spectrum, the present ac-
count is a lexicographic outranking method, mixed with additive mod-
els for simplicity.
Other kinds of criticism based on the fact that we do not make 
decisions in the way prescriptive decision theory mandates are also well 
known. See, for instance, Kahneman & Tversky (1979; 2000), argu-
ments by Broome (1999: Ch. 6) for Bolker-Jeffrey utility theory, and 
the Maximin and Minimax with Regret approaches mentioned above. 
As suggested in the last section, it seems possible to adjust the bipolar 
threshold view to such alternative frameworks, but perhaps this is not 
needed. Some of the approaches mentioned above, such as work by 
Kahneman and Tversky and work in the evolving field of ‘ecological 
rationality’, draw their motivation from empirical aspects of decision 
making, and there are doubts whether these successfully undermine the 
normativity of expected utility theory that is established by intuitively 
plausible rationality postulates. I am personally wary of any account of 
rationality whose justification is mainly derived from empirical success 
criteria. Be that as it may, the matter seems to be undecided even among 
scholars of decision theory.
There is another worry about the threshold view that has to be 
mentioned. Thresholds constitute sharp boundaries that in practice 
might make the approach unfruitful. If thresholds for moral attributes 
are always so low that the cases when they are not relevant are utterly 
trivial, then the differences between (1) and (4) might become unin-
teresting. Perhaps the stakes are always high in situations worthy of 
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thorough decision analysis. Whether this is a problem or not can only 
be decided in practice.
Finally, one might wonder whether the theory laid out so far could 
serve as a basis for a utilitarian calculus. The answer is clearly no. First, 
there are elements of virtue ethics in the account; not only the actu-
al decision counts for an assessment, but the whole decision table on 
the basis of which it has been made. Second, a fully-fledged utilitarian 
calculus requires much more than what multi-criteria decision theory 
can offer. Time has to be taken into account for there is no doubt that 
many people prefer short amounts of intense displeasure (pain, incon-
venience, dissatisfaction) over a long period of lesser suffering and, vice 
versa, are sometimes willing to tolerate extended amounts of displeas-
ure – morally acceptable variants of the so-called ‘necessary evil’ – to 
later obtain a greater good. If at all, the bipolar threshold view can only 
become a small part of such an approach, allowing one to consider sin-
gle decision situations from a moral aspect provided that the relevant 
alternatives including their consequences over time can be identified 
and an appropriate connection between attribute values, their thresholds 
and moral rules can be drawn. What such a connection would look like 
and how it fares with known methods of preference elicitation is a sur-
prisingly open question of moral philosophy though.
Third, while decision making can account for the influence of possi-
ble courses of actions on other people, the simple version laid out above 
cannot represent equilibria between preferred choices of several decision 
makers. Such equilibria between morally relevant values would have to 
be the cornerstone of a fully-fledged utilitarian calculus and have not 
been addressed at all. As is well known, there are a number of obstacles 
to such an ambitious project, ranging from the question of how to ‘tame’ 
respective variants of Arrow’s theorem to more philosophical worries 
about value aggregation and the interpersonal comparability of utilities. 
It is also well known that Pareto optimality used in economics allows for 
social states that are inherently unjust, and so a utilitarian calculus worth 
being taken seriously would have to take into account additional justice 
criteria. Variants of decision theory like the one laid out above may help 
in making morally acceptable decisions, but in a social context only on 
the basis of an existing theory of justice. By itself, decision theory does 
not contribute to such a theory and also cannot provide the criteria for 
deciding at what level attributes become morally relevant. 
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Moral Relativism and Perspectival Values
Pietro Gori and Paolo Stellino
Although the term ‘relativism’ entered the philosophical vocabulary as 
a terminus technicus only in the nineteenth century,1 the philosophi-
cal position known as relativism can be traced back to Ancient Greek 
philosophy. As is known, the fundamental proposition of Protagoras of 
Abdera was that ‘man is the measure of all things: of the things which 
are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not.’ 
(Plato, Theaetetus: 152a) Socrates’ refusal of Protagoras’ proposition 
in the Theaetetus has led and still leads many philosophers to think that 
relativism is self-refuting:
[Protagoras’ doctrine] has this most exquisite feature: Protagoras admits, I pre-
sume, that the contrary opinion about his own opinion (namely, that it is false) 
must be true, seeing he agrees that all men judge what is … And in conceding the 
truth of the opinion of those who think him wrong, he is really admitting the fal-
sity of his own opinion? … But for their part the others do not admit that they are 
wrong? … But Protagoras again admits this judgement to be true, according to his 
written doctrine? … It will be disputed, then, by everyone, beginning with Pro-
tagoras – or rather, it will be admitted by him, when he grants to the person who 
contradicts him that he judges truly – when he does that, even Protagoras himself 
will be granting that neither a dog nor the ‘man in the street’ is the measure of 
1 Maria Baghramian (2004: 11) points out that the first use of the term ‘relativism’ 
can be traced to John Grote’s Exploratio Philosophica (1865). Mi-Kyoung Lee 
(2005: 34), for his part, mentions an earlier use of the word in writings of Sir Wil-
liam Hamilton and puts forward the hypothesis that the term entered the English 
language from the German use of ‘Relativismus.’ As a matter of fact, as Bernd 
Irlenborn (2016: 7–8) indicates, the word ‘Relativismus’ can be already found in 
the fifth volume of Wilhelm Traugott Krug’s Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der 
philosophischen Wissenschaften, dating from 1838. Lee (2005: 34) also points out 
that ‘Relativismus’ was the term used by nineteenth-century neo-Kantian German 
philosophers and scholars to refer to the position that nothing can be known in 
itself, and that all we can know are appearances.’
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anything at all which he has not learned. Isn’t that so? … Then since it is disputed 
by everyone, the Truth of Protagoras is not true for anyone at all, not even for 
himself? (Plato, Theaetetus: 171a-c)
Socrates draws attention to the fact that, if man is the measure of all 
things and, therefore, truth is relative to man, then Protagoras must con-
cede the truth of the opinion contrary to his own doctrine, namely the 
opinion according to which it is false that man is the measure of all 
things. By doing so, however, Protagoras would be contradictorily com-
mitted to both the truth and falsehood of his own doctrine. In order to 
avoid falling into this contradiction, Protagoras must assume that there 
is at least one absolute truth, that is, the truth of the proposition ‘man 
is the measure of all things.’ But then, once again, this could be seen as 
a contradictory move, for Protagoras would be maintaining at the same 
time that all truth is relative and that there is – at least – one absolute 
truth, namely, that all truth is relative.2
As Neil Levy (2002: 19) has pointed out, unlike epistemic relativ-
ism, moral relativism is not vulnerable to the contradiction argument. 
Indeed, no contradiction is involved in claiming that ‘moral claims are 
true only relative to some standard or framework’ since this is not it-
self a moral claim. Even so, moral relativism faces other difficulties. 
Above all, opponents of moral relativism claim that if moral relativism 
is true, then we have no means to condemn morally actions that we find 
profoundly reprehensible or immoral if these actions are performed by 
members of a different culture than ours. This claim usually takes the 
form of a slippery slope argument: if we recognize that a (we do not 
have any absolute moral standards in the name of which we can de-
nounce reprehensible or immoral actions), then the result b (the way is 
open for any kind of crime) inevitably follows. Moral relativism would 
thus fatally undermine morality: if moral relativism is true, so the crit-
icism goes, then anything goes, that is, everything is permitted. But is 
it really so? Does this way of framing the problem really capture the 
subtleties and complexities of moral relativism?
It is interesting to notice how the terms in which the debate be-
tween moral relativists and moral absolutists is phrased recall the way 
 
2 For a more detailed analysis, see Baghramian (2004: 18–31).
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in which philosophers have interpreted and still interpret the relation 
between Dostoevsky and Nietzsche. Needless to say, the argument ‘if 
moral relativism is true, then everything is permitted’ has a clear Dos-
toevskian flavour. In Dostoevsky’s last novel The Brothers Karama-
zov, Ivan, one of the brothers Karamazov, puts forward the following 
idea: if there is no God and if there is no immortality of the soul, then 
everything is permitted. The parricide, around which the novel revolves, 
can be considered as a consequence of this idea, whereas the novel itself 
can be regarded as a grandiose response to it.
Ivan’s idea bears a striking similarity to the maxim ‘nothing is 
true, everything is permitted’ that appears in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, in On the Genealogy of Morality, as well as in some post-
humous fragments from 1884 and 1885. This similarity has not gone 
unobserved and, beginning from the end of the nineteenth century, 
Russian and European intellectuals have taken it as the key to read 
the relation between Dostoevsky and Nietzsche. The maxim ‘nothing 
is true, everything is permitted’ has been removed from context and 
read as summing up the core of Nietzsche’s philosophy. This has led to 
the controversial identification of Nietzsche’s moral perspectivism with 
Ivan’s moral indifferentism. As a result, Dostoevsky’s novel The Broth-
ers Karamazov has been seen as anticipation and critique ante litteram 
of Nietzsche’s perspectival philosophy.
Beyond the question of the philological and philosophical adequa-
cy of this kind of interpretation,3 what should not be overlooked here is 
the logic underlying this kind of reading. Far from questioning whether 
the maxim ‘nothing is true, everything is permitted’ could be taken as 
summing up the message of Nietzsche’s philosophy, intellectuals have 
taken for granted that the logical and inevitable conclusion following 
from Nietzsche’s moral perspectivism (essentially read as a moral rela-
tivism) was that ‘everything is permitted.’ As one can see, what we have 
is, once again, the argument according to which, if moral relativism – 
or, in Nietzsche’s case, moral perspectivism – is true, then everything 
is permitted.
In what follows, we will tackle this argument. More specifical-
ly, we will take Nietzsche’s case as paradigmatically showing that a 
3 On this, see the second part of Stellino (2015a).
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relativization or perspectivizing of morality does not imply ipso facto 
that anything goes or that everything is permitted. In order to do this, 
we will consider two assumptions which are often made uncritically: (1) 
Nietzsche’s moral perspectivism is essentially a moral relativism, and 
(2) the practical consequence deriving from Nietzsche’s moral perspec-
tivism is that everything is permitted.4
1. Moral Perspectivism
One of the aspects of Nietzsche’s thought that in recent years has cat-
alysed the attention of many scholars is ‘perspectivism.’ Although oc-
currences of this term are limited in number (at least, if we take into 
consideration only the oeuvre5) and time (they appear almost exclu-
sively in the late period), this notion has been taken as indicating one 
of the fundamental theories of his philosophy. The reason for the im-
portance that many scholars have given to this notion lies in the fact 
that perspectivism is considered as a key term used by Nietzsche to 
define, in a more synthetic and incisive way, his theory of knowledge. 
Within this context, scholars often focus on a famous passage from GM 
III 12 (‘There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival ‘know-
ing’’), but scarcely consider GS 354, where Nietzsche relates what he 
considers ‘to be true perspectivism’ with the morally-oriented view of 
 
4 Nietzsche’s works are cited by abbreviation, chapter (when applicable) and sec-
tion number. The abbreviations used are the following: BT (The Birth of Tragedy), 
HH (Human, All Too Human), GS (The Gay Science), Z (Thus Spoke Zarathus-
tra), BGE (Beyond Good and Evil), GM (On the Genealogy of Morality), TI (Twi-
light of the Idols), EH (Ecce Homo). The translations used are from the Cam-
bridge Edition of Nietzsche’s works. Posthumous fragments (PF) are identified 
with reference to the Colli & Montinari standard edition. The fragments which 
do not appear in the Cambridge Edition of the Writings from the Late Notebooks 
are translated according to the Kaufmann and Hollingdale edition of The Will to 
Power (see References).
5 See, particularly, BT, An Attempt at Self-Criticism 5; HH I, Preface 6; BGE, Pref-
ace and sections 11 and 34; GM III 12; FW 354 and 374.
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the herd community. Similarly, the posthumous note 7[60], 1886–87 is 
often mentioned, but most of the time it is misleadingly and arbitrarily 
quoted with no reference to its context.6 Since in this note Nietzsche’s 
aim is to criticize the attitude of positivism, scholars interpret the claim 
that ‘there are no facts, only interpretations’ – a statement often con-
sidered as summing up Nietzsche’s perspectivism – as being exclusive-
ly linked to epistemology. By so doing, the same scholars ignore that 
Nietzsche had already published the maxim in section 108 of Beyond 
Good and Evil (which chronologically predates the posthumous note 
7[60]) and that, in that book, the maxim was specifically referred to 
moral phenomena: ‘There are absolutely no moral phenomena, only a 
moral interpretation of the phenomena …’7 
This does not imply the rejection of the many interpretations that give 
preference to the epistemological character of Nietzsche’s reflections on 
perspectivism.8 Still, it is important to point out that, although Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism is grounded on a specific epistemological view, the former 
cannot be reduced to the latter. Nietzsche himself suggests this idea, for 
instance, when he argues that our fundamental ‘will to truth’ forces us to 
recognize that ‘it is no more than a moral prejudice that the truth is worth 
more than appearance’ (BGE 34; our italics). On the contrary, Nietzsche 
writes, we have to acknowledge that ‘life could not exist except on the basis 
of perspectival valuations and appearances.’
The maxim in BGE 108, which can be taken as the ‘motto’ of 
Nietzsche’s moral perspectivism, reappears two years later and in a 
slightly different way in the following passage from Twilight of the 
Idols:
6 For a thorough examination of this note, see Gori (2016: chapter 2).
7 See also PF 1885–86, 2[165]: ‘My main proposition: there are no moral phenom-
ena, there is only a moral interpretation of those phenomena. This interpretation 
is of extra-moral origin.’ We can find perspectivism and morality strictly related in 
other posthumous fragments of Nietzsche’s (e.g. PF 1884, 26[178] and 1885–86, 
2[206]). In PF 1887, 10[154], Nietzsche writes: ‘My intention to show the abso-
lute homogeneity in all that happens and the application of the moral distinction 
as only perspectivally conditioned.’ According to Robert C. Solomon (2003: 46), 
‘Nietzsche’s ‘perspectivism’ is most in evidence and most at issue in his moral 
philosophy.’
8 On this, see, among others, Clark (1990) and Leiter (1994).
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You have heard me call for philosophers to place themselves beyond good and evil, 
– to rise above the illusion of moral judgement. This call is the result of an insight 
that I was the first to formulate: there are absolutely no moral facts. What moral and 
religious judgements have in common is the belief in things that are not real. Mo-
rality is just an interpretation of certain phenomena or (more accurately) a misinter-
pretation. Moral judgements, like religious ones, presuppose a level of ignorance in 
which even the concept of reality is missing and there is no distinction between the 
real and the imaginary; a level where ‘truth’ is the name for the very things that we 
now call ‘illusions’. That is why moral judgements should never be taken literally: 
on their own, they are just absurdities. (TI, ‘Improving’ Humanity 1)9
According to Nietzsche, to deny the very existence of moral facts (or 
phenomena) means to deny the possibility of claiming that the same 
facts (or phenomena) are intrinsically moral. In Nietzsche’s view, re-
ality is morally neutral. To believe that there are moral realities is 
the consequence of an illusion: what we do have is the existence of 
facts or phenomena, to which a moral interpretation is added by us 
depending on the specific moral perspective from which we judge. 
According to Nietzsche, the moral character of an action has thus not 
been found or discovered, but rather introduced in the action by the 
human being.
Here we face the question of the so-called Sinn hineinlegen, i.e. the 
‘introduction of meaning’ into the world. As Nietzsche puts it in a well-
known passage from section 301 of The Gay Science:
It is we, the thinking-sensing ones, who really and continually make something 
that is not yet there: the whole perpetually growing world of valuations, colours, 
weights, perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations. … Whatever has value 
in the present world has it not in itself, according to its nature – nature is always 
value-less – but has rather been given, granted value, and we were the givers 
and granters! Only we have created the world that concerns human beings! But 
precisely this knowledge we lack, and when we catch it for a moment we have 
forgotten in the next.
As this passage clearly shows, Nietzsche maintains a projectivist stance 
on valuations.10 The world appears to be valuable and meaningful 
9 This passage is often quoted in order to support a reading of Nietzsche’s metaeth-
ics in the light of J.L. Mackie’s ‘error theory’ (see, for instance, Hussain 2007).
10 On this, see Stellino (2015b: 182–184).
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because human beings previously gave value and meaning to a value-
less and meaningless world. In other words, they projected moral, aes-
thetic, religious and other kinds of valuations and estimations onto it. 
By so doing, they created a perspectival and anthropomorphic world 
and then forgot about their creation, wrongly believing the world to be 
intrinsically beautiful and meaningful.11
The awareness of the intrinsic meaninglessness of the world 
strongly characterizes Nietzsche’s late philosophical thought. Whereas 
philosophers so far searched for a meaning of or in the world, Nietzsche 
becomes conscious that meaning or value has to be created. This crea-
tion opens up new, unexplored possibilities for the human being: this is 
the ultimate meaning of the metaphors of the ‘new dawn’ and the ‘open 
sea’ that Nietzsche uses in order to describe the free spirit’s reaction to 
the news that ‘the old God is dead’ (GS 343). ‘The world has once again 
become infinite to us,’ Nietzsche writes in another section of the fifth 
book of The Gay Science, ‘insofar as we cannot reject the possibility 
that it includes infinite interpretations’ (GS 374).
A superficial reading of Nietzsche’s philosophy could take these 
passages and metaphors as a confirmation that the reasoning men-
tioned above – according to which, if moral perspectivism is true, then 
everything is permitted – is validated by Nietzsche himself. As a matter 
of fact, if, according to Nietzsche’s moral perspectivism, (i) every moral 
interpretation is relative to a judging perspective, and (ii) God is dead, 
that is, an absolute viewpoint (God’s eye view) is lacking, then (iii) 
every moral interpretation seems to be as true, valid or justified as the 
others. In other words, everything would be permitted. Following this 
reasoning, Nietzsche is often interpreted as a supporter of an extreme 
moral relativism as well as of a radical form of normative ethical ego-
ism according to which, given God’s death and the perspectival charac-
ter of reality, moral agents ought to do what is their own self-interest, 
even if this means to act in detriment to others’ interest. In what follows, 
attention will be briefly focused on both views.
11 See also PF 1884, 25[505].
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2. Individualism vs. Relationalism
In arguing against the view that takes Nietzsche to be a supporter of a 
radical form of normative ethical egoism, the following premise is need-
ed: it is undeniable that in Nietzsche’s writings and posthumous notes 
one finds abundant textual evidence in favour of moral individualism. In 
a passage from Thus spoke Zarathustra, for instance, Nietzsche writes as 
follows: ‘He will have discovered himself who speaks: ‘This is my good 
and evil.’ With this he has silenced the mole and dwarf who says: ‘Good 
for all, evil for all’.’ (Z IV, On the Spirit of Gravity) This individualistic 
attitude – a peculiar feature of Nietzsche’s philosophy – acquires its full 
meaning when contrasted with Kantian universalism. This contrast, in 
particular, is symbolised by the second metamorphosis of the spirit, who 
first becomes a camel (‘Thou shalt’) and then a lion (‘I will’).12
It is because of his strong opposition to Kantian universalism that 
Nietzsche puts particular emphasis, in Zarathustra as well as in other 
writings, on the point of view of the individual in morality. This empha-
sis has been, however, interpreted in the sense of a radical and extreme 
form of individualism, which would directly follow from Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism. Nevertheless, although Nietzsche often makes reference 
to the human tendency to subjugate and tyrannize – a tendency which is 
the expression of the fundamental feature of the world, the well-known 
and widely debated ‘will to power’ – the perspectival talk of a mul-
tiplicity of different and opposed perspectives leads to quite different 
outcomes. This becomes evident when attention is focused on the key 
question of the subject of perspectivism.13
Contrary to what one may be led to believe, most of the time 
Nietzsche does not identify the human being (the individual) as the 
proper subject of perspectivism; rather, he refers both to supra-in-
dividual subjects (e.g. the species or society) and to infra-individu-
al subjects (e.g. the centres of force). Moreover, no matter which is 
the subject of perspectivism (the individual, the supra-individual or 
12 Z, I, On the Three Metamorphoses. See also GS 355, A 11, and TI, Morality as 
Anti-nature 6.
13 On this, see Cox (1997).
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the infra-individual one), the reality lying behind it is always plural 
and dynamic. This reality is characterised by the mutual relation-
ship between its component parts, according to the view of nature 
that Nietzsche defends as from 1881.14 Nietzsche’s perspectivism is, 
therefore, grounded on a relational model with no privileged subject. 
Within this model, the validity of one specific perspective cannot be 
thought without any reference to the relation (be it conflicting or not) 
that this perspective entertains with other perspectives.
A brief scrutiny of the most interesting passages where Nietzsche 
talks about a ‘perspectival seeing’ can lend support to what has been 
argued. The wider subject of perspectivism that Nietzsche considers is 
the species, whose perspective on, or interpretation of, reality is shared 
by all the single individuals that have the same perceptive and cognitive 
apparatus. Nietzsche has in mind what we could define as a collective 
subject on a biological basis. During its evolutionary history, every spe-
cies has developed a particular psycho-physiological structure which 
is functional to adaptation to the environment. Although each member 
of the species has a specific viewpoint of the world, she is still part of 
a wider interpreting perspective of reality which is the result of similar 
perceptive mechanisms.15
Nietzsche follows a similar line of thought when it comes to anoth-
er wide subject of perspectivism, namely the social collectivity. In the 
well-known section 354 from the fifth book of The Gay Science – the 
only section of the published texts in which Nietzsche uses the term 
‘perspectivism’ and explains what he considers to be ‘true phenome-
nalism and perspectivism’ – attention is focused on communication as a 
prerequisite for the creation of a society. In particular, Nietzsche points 
out that human consciousness ‘actually belongs not to man’s existence 
as an individual but rather to the community- and herd-aspects of his 
nature.’ The herd is here the subject of a generalized and vulgarized 
14 On Nietzsche’s view of the world as an unresting dynamics of force-quanta in 
mutual relationship, and on the connection between this ontology and the idea of 
‘will to power,’ see Abel (1998) and Gori (2007: chapter 3).
15 On this, see, e.g. GS 110; PF 1885, 43[1] and 5[36]; PF 1886, 7[2]. George Stack 
particularly focuses on the species as the main reference of Nietzsche’s perspec-
tivism. See, for instance, Stack (1991). See also Cox (1997: 274–275).
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perspective, a dimension where any individual feeling and willing loses 
its value in favour of the usefulness to the herd.16
Species and society are two plural subjects of perspectivism in 
which individuality plays no fundamental role. On the contrary, when 
it comes to the human being – considered as the referent of a singular 
perspective determined not only by its space-time perception, but also 
by its specific interests and needs – individuality obviously has a more 
important position.17 On this level, we have a multiplicity of singular 
perspectives pertaining to individual subjects whose fundamental ten-
dency, according to Nietzsche, is to affirm their own worldview (their 
own ‘taste’) over those of the other subjects. This picture can particu-
larly lead to the dangerous idea that Nietzsche is a supporter of a rad-
ical form of normative ethical egoism for, given this conflictive pic-
ture, moral agents could seem to be justified in doing what is their own 
self-interest, even if this means to act in detriment to others’ interest.
Without denying that, in Nietzsche’s view, individual perspec-
tives conflict with each other and often tend to overmaster different or 
opposite perspectives, it should be pointed out that this interpretation 
suffers one serious flaw: it overlooks the constitutive character that re-
lationalism plays in Nietzsche’s perspectivism. As already mentioned, 
Nietzsche considers the individual as always making part of a species 
or a social collectivity. Within both of them, the individual is not like a 
monad, but is rather situated in a network of dynamic and interpersonal 
relations. Moreover, even when emphasis is put on the individual, it 
should not be forgotten that Nietzsche conceives the individual itself in 
terms of a plural multiplicity, a collectivity. This is evident, for instance, 
in Beyond Good and Evil, where Nietzsche’s criticism towards the tra-
ditional view of the substantialist concept of ‘subject’ makes reference 
to ‘social structures’ like the soul, ‘a society constructed out of drives 
and affects’ (BGE 12), or the body, made of many souls from which 
the action that we call ‘individual’ arises (BGE 19).18 Thus, behind the 
16 See on this Ibbeken (2008: 75) and Gori (2016: chapter 3).
17 Among others, Clark and Leiter argue that Nietzsche’s perspectivism is limited to 
human consciousness only. Their view is discussed in Cox (1997: 276 ff). On this, 
see also (Grimm 1977: 68). 
18 See also PF 1880, 6[70]. According to Nietzsche, individuals are plural subjec-
tivities made of drives and instincts acting at an ‘unconscious’ level (see, e.g. PF 
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individual, as well as behind the species and the social collectivity, there 
lies a network of relations between singularities, singularities that we 
ignore in favour of a more unitary and inclusive perspective.
What emerges from this picture is a plural conception of the hu-
man being: on the one side, we find a supraindividual (biological and/
or social) perspective that includes the individual one; on the other side, 
there is the plane of the single entities that constitute the human being 
and that find in him a (merely illusory) unity.19 Behind these entities, 
there is the last subject that it is possible to find in Nietzsche’s writings, 
namely the single centre of force.20 Here, Nietzsche leads perspectiv-
ism to the extreme, considering that the plane of interpretation coin-
cides with that of being, that is, with the plane of pure and necessary re-
lationship among the different perspectives, which can be defined only 
from within their mutual relation:
As if a world would still remain over after one deducted the perspective! By do-
ing that one would deduct relativity! Every center of force adopts a perspective 
toward the entire remainder, i.e., its own particular valuation, mode of action, and 
mode of resistance. … The ‘world’ is only a word for the totality of these actions. 
Reality consists precisely in this particular action and reaction of every individual 
part toward the whole. (PF 1888, 14[184])
As the analysis developed shows, when Nietzsche talks of ‘perspectiv-
ism’ or ‘perspectival seeing,’ he always has in mind a relational dynamics. 
The different interpretations of the world (be they of theoretical or moral 
nature) are all expression of this dynamics, on the basis of which the in-
ternal articulation of the most complex structures existing in the world is 
grounded. Everything is based on a non-teleological and necessary, but 
constitutively unstable, action-reaction process. Value judgments can be 
defined only by reference to this relationship, where, at the micro-level, 
a centre of force gains ‘power’ only insofar as it exchanges energy with 
1885, 40[42]). Within this picture, the I (or the subject) is a non-substance entity, 
a theoretical notion whose ontological ground is only that of the pure activity that 
we attribute to it. In other words, the I is ‘a perspectival illusion – the illusory uni-
ty in which, as in a horizon, everything converges’ (PF 1885–86, 2[91]; on this, 
see also BGE 16, 17 and 19, and, for an examination of this issue, Gori 2015).
19 On this, see Cox (1997: 290).
20 See, among others, PF 1888, 14[184] and [186].
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other centres. The kind of mastery grounded on this relationship is there-
fore not fixed and immutable. On the contrary, once the power of a centre 
of force is exhausted, the equilibrium of the total mass of energy changes 
and another centre becomes ‘master’ for a limited period of time.
The reference to this dynamic relationship avoids the risk of inter-
preting Nietzsche’s moral perspectivism as leading to a form of autar-
chic individualism. The idea that different, conflicting interpretations 
can coexist follows indeed from the view according to which relation-
ship itself is the constitutive element of a perspectival reality. In other 
words, we cannot define the centres of force outside their mutual rela-
tions or without making reference to the way they react to the obstacles 
they find when they discharge their energy. As a result, every perspec-
tive can affirm itself only through the relation with the other ones and, 
furthermore, in alternation with them. Thus, it would be wrong to think 
that, within Nietzsche’s worldview, a specific evaluative perspective 
could be valid in itself, that is, in isolation from a context that gives to it 
its specific meaning, or to claim that one can affirm his own view over 
the others once and for all. This does not amount to any rejection of the 
individualistic and affirmative tendency pertaining to each perspective. 
Still, it is important to emphasize that this tendency must face the same 
attempt of affirmation from other subjects. In this way, conflicting per-
spectives give birth to a relational dynamics.21
3. Relativism
Nietzsche’s moral perspectivism has been interpreted not only as an ex-
treme form of ethical egoism, but also as a radical relativism according 
to which, as mentioned, since (i) every moral interpretation is relative to 
a judging perspective, and (ii) an absolute viewpoint is lacking, then (iii) 
21 L. Hatab (1995: 160) argues that Nietzsche’s pluralistic perspectivism is different 
from any other view that defends the coexistence of multiple ‘truths’ because it 
puts emphasis on the agonal dimension, that is, on the conflict existing between 
different perspectives. Nietzsche’s perspectival view has been used by Günter Abel 
in order to develop an ‘interpretation ethics’ (see e.g. Abel 1995: chapter 24).
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every moral interpretation seems to be as true, valid or justified (i.e. per-
mitted) as the others. In order to understand why this kind of reading fails 
to capture the real meaning of the radical change that Nietzsche operates 
in the realm of morality, it is necessary to focus attention on the main 
goal of Nietzsche’s late philosophy. The death of God announced by the 
madman of The Gay Science (§ 125), together with the collapse of the 
Christian-moral interpretation of the world, leave an axiological and nor-
mative void. Far from accepting this void as an inevitable existential con-
dition, Nietzsche aims to face it ‘fearless’ and ‘cheerful’ (GS 343), and 
to fill it through the well-known revaluation of values. It is symptomatic, 
for instance, that although, on the one hand, Zarathustra (Nietzsche’s alter 
ego) presents himself as ‘the annihilator of morals’ (Z I, On the Adder’s 
Bite), on the other hand he puts strong emphasis on the need of creating 
new values. In other words, Nietzsche is well aware that a new evaluative 
interpretation must take the place of the former one, and much of his 
effort in the late period is focused on elaborating this new interpretation.
The attitude that, in the fifth book of The Gay Science, Nietzsche 
claims to be that of the new philosophers and ‘good Europeans’ shows 
us that, according to him, one of the consequences of the death of God 
is the opening of what Karl Jaspers has defined as a ‘positive, creative 
freedom’ (Jaspers 1997: 157) for the human being. In the posthumous 
fragment 39[15], 1885, Nietzsche clearly writes that, with the death of 
God, the Christian-European morality has become no longer necessary 
(the Christian God and morality held themselves together, he claims). 
Once traditional morality has been denied validity, Nietzsche exhorts 
the human being to become a self-legislator, that is, to give himself 
new values and ideals and to set new goals (GS 335). In other words, 
man must become autonomous. This autonomy, however, is not to be 
conceived in terms of an unlimited or licentious freedom.22 The con-
sequence of the death of God is rather an assumption of both individ-
ual and collective responsibility.23 This is a key point which Heidegger 
(2002 [1943]: 189) did not fail to notice, as the following passage clear-
ly shows:
22 See on this e.g. Constâncio (2012).
23 On this, see Pfeuffer (2008).
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It is easy but irresponsible to be outraged by the idea and the figure of the over-
man, which was designed to be misunderstood; it is easy but irresponsible to 
pretend that one’s outrage is a refutation. It is difficult but for future thinking 
unavoidable to attain the high responsibility [hohe Verantwortung; our italics] out 
of which Nietzsche reflected on the essence of that humanity destined … to un-
dertake mastery over the earth. The essence of the overman is not a warrant for a 
fit of capricious frenzy. It is the law, grounded in being itself, of a long chain of 
the highest self-overcomings.
With these words, Heidegger gets at the heart of the problem: the axio-
logical and normative void left by the death of God and by the collapse 
of the Christian-moral interpretation of the world is not conceived by 
Nietzsche as a ‘warrant for a fit of capricious frenzy,’ to use Heidegger’s 
words. On the contrary, as already mentioned, Nietzsche calls humanity 
to an assumption of individual and collective responsibility, that is, to 
an attainment of the awareness that, since humanity’s great values and 
ideals have proved to be hollow, new values and ideals are now required, 
i.e. must be created.24
This is the chief reason for which Dostoevsky’s and Nietzsche’s an-
swer to the question of the consequence of the death of God for moral-
ity could not be more opposite. As The Brothers Karamazov exemplary 
shows, Dostoevsky believes that God’s existence and the immortality of 
the soul are two essential pillars of the moral edifice. Without them, what 
we have is a dangerous slope that leads from atheism to self-deification, 
and from self-deification to the breaking of all moral rules. This logic 
becomes evident in the following passage from the dialogue between the 
devil and Ivan Karamazov (fourth part of the novel): 
Once mankind has renounced God, one and all … then the entire old world view 
will fall of itself, without anthropophagy, and, above all, the entire former moral-
ity, and everything will be new. … Man will be exalted with the spirit of divine, 
titanic pride, and the man-god will appear. … The question now … is whether or 
not it is possible for such a period ever to come. If it does come, then everything 
will be resolved and mankind will finally be settled. But since, in view of man’s 
inveterate stupidity, it may not be settled for another thousand years, anyone who 
already knows the truth is permitted to settle things for himself, absolutely as 
he wishes, on the new principles. In this sense, ‘everything is permitted’ to him. 
Moreover, since God and immortality do not exist in any case, even if this period 
24 See PF 1887, 11[411].
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should never come, the new man is allowed to become a man-god, though it be he 
alone in the whole world, and of course, in this new rank, to jump lightheartedly 
over any former moral obstacle of the former slave-man, if he need be. There is 
no law for God! (Dostoevsky 1992: 648f.)
Unlike Dostoevsky, for Nietzsche the dichotomy ‘either God or amoral-
ity’ is a false dichotomy. Aware that, to put it with Kant (1998 [1786]: 
12), ‘without any law, nothing – not even nonsense – can play its 
game for long,’ Nietzsche is far from being a supporter of the thesis 
‘everything is permitted,’ at least when this thesis is understood as an 
absolute lack of laws and values. If so understood, this thesis leads in-
deed to the nihilistic attitude that Nietzsche diagnoses in the European 
culture of his own age (with its degenerative effect on humanity) and 
to whose opposition a large part of his late writings and Nachlass is 
dedicated. On the contrary, as one can read, e.g. in On the Genealogy 
of Morality (III, 27), Nietzsche shows a clear awareness of the fact that 
European nihilism can and has to be countered with a revaluation of 
values. This is the groundbreaking task that Nietzsche decides to face, 
as he himself confesses in his autobiography: ‘I have a hand for switch-
ing perspectives: the first reason why a ‘revaluation of values’ is even 
possible, perhaps for me alone’ (EH, Why I Am So Wise, 1).
One of the fundamental conditions of the new ‘doctrine and coun-
ter-evaluation of life’ to which Nietzsche makes reference in the new 
preface to The Birth of Tragedy (BT, An Attempt at Self-Criticism, 5) is, 
without doubt, the acknowledgment of the perspectival character of ex-
istence. This acknowledgment poses a classical problem to Nietzsche, 
namely that of the conflict between different moralities or different tables 
of values. Since there is no one absolute morality, but rather a plurality of 
(often conflicting) moral perspectives, how can one perspective claim to 
be better than another? Here, again, relativism seems to cast its shadow 
and one may be led to believe that there is no plausible alternative to the 
position according to which every moral interpretation seems to be as 
true, valid or justified (i.e. permitted) as the others. However, this would 
be wrong. Indeed, Nietzsche defends the idea that it is possible – in fact, 
according to him, necessary – to establish a rank order among values, 
valuations, men, individuals, types, affects, drives, forces, goods, types of 
life, societies and cultures. The Nachlass bears abundant testimony that 
this is one of the most pressing tasks of Nietzsche’s late philosophy. In 
170 Pietro Gori and Paolo Stellino
particular, the problem of values and the establishment of the rank order 
of values are considered by Nietzsche as the future task of the philosopher, 
as the following passage from the Genealogy of Morality clearly shows:
The question: what is this or that table of values and ‘morals’ worth? needs to be 
asked from different angles; in particular, the question ‘value for what?’ cannot 
be examined too finely. … The good of the majority and the good of the minority 
are conflicting moral standpoints: we leave it to the naïvety of English biologists 
to view the first as higher in value as such … All sciences must, from now on, pre-
pare the way for the future work of the philosopher: this work being understood 
to mean that the philosopher has to solve the problem of values and that he has to 
decide on the rank order of values. –
There is little doubt that Nietzsche’s attempt to establish a rank order 
of perspectival values is problematic. Brian Leiter (2000: 277), for 
example, in his paper on Nietzsche’s metaethics, poses the following 
question: ‘is there any sense in which Nietzsche’s evaluative perspec-
tive can claim some epistemic privilege – being veridical, being better 
justified – over its target?’25 In other words, as John Richardson (2004: 
68) points out, Nietzsche’s attempt to establish a rank order of values 
generates an interpretive puzzle: how can Nietzsche reconcile his ‘em-
phatic ‘perspectivizing’ of all values, including his own, with his equal-
ly vehement ‘ranking’ of values – a ranking that so clearly purports to 
some privileged status?’26 To provide an answer to these questions goes 
 
25 Leiter seems not to take into consideration the possibility that the privilege 
claimed by Nietzsche’s evaluative perspective is not epistemic, but rather prac-
tical. See, for instance, Gerhardt 1989. On the primary function of every per-
spective as sinnorientierend, that is, as providing a meaning though which the 
human being can be practically orientated in the world, see Kaulbach (1980) and 
Gerhardt (1989).
26 Another way to put the problem is the following: how do we reconcile the me-
taethics of the values Nietzsche criticizes and the metaethics of the values he 
defends? As Robertson (2009: 67) puts it, ‘If Nietzsche denies the objectivity of 
value upon which morality’s claim to authority rests, he thereby deprives his own 
positive values of a legitimate claim to objectivity and authority; in that case, the 
values constitutive of his own positive evaluative outlook are no more objectively 
justified than or superior to those he rejects; there may then be no objective justi-
fication for the claim that we should alter our evaluative commitments or pursue 
the revaluation through to completion.’ On this, see Stellino (2015b).
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beyond the scope of this paper. However, within the present context, we 
may observe that Nietzsche’s insistence on the need of a rank order pre-
cisely constitutes the chief objection against those readings that equate 
Nietzsche’s moral perspectivism with a moral relativism according to 
which all evaluative perspectives would have the same status or the 
same validity. For if Nietzsche would consider all evaluative perspec-
tives to have the same status or the same validity, why would he feel the 
urgent need to establish a rank order of values?
Werner Stegmaier (1994: 202) stresses quite clearly Nietzsche’s 
original attitude towards relativism:
According to Nietzsche, to think in a relativistic way means to search for a hold 
no longer on any highest point – with which, if proved to be untenable, everything 
would break down – but rather on a network of relations which maintain their 
hold on one another. For Nietzsche, nihilism was the groundless-becoming of 
every higher philosophy of absolute, while the relativism of his perspectivism 
was the disillusion that had to follow and a relief. Philosophy could now give up 
the search for ultimate criteria for the foundation of truth and good and, instead, 
explore the changing plausibilities according to which we generally validate truth 
as truth, good as good and grounded [Begründen] as grounded. 
In this passage, Stegmaier particularly focuses on the connection be-
tween relativism and what we have defined as ‘relationalism,’ and 
stresses the importance of considering values and truths as generated 
by ‘a network of relations which maintain their hold on one another’ 
instead of with reference to a single, absolute principle. If we take this 
viewpoint, then it is easy to understand how a relativization or a per-
spectivizing of morality – which is Nietzsche’s case – does not imply 
ipso facto that anything goes or that everything is permitted. As we 
have seen above, Nietzsche is highly aware that the risk of defending a 
perspectival view in the moral domain is that all evaluative perspectives 
can be considered to have the same status or the same validity, but he 
also defends a relationalistic view according to which each truth, each 
value can be judged only with reference to the network of which they 
are part. In short, Nietzsche thinks that there should be (or there has to 
be) a rank order of values and, furthermore, that the criterion or stand-
ard, which has to be defined in order to establish this rank order, must 
take into account the relationalism of values. Thus, the rank order of 
values cannot be grounded on some kind of individualistic principle or 
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normative ethical egoism.27 As Nietzsche suggests in the passage from 
the Genealogy mentioned above, to define this criterion constitutes the 
future work of the philosopher.
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Political ethics as a functional requirement  
of democracy: sketching a theory of political  
values in democratic systems
Gabriele De Angelis
Social theory abandoned the topic of political legitimacy long ago. 
Max Weber set forth the last truly influential theory that a few schol-
ars still occasionally attempt to follow up on (Beetham 1991). Domi-
nated by political moralism, political philosophy disregards the (thus 
far admittedly insufficient) contribution of the social sciences, and 
frames legitimacy in terms of adequacy to pre-political moral prin-
ciples – an approach to which minority opinions only pose a minor 
challenge despite their at times noble source (Rorty 1991, Williams, 
2005). And yet, a theory of legitimacy with both normative relevance 
and descriptive capacity is possible through an analysis of political 
ethics as a “functional requirement” of a political system. What fol-
lows is a sketch of such a theory that builds on Niklas Luhmann’s 
intuitions (2002, 2008).
1. Political theory between moralism and realism
In contemporary political theory, democratic legitimacy is most com-
monly conceptualised according to either one of two models: the “mor-
alism” that characterizes the bulk of contemporary political liberalism, 
or realism. Moralism sees legitimacy as a fulfilment of pre-political eth-
ical principles to which political institutions are supposed to conform. 
Such principles tell us what legitimate political institutions look like 
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and, vice versa, real existent political institutions can be said to be legit-
imate if and only if they conform to such principles.1
Realism is more multifarious than moralism. Williams’ realism 
focuses on the Hobbesian task of securing “order, protection, safe-
ty, trust, and the conditions of cooperation” (2005: 3). The accom-
plishment of these tasks requires taking into account the historical 
circumstances in which order has to be established and qualified, 
and includes a number of variables of which moral principles are 
a component among others (2005: 77). Realism is, however, a less 
cogent theoretical attitude than moralism. A frequent line of thought 
reproduces the early modern distinction between ethics and politics 
as a distinction between ends and means.2 Another, also frequent, 
version of realism consists in a prudential assessment of the scope 
of ethical consensus in contemporary societies, and concludes that 
democratic politics can be justified as avoidance of uncontrolled po-
litical conflict, and as a space for peaceful controversy and the exer-
cise of public reason, mediation and negotiation (Bellamy 2010; see 
also Galston 2010 and Philp 2010).
Both moralism and realism accept the distinction between de-
scriptive and normative approaches to politics, and take up the classic, 
already Machiavellian, distinction between morals and politics as two 
different and autonomous systems of norms, the first belonging to the 
domain of philosophy as a “normative” discipline, the latter belonging 
to political science as a “descriptive” discipline of political behaviour 
and institutional systems. Similarly, Dahl distinguishes between theo-
ries that are “essentially ethical” in character and theories that attempt 
to give us a picture of the world “as it really is” (Dahl 1956: 1).
Theories that attempt to do the latter often construe legitimacy in 
terms of expressed consent: a power relationship is legitimate as long 
as “it can be justified in terms of [people’s] beliefs” (Beetham 1991: 
11) independently of whether those beliefs are worth sharing from our 
point of view. The social scientist suspends his/her own judgement 
and attempts to look at power and legitimation from the point of view 
 
1 On moralism, see Williams (2005).
2 A contemporary version of such a theory is presented by Bobbio (1984) and 
Coady (1991).
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of the actors involved: legitimacy – as long as it is considered as a 
social fact – is considered to be relative to the beliefs and expressions 
of consent of the actors whose political behaviour the social scientist 
observes and interprets.
As methodologically correct as this is, such an objectifying atti-
tude is somehow unsatisfactory when it is applied to our own political 
world, in which the reasons why we should or should not agree with 
political acts is often hotly debated, and factual but dubious consent 
is often opposed to deserved and qualified consent. Such a normative 
evaluation is usually counted to the domain of political philosophy, 
while social scientists content themselves with detecting the presence 
and the sources of factual consent independently of its moral quality. 
Such a sharp distinction is, however, not necessarily reasonable as it 
can indeed be shown that our political world is structured in such as 
way as to make certain moral assumptions both more frequent and 
more justified than others. While we participate in our political world, 
moral assumptions are at work that cast mora than a doubt on whether 
too strict a distinction between social facts and moral justifiability is 
actually viable.
2.  Beyond the opposition between descriptive  
and normative theories
In the division of labour between descriptive and normative theories 
there seems to be no room left for the idea that ethical principles might 
be present in a different form than as simple “beliefs”: ideas rooted 
in the heads of citizens and political actors with no real relevance for 
what happens in the political domain. In particular, in current political 
science or political theory, the idea is no longer pursued that a con-
ception of legitimacy is paramount to the comprehension of political 
systems, so that too strict a distinction between a normative and a 
descriptive approach is untenable from the point of view of an effec-
tive analysis of political institutions as they are in political reality. 
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Political institutions rest in fact on normative, ethical assumptions 
without which political processes would cease to make sense both to 
actors and observers. In other words, ethical principles can be shown 
as being the “salt” of political institutions and practices. This is an in-
tuition that was clearly present at the beginning of political sociology 
and political science (for instance in the works of Hans Kelsen and 
Carl Schmitt) (De Angelis 2009).
A political system rests on a language of legitimacy as a key com-
ponent of public communication so that a semantics of political ethics 
is a functional requirement of any political system. In particular, a dem-
ocratic political system is characterised by a definite set of identifiable 
semantical layers by means of which actors and observers distinguish 
and communicate about the legitimacy of political acts and decisions, 
with such a communication being part of the political process itself.
The analysis of legitimacy as a component of public political 
communication is descriptive in as much as it identifies a set of se-
mantical references as a presupposition for the functioning and un-
derstanding of a democratic political system. As such, it resists the 
temptation to affirm what ought to be from the point of view of Rea-
son or truth. However, the distinction between a descriptive and a 
normative approach becomes less and less useful once we acknowl-
edge that the normative assumptions that are inherent to democratic 
political institutions and communication are what we as citizens of 
democratic countries act upon in our political behaviour. Such a set 
of assumptions lies at the core of our political judgement. Political 
institutions rest on an ethical basis that invites us to question politi-
cal behaviour against the background of normative assumptions that 
are valid inasmuch as they are part of the institutions that frame our 
political behaviour. These kinds of normative assumptions represent 
therefore a “tacit” knowledge (Polanyi 1966) that makes our political 
behaviour meaningful and intelligible. In particular, the here suggest-
ed approach analyses political institutions as the embodiment of eth-
ical assumptions in a dialectical relationship between procedures and 
semantics, the latter being “functional requirements” of the former. 
Specific institutional mechanisms become intelligible only in the light 
of specific ethical assumptions. Without the latter, the former cease 
to make sense to their actors. Moreover, formal procedures are often 
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structured in such a way as to “make true” certain ethical assumptions, 
as will become clear in the case of political representation.
3. The “circle” of democratic power
Any political system is characterised by a set of rules that determine 
who is authorised to make collectively binding decisions and how, i.e. 
by means of which procedures (Bobbio 1995: 4). In a representative de-
mocracy, such determination takes the form of a chain of authorisations 
that starts with a more or less complex and mediated selection of deci-
sion-makers by means of which citizens choose “representatives” in a 
regularly repeated electoral process. The rules of the game are such that 
decision-makers are chosen between alternative proposals of competing 
political personnel and platforms. They aim to ensure “responsiveness” 
and “accountability”, and therefore result in the indirect control of citi-
zens over decision-makers. This is the kernel of democratic “freedom”: 
citizens are not free because they make the rules themselves, they are 
free inasmuch as decision-makers are not free to make the rules arbi-
trarily (Sartori 1994: 172). Political freedoms and rights are such as to 
ensure the smooth reproduction of such a “circle of power”.
A political system thus results in the alternation of inputs and out-
puts. In a democratic political system, the input consists principally in 
an electoral result that works as an authorisation for a definite set of 
people to make collectively binding decisions. These decisions (and 
their impact on social life) are the output of the political system.
Inasmuch as it is bound up with a mechanism of authorisation – 
and therefore with a set of expectations and decisions that are supposed 
to satisfy these expectations (“responsiveness”) – the relation of inputs 
and outputs already is an ethical relation in which a legitimising input 
represents a “request” that is to be interpreted and responded to through 
the output. The correctness of such an “interpretation” is tested by the 
periodical reiteration of the process of authorisation.
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4. Input and output legitimacy, and sovereignty
In modern times, the “circle of power” depicted above is explained with 
the people’s “sovereignty”. The specific procedures that give to the po-
litical system its input-output structure tell us how such sovereignty is 
exercised and exactly what it consists of: it generally consists of the 
capacity to periodically (and more or less directly) determine who is au-
thorized to make collectively binding decisions, while the legally valid 
procedures determine the specific articulation of such a general ethical 
relationship. Procedures are thus intelligible as embodiments of more 
specific ethical principles (such as the exact entitlements to the exercise 
of sovereignty, the interpretation that is given to political equality, the 
constitution of social, geographical and cultural subgroups as political 
constituencies, etc.). On the other hand, ethical principles only become 
effective by means of procedures. Ethical principles make procedures 
“meaningful” inasmuch as they are the reason why certain procedures 
are in place: for instance, for the sake of popular sovereignty, collec-
tive self-determination, freedom, etc. On the other hand, procedures tell 
us what kind of a difference ethical principles make in the practice. 
Generally, “popular sovereignty” makes the world different inasmuch as 
voters contribute to the periodical selection of decision-makers. More 
specifically, the exact entitlements will determine who is exactly part of 
“the people”, what “popular” therefore means, which specific cultural 
or geographic interpretation is given of the set of actors who share this 
entitlement.
However, the liaison between procedures and principles will also 
show the limits of the latter: in contemporary democracies, sovereignty 
can only be exercised indirectly by means of a relation of political rep-
resentation, and is filtered by a complex set of institutional, commu-
nicative and organisational infrastructures. Moreover, procedures are 
independent of the ethical principles that they are supposed to embody 
inasmuch as time can change some of the sociological assumptions 
that are part of those principles, while the procedures continue to take 
place unperturbed. For instance, the feelings of the actors that compose 
a constituency may change throughout time as regards the reasons for 
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their coexistence: separatisms may arise just like separations may lose 
their reason to be. Conversely, procedures can also become obsolete as 
they may be perceived as more or less satisfactory embodiments of a 
changing concept of sovereignty, representation, etc. Although institu-
tional procedures are intelligible as embodiments of ethical principles, 
this does not mean that they are also their truthful implementation, 
nor does it mean that such an implementation would not be possible 
otherwise.
Far from being an endpoint, the double relationship between proce-
dures and ethical principles is the starting point of political communica-
tion, for both the exact “embodiment” or realisation of ethical principles 
by means of institutional procedures and the reasonableness of ethical 
principles in the light of what we can actually achieve procedurally are 
open for discussion. Thus, the reform of an electoral system will likely 
be motivated through reference to a “better” representation of “the peo-
ple”, the reform of an institutional system might prompt discussions 
about the exercise of sovereignty in a complex and multifarious constit-
uency (as has been the case in Italy when elements of a federal system 
were introduced in 2001).
Despite historical mutations of procedures and semantical nuanc-
es, the interpretation of the electoral mechanism as an authorisation 
and of its reiteration as a form of accountability is a common feature of 
contemporary democracies. They make sure that decision-makers are 
not self-referential, but – on the contrary – interrogate themselves as 
to the “requests” that come to them from “outside” the political system.
What ought to be, however, the result of such an interrogation? 
Again, the history of political semantics provides us with “representa-
tion” (of the people’s interests, needs, etc.) as an apt normative reference.
5. “Representation” as an ethical relationship
What ought to be represented, and how, is subject to interpretation, but 
the semantical reference to representation is a starting point for political 
communication: something is expected to be represented and somebody 
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is expected to represent something and somebody else. What, how and 
by which means will be a further object of political communication 
and, ultimately, a matter of choice, preference and evaluation by means 
of the electoral process. Notwithstanding its openness, a relation of 
representation fulfils the goal of entitling the represented people with 
the legitimate expectation to be the addressees and the arbiters of de-
cisions and decision-makers. Thus, a formal procedure makes an eth-
ical assumption true inasmuch as it prompts political actors to enact 
corresponding patterns of behaviour: as a political representative I will 
have an interest in being accountable to my constituency and will be 
motivated to interpret my role as a role of representation with a strong 
ethical character. And, vice versa, as a citizen and a voter I will also be 
induced to look at political representatives as more or less satisfactory 
interpreters of my political preferences, for it is the very structure of the 
political process that motivates me to do so.
Thus, representation calls for responsiveness and accountability. 
It requires that decision-makers address citizens as the ultimate sover-
eigns. “Representation” is one of the core assumptions of democratic 
politics in that it structures political communication around the need to 
interpret the citizens’ “will”, “needs”, “demands” and so on, and address 
them adequately. “Representation” shows how the relationship between 
formal procedures and ethical principles is structured in such a way as 
to make sure that not anything goes, but is also “loose” enough to open 
up a space for controversies, alternatives and civilized struggles.
The space for controversies that opens up in the interplay of ethical 
principles and institutional procedures allows for – roughly – two levels 
of communication: the first concerns the “content” of inputs and out-
puts, the second concerns the adequacy of the principles and procedures 
themselves. This is the point at which the “dialectical” relationship be-
tween procedures and semantics sets in: ethical principles become real 
only through their embodiment in procedures, while procedures are 
meaningful only against the background of some ethical principle. Po-
litical equality is a case in point.
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6.  Systemic approach vs. moralism: the case of political 
equality
In a representative democracy, political equality is realised by means 
of an institutional procedure that endows citizens with an equal voting 
right. Again, there might be exceptions, but they have to be justified 
against the background of such a general assumption of equality.
Indeed, as long as political equality is upheld as a principle and 
“equal voting right” is its key embodiment, exemptions will have to be 
publicly justified. This is the main consequence of having a principle 
and a corresponding procedure as normative paradigms: both work as a 
criterion in political communication in relation to which discussions are 
conducted, normative expectations structured, and justifications asked.
The ethical relationship between principle and procedure outlined 
here is different from what political moralism usually understands as a 
moral foundation of politics. Thus, political equality can surely be un-
derstood as the embodiment of a moral principle that a priori (i.e. from 
a non- or pre-political standpoint) determines what is politically legiti-
mate. This is the case whenever we understand political equality as the 
embodiment of the equal moral standing or dignity of human beings, 
their mutual recognition, respect, etc. However, the relationship be-
tween ethical principles and formal procedures that is being pointed out 
here is different from the assumptions of political moralism inasmuch 
as the selfsame relationship is open to a plurality of moral interpreta-
tions, theories and scholarly attitudes. Enlightened self-interest or con-
siderations of opportunity may also be sufficient to accept democratic 
rules as expressions of a necessary modus vivendi (Horton 2010: 440).
Thus, political equality and its embodiment through equal voting 
rights and weight can as well be justified prudentially inasmuch as I ac-
cept that the equal representation of all (alongside the constitutionally 
entrenched fundamental rights) is a guarantee against oppression that is 
simply necessary in a complex society in which several conceptions of the 
good and innumerable individual life plans coexist and compete with each 
other. In other words, I may accept political equality as a guarantee that 
the law will be obeyed although anyone would be inclined to exempt him/
herself from obedience, as is the case in the Kantian “people of devils”:
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The problem of the formation of the state, hard as it may sound, is not insoluble, 
even for a race of devils, granted that they have intelligence. It may be put thus: 
Given a multitude of rational beings who, in a body, require general laws for 
their own preservation, but each of whom, as an individual, is secretly inclined 
to exempt himself from this restraint: how are we to order their affairs and how 
establish for them a constitution such that, although their private dispositions may 
be really antagonistic, they may yet so act as a check upon one another, that, in 
their public relations, the effect is the same as if they had no such evil sentiments 
(Kant 1795/1903: 153–4).
Goodin also construes the principle “one person, one vote” not only as 
the enactment of a moral principle of fairness and reciprocity, but also 
as a safeguard against extreme decisions: since majorities are likely to 
shift throughout time, I may consider taking on a prudential attitude for 
fear that those that I put to a burdensome disadvantage when finding 
myself in the majority will pay me back in the same coin once I find 
myself in the minority (Goodin 1992: 85). Publicity, accountability and 
discursive defensibility are further examples of rules whose accepta-
bility may rest on both prudence and morality.
While moralism takes steps from pre-political moral principles, 
the systemic approach shows that political procedures and principles of 
public political ethics are compatible with different moral beliefs. Such 
a pluralist understanding of morals in politics acknowledges that moral 
principles rarely are the ratio essendi or the historical origin of the po-
litical procedures that shape our political systems. A closer look at the 
moral debates that shaped the historical origin of our political institu-
tions would show that moral reasons surely played a role, but it would 
also show that political institutions are not in place because a given mor-
al principle has been universally acknowledged and applied at a certain 
given time. The historical origin of political institutions is far more com-
plex than this, and results from a complex interplay of moral attitudes 
and circumstances as well as material, class and sectoral interests.
Nevertheless, the specific result of such an interplay of social forc-
es is that political equality is a normative and institutional assumption 
lying at the basis of our political systems. It belongs to its semantics, 
i.e. to the fundamental assumptions of the political communication 
that takes place in it, and is solidly anchored in its political practice. 
“Equality” consists of an equal chance to determine who will be a de-
cision-maker and (indirectly) what his/her agenda will be. For such a 
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chance to be effectively used, further “functional assumptions” must be 
in place: equal access to information, and therefore freedom to produce 
information, freedom of speech, freedom to form political organisa-
tions, etc. (Dahl 1989: Ch. 8; 2006).
7. General vs. self-serving interest
Representation as an ethical relationship is undetermined enough to 
make room for different interpretations of what is to be represented and 
how. It is a choice of the representative to focus on concepts such as “in-
terests”, “needs”, “demands”, or on actors such as “citizens”, “groups”, 
“classes”, etc. However, the history of modern political semantics pro-
vides us with a dominant dichotomy: the one between “self-serving” 
and “general” interest. Although it is difficult enough to define the con-
cept of general interest (the indeterminacy of Rousseau’s concept of 
a “general will”, as opposed to a “will of all”, is indicative enough of 
such a difficulty), it is far less problematic to detect a self-serving in-
terest. A particular interest as the interest of a few is usually what is 
not to be represented, unless it also serves a general interest or the in-
terest of all (Shapiro 2003: 200) (as for instance in the justification of 
“trickle-down” economics). Exceptions are indeed possible, but must 
be motivated (as is for instance the case of “positive discrimination”) 
against a normative expectation that takes for granted that a general, not 
a self-serving, interest is what ought to be promoted.
What exactly is a correct interpretation of a general interest, or the 
interest of all, and what is just a self-serving interest is again open for 
discussion. (for instance, is trickle-down economics really in the interest 
of all, or is it just neoliberal hocus-pocus?). The conceptual opposition 
between the two kinds of interest does nevertheless shape citizens’ ex-
pectations as to the legitimacy of collectively binding decisions – a le-
gitimacy that will be verified again in the course of the electoral process 
once decision-makers put their behaviour to the test of the ballots. Be-
tween one electoral process and the next, the concepts provide partici-
pants in political communication – be these opposition parties, protest-
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ers, civil society organisations, etc. – with a normative reference that 
they can use to shift public opinion in their own favour. In democratic 
politics – and as far as the citizenry is concerned (constitutional courts’ 
rulings are a somehow different matter) – it is ultimately the electoral 
process, i.e. a numeric result, that decides upon the quality (including the 
moral quality) of decisions and decision-makers. The interplay between 
normative criteria of political judgement (here: “semantics”) and formal 
procedure is such that no telos leads necessarily towards the discovery of 
the “real” general interest or political “truth”. The political process is not 
necessarily a cognitive process. The criteria in question are “empty” in-
asmuch as their content is necessarily controversial: citizens do not need 
to agree on what a general will is in order to successfully interact in po-
litical communication. It is enough that they share sufficient semantical 
reference points in order to be able to communicate and understand each 
other despite their disagreement. The simple fact that a general interest 
(or the interest of all) is what is, in principle, to be achieved in politics, 
while a particular will is usually what is to be avoided or subjected to 
specific justification, is enough to make sure that decision-makers will 
aim to depict their political choices as legitimate representations of the 
former, while the opposition will aim to make them out as expressions of 
a self-serving (or a failed expression of a general) interest.
Both the formal procedures of democratic regimes and the se-
mantical opposition between general and self-serving interest serve 
the goal of stimulating the generalisation of particular, individual or 
sectoral interests, as political actors strive for the formation of an elec-
toral majority. Whatever kind of interest an actor represents, he/she will 
hardly be able to reach a political majority if what he/she represents 
cannot be shown to match some kind of “general” or collective inter-
est. In order to achieve such a majority, political actors must rely on 
public communication and its categories of political judgement. The 
restrictions to which particular or self-serving interests are subject in 
public communication favour the framing of interests in terms of more 
general, encompassing, overarching or collective interests. Insofar as 
democratic procedures include public discussion and justification, the 
generalisation of interests is part of results in a sort of Kantian “public 
use of Reason”.
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8. “Individualism” as a functional requirement of democracy
Besides lying at the core of an ethical relationship between represent-
atives and constituency, political equality and its institutional embodi-
ments produce a further ethical consequence: the imputation of political 
choices to individuals. Citizens bear responsibility for their electoral 
choice inasmuch as they are the starting point of the electoral proce-
dure. Therefore, a political system based on citizens’ choice – exercised 
through the casting of a vote – institutes individual responsibility for 
the consequences of the votes cast – and therefore individual autonomy 
of judgement – as two fundamental moral assumptions. Participation, 
abstention, knowledge, ignorance, degree of information, etc. will all 
be ascribed to the individual as a citizen of a democratic society. I will 
be the author of my behaviour and the sole person responsible even if 
I choose not to know and not to participate. The individualisation of 
the procedure paves the way for a series of imputations and claims: the 
claim to receive sufficient access to relevant information, to be put in 
the condition to best exercise my political autonomy, etc. Thus, a demo-
cratic political system also institutes an ideal of the democratic citizen, 
who is supposed to get access to information, to debate, to develop 
cognitively consistent attitudes and make his/her choice accordingly. It 
is well known how much political reality differs from such an ideal of 
the democratic citizen (Zolo 1992: 111–20). Nevertheless, the prima-
ry effect of such a mechanism of imputation of rational or reasonable 
choice is to open up a space for controversies about access to and qual-
ity of information, freedom of the press, manipulation, rationality, etc. 
It is the normative background against which citizens of a democratic 
society conduct their debates about the quality and openness of public 
communication, and the degree to which it is conducive to the kind of 
responsible and autonomous choice that the institutional context pre-
supposes. Again, such a normative background is purely political inas-
much as it is independent of whatever “natural” or pre-political moral 
assumptions I may want to make with regard to human beings. It is a 
consequence of the political institutions we live in. Nor are these nor-
mative assumptions undermined by scepticism towards political elites: 
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the disenchanted citizen that blames the untrustworthiness of repre-
sentatives actually acts upon the same assumption, and is just shifting 
responsibility to the person or organised group that obtained his/her 
consent under false pretences.
9. Political ethics in the social sciences
Although “counterfactual”, the link between ethical principles and for-
mal procedures bears important consequences for political life in that 
it determines the grid of cognitive criteria through which we look at 
and communicate about democratic politics. Such a link binds political 
actors to give allegiance (or at least pay lip service) to given ethical 
standards. On similar grounds Skinner argues against the idea that po-
litical actors’ profession of belief in political ethics is at best an ex-post 
rationalisation: although the acknowledgement of such principles can 
be merely ideological or straightforwardly manipulatory, it does never-
theless make a difference inasmuch as it subjects political behaviour to 
collectively valid standards of ethical judgement (Skinner 2002: 145).
The ethical meaning of legal procedures belongs, in sum, to the 
“functional requirements” of politics. It structures public communica-
tion around a definite set of normative expectations, offers criteria for 
assessing individual behaviours on the basis of ascribed responsibil-
ities, determines political roles and traces the boundaries of political 
entities (such as “the people”). In complex societies, such a liaison be-
tween ethical principles and formal procedures includes a “reduction of 
complexity” inasmuch as innumerable individual wills, preferences and 
interests are summed up in the (ideally) dual relationship of political 
minorities and majorities. Citizens are as well encouraged to link up 
to other people’s different wills, interests and preferences, as their own 
claims have having to pass the test of generalisability while striving 
for political majorities. This results in a further ethical relationship that 
involves the members of a constituency: political behaviour and deci-
sion-making will tend to be structured in such a way as to satisfy the 
need to respond to a collective “will” or interest.
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The intimate connection between ethical principles and formal 
procedures provides citizens with a set of cognitive criteria for political 
judgement by means of which they can communicate and understand 
each other in public communication. Nevertheless neither the ethical 
principles nor the formal procedures are fully determined by each other: 
there are several interpretations of popular sovereignty as there is more 
than one procedure to enact it. Democracies are also dynamic political 
systems inasmuch as the relationship between ethics and procedures 
shifts throughout time, propelled by the struggle for new political ma-
jorities, political opportunities and semantical innovations. The “ambi-
guities” of the ethical principles, their openness for ever further inter-
pretation and reconsideration as well as the questionability of formal 
procedures (how apt are they to embody the ethical principles on which 
they rest? what are their unintended consequences?) are all dynamic 
elements in the evolution of political systems.
The study of “embedded” political ethics opens a new perspec-
tive on legitimacy. It shows that the interplay of ethical semantics and 
formal procedures represents a key element of everyday normative as-
sumptions in political communication and behaviour. Political ethics 
emerges as an ingredient of formal procedures beyond both the straight-
forward distinction between normative and descriptive approaches and 
the opposition between moralism and realism in political theory. It may 
represent a new paradigm for the study of political ethics from the point 
of view of the social sciences, while having a positive impact on politi-
cal theory inasmuch as it casts light on the normative assumptions that 
are a functional part of everyday political life.
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II – Arguing about values

Practical Rationality at Work – A New  
Argumentation Model
João Sàágua and Michael D. Baumtrog
Introduction
Conceptual ideals typically provide unobtainable standards from which 
to measure and evaluate the real. In philosophy, ideals are often concep-
tualized and articulated not with the intent of literally dictating practice, 
but with the hope of providing norms from which reflective evaluation 
might lead to improved practice. Such is the case with any ideal model 
of reasoning or argumentation. No philosophy working with ideal rea-
soning or argumentation expects real reasoners or arguers to follow the 
ideal model perfectly or always. Rather, many of the models of reason-
ing and argumentation put forward thus far serve as standards against 
which poor or fallacious practices become apparent. Thus, the ‘phil-
osophical punch’ of an ideal model is two-fold: the model itself is an 
articulation of the way things ought to be, and if correct, the way things 
ought to be informs, motivates, and justifies articulations of failures in 
practice.
In what follows we provide our first articulation of a new ideal 
model of integrated practical reasoning and argumentation. It is ideal 
in two senses. First, its method is prescriptive, although it may never be 
executed perfectly in practice. Second, as an ideal standard, applying 
it to an instance of real life reasoning or argumentation will provide 
evaluative insights (see Baumtrog 2015). However, although an ideal 
model, we have tried to keep its ideal and prescriptive aspects relevant, 
pertinent, and realistically representative of intuitions regarding what 
we actually do when we practically reason and argue.
As alluded to above, we are not the first to put forward an ideal 
model for practical reasoning or argumentation. Philosophers have long 
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focused on practical reasoning, with recent models/schemata coming 
from Broome (2002) and Audi (2006), to name but a few. Argumen-
tation scholars such as Walton (1990, 2007, 2013a, b), van Eemeren, 
Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans (2002 pp.101–102),1 and Fair-
clough & Fairclough (2012) have provided recent models of practical 
argumentation. As such, if we are to be responsible academics, we must 
then justify the need for our current contribution; we must answer the 
question ‘What is on offer here that cannot be found elsewhere?’
The answer will become clearer below, but here we would like to of-
fer one brief answer explained through three supporting points. The main 
answer is that the new model is an integrated model of practical rea-
soning and argumentation. Philosopher’s working on practical reasoning 
and ethics have thus far paid little attention to argumentation theory. 
Similarly, argumentation scholars have paid little attention to the work 
of those in practical reasoning and ethical decision-making. In short, 
there is a gap between the two areas. This could be in part due to the 
explanation Walton (2007: 212) gives that there is a contrast between his 
‘commitment’ model and the ‘Belief, Desire, Intention’ (BDI) models. 
As integrative, then, we consider our model a novel contribution. 
The three supporting points indicate the main ways the model is 
integrated. The first is that it can be used by both commitment and BDI 
proponents. For those viewing the model with a mind to argumentation, 
we invite the reader to feel welcome to think in terms of commitments 
interlocutors have and can be held accountable for. Viewing the model 
as an instance of reasoning, we invite the reader to view the model in 
terms of attitudes that connect to reasons in an inferential process. In 
both cases, however, we side with the view that practical reasoning and 
argumentation conclude in an intention to act rather than, as many in 
argumentation have it, a belief that one should act. For argumentation, 
this means maintaining a discursive commitment that one intends to 
perform some act. 
The second way the model is integrative is that we reconceptualise 
and reposition what have come to be known as ‘argumentation schemes’ 
as producing pro tanto reasons. In this way, we use one concept from 
argumentation – argumentation schemes with critical questions – while 
1 They refer to their scheme as ‘pragmatic argumentation’ rather than ‘practical’.
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using them as providing support for reasons used on a BDI conception 
of the role of reasons. The importance of this move will be made clearer 
below.
The third point of integration is that we attempt to integrate explic-
it moral considerations into the production and evaluation of practical 
reasoning and argumentation. While moral components have been a 
focal point for philosophers of practical reasoning, many in argumenta-
tion have stayed away from including them on the basis that procedural 
accounts of argumentation ought to remain silent on content. As will 
be shown below, our account takes moral considerations into account, 
without, however, dictating or advocating for an authoritative moral 
theory or threshold.
Without further ado then, the next section will introduce our start-
ing points: what we take as background and assumptions from which 
to proceed. Section 3 provides an overview of the model, looking at its 
functioning on a macro scale. Section 4 zooms in on each of the model’s 
component parts, detailing and justifying the selection of the schemes 
so as to provide a picture of the scaffolding of practical reasoning. In 
section 5 we provide a summary and some concluding remarks.
1. Background and Assumptions
1.1 Background
We take up Broome’s characterization of reasoning as ‘a process where-
by some of your attitudes cause you to have a new attitude’ (Broome 
2013: 221) and agree that for practical reasoning the new attitude is an 
intention. Accordingly, in designing this model we have conceived of 
practical reasoning as an activity of the human mind aiming at forming 
an intention to complete the actions required for some alteration in the 
state of the world. 
Theoretically, we separate reasoning and argumentation – though 
recognize the two are intertwined in practice. We consider argumentation 
to turn on the notion of conflict, and thus conceive of it as a dialectical 
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situation, which can be individual, dialogical, or polylogical. It is the 
practice, through which human agents support or criticise a given line of 
reasoning, or a step of that reasoning (Baumtrog 2017). Reasoning and 
argumentation are differentiated by the nature of the activity that each one 
carries out. Reasoning is a mental and usually individual process leading 
to a conclusion. It is an activity of the mind through which an individual, 
starting from certain mental states and following a rational process ac-
cording to rules, leads his mind into a new mental state that concludes the 
process (Broome: 2004). Argumentation begins when one or more parts 
of the process of reasoning come into conflict – it is the contestation of 
reasoning or its conclusion.
In terms of practical argumentation, if the argumentation from 
an opponent is successful, the proponent can interiorize that recom-
mendation and make it his own intention. Only when someone reasons 
or argues by himself, does the argumentation immediately result in an 
intention to perform the action (or not).2 Practical reasoning and ar-
gumentation have the following purpose in common: to produce and 
serve as rational support for an intention to realize an action and/or a se-
quence of actions consisting of the means chosen to achieve that action.
1.2 Assumptions
In order to philosophically frame the model, it is first necessary to ex-
plain the main assumptions from which we start. 
A) Practical reasoning and argumentation:
(A1) Objectives are intentions. Objectives are nothing other than inten-
tions linguistically expressed and sufficiently stable to serve as the base 
for practical reasoning and practical argumentation. Since objectives 
can be more general or more specific, so too can intentions. In some 
cases, it is helpful to distinguish more precisely between an objective 
and an aim. Whereas an objective can be achieved through a traceable 
2 Thanks to Dima Mohammed for this suggestion.
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causal sequence, an aim is a broader objective such as ‘being a good 
person’, which may not be as easily traceable. Since both are intentions 
we consider them both objectives. However, for clarity, we try to use the 
word ‘aim’ where it applies and is helpful to clarify.3 In what follows, 
and for formal simplicity, we shall use ‘G’ (or variants) to refer to the 
common content of the intention or the objective.
(A2) Complex objectives give rise to plans. When a certain objec-
tive assumed by x is sufficiently complex and for that reason involves 
a progressive execution over time, it gives rise to a plan. Plans, among 
other things, influence our actions beyond the present (Bratman, 1987). 
In what follows, we shall use ‘M’ (or variants) to refer to the content of 
any means or sequence of means, whether they belong to a plan over 
time or to simpler practical reasoning.
(A3) The relation between Objective and Mean is contextual. The 
first objective of a plan can be a means for another, more inclusive, plan. 
It should also be noted that, for example, x can have as an objective ‘to 
be in a place of power’ and use the sub-plan ‘to be Prime-Minister’ as a 
means (and that other means/sub-plans would eventually also be needed). 
Hence, it becomes apparent that being a means and an objective (end) of-
ten depends on context and can be conceived of differently depending on 
the level of zoom with which the reasoning or argumentation is viewed.
B) Human Agents
(B1) The relation ‘is a reason for’ is considered primitive and pro tan-
to. To justify their objectives and the means they choose for realizing 
them, human agents reason and argue in terms of reasons. At this point 
we will not go beyond the intuitive notion of ‘a reason’ that Thomas 
Scanlon articulates: ‘a consideration that counts in favour’ (Scanlon, 
1998, p. 17). For example, that ‘x is thirsty’ is a reason (a consideration 
that counts in favour) for x to (intend to) drink water. Along with Dancy 
(2004) we recognize that reasons may count in favour of and/or against 
 
3 Many thanks to David Hitchcock for bringing the difference between goals and 
aims to our attention. We acknowledge that further work is needed regarding how 
this might impact our view of practical reasoning and argumentation overall. 
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the assumption of an objective and we are therefore talking about con-
tributing reasons or reasons pro tanto.4 In what follows, if we wish to 
distinguish between reasons, we will number them as R1, R2, and so on. 
To qualify reasons, we will write R+ or R-, depending on whether these 
contribute in a positive or negative way, respectively, for the assumption 
of an objective, G (or for the adoption of a mean, M). Taking this no-
tation a little further, we will accept that (R±1, …, R±n)G* represents 
the set of reasons, positive or negative, associated to the assumption of 
an objective G* where the asterisk identifies that the goal has yet to be 
assumed and that (R±1, …, R±n)M* represents the set of reasons, pos-
itive or negative, associated to the adoption of a mean or set of means 
which have yet to be assumed. Accordingly, and in short, G* is used to 
stand for ‘proposed goal’ and M* is used to stand for ‘proposed means.’
(B2) Situation, Circumstance, and Context. We can describe prac-
tical reasoning and argumentation in relation to the baseline situation, 
S’, and to a situation of arrival, S*, also called a future state of affairs 
(Hitchcock, 2011; Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012): x is in situation S’, 
S’ has some aspect that leaves x unsatisfied, let us call that aspect ‘the 
absence of G*’, and x assumes G* as an objective, whose realization 
will turn S’ into S*. x thinks that to realize G*, he should mobilize the 
means M*. The beliefs and evaluations the agent(s) hold about a given 
situation determine what is relevant for a given occurrence of practical 
reasoning or argumentation. Accordingly, we call the context of practi-
cal reasoning and argumentation the set of relevant circumstances.
(B3) Plausible Justifications and Defeasible Rules. Given that in-
compatibilities exist between objectives, means for objectives, and the 
means for one objective impacting a different objective, etc., combined 
with the ever evolving (perceived) knowledge of the agent, it follows 
that the rules the agents can use to infer a certain conclusion from cer-
tain premises are rules of plausible inference and, therefore, remain de-
feasible and sensitive to context.5 Although they are never deductive or 
inductive (or statistical) inferences (even if these enter as components 
 
4 The literature on reasons is vast and very complex. Some of our favourite texts are 
(in alphabetical order) Broome (2001, 2004), Dancy (2004), and Scanlon (1998).
5 As convincingly argued by Walton, Reed, & Macagno (2008). Along the same 
lines, though more moral, see Dancy (2004: 111–117, 184–187).
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of plausible inferences), plausible justifications and defeasible rules 
should not be seen as a defect or limitation, but rather the condition of 
the exercise of practical reasoning and argumentation.
With this background and these assumptions in mind, we now 
move to our view of practical reasoning and argumentation illustrated 
through a flowchart and accompanying explanation. 
Overview of the New Model
Figure 1: Integrated Model for Practical Reasoning and Argumentation.6\
6 Thanks to Jacky Visser for suggestions on improving the visual layout of the model.
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Our model is an integrative, realistic,7 and normative model. In a sin-
gle representation, our model integrates the structure of both practical 
reasoning and practical argumentation, including the variants usually 
differentiated in both – i.e., instrumental, normative, and value based. It 
is realistic in the sense that following the model generally corresponds 
to the real practice of reasoners and arguers. It is normative in the sense 
that it prescribes a chain of inferences (for reasoning) or a chain of 
primitive argumentative schemes (for argumentation) that should occur, 
and in a certain order, for both to provide maximally plausible formula-
tions, conclusions, and decisions.
3.1 Stages and Topics
The model has 5 Stages. Stage one addresses the agent’s motivation for 
action; Stage two is concerned with the proposed goal and other goals; 
Stage three concerns the available means for achieving the proposed 
goal; Stage four deals with the relation between the means and between 
the means and other goals; and Stage five is the decision to act, not act, 
or make a modification to the reasoning or argumentation and start the 
process over. Given that our model is integrative and that, simultane-
ously, we think that the assumption of the objectives themselves should 
be an object of reasoning and argumentation – and not only the choice 
of means – our model includes two initial stages about objectives, two 
about means, and one for the decision.
In order to license moving from one Stage to the next, the reasoner 
must answer one or two ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ Topic questions. In any case, an 
affirmative answer results in a ‘green light’ to move to the next Stage. In 
some cases, a negative answer or ‘red light’ will lead to another Topic 
question and thus a second chance to move to the next Stage. In other 
cases, a negative answer leads straight to a conclusion not to act.
Each Topic questions an aspect of the general theme of the Stage 
and conditions the specific practical reasoning and argumentation asso-
ciated with it. Ideally, the answer should be properly justified through 
 
7 Thanks to Eugen Poppa for this term.
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an instantiation of one or more primitive argumentation schemes (AS), 
together with responses to their respective critical questions (CQ). 
These together determine the basic argumentation structure of the Top-
ic. Discussing (arguing about) those primitive argumentative schemes 
may require (several) other argumentation schemes.8 It is not possible 
to anticipate which schemes those might be, given that they can vary 
from case to case. We can thus only provide a complete string of what 
we believe to be primitive schemes.
3.2 Tracks
Given the possibility of providing differing answers to the Topic ques-
tions, there are different paths or tracks one can take through the model. 
The ‘fast track’ (shortest path)9 most readily resembles routine reasoning 
and involves only ‘Yes’ answers to the Topic questions. In such a case the 
arguer only addresses Topics 1, 2, 4, and 6. In the most involved cases, 
the arguer has to address all of the Topics – weighing the reasons for and 
against the acceptance of both the goal and the means.
3.3 Schemes and Critical Questions
Many of the schemes we include in our primitive list are based on 
schemes already articulated by others, especially Walton, Reed, and 
Macagno (2008). We have, however, made efforts to systematize the 
schemes by including only one term with inferential power per premise. 
For example, the first argumentation scheme for the argument from tel-
eology includes as the first premise: x has G+ as its finality. In this case 
‘finality’ is the sole term with inferential power.
8 The distinction between primitive and derived schemes is contextual and was a 
suggestion made by Fabrizio Macagno.
9 Nothing guarantees a reasoner or arguer will be able to address the ‘short’ track 
Topics quickly or quicker than perhaps all of the long track Topics. We are mak-
ing a quantitative observation here only that fewer Topics and schemes need be 
addressed when taking this route.
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We have also adjusted the schemes and critical questions to 
strengthen them for individual use. If you have a separate, critical Other 
asking the critical questions, then the wording of the questions can be 
less stringent in light of the opportunity for the Other to ‘press harder’ – 
so to speak – if the answerer does not provide a satisfactory answer. 
In the case where you are the only one responsible for asking and an-
swering the critical questions, a more carefully worded question will 
make it harder to provide an unsatisfactory answer. As such, we find the 
wording of the questions is of great importance and have avoided using 
critical questions with only ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answers. 
Accordingly, we asked ourselves ‘what makes a critical question, 
critical?’ If you envisage the question being asked by a critical Other, 
then part of the answer would be ‘The disposition with which the ques-
tion is being asked’. When you are alone and conducting individual dia-
lectical or quasi-dialogical argumentation, however, that critical attitude 
may be nearly absent. Thus, another part of the motivation for the way 
we have formulated the critical questions was in an effort to make the 
questions themselves as critical as possible, while relying less on the 
person asking them. 
Taking the above two considerations into account – avoiding 
Yes/No questions and making the questions critical – we have de-
signed the questions as a pair of questions, the first of which asks for 
an explanation of the inferential term’s use and the second of which 
challenges it. Both parts are necessary, in our view, for the critical 
questioning of the inferential term to be adequate. Thus, in our mod-
el, the second (part of the) question ensures the question contains a 
critical component in every case and regardless of the questioner or 
their disposition.
Finally, it should also be noted that schemes may be used more than 
once to answer any given Topic question. For example, when answering 
the question in Topic one, the reasoner or arguer may put forward two 
differing reasons from positive values. In addition, they may avoid one 
of our identified schemes altogether. For example, they might not use 
any reasons from teleology. Our only contention is that at least one of the 
argumentation schemes should be used in answering any given Topic. As 
contributory, how the reasons resulting from the use of the schemes inter-
act is a separate question from which and how many schemes are used.
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3.4 Closure
Following a track and using the schemes ensures that the use of our model 
always ends in a traceably justified decision to act or not act. Whereas other 
models have left the decision to an unarticulated procedure of weighting, 
our model provides a way to rationally justify the selection of one of the 
alternatives. This is especially important for the evaluation or challenging 
of the process. On our account, the choice of which schemes to employ 
(or not), as well as the quality with which they were employed, can both 
be identified and evaluated as precise areas of challenge or critique against 
which an alternate possibility can be clearly projected.
2.  The Structure of Practical Reasoning and Practical  
Argumentation
Let us now identify the problem each Topic addresses, how this problem 
can motivate practical reasoning, and the primitive argumentative schemes 
(and respective critical questions) that should be used to justify a response.
Stage 1. Topic 1
Stage 1, containing only Topic 1, consists in answering the problem: ‘Does 
X or should X have (at least) one reason to aim at goal G*?’ It should be 
noted that a reason here does not have to be a pro-attitude. I can suppose that 
I should assume G* for another type of reason: maybe G* involves some sac-
rifice that I have to make (hence, my not having a pro-attitude towards G*), 
but, if I assume G*, perhaps I feel that I am contributing to realize a certain 
value (‘social equity’) that I cherish. We can also include here reasons deriv-
ing from ‘institutional facts’ (Searle, 1995; 2001, p. 56–7).
The rational justification of the answer to the question of Topic 1 
seems to depend on three main considerations, articulated through four 
argumentation schemes.10
10 For reasoning, consider only the pattern of reasoning without the critical questions.
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Teleological Considerations. Practical reasoning and argumenta-
tion are teleological in that goals are instantiations or manifestations of 
a general purpose or aim. If, for example, x is an institution created with 
the mission G+, we consider that G* can be a manifestation of G+. By 
arguing that G* results from that objective, one attributes to x a reason 
for assuming G*. To illustrate:
Major Premise:  NATO’s mission is to actively contribute to world 
peace and security (G+)
Minor Premise:  Helping Ukraine increase its defensive power (G*) 
will actively contribute to world peace and security
 Therefore, it is plausible to suppose that,
Conclusion: NATO has a reason to help Ukraine increase its defensive 
power.
More formalized we arrive at:
Argumentation Scheme 1. Assumption of Objectives  
by Teleology11
(AS1)
Premise 1: x has G+ as its finality
Premise 2: G* belongs to G+
 Therefore, plausibly
Conclusion:  There is a reason for x to assume G*
By definition, answering CQs in plausible argumentation is essentially 
contextual: it depends on the circumstances (in the sense of ‘circum-
stance’ explained above). 
Satisfactorily answering the following critical questions provides a 
plausible justification:
 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 1
CQ1: How does G+ really correspond to the finality of x? 
 How can G+ not correspond to the finality of x?12
11 We agree with Fabrizio Macagno, who suggested that AS1 can be considered a vari-
ant of ‘Argument from Commitment’ (Cf. Walton, Reed, & Macagno 2008: 335).
12 For this and all critical questions we assume there can be more than one response/
reason. We use the singular wording only for the sake of simplicity of presentation. 
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CQ2: How is G* really a particular case of G+?
 How could G* not be a particular case of G+?
Value Considerations. These are considerations involving moral or so-
cial values, sensu lato, regarding both individual and collective behav-
iour (e.g. ‘Individual Well-Being’, ‘Collective Well-Being’, ‘Keeping a 
Promise’, ‘Honesty’, etc.)
For this consideration, we have two types of cases in mind. The first 
regards the assumption of your value as positive (V+). For example, if 
you are a political leader who values fairness (V+), you may consider it 
to be positively promoted by taxing the rich to help fund a free national 
public health system (G*). In the second type, G* may not directly pro-
mote any obvious value. It may, however have consequences positively 
valued by x, for instance, to quench thirst, thus giving x another kind of 
reason to assume G*.
In the first case, the argumentative scheme from positive values 
(Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008, p. 321) generally applies, but with 
two caveats. First, there are no critical questions associated with the 
scheme in the literature so, using the method described above, we have 
taken the liberty of formulating them ourselves. Second, since we for-
mulated these questions to focus on the correct application, in a given 
context, of the essential term with inferential power, we will propose a 
slightly modified, simplified version of the scheme that clearly isolates 
the (only) expressions we consider essential.
Argumentation Scheme 2. Argument from Positive Values
AS2)
Premise 1: value V is positive (= V+)
Premise 2: V+ positively values G*
 Therefore, plausibly
Conclusion: There is a reason for x to assume G*
 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 2
CQ1: What reasons are there for attributing a positive value to V?
 What reasons could count against attributing a positive value to V?
CQ2: What reasons are there for the positive evaluation of G* by V+?
  What reasons are there for G* not to be positively evaluated by 
V+?
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The answer to CQ1 will likely involve the participants in a substantial 
discussion regarding values. The answer to CQ2 most likely consists in 
the demonstration of the relevant relation between V+ and G*, which 
may require sub-argumentation. For instance, if V+ is ‘to promote 
peace’ and G* is ‘to reinforce military power in Ukraine’ there is defi-
nitely room for sub-argumentation.
  Argumentation Scheme 3. Argument from Positive Conse-
quences
 (AS3)
Premise 1:  If G* is realized by x, then the consequences K1, …, Kn 
will occur.
Premise 2:  K1, …, Kn are to be valued positively.
Therefore, plausibly
Conclusion:  There is a reason for x to assume G* 
We have ‘unfolded’ the single premise put forward by Walton, Reed & 
Macagno (2008, pp. 332–3; cf. Walton, 2013a, p. 102) into two premises 
to permit a critical question to specifically focus on two issues in two 
premises. This is because in the actual argumentative process it is possi-
ble to accept one of the premises and deny the other, deny both, or accept 
both. The use of the infinitive in the second premise is deliberate, for it 
allows a discussion (CQ2) on the positive evaluation: x, the proponent, 
can positively value K1, …, Kn, but in argumentation, y, the opponent, 
can value them negatively or be neutral. If we indexed the evaluation to x, 
the second premise would become undisputable (it would consist in the 
truism, stated by x, that x values K1, …, Kn positively) and we think that 
it should be able to be discussed. We have also suppressed the original 
version’s CQ3, because we think that it should be carried out in Topic 3 
(where pro and con reasons are pondered), as we shall show below.
 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 3
CQ1: What makes it plausible that G* has K1, …, Kn as consequences?
 How could G* not have K1, …, Kn as consequences?
CQ2: Why should K1, …, Kn be positively valued?
 How could K1, …, Kn not be positively valued?
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Operational Consideration. One last basic aspect that could enable x with 
a reason to assume G* is to know if x has the ability to (contribute to) 
realize G* and, also, if his assumption of G* is or is not idle regarding 
the realization of that objective. At this point, it is important to note that 
we are not here addressing the ability of x to carry out the means. This 
argument scheme will appear again later in the model where it can be 
appropriately used for that purpose. For its use in providing a reason to 
aim at the goal, ‘ability’ here is to be understood more broadly as ‘in a 
position’. For example, consider a husband who needs to pick his wife up 
from the train station. His having a driver’s licence that his children do 
not have could be an ability reason that enables him to realize the goal 
of picking her up. This ability, however, says nothing about the car being 
functional or otherwise available for him to perform the means of driving 
to get there. We recognize that if hard pressed, the ability reason does in-
deed boil down to an ability to perform the means, but think an important 
part of early practical reasoning rests on a preliminary consideration of an 
agent’s being in a position – having the ability – to achieve the goal. Since 
this scheme is used again later while addressing the means, it is not cru-
cial to follow the ability chain all the way to the end of the performance 
of the means here. Its second instantiation functions as an appropriate 
check on the means at that point.13 The argumentation at this stage should 
instantiate the following scheme:
 Argumentation Scheme 4. Argument from Ability14
 (AS4a)
Premise 1: G* should be positively valued
Premise 2: x has the ability to realize G*
Premise 3:   x’s ability to realize G* is a necessary/enabling condition 
for the realization of G*
Therefore, plausibly, 
Conclusion: There is a reason for x to assume G*
13 Changing AS4 to appear in two places is new in this articulation as compared to 
the forthcoming publication, but has been added in consultation with João Sàágua 
who maintains reservations about such a decision.
14 Given that we have not found a similar scheme in the literature, we hope this 
constitutes a modest contribution to the field.
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In this scheme, the agent goes from the existence of a reason to carry 
out G* (Premise 1) to the existence of a reason for x, and not any other 
agent, to carry out G* (Premises 2 and 3). If x were not in a position 
to realize G*, or if the assumption of G* by x was unnecessary, in the 
sense that G* would occur anyway even if x would not assume it, then 
there would not be this reason for x assuming G*. The two reasons are 
not the same. Going back to the NATO example, the reason to carry 
out G* (NATO helping Ukraine increase its defensive power) can be, 
for example, because it ‘Promotes Peace’, which is considered to be a 
positive value (V+), while the reason for x assuming G* (and not any 
other agent) can be, for example, because NATO is in a better position 
to negotiate with the quarrelling parties, an operational reason. 
 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 4a
CQ1: How does x have the ability to realize G*?
 What could prevent x from realizing G*?
CQ2:  To what extent is the assumption of G* by x a necessary/ena-
bling condition for the realization of G*?
  Which y exists (such that y≠x) whose ability to realize G* is a 
necessary/enabling condition for the realization of G*
Since we think that, normatively, it only makes sense to argue 
through the instantiation of AS4 if its Premise 1 has already been 
proven by another type of argumentation (AS1-AS3), we consider 
Premise 1 as assumed. For that reason, it does not need the associ-
ation of a CQ. Further, this illustrates the importance of following 
the argumentation schemes in order since if AS4 were used first, it 
would be unsupported. 
Let us imagine that all four schemes were employed on real argu-
mentation and that all of the CQs were answered successfully. While it 
may mean there are reasons to assume G*, it does not yet mean that x 
should assume G*. This is because the reasons x has for assuming G* 
are pro tanto and not pro toto. We thus have now to consider ‘the other 
side of the scale’.
Practical Rationality at Work – A New Argumentation Model 209
Stage 2. Topic 2
Topic 2 involves argumentation aimed at founding an answer (positive 
or negative) to the problem: ‘Is G* compatible with other goals, G1, 
….Gn, that x has or should have?’ As stated, the problem seems to lead 
to the idea that x has to consider the compatibility of G* with virtually 
every objective (including aims) that x has, as well as with all those that 
x should have. To complicate the situation further, we assume that there 
is no safe and sound method for the calculation of (in)compatibilities! 
Although seemingly extremely complex, this is not an intractable situa-
tion. It will be sufficient to use the Principle of Charity and, in a sense, 
to reverse the burden of proof. Given that we are speaking of human rea-
soning, using the principle of charity we shall assume from the outset 
that x is 1) usually not (knowingly) self-contradictory and 2) is not an 
inherently evil person. Obviously, there is place for a margin of error: x 
can overlook conflicting goals, or accidentally contradict himself and x 
can have instances of evil. Generally, however, we take x to be consist-
ent and morally neutral or good by default, thus reversing the burden of 
proof and leaving it to the opponent to build an argument to challenge a 
positive answer to Topic 2.
With these qualifications in mind, we consider the argumentation 
supporting an answer to the Topic to rest on the four following argumen-
tation schemes: the first argues against the assumption of G* because 
this objective promotes a negative value; the second argues against the 
assumption of G* because this objective contradicts or inhibits a pos-
itive value; the third argues against the assumption of G* because the 
enactment of this objective has negative consequences; the fourth is 
neutral regarding values and evaluations and simply argues that there is 
an operational incompatibility between G*, if assumed by x, and other 
objectives x has already assumed. The first three schemes thus concern 
objectives that x should have, while the fourth concerns the objectives 
x has. Since these schemes occur in the overall model twice – here as 
applied to the goal and later as applied to the means – on the flowchart 
they have been labelled ‘a’ and ‘b’ respectively, as was done with AS4 
above. This double applicability is represented in each scheme with 
G*/M*. Assumptions A2 and A3 above address our view on the flux 
between means and goals.
210 João Sàágua and Michael D. Baumtrog
 Argumentation Scheme 5. Argument from Negative Values15
 (AS5)
 Premise 1: the value V is negative (= V-)
 Premise 2:  V- negatively values G*/M*
 Therefore, plausibly,
 Conclusion: There is a reason for x not to assume G*/M
 Critical Questions for Argument Scheme 5
CQ1: What reasons are there for attributing a negative value to V?
 How could V not have a negative value?
CQ2:  What reasons are there for the negative evaluation of G*/M* 
by V-?
 How could G*/M* not be negatively valued by V-?
Argumentation Scheme 6. Argument Contradicting Positive Values16
 (AS6)
 Premise 1: Value V is positive (V+)
 Premise 2:  G*/M* contradicts (or inhibits) V+
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion:  There is a reason for x not to assume G*/M*
 Critical Questions for Argument Scheme 6
CQ1: What reasons are there for attributing a positive value to V?
 How could V not be valued positively?
CQ2:  What reasons are there to indicate G*/M* contradicting (inhib-
iting) V+?
 How could G*/M* be congruent with V+?
15 See, Argument from Negative Value (Walton, Reed, & Macagno 2008: 321; Walton 
2013a: 103). The two remarks made above regarding the argumentative scheme on 
positive values apply, mutatis mutandis, also here, hence, we will not repeat them.
16 Although this scheme cannot be found as such in Walton, Reed, & Macagno 
(2008), or in Walton (2013a), it is considered a variant of the ‘Argument from 
Values’, easily manageable out of the two schemes that are ‘traditionally’ includ-
ed in it.
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  Argumentation Scheme 7. Argument from Negative Conse-
quences
 (AS7)
 Premise 1:  If G*/M* is realized by x, the consequences K1, 
…, Kn will occur
 Premise 2:  K1,…, Kn are to be negatively valued
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion: There is a reason for x not to assume G*/M*
Similar remarks to those made for AS3 are applicable, mutatis mutan-
dis, here – with the exception of the ones regarding the existence of a 
second premise, which, in this case, already appear in the original for-
mulation of the scheme (see Walton, Reed, & Macagno 2008: 332–333; 
Walton, 2013a: 102).
 Critical Questions for Argument Scheme 7
CQ1:  What makes it plausible that G*/M* has K1, …, Kn as conse-
quences?
 How could G*/M* not have K1, …, Kn as consequences?
CQ2: Why should K1, …, Kn be negatively valued?
 How could K1, …, Kn not be negatively valued?
Other schemes related to AS7 are rightly described by Walton, Reed & 
Macagno (2008, pp. 318–344) as in the realm of practical reasoning, 
but are not primitive. A discussion of how they relate to the primitive 
scheme would be an excellent topic for a further paper.
  Argumentation Scheme 8. Argument from Operational  
Incompatibility17
 (AS8)
 Premise 1: G is an objective already assumed by x
 Premise 2: G and G*/M* are operationally incompatible
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion: There is a reason for x not to assume G*/M*
17 Given that we have not found a similar scheme in the literature, we hope this 
constitutes a modest contribution to the field.
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It is noteworthy that in premise 1, the objectives of x are restricted to 
those already assumed by x and do not include those that the opponent 
considers x should assume. If the latter were included, the reference to 
values and evaluations would be unavoidable (and, for that, we already 
have AS5, AS6, and AS7). This scheme aims at situations in which the 
existence of a contradiction between the realization of certain objec-
tives already assumed by x and the new objective x is considering to as-
sume, G*, is ‘pointed out’. In this way it remains focused on operational 
incompatibility rather than ideological incompatibility.
 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 8
CQ1:  What reasons are there for taking G as an objective already 
assumed by x?
 What reasons are there for doubting x already assumed G?
CQ2: What makes G and G*/M* operationally incompatible?
 How could G and G*/M* not be operationally incompatible?
Let us imagine that AS5, AS6, AS7, and AS8 were actually instantiated 
in a concrete argumentation and that they passed their respective CQs; 
or that at least one of them did. In that case, the practical argumentation 
that took place guaranteed that x has up to four, but at least one reason, 
for not assuming G*. Does this mean that x should not assume G*? Not 
yet. The reasons x has for not assuming G* are pro tanto, and not pro 
toto, so we have to decide between the two sides – we have to weigh the 
pros and cons. That is the purpose of Topic 3.
Excursus. Negotiation of Objectives
Before analysing the argumentation belonging to Topic 3, it is appropri-
ate to consider a situation in which a contradiction has arisen between 
an objective to be assumed, G*, and another objective !G. Instead of ar-
guing about which objective is preferable (Topic 3), one can argue for a 
modification to one of those objectives, or both. This is arguing through 
negotiation. It is important to emphasize precisely this argumentative 
aspect of the negotiation, because negotiation writ large does not have 
to be rational as in the case of pure threat, blackmail, or bribery.
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A simple18 example. Let us imagine that x already had as an ob-
jective, G, ‘To act in an environmentally-friendly way’. Now, x wins 
the lottery and can buy the car he always dreamt of. x is considering a 
new objective, G*, ‘To buy a Ferrari Testarossa’. Knowing the Testa-
rossa’s high fuel consumption, it is obvious that the second objective 
is incompatible with G – his aim to be environmentally friendly. To 
mark the incompatibility of G with G*, we will represent G as !G – 
in which ‘!’ is used to point out that contradiction with G*. Now, in 
a certain sense, x can choose between determining which of the two 
objectives, G* or !G, is preferable, thus going to Topic 3. Or x can try 
to modify one of the two objectives, or both, in order to make them 
compatible. Let us imagine that x enters into a process of argumen-
tative negotiation in which he will have to determine how far he can 
go in the modification of his objectives, G* and !G, in order to make 
them compatible, but also to think that he is still assuming that part 
of those objectives that x considers essential. Let us imagine, for in-
stance, that at the end of the negotiation (either with y or with himself) 
x modifies G*, ‘To buy a Ferrari Testarossa’ into, ‘To buy a Citröen 
DS5’. There is a clear sense in which the objective, G*, was preserved 
and modified: x now has the objective of buying a more environmen-
tally-friendly car that, although not a Ferrari, is still a fancy car. This 
is now, so to speak, the ‘car of his dreams’ insofar as it achieves the 
assumption of both goals rather than requiring the sacrifice of one. 
We consider that the argumentative process just illustrated consists 
in an instantiation of the following Argument Scheme. 
  Argumentation Scheme 9. Argument Based on Reasonable 
Negotiation19
 (AS9)
 AS9.1. Variation on !G
 Premise 1: !G and G*/M* are contradictory
 Premise 2: Modifying !G into Gi preserves the essential in !G
18 But it is obvious that this kind of situation can be enormously complex. For ex-
ample, consider the negotiation between social stakeholders: employers, unions, 
and government.
19 Given that we have not found a similar scheme in the literature, we hope this 
constitutes a modest contribution to the field.
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 Premise 3: Gi is compatible with G*/M*
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion: x should assume Gi (instead of !G)
 AS9.2. Variation on G*
 Premise 1: !G and G*/M* are contradictory
 Premise 2:  Modifying G*/M* into G’ preserves the essential 
in G*/M*
 Premise 3: G’ is compatible with !G
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion: x should assume G’ (instead of G*/M*)
 AS9.3. Variation on G* and !G
 Premise 1: !G and G*/M* are contradictory
 Premise 2: Modifying !G into Gi preserves the essential in !G
 Premise 3:  Modifying G*/M* into G’ preserves the essential 
in G*/M*
 Premise 4: Gi and G’ are compatible
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion:  x should assume Gi and G’ (instead of !G and 
G*/M*, respectively)
Since premise 1 works as an assumption imported from the previous 
Topic we do no need to question the incompatibility. Accordingly, these 
are the remaining Critical Questions associated to this scheme (in any 
of its variations).
 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 9
CQ1:  How do the modifications of !Gi into Gi or of G*/M* into G’, 
respectively, preserve the essential aspect(s) of each of the ini-
tial objectives?
  How might the modifications of !Gi into Gi or of G*/M* into 
G’, respectively, diminish/jeopardize the essential aspect(s) of 
each of the initial objectives?
CQ2:  What makes the schemes resulting from the proposed modifi-
cations (Gi/!Gi and G’/G*/M*) compatible?
  How might the schemes resulting from the proposed modifica-
tions (Gi/!Gi and G’/G*/M*) be incompatible?
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CQ3:  What incompatibilities with other objectives x has or should 
have result from the proposed modifications (Gi/!Gi or G’/
G*/M*)?
 How could one resolve these resulting incompatibilities?
We consider the burden of proof of CQ1 to be on the side of the propo-
nent and the burden of proof in the case of CQ2 and CQ3 to be on the 
side of the opponent (in line with what was stated about that matter in 
Topic 2).
Stage 2. Topic 3.
Topic 3 receives a situation of incompatibility (insurmountable, or over-
looked, by negotiation) between G* and one or more objectives/aims 
that x has or should have as input and has to provide a founded answer 
to the question: ‘Is G* preferable to the goals, !G1, …!Gn, with which 
it is incompatible?’. Intuitively, and simplifying slightly, if G* is pref-
erable to another objective, !G, with which it is incompatible, then that 
other objective should be abandoned and the reasoning should progress 
to Topic 4. If !G is preferable, then !G should (continue to) be assumed 
by x and the practical reasoning on G* ends here. To found the answer 
to the question, an argumentative process in favour of the preference 
for G* or for !G should be carried out. In addition, that argumentative 
process should take into account the specific results obtained in Topics 
1 and 2. Let us see this in greater detail. 
Topic 1 allowed for four types of reasons in favour of the assump-
tion of G*, of which at least one would have been positively associat-
ed to G*. Obviously, we are talking about several types of reasons. As 
mentioned above, this means that there can be several particular reasons 
in favour of the assumption of G* by x that are specimens of each one 
of those types. Topic 2 allowed for four types of reasons against the 
assumption of G*, of which at least one would have been negatively 
associated to G*. Here, we are again talking about types of reasons and 
so there can be several particular reasons against the assumption of G* 
by x that are specimens of each one of those types. This time, the par-
ticular reasons positively associated to G* in Topic 1 are the ones that 
must be weighed against the particular reasons negatively associated to 
G* in Topic 2. Resolving Topic 3 rationally articulates this process of 
‘weighing’ the reasons in favour/against the assumption G* by x. 
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  Argumentation Scheme 10. Argument Based on Rational 
Preference20
 (AS10)
 10.1 Variation in favour of G*/M
 Premise 1: !G and G*/M* are contradictory
 Premise 2: (R*±1, …, R*±n)G*/M*
 Premise 3: (!R±1, …, !R±n)!G
 Premise 4:  (R*±1, …, R*±n)G*/M* are preferable to (!R±1, 
…, !R±n)!G
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion: x should assume G*/M* (and abandon !G)
 10.2 Variation in favour of !G
 Premise 1: !G and G*/M are contradictory
 Premise 2: (R*±1, …, R*±n)G*/M*
 Premise 3: (!R±1, …, !R±n)!G
  Premise 4: (!R±1, …, !R±n)!G are preferable to (R*±1, …, 
R*±n)G*/M*
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion: x should assume !G (and abandon G*/M*)
In theory, the R*± of premise 2 were all identified in Topics 1 and 2. In 
concrete argumentative practice, if the matter is very serious, one can 
submit G* to a ‘second round’ of those very same Topics. It is almost 
certain that the !R± of premise 3 were not all identified when having G* 
and not !G in sight. Hence, one should now go through those two Topics 
having !G in sight. For that we do not need additional Topics or schemes. 
Thus, the individual reasons (R*±1, …, R*±n) and in (!R±1, …, !R±n) 
are just those reasons identified positively in Topic 1 or negatively in Top-
ic 2 for G* or !G.
What is being weighed ({R*±} vs. {!R±}) in premise 4, when the 
relation of preference is applied?
20 Given that we have not found a similar scheme in the literature, we hope this 
constitutes a modest contribution to the field.
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1) All evaluations of reasons considered positive vs. all evaluations 
of reasons considered negative. For example, ‘In this situation 
S1, it is preferable to slightly sacrifice the value V1+, in order to 
greatly implement the value V2+’; or another example, ‘In the situ-
ation S2, it is preferable to slightly sacrifice K1+, to be able (in the 
future) to enjoy the positive consequence, K2+, that will increase 
the well-being of x in a more sustained way’.
2) Ideally, the subjective probabilities (possibly conditional) that x 
and y believe to be associated to both: (a) the success in realizing 
G* or, alternatively, !G; and (b) the ‘coming to existence’ of the 
reasons {R*±} and {!R±} as a result of the realization of that G*, 
or !G, respectively. For example: G* has a 0.9 probability of being 
realized, its R+I has a 0.7 probability to be implemented if G* is 
realized (repeated for each R+i) and its R-I has a 0.2 probability of 
occurring if G* is realized (repeated for each R-i); and a similar 
reasoning for !G and its associated reasons.
3) Most of the time and in alternative to 2), the subjective ‘plausibil-
ities’ which are equal to 2, but replacing the probabilistic quanti-
fication, between 0 and 1, by qualifiers such as ‘very’, ‘few’, and 
so on. We are not often capable of specifying a probability, even a 
subjective one, for the success of G* or of reasons that we believe 
to be associated to G*.21
4) The beliefs regarding the circumstances of the situation.
Importing the critical questions from above for the input premises 
(1–3), let us now see the CQs for premise 4. As noted above, the crit-
ical questions for this scheme depart slightly from the usual 1:1 ratio 
of critical question per term with inferential power. This is because, 
we believe, the term ‘preference’ entails both aspects of goodness and 
probability. Thus, the questions here, while focused only on the single 
term ‘preference’, address both of its component parts.
21 How people pick and assign probability and weight to reasons is an interesting 
and important question, but one which is ultimately a matter for psychologists. 
Further work could, however, address how one ought to assign probability and 
weight to reasons (See Lord & Maguire 2016).
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 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 10
CQ1:  What makes the standard(s) used for the evaluation of the rea-
sons associated with the goals/means the best for this situation? 
  Why might the standard(s) used for the evaluation of the reason 
associated with the goals/means not be the best for this situation? 
CQ2:  What makes the standard(s) used to assess the probability or 
plausibility of the reasons used to justify the assumption of the 
goal/means and of the goal/means being assumed the best for 
this situation? 
  Why might the standard(s) used to assess the probability or 
plausibility of the reasons used to justify the assumption of the 
goal/means and of the goal/means being assumed not be the 
best for this situation?
In short, these questions are challenging the goodness in the reasons and 
the accuracy of the probability of success, respectively. These questions 
are notoriously difficult to formulate because it is at this point where 
argumentation theory meets choice theory, and both meet moral theory.
Stage 3. Topic 4
This Stage begins when the objective G* has been rationally founded. We 
then need to associate one or more means to it. Here is where what has 
been called instrumental practical reasoning (Wallace 2014; Hitchcock 
2011), or ‘means-ends reasoning’ begins. The first question each agent 
will ask about the means can be vague, of the kind: ‘Is there any way to 
realize G*?’ As an answer to this question, the agent expects that rep-
resentations of actions he can carry out and whose implementation will 
bring him closer to the realization of G* until G* is realized will ‘pop into 
mind’ by a process that he usually does not control well. The agent might 
use his experience from similar cases along with other tools to marshal 
every means offered to him in any more or less fortuitous, more or less 
contextual, way. There are also studies pointing out the importance of 
automated or innate heuristics to ‘the finding of means’.22 Though the 
creation of reasons is a matter generally investigated within psychology, 
it also has philosophical implications (Smith 2010; Mizrahi 2014).
22 See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman (1974).
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From a philosophical point of view, one part of the important work 
consists in classifying the means into necessary or possible options. 
Accordingly, the problem of interest to us at Stage 3, Topic 4 is, ‘Are 
there means, M1, …, Mn (M*), to realize G* which are simultaneous-
ly necessary and sufficient for x to achieve G*?’. As a matter of fact, 
this problem includes two questions: 1) ‘are there means that have to 
be used if one intends to realize G*?’ and 2) ‘are those all the means 
needed to realize G*?’
A ‘Yes’ to the first question means that, without the use of those 
means by x, x is not able to realize G*. In that case, those means have 
to be used. Imagine a situation where the only way to beat a competitor 
is to kill him. While perhaps necessary (and say, sufficient) it is not usu-
ally something that should be done. Here we deal only with what has 
to be done, with the foresight of knowing that the ‘should’ is addressed 
shortly (Topics 6 and 7). 
However, a ‘No’ to the first question does not necessarily imply that 
there are no means available to realize G*. It can also imply that there are 
several alternative means that x can choose between. In that case, there is 
the problem of knowing if those means are sufficient. That is the problem 
of Topic 5. If they are, and given that x can choose, then the discussion 
about the ‘best means’ will be opened. That problem will be dealt with in 
Topic 6 and eventually 7. At present, a ‘No’ to the first question is simply 
tantamount to going to Topic 5, where we will deal with the problem of 
the existence, or not, of sufficient means to realize G*.
Let us now imagine that we answer ‘Yes’ to the question regarding 
the necessary means (NM). Now we need to know if the set {NM1, …, 
NMn} is sufficient to realize G*; or if, some other means besides {NM1, 
…, NMn} will still be needed. This is the raison d’être for our second 
question in Topic 5: ‘are the means necessary to realize G* sufficient in 
conjunction?’ If the answer is ‘Yes’, we go to Topic 6. If we answer ‘No’, 
it means that the set {NM1, …, NMn} has to be supplemented with more 
means from which a choice will have to be made. ‘Supplemented’, be-
cause {NM1, …, NMn} is not sufficient to realize G* and ‘a choice will 
have to be made,’ because if there were no choice, the added means would 
actually be necessary and would belong to {NM1, …, NMn}. Schemat-
ically: to realize G*, x has to use {NM1, …, NMn} and then still use 
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M1, or M2, or Mn (which do not belong to {NM1, …, NMn}), because 
without at least one of these means, x cannot realize G*. 
Schematized, we arrive at:
  Argumentation Scheme 11. Necessary Condition Argument23 
 (AS11)
 Premise 1: x has the objective of realizing G*
 Premise 2: .... {NM1, …, NMn} are necessary means for x real-
izing G*
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion: x has a reason to carry out {NM1, …, NMn}
There is no CQ for premise 1 because it works as an assumption, in the 
sense already explained.
 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 11
CQ1:  What makes it plausible that {NM1, …, NMn} are necessary 
means for x realizing G*?
  How could any of these means be suppressed while still allow-
ing for the realization of G*?
Obviously, the argumentation aimed at showing the (defeasible) neces-
sity of any of the means has an extremely high sensitivity to context. 
Think of the necessary means for becoming President – a detailed dis-
cussion of what those means are will involve differing argumentative 
schemes derived from AS11, in the sense already explained. For that 
reason, the ‘course’ the argumentation will take in each case is difficult 
to predict. It also seems reasonable to accept that it is the proponent 
of the argument instantiating AS11 who has the initial burden of proof 
regarding the necessity of {NM1, …, NMn}, given that it requires the 
23 We have distanced ourselves from the ‘Necessary Condition Schema’ (Walton, 
Reed, & Macagno 2008: 323–324) for two reasons. The formulation of the ‘Alter-
natives Premise’ removes the necessity of each of the means by using the expression 
‘at least one of’, making them optional amongst themselves. Also, the formulation 
of the ‘Selection Premise’ and of the conclusion clearly shows that the scheme’s 
objective is to select ‘the best mean’ (referred as ‘Bi’), which will only be dealt 
with by us in Topics 6 and 7. These are not meant as criticism of the scheme, but as 
justification for not considering it primitive and thus not using it here.
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use of those means or the waiving of the realization of G* on reasonable 
grounds. 
Despite this highly contextual character, it is known that an argu-
ment in favour of a necessary condition (in the present case, a mean) 
ends with a conclusion in the form. ‘If not {NM1, …, NMn}, then not 
G*’, in which the conditional is material, and which is, thus, logical-
ly equivalent (by contraposition) to ‘If G*, then {NM1, …, MNn}‘. 
Any of those forms of the conclusion can be used to build a plausible 
argument in favour of the necessity of each one of the NMi, an argu-
ment whose premises will be, as already stated, strongly dependent 
on context. To determine if the means are sufficient, we can use the 
following scheme:
  Argumentation Scheme 12. Sufficient Condition Argument24 
 (AS12)
 Premise 1: x has the objective of realizing G*
 Premise 2:  If x carries out {NM1, …, NMn}, then x realizes G*
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion: x has a reason to carry out {NM1, …, NMn}
There is no CQ for Premise 1 because it works as an assumption in the 
sense already explained.
 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 12
CQ1:  How does carrying out all of the necessary means guarantee the 
realization of G*?
  How might G* remain unrealized despite carrying out the nec-
essary means?
The same observations we made regarding the sensitivity to context 
of AS11 and its CQ are applicable to AS12 and its CQ, therefore we 
will not repeat them. The same can be said regarding the matter of the 
burden of proof. 
Likewise, and despite this highly contextual character, it is known 
that an argument in favour of a sufficient condition (in the present case, 
 
24 See the previous footnote. Similar considerations can be applied here in regard to 
‘22.3. Sufficient Condition Schema’ (Walton, Reed, & Macagno 2008: 323–324).
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a mean) ends with a conclusion of the form: ‘If {NM1, …, NMn}, then 
G*’, in which the conditional is material, and which is, thus, logically 
equivalent (by contraposition) to ‘If not G*, then not {NM1, …, NMn}’. 
Any of these forms of conclusion can be used to build a plausible argu-
ment in favour of the sufficiency of each mean, taken in conjunction – an 
argument whose premises will be, as already stated, strongly dependent 
on context.
Finally, it is one thing to recognize necessary and sufficient means, 
and another to ensure that x has the ability to carry them out. Further, 
in our view, being the only one able to carry out the means can provide 
an additional reason for x to pursue M*. Accordingly, we re-use the 
scheme for ability from Topic 1 and include it in Topic 4 (and Topic 5 
if it should be necessary), in a similar but slightly modified way. The 
similarity is that, as before, it still only becomes necessary after the 
other schemes in the Topic have been addressed. In other words, for this 
Topic, if there are no means then there is no need to consider the agent’s 
ability to carry out the non-existent means. The modification is that, in 
this instantiation, ability does not refer to ‘being in a position’ but rath-
er, more directly, to ‘being able to perform’.
 Argumentation Scheme 4b. Argument from Ability
 (AS4b)
 Premise 1:  M* are necessary and sufficient (or at least suffi-
cient) for G*
 Premise 2: x has the ability to realize M*
 Premise 3:   x’s ability to realize M* is a necessary/enabling 
condition for the realization of G*
 Therefore, plausibly, 
 Conclusion:  There is a reason for x assuming M*
In this scheme, we go from the existence of a reason to carry out G* 
(Premise 1) to the existence of a reason for x to carry out M* (Premises 
2 and 3). For the same reasons as presented in Topic 1, if x did not have 
the ability to realize M*, or if the assumption of G* by x was unnec-
essary, in the sense that G* would occur anyway even if x would not 
assume it, then there would not be a reason for x assuming M*.
Also for the same reasons as mentioned with this scheme in Topic 1, 
there are only two Critical Questions needed for this scheme.
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 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 4b
CQ1:  How does x have the ability to realize M*?
 What could prevent x from realizing M*?
CQ2:  To what extent is the assumption of M* by x a necessary/en-
abling condition for the realization of M*?
  Is there any y (such that y≠x) whose ability to realize M* is a 
necessary/enabling condition for the realization of M*
Stage 3. Topic 5
An agent only arrives at this Topic if the prior argumentation leads to a 
negative answer to the question ‘Are there means M1, …Mn which are 
simultaneously necessary and sufficient for x to achieve G*?’ (Topic 4). 
If the Topic reveals that there are necessary but not sufficient conditions, 
then we are then directed to Topic 5 while bringing with us a set of nec-
essary means (if they were also sufficient we would have gone to Topic 6, 
without going through Topic 5). However, this difference between having 
or not having means does not substantially affect the formulation of the 
scheme, which, in reality, is nothing more than our well-known AS12, now 
formulated in a more general way: AS12G (here, ‘G’ means ‘General’). 
 Argumentation Scheme 12. Sufficient Condition Argument25
 (AS12G)
 Premise 1: x has the objective of realizing G*
 Premise 2:  If x carries out {NM1, …, NMn} and {SM1 or, 
…, or SMn}, then x realizes G*
 Therefore, plausibly
 Conclusion:  x has a reason to carry out {SM1 or, …, or 
SMn} (in addition to the reasons x may have 
to carry out {NM1, …, NMn})
Since the question ‘Are there necessary means to realize G*?’ would 
have been positively answered in Topic 4 and since a negative answer 
would be inconsequential and leave us only to consider the sufficient 
means, no specific CQ on them is provided here.
25 See the previous footnote.
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The critical question associated to this scheme, then, addresses the 
sufficient means.
 Critical Questions for Argumentation Scheme 12G
CQ1:  How does carrying out at least one of SMi, where SMi belongs 
to {SM1, …, SMn} (in addition to {NM1, …, NMn}, if there 
are such) guarantee the realization of G*?
  How might G* remain unrealized in spite of carrying out all of 
these means?
All of the remarks made in Topic 4 about that version of AS12 are natu-
rally applicable to AS12G and so we will not repeat them.
Further, because any number of new sufficient conditions may 
have been introduced in this Topic, AS4b applies here as well.
If the concrete argumentation that instantiates AS12G is negatively 
concluded, that means that there are no sufficient means to realize G* 
and the reasoning/argumentation stops here.
If the concrete argumentation instantiating AS12G is positively 
concluded, that means that there is more than one means M1, …, Mn 
(that is sufficient) for x realizing G*, i.e. there several possible means 
for x realizing G*.26 In this case x may choose the one that he considers 
the best means. As expected, the choice of the best means is a process 
subjected to argumentation. This takes us to Topics 6 and 7. 
Stage 4. Topic 6
Topic 6 involves an argumentative process aimed at founding an answer 
(positive or negative) to the question: ‘Are the selected means, M1, …, 
Mn, compatible with the objectives G1, …, Gn, that x has or should 
have?’ In this sense, the Argumentation Schemes and respective Critical 
Questions to be used are exactly the same as the ones proposed for Topic 
2, as is immediately perceivable if we replace, in the formulation of the 
problem, ‘the selected means, M1, …, Mn’ by ‘the objective G*?’ (as 
formulated in Topic 2). In line with what was stated above, we consider 
26 Of course, if there are also necessary (but not sufficient) means, it will be nec-
essary to combine them through a distribution of conjunction over disjunction. 
Thus: {NM1, …, NMn} and SM1, or {NM1, …, NMn} and …, or {NM1, …, 
NMn} and SMn.
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that the burden of proof is on the side of the opponent here as well (even 
if this is x with ‘second thoughts’, before going into action, on whether 
he should or should not use the means M1, …, Mn, to realize G*).
We thus consider the schemes AS5 to AS9 to be reproduced here, 
along with their respective CQs and what we stated in their regard in 
Topic 2. The only difference is that the schemes and critical questions 
here employ the M* side of the G*/M* option where M* indicates ‘set 
of selected means’. We now simply need to add an illustration and an 
explanation. 
It suffices to recall our presidential ‘murderer example’ (mentioned 
in Topic 4): there may not be any incompatibility between the objective 
‘To be President of the Portuguese Republic’ and all the other objec-
tives that x has or should have. But if, at a given time, the means chosen 
by x to realize this objective is ‘To get his most direct rival candidate 
killed’, then this means will surely clash, no matter how efficient it is, 
with several other objectives or aims x has or should have.
Explanation: Three cases to be considered.
Case 1. If, among M1, …, Mn, only necessary means are to be found, 
then the conclusion that one of those means is incompatible with G1, 
…, Gn, immediately leads us to the argumentative process taking place 
in Topic 7.
Case 2. If, among M1, …, Mn, several sufficient means are to be 
found (thus resulting from a list of alternative means corresponding to 
the affirmative answer to the question of Topic 5), then if some of those 
alternative means, but not all, are considered incompatible with G1, …, 
Gn, through the argumentative process taking place in Topic 6, that may 
permit us to select only the compatible ones (given that, hypothetically, 
any one of them is sufficient to realize G*) which immediately leads us 
to Stage 5 and a decision to act.
Case 3. In the case of the sufficient means, only if all of them (that 
is, all possible means) are considered incompatible with G1, …, Gn, 
will we be directed to the argumentative process of Topic 7. 
Also in regard to Topic 6, it will be possible to try a procedure of 
negotiation like the one described in the Excursus and associated with 
AS9. With this supplementary proviso: the potential modifications to be 
introduced into M1, …, Mn, cannot remove the effectiveness of any of 
these means making them no longer sufficient to realize G*. 
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Stage 4. Topic 7
Topic 7 involves an argumentative process aiming at founding a (pos-
itive or negative) answer to the question: ‘Are the means M1….Mm, 
preferable to the goals !G1, ….!Gn, with which they are incompati-
ble?’. AS10 (and variants) with their respective Critical Questions can 
also be used here, as can be immediately perceived if we replace the 
occurrences of ‘M1, …, Mn’ by ‘G*’ in the formulation of the problem. 
Likewise, the comments we associated to the presentation of AS10 and 
its CQ in Topic 3 are applicable here with the same caveat that the M* 
option is to be used in this Stage. Hence, nothing else needs to be added 
at this time. 
Stage 5. Decision
In Stage 5, the final stage, there is not exactly a problem to be dealt 
with and to be answered, so this stage does not contain a Topic. It is 
only the matter of capitalizing on the reasoning process and on the ar-
gumentative course realized in the previous Topics, whether one has 
gone through all the Topics or just some of them. Obviously, the process 
may be stopped at any time, simply by answering ‘No’ to Topic 1, or 
from then on answering ‘No’ two consecutive times. If that happens, the 
agent may decide either not to act, or to make an appropriate modifica-
tion to the goal or means (depending on where the process was stopped) 
and begin again with the modification in place. If the process is not 
stopped, however, and we have arrived at Stage 5, then it is now just the 
matter of making a decision (practical reasoning) or recommending the 
action (practical argumentation) founded on all the process, or courses, 
which started at Topic 1. Therefore, if we consider Γ as the best formu-
lation of the argumentative thread that started at Topic 1 and ended in 
Stage 5, we can propose:
– For practical reasoning: ‘Given that I accept Γ, I justifiably (do not) 
intend to carry out M1, …, Mn, to realize G*’.
– For practical argumentation: ‘Γ being given, the recommendation 
that x carries out M1, …, Mn to realize G* is (not) justified’.
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Conclusion
To conclude, given the detail in the explanations above, we will start by 
risking a limited amount of repetition for the sake of clarity. The above 
presentation constitutes our efforts to contribute a new integrated model 
of practical reasoning and argumentation to the field. Imagining a hu-
man agent in any given circumstance, the model begins by asking if the 
agent has a reason to alter the current state of the world. With the aim of 
providing a model extending beyond mere instrumental reasoning, we 
have included consideration of the motivations for aiming at a goal as 
the first step in explicit practical reasoning and argumentation.
The complete model is composed of five stages: Stage one address-
es the agent’s motivation for action; Stage two is concerned with the 
proposed goal and other goals; Stage three concerns available means for 
achieving the proposed goal; Stage four deals with the relation between 
the means and other goals; and Stage five is simply the decision to act 
or not. If the agent progresses through all five Stages, they will have 
reasonable grounds for deciding to act. If they are stopped at any stage, 
they will then have reasonable grounds for not acting. 
In order to license moving from one Stage to the next, the agent 
must answer one or two ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ Topic questions. In any case, an 
affirmative answer results in a ‘green light’ to move to the next Stage. In 
some cases, a negative answer or ‘red light’ will lead to another Topic 
and thus a second chance to move to the next Stage. In other cases, a 
negative answer leads straight to a conclusion not to act.
Each Topic questions an aspect of the general theme of the Stage. 
Answering ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to the Topics is not, however, based merely on 
the free thinking or intuitions of the agent. In order to reasonably an-
swer the Topic questions, the agent must have reasons supporting their 
answer. Those reasons can be specified using an appropriate argument 
scheme. The model indicates what we consider to be the basic, neces-
sary schemes to justify an answer to each one of the Topics, though in 
practice an agent may of course use schemes over and above the pro-
vided list.
Importantly, the reasons which emerge from the schemes are to be 
considered pro tanto, or contributory reasons, in the way that Jonathan 
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Dancy (2004) has characterized them. This consideration is important 
because of two major implications it carries through the reasoning. First, 
it means a reason on one side is not, by itself, enough to license moving 
to a conclusion to act or not act. The questions and schemes are set up 
in oppositional fashion so that contributing reasons from both sides can 
be weighed. For example, an agent using the schemes associated with 
Topic 1 could come up with four reasons to pursue the goal. Rather 
than jumping straight to a conclusion to pursue it, however, Topic 2 is 
aimed at finding reasons not to pursue it. Only after both reasons for and 
reasons against have been addressed is the agent free to look for means. 
Second, reasons being contributory also means that one reason 
may outweigh all opposing reasons. In other words, the number of rea-
sons and weight provided to one side of the ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answer are not 
in a strict relationship. Thus, even though there may be four reasons for 
accepting the proposed means and one reason against, that one reason 
may outweigh the other four.
We have also aimed to improve the way moral considerations are 
included in the model in a few important ways. First, we have provided 
a way to include consequentialist and other moral considerations. While 
consequences are addressed during the selection of both the goal and 
the means, any given moral principle can be used in our Argumentation 
Scheme 10, which performs an overall weighing between a proposed 
goal or means and incompatible alternatives an agent has or should 
have. Rather than stipulate a moral authority for these decisions, a Crit-
ical Question for the Scheme asks the user to justify why the moral 
standard they have chosen is best, and to account for the exclusion of 
others. In the absence of a universally agreed authoritative moral theo-
ry, we think that the best that can be done at present is to argue for the 
selection of the chosen standard in rational use at any given time.
Second, we have included moral evaluation of the means and not 
just the goal. Such an inclusion may have a much bigger impact than 
at first appears as was partially demonstrated through our example of 
wanting to become president but killing to do so. While there may be 
nothing wrong with having a goal to become president, if one overlooks 
the moral component of killing to get there, an important check on the 
decision-making process has been overlooked.
Practical Rationality at Work – A New Argumentation Model 229
Finally, when filled out, the use of such a model provides many op-
portunities for the evaluation of the reasoning or argumentation. While 
a full theory of evaluation is better suited for another paper, at this point 
it suffices to point out that evaluation can take the form of pointing 
to Argumentation Schemes that were not used when they could have 
been, pointing to poor usage of the Argumentation Schemes that we 
employed, assessing the quality of the answers to the Critical Ques-
tions, and acknowledging the inclusion or lack thereof of goals an agent 
should have. In all of these cases, an evaluator can pinpoint an exact 
component in the process and recommend a systematic solution for im-
provement. 
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In this essay we will outline the constituent process that took place in 
Italy between 25 July 1943 (the fall of Fascism) and 1 January 1948 
(the effective promulgation date of the Republican Constitution), pay-
ing special attention to the debate that arose during the sessions of the 
Constituent Assembly between 2 June 1946 and 27 December 1947.
This essay is based on Jon Elster’s paper, Arguing and bargaining 
in two constituent assemblies2, which focuses on the study of constitu-
ent processes and, above all, constituent debates. The theoretical issues 
raised by the concept of constituent power3 will remain in the back-
ground for reasons of space.
1 Giovanni Damele is the author of section 8; Francesco Pallante is the author of 
sections 3–7 and 9. Sections 1, 2 and 10 are the fruit of a shared reflection.
2 ELSTER 2000 (the paper was based on a conference held at Yale University in 
1991).
3 In Italian constitutionalist doctrine, see at least: BARILE 1966, DOGLIANI 1986 
and 1990, MORTATI 1972, GRASSO 1985, PACE 1997, RESCIGNO 1996. In in-
ternational literature, the following writers have recently worked on standardizing 
constituent processes with regulatory intents: GINSBURG-ELKINS-BLOUNT 
2009, ELKINS-GINSBURG-MELTON 2009; GINSBURG 2012.
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2. The Elster diagram
The summary indications in Elster’s essay can be broken down into 
seven main steps of constituent processes:
1) convocation of the constituent assembly
2) choice of the delegate selection procedure
3) definition of the mandate of the assembly and of the delegates
4) verification of the delegates’ credentials
5) choice of the decision-making procedure to be adopted during the 
assembly
6) discussion and approval of the constitution by the assembly
7) ratification of the constitution
The Norwegian scholar first distinguishes between the first two steps 
and the following ones, claiming that the convocation of the constit-
uent assembly and the choice of the delegate selection procedure are 
performed by independent authorities who are not part of the assem-
bly, while all of the other steps refer to assembly decisions (under 
penalty of establishing a puppet-body that simply enacts the will of 
others)4.
This point is pivotal: only a process that is possibly “self-founded” 
can truly be considered as “constituent”, whereas a process which fol-
lows from a decision by a pre-existing body5 should be considered as 
being “constituted”.
4 ELSTER 2000: 358–59 (in addition to 361–62, 364 and 366).
5 RESCIGNO 1996: 34 et seq.
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3. The convocation of the constituent assembly
A) Starting from the first step, according to Elster, the authority conven-
ing the constituent assembly may be6:
– the constitution itself, if it provides for periodic constituent 
assemblies (Thomas Jefferson’s idea). The idea that the constitu-
tion provides for its total review is similar (see Article 193 of the 
Constitution of the Helvetic Confederation; something similar 
happened in Spain in 1978)7.
– an authority different from that of the State to which the consti-
tution will apply: for example, an occupying power (as in West-
ern Germany and Japan after the Second World War). Today, the 
hypothesis that a non-State authority has an international character 
prevails (consider Kosovo and Afghanistan).
– a provisional government resulting from a revolution (as in France 
with the 1789 and 1848 revolutions) or a coup (the case of the 
Ghana Constitution of 1992). Naturally, a revolution or coup does 
not always involve the use of violence (since the constituent assem-
blies convened by bodies belonging to the previous constitutional 
organization – like the French National Convention which approved 
the 1793 Constitution – would allegedly fall under this hypothesis).
– a mixed government or a seat of concertation between the old 
regime and the opposition (which is what happened in Poland in 
1989 with the so-called Round Table Agreement).
B)  In the Italian case, the convocation of the Constituent Assembly 
may be formally traced back to two documents:
– Law Decree no. 151/1944, which provides for the election of a 
Constituent Assembly to pass resolutions on all aspects (including 
the institutional form: monarchy and republic?) of the “new State 
Constitution” (the so-called first provisional Constitution).
6 ELSTER 2000: 358, note 64.
7 Contra PACE 1997: 8 et seq., in his opinion these hypotheses amount to the prac-
tice of a constituted power.
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– Delegated Decree no. 98/1946, which redefines the powers of the 
Constituent Assembly establishing that the institutional issue must 
be solved by popular referendum to be held at the same time as the 
election of the assembly itself (so-called second provisional Con-
stitution).
Both documents were adopted by provisional governments of national 
unity, hence by external authorities according to the Elster diagram: the 
former was enacted by the Bonomi government, the latter by the first 
De Gasperi government. In both cases, there were also influences from 
the monarchy and the Allies.
Elster notes that, since it is not clear whether the new or old rules 
apply at the time of constituent processes, the relationships between 
the old and new regimes often give rise to a logic paradox by virtue of 
the framers’ attempt to give their actions formal legitimacy based on 
pre-existing legal arrangements8.
In the Italian case, a clear symptom of these problems is the dif-
ferent format taken by the two decrees: one is a law decree, the other 
is a delegated decree. The difference is explained by the fact that the 
document dated 1944 – adopted under Article 3 of Law no. 100/1926 – 
establishes the delegation of legislative powers to the government; con-
sequently, only subsequent documents may be delegated documents. 
However, since law decrees are temporary, there is the problem of the 
conversion of Law Decree no. 151/1944 into law: the fifteenth transito-
ry and final disposition of the Constitution did so, however, terming it a 
… “delegated decree”.
4. The delegate selection procedure 
A) As concerns the selection method of assembly members, Elster 
stresses that the deciding authority should be different from the one con-
vening the assembly; however this would create a “puppet assembly” 
8 ELSTER 2000: 360.
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since the delegates would allegedly be selected based on their loyalty 
to the convening authority9. The Norwegian political scientist does not, 
however, linger on subjects regarding the selection of the delegates10.
B) In the Italian case, the document establishing the methods of for-
mation of the Constituent Assembly is Delegated Decree no. 74/1946, 
which introduced a strictly proportional electoral law. The selection of 
the assembly members was referred to the people, convened on 2 June 
1946 to vote by universal suffrage for the first time. It is clear, however, 
that the definition of the electoral system was extremely important and 
was largely affected by the fact that the parties were not familiar with 
their electoral “weight” (since they opted, Rawls-style, for the choice 
that would have secured them in case of defeat).
In the Italian case, two independent authorities were involved: the 
provisional government, which established the electoral system, and the 
Italian people, who elected the assembly delegates. This partly proves 
the Elster diagram wrong since the provisional government intervened 
in both phases – convocation and selection of the members – which 
preceded the formation of the Assembly.
5. The definition of the mandate
A) As concerns the definition of the mandate, the question is whether 
there is a constraint. On the practical side, it is easy – as Elster writes – 
for the authority convening the constituent assembly (or, more rarely, the 
one selecting its members) to try to influence the outcome of the work 
by constraining the mandate of the delegates. It is, however, equally easy 
for the constituent process to get away from its “creator” (which is what 
happened to Louis XVI)11.
9 ELSTER 2000: 359, in particular note 65, which gives the example of “the body 
of 66 men convened in China by Yuan Shikai in 1914 to give his rule a semblance 
of legality through a ‘constitutional compact’”.
10 ELSTER 2000: 359.
11 ELSTER 2000: 361–62.
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Aside from its practical infeasibility, the Norwegian scholar does 
not give a completely negative opinion of putting constraints on the 
mandate because it can be useful in order to strengthen the threats made 
during the bargaining12.
B) In the Italian case, it could be believed that a type of constraint was 
applied to the mandate of the Constituent Assembly members by not 
allowing them to decide on the institutional question.
As already mentioned, Law Decree no. 151/1944 initially stated 
that the selection was the responsibility of the Assembly, then Delegated 
Decree no. 98/1946 re-examined the issue, referring the decision to the 
people by referendum. This is one of the key steps of the entire Italian 
constituent process. Despite the fact that the 1944 decree resulted from 
a comprehensive agreement involving the Allies, CLN (National Libera-
tion Committee) parties and the monarchy, Lieutenant Umberto broke the 
understanding, asking the people to decide on the institutional question. 
Along the same lines, the (mainly monarchist) Italian Liberal Party and 
the Christian Democracy (DC) were concerned about the gap between the 
Party’s positions and those of its electorate (considered more inclined to 
institutional continuity). De Gasperi also convinced the Allies to support 
the referendum as a solution. On the contrary, the left-wing parties and 
the Actionists favoured abiding by the original provisions of Law Decree 
no. 151/194413.
The issue was first raised by De Gasperi on 10 October 1945 un-
der the Parri government. A complex debate arose which became inter-
twined with the two additional issues of whether or not the Constituent 
Assembly should also act as a law-making body and whether the Con-
stituent Assembly should pass resolutions by a simple or a qualified ma-
jority. The Council of Ministers (and the so-called Cabinet, a selected 
committee made up of the ministries representing the CLN parties) was 
involved in these debates during the sessions held between 19 February 
and 2 March 1946 until the secretaries of the DC, PSI and PCI agreed 
to approve Delegated Decree no. 98/1946 under the De Gasperi gov-
ernment.
12 ELSTER 2000: 363.
13 The event is carefully re-enacted in RICCI 1996: 449–459.
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6. The verification of credentials 
A) Elster considers the verification of the credentials of the constituent 
assembly delegates a logic paradox (in addition to the paradox on the 
legal origin of the constituent assembly): the assembly cannot verify the 
credentials of the delegates without taking office, but – at the same time – 
it cannot take office without having first verified the credentials of its 
member14. An independent audit would be necessary, but this would 
undermine the independence of the assembly. In France, the issue was 
hotly debated during the Estates General convened by Louis XVI, and 
a solution was found on the basis of the following consideration: “It is 
impossible to believe that the majority of those who present themselves 
as delegates should not have valid credentials”15.
B) In the Italian case, the Constituent Assembly established a Commit-
tee responsible for verifying the credentials of elected members, which 
it did, making some replacements.
The issue raised no specific debates because the Assembly worked 
on the basis of the parliamentary procedures of the pre-Fascist Low-
er House (Camera dei Deputati), which had already provided that the 
Council was competent for the election.
7. The choice of the decision-making procedure
A) Elster mentions the following problems regarding the choice of the 
procedures to be adopted during the assembly to discuss and approve 
the constitution16:
14 ELSTER 2000: 366.
15 ELSTER 2000: 366.
16 ELSTER 2000: 367 and 404–405.
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1) the duration of the sessions
2) whether the constituent assembly should also act as a law-making 
body
3) how to decide on the allocation of the time between law-making 
and constitution-making
4) the possibility to establish constitution-drafting or problem-solving 
committees
5) whether to proceed in closed sessions or open the debates to the 
public. (Elster believes that closed sessions encourage bargaining 
and arguing because it is easier to change opinion.)17
6) the quorum and the voting method (by “person” or by group18? 
And, if by “person”, by roll call, show of hands, division of the 
assembly etc.?)
7) the procedure of transforming votes into decisions
B) In the Italian case, we must refer to Article 4 of Delegated Decree no. 
98/1946 that applied to the Assembly the procedures promulgated for the 
Lower House in July 1900, as repeatedly amended until 1922. The Con-
stituent Assembly itself made some “additions”. In short, the decision on 
the procedures was made by an independent authority (the provisional 
government, although with the Assembly’s tacit consent) in lieu, as the 
Elster diagram provides, of the Constituent Assembly.
Let us now look more closely at the individual profiles identified by 
Elster. Starting with the duration, Delegated Decree no. 98/1946 estab-
lished an eight-month deadline from the first session (held on 25 June 
1946). This deadline could be extended by no more than four months. 
After using such an extension, the Assembly applied for an additional 
six-month extension (plus a few days, to set the deadline at 31 De-
cember 1947) since the duration was decided partly by an independent 
authority (the provisional government), and partly by the Constituent 
Assembly itself.
As concerns law-making powers, the CLN was internally divided 
between the DC and PLI, which wanted, with the support of the Allies, 
17 ELSTER 2000: 410–411 (on the usefulness that the involved parties may change 
their ideas, also see p. 385).
18 The question was hotly debated during the French Constitutional Assembly 
(ELSTER 2000: 367–368).
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to limit the competences of the Assembly to constitution-making top-
ics (leaving ordinary law-making powers to the government) and left-
wing parties, which thought it preferable to refer the decision to the 
Constituent Assembly. The question had to do with the fear that the 
left-wing parties, if they won the election, might have exploited the As-
sembly’s powers in order to establish “revolutionary” legislation. The 
problem was addressed together with those of the subject in charge of 
making the institutional choice and the quorum of the Constituent As-
sembly. In this case, the solution is also found in Delegated Decree no. 
98/1946 (Art. 3). Although the provision ratified the victory of moder-
ate parties, the Assembly was permitted to indicate bills that, though 
not part of its law-making competence, were to be submitted for its 
resolution19.
Moving on to the time of the sessions, the division between consti-
tution-making and “ordinary” activity20 was decided with the planning 
of the sessions by the Constituent Assembly itself: 375 public sessions 
were held, 173 of which focused on the discussion and approval of the 
new Constitution.
Concerning the establishment of constitution-drafting committees, 
a Constitutional Committee was appointed under the presidency of 
Meuccio Ruini in order to prepare the Constitution draft. The 75-mem-
ber Committee was split into three sub-committees: (1) citizens’ rights 
and duties; (2) constitutional organization of the State, (which was then 
split into two branches: one on executive power, one on judicial power 
and the Constitutional Court; a selected committee was also established 
for the regional system); and (3) economic and social relationships. The 
topics of the first and the third sub-committees partially overlapped, so 
a Coordinating Committee was established to unify their work. Even-
tually, a Drafting Committee (with 18 members) prepared the text of 
the final draft, coordinating and harmonizing the work of the three 
sub-committees.
19 For a re-enactment of the event, see RICCI 1996: 449–459.
20 In addition to the opinions on the draft legislative decrees, the Assembly’s main 
non-constituent activities were the vote of confidence for the De Gasperi Govern-
ments II, III and IV; the approval of the budget laws for 1947 and 1948; and the 
ratification of the peace treaties signed in Paris on 10 February 1947.
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As concerns whether the sessions were public or closed, the Con-
stituent Assembly’s activity was public, but that of the Committee and 
its various sub-committees was not since the Italian people were not 
permitted to directly attend the entire constitution-making process21. 
The debate was covered by the press22 and the Ministry for the Constit-
uent Assembly also provided extensive information.
The quorum and voting method were governed by the pre-fascist 
procedures of the Lower House23. Voting (by “person”) was by ballot for 
the final approval of the bills and by sitting and standing in all other cas-
es (unless ten members asked for voting by division, fifteen by roll call, 
and twenty by ballot). The quorum was the majority of participants. 
Under these rules, the Constitution was approved on 22 December 1947 
with voting by ballot by roll call (out of 515 participants, 453 votes in 
favour, 62 against).
As concerns the “procedure for transforming votes into deci-
sions”24, once approved, the Italian Constitution was enacted by the 
provisional Head of State, Enrico De Nicola, on 27 December 1947 and 
published immediately in an extraordinary edition of the Official Ga-
zette no. 298 of the same day. It came into effect on 1 January 1948.
8. The discussion
A) Elster believes that constitution-making projects represent a “par-
adigmatic case” useful to highlight two types of dialogue: arguing 
and bargaining. Those “types” are exhibited in “their most striking 
forms”25 in constituent assemblies, which are more polarized than or-
dinary law-making bodies and oscillate between “higher law-making” 
 
21 PALDIN 2004: 46 (and 48–49) writes, on the other hand, that the sessions were 
often “quite confidential”.
22 POMBENI 1995: 93–96.
23 RICCI 1996: 449–459.
24 ELSTER 2000: 367.
25 ELSTER 2000: 347.
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and “sheer appeal to force”. Elster also introduces a third type of (in 
Elster’s words) “speech act”: “rhetorical statements aiming at persua-
sion”, though he is uncertain about its proper analytical characteriza-
tion. However, it seems that the distinction between the three types is a 
question of “motives”. Not those of the speakers, which Elster distin-
guishes as “reason”, “passion” and “interest”, but the motives that the 
speakers ascribe to their audience. Rhetoric may perhaps be defined 
“by the feature that its practitioners appeal to the passions of their audi-
ence rather than to their reason or self-interest” since “in some debates 
reason speaks to reason; in others, interest to interest; in still others, 
passion to passion”26. Somehow, Elster’s triadic model seems to reflect 
Aristotle’s three-part division of persuasion modes, where logos can 
easily be matched with arguing, ethos can refer to bargaining (where 
the criterion of credibility is key) and pathos could match “rhetoric” 
within the meaning given by Elster, i.e. an appeal to the passions of the 
audience. However, Elster does not develop this parallelism, nor does 
he develop the analysis of the more genuinely pathetic components of 
assembly discussions.
A.1. (Arguing and bargaining). For Elster, rational arguing is subject 
to criteria of validity, and promises or threats to criteria of credibility27. 
The former recalls Habermas’s theory of communicative action, binding 
a speaker aiming at understanding and not sheer success to “three va-
lidity claims: propositional truth, normative rightness, and truthfulness”. 
Even speakers who are not “genuinely moved by impartial considerations 
of the common good”, but whose concerns are “purely self-interested”, 
may still be forced or induced “to substitute the language of impartial 
argument for the language of self-interest”28. This substitution would be 
the fruit of the civilizing force of hypocrisy, thanks to which “a speaker 
who wants to appear as aiming at understanding must also appear to be 
committed to these claims”29. Consequently, “one need not always op-
pose impartiality and self-interest” since “one may offer an argument 
from self-interest for impartiality”. Such a typical argument is the 
26 ELSTER 2000: 371, no. 116.
27 ELSTER 2000: 372.
28 ELSTER 2000: 349.
29 ELSTER 2000: 373.
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so-called “veil of ignorance”30, or, in general, represents all those cases in 
which “apparently self-interested behaviour” may actually be guided “by 
impartial concerns”31. Authenticity, or sincerity, on the other hand may be 
traced back – at least in one of its versions – to consistency, which is not 
incompatible with what could be defined as argumentative hypocrisy32. It 
would be important to distinguish between authentic changes of opinion, 
which per se would not reveal an inconsistent argument, and actual op-
portunism33.
As concerns arguing, Elster distinguishes arguments as “tending to 
be” either consequentialist or deontological. Roughly speaking: appeal-
ing “to overall efficiency” or “to individual rights”. The latter, as well as 
those “based on the public good” and those “which rely on some version 
of utilitarianism”, are considered impartial because of their generaliz-
ability34. Starting from these arguments, the framers would somehow 
prove that they are motivated by impartial reason, despite being perme-
able to self-interested considerations, as we have noted. Elster qualifies 
framers as imperfectly rational35. 
While rational discussion is supposed to be based only on the “pow-
er of the better argument”, constitutional bargaining, by contrast, rests 
on “resources that can be used to make threats (and promises) credible”. 
Such resources may be extra-political or intra-political. The latter include 
the exchange of concessions36. The use of these resources is strictly de-
pendent on the framers’ ability to make them credible: the framers’ credi-
bility affects the credibility of their threats and/or their promises.
A.2. (Pure and impure types). In the analysis of the actual arguments 
of the two assemblies, the two types seem to translate in a sequence of 
“mixed” or “impure” cases. On the one hand, a strategic use of (appar-
ently) non-strategic arguments is not only possible but common, and in 
some cases desirable: in these cases, “self-interested actors often try”, 
 
30 ELSTER 2000: 374.
31 ELSTER 2000: 388.
32 ELSTER 2000: 413.
33 ELSTER 2000: 377.
34 ELSTER 2000: 378–379.
35 ELSTER 2000: 380.
36 ELSTER 2000: 392. 
Arguing, bargaining and persuading in constituent processes 243
in their own self-interest, “to ground their claims in principle”. On the 
other hand “bargainers often try to present their threats as warnings”37. 
The difference between threats and warnings would lie in the fact that 
the former “are statements about what the speaker will do”, whereas the 
latter are “statements about what will (or may) happen, independently of 
any actions taken by the speaker”38. In the former case, “self-interested 
actors” appeal to an impartial equivalent. In the latter case, bargainers 
substitute a factual equivalent of a threat.
From the point of view of arguing, what happens in reality is not 
actually a “perfect fit between partial interest and impartial arguments” 
but a “maximal fit”39. The reasons for this substitution between partisan 
arguments and impartial arguments may vary. First, “if others believe 
that one is truly arguing from principle, they may be more willing to 
back down”. Second, “legislative coalitions tend to use public-regarding 
language as a ‘subterfuge’ for what is in reality a deal among special 
interests”40. Third, “by citing a general reason one might actually be 
able to persuade others”41.
In any case, thanks to the civilizing force of hypocrisy, arguing 
“tends to yield more equitable outcomes than bargaining”, even when 
it is purely strategic and based on self-interest, because it will prevent 
“the strong from using their bargaining power to the hilt”. In this case, 
“the optimal impartial equivalent”, able to “yield more equitable out-
comes”, will be the one that “dilutes” the self-interest of the strong by 
“taking some account of the interest of the weak”42.
B) Elster believes that “the most important requirement” of a bar-
gaining theory should be “that we are able to specify what will happen 
during a temporary breakdown of cooperation”43. In short, how the con-
stituents can get out of an impasse caused by a non-cooperative – even 
37 ELSTER 2000: 405–406.
38 ELSTER 2000: 415.
39 ELSTER 2000: 406.
40 ELSTER 2000: 408.
41 ELSTER 2000: 408.
42 ELSTER 2000: 413.
43 ELSTER 2000: 398.
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if temporary – situation. An example is the debate which led to the final 
version of Article 29 of the Constitution44.
It is known that this article was the result of a difficult writing pro-
cess that significantly affected its text (and its subsequent interpretations). 
This is due, on the one hand, to the relevance of the topics (family and 
marriage) for the members of the DC Party and, in general more for 
Catholics, and on the other, to the difficult position of the Communist 
Party, which was not willing to be confined to markedly secular positions 
in view of the future political election (in which Catholic votes would 
have been critical) and could not ignore that a significant portion of its 
electorate (and PCI members) held positions very similar to DC Party 
members on some aspects of the matter, and divorce in particular.
The drafting of Article 29 was marked by a series of “temporary 
breakdowns of cooperation” that were overcome through exchanges of 
concessions, recourse to “intra-political” resources (for example a stra-
tegic placement of available votes of a certain parliamentary group) and 
the strategic use of procedures. A first impasse caused by the opposing 
positions of the sub-committee on the indissolubility of marriage and 
the definition of family as a “natural and fundamental unit of society” 
was overcome by Moro and Togliatti through an exchange of conces-
sions which translated into a new version that divided the theme into two 
articles, included a (more ambiguous) definition of “natural society” in 
the article on the family and a (more vague) reference to “unity” (in lieu 
of indissolubility) in the article on marriage. The second breakdown of 
cooperation occurred because of Togliatti and the PCI members’ failure 
to take strategic recourse to the “intra-political” resource of voting. In 
the Constitutional Committee, in keeping with the compromise reached 
with Moro, Togliatti led his group to approve the formula “family as nat-
ural society”. However, when the vote was cast for the second article, 
the amendments against the clause of “indissolubility of marriage” were 
44 CAPORRELLA 2010. The documents of the Constituent Assembly are available 
online in the “Previous legislatures” section of the website of the Lower House 
(“Constituent Assembly” section) or on the “Birth of the Constitution” website, by 
Fabrizio Calzaretti: www.nascitacostituzione.it. The debates leading to the final 
drafting of Article 29 were held on 26 July, 13 September, 30 October, 5–7, 12–13 
and 15 November 1946 and 15 January 1947, as concerns the I Sub-committee; 
4–8, 10–11 and 17 March, 15, 17–19, 21–24 April 1947, as concerns the Assembly.
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not approved. Therefore, the result could be re-balanced only in the last 
voting session through the strategic use of the Assembly’s procedures. 
The request for secret voting by twenty Assembly members allowed the 
compromise to be re-established, leading to the approval by three votes of 
an amendment by Socialist Party member Grilli to remove the reference 
to “indissolubility”. As for bargaining and the recourse to warnings, it is 
interesting to consider the speech by Lelio Basso in the 7 November 1946 
session of the I Sub-committee, during which the Socialist Party member 
warned that the “categorical request for the indissolubility of marriage” 
might have “led to a break-up of the Sub-committee”.
As concerns the arguments used, the trend was not so much to 
argue on principles, but to present consequentialist arguments. In both 
cases, the objective was to present a general and impartial point of view. 
This is especially clear in the speeches by DC Party framers, whose 
main concern was to prove that the need for inclusion of “indissolu-
bility” in the constitutional text went beyond compliance with certain 
religious principles. Corsanego declared that “the authentic Italian pop-
ulation, even in its humbler classes, has clear, well-defined and tangible 
arguments” on the family, recalling the authority of “common sense”. 
He also resorted to a consequentialist argument, noting that “divorce 
represents the dissolution of the family and a poisonous germ for its 
establishment, as is proved in all the countries where it is accepted”. La 
Pira also claimed to insist on permanence because he had been persuad-
ed by “an increasingly determined confirmation in the scientific field of 
the indissolubility of marriage considered as a structural element of the 
family”. He then stressed that the DC Party members wanted to include 
indissolubility in the Constitution because it should concern marriage 
as such, and not as a sacrament (hence, also civil marriage). Thus, he 
considered important “to overcome the question of the parties, so that 
the claim made is not the claim of the DC Party, but of the entire Italian 
population”.
The intention of the DC Party members to present a theme from 
an impartial point of view is clear. Such a theme, they admitted, was 
essential for their political and religious position. The position of those 
opposing inclusion of the phrase “natural society” with respect to the 
family in the Constitution, and those opposing the introduction of 
the indissolubility of marriage appeared more delicate. Following the 
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compromise between Moro and Togliatti, the PCI Party members op-
posed the latter but not the former. On the other hand, the Socialists and 
some Liberals opposed both. However, neither the Socialists nor Togli-
atti posed the question of divorce. In a way, because of the necessary 
tactic in view of the future election, the position of the left-wing parties 
appeared more “defensive” and ambiguous, which exposed them to the 
accusation of inconsistency and opportunism.
Concerning the “exchange of concessions” between Moro and To-
gliatti, we should note the recourse to the strategic use of ambiguity, 
which allowed for an agreement on a formulation sufficiently ambigu-
ous to provide different interpretations that were more or less directly 
consistent with the actors’ different points of view. For Moro, keeping 
the expression “natural society” in the article allowed him to overcome 
a merely confessional position and affirm the “natural rights” of the 
family, while the definition of “natural society” had no legal effect for 
Togliatti and did not imply per se the conclusions that La Pira wanted to 
draw (i.e. “the indissolubility of the bond”).
9. Modes of ratification 
A) The modes of ratification – Elster states – are necessary to confer 
“downstream” legitimacy on the constitutional document approved by 
the constituent assembly.
The following possible modes can be identified45:
– right of veto of the independent convening authority (but how can a 
constituted power influence the constituent power?)
– ratification by the people through referendum or an ad hoc convention
– no additional ratification to the final vote of the constituent assembly.
B) In the Italian case, the approval by the Constituent Assembly was 
sufficient. However, it should be considered that there had already been 
45 ELSTER 2000: 371.
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popular involvement because of the institutional referendum in whose 
wake the Constituent Assembly operated.
10. Conclusion
As concerns the execution of the constituent proceedings, we can say 
that the Elster diagram shows actual endurance capacity as applied to 
the Italian constituent process. Some steps may be overestimated (such 
as the verification of delegates’ credentials), others underestimated (like 
the definition of the assembly’s powers). However, as a whole, the steps 
appear to match and the most critical profiles identified by the Norwe-
gian scholar are present in the Italian case.
The conclusion from the arguing theory perspective appears more 
critical. The analysis of the debate on Article 29 highlights some weak-
nesses of Elster’s model. The first is the role played by rhetoric and 
more generally the concept of rhetoric he refers to. The second problem 
is the articulation of the debates according to the arguing/bargaining 
opposition and the analytical utility of such an opposition. A third prob-
lem could be the strategic use of ambiguity. As concerns the latter two, 
we can supplement Elster’s model with analytical instruments from ar-
guing theory and bargaining theory. 
Qualifying bargaining and arguing as “types of dialogue” appears 
to provide a better description of their characteristics and especially 
their co-presence within the same dialectic interactions through the 
concept introduced by Walton of the “dialectical shift”. In this case, 
it is not just a “combination” of types of dialogue but a more-or-less 
gradual transition from one type of dialogue to the next. It may be a 
legal or illegal transition, and in the first case, the second type of dia-
logue is included in the first, thereby further developing, constructively, 
a dialectical shift46. Thus, bargaining can be transformed (more or less 
accidentally) into a persuasive dialogue. These transitions then make it 
 
46 WALTON 1992: 138 and MACAGNO 2011: 106.
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possible to assess the context within which a certain argument may be 
fallacious or not, replacing a rigid concept of fallacy with a dynamic 
one linked to the use of an argument in a set type of dialogue. Consid-
ering the Elster concept of bargaining, for example, and the central role 
played by threats or warnings within it, it may be interesting to recall 
Walton’s analysis of the argument ad baculum, according to which the 
criterion distinguishing between a fallacious and a non-fallacious use 
of the threat is exactly the type of dialogue since it may be legitimate in 
bargaining but not in a persuasive dialogue47.
Strategic use of ambiguity plays a key role in overcoming “tempo-
rary breakdowns of cooperation”. As Eric M. Eisenberg noted, strategic 
ambiguity favours agreement on an abstraction without committing the 
bargainers on their potential future interpretations48. This is even more 
important when considering that arguers (or bargainers) in a deliberative 
setting may have multiple objectives, some of which may even be (partly) 
contrasting. One can see that this is very similar to what Cass Sunstein de-
fined as “incompletely theorised agreements”49 in a juridical setting, i.e. a 
communicative strategy that does not minimize but manages ambiguity50.
The role of rhetoric remains to be defined. Elster’s dyadic model 
appears to be a triadic model, which is missing a component: “rhetori-
cal statements aiming at persuasion”. This is because Elster considers 
the term “rhetoric” to essentially have a negative meaning, i.e. the com-
mon meaning of manipulation, appeal to passions (and not to reason) 
and demagogy. However, it is reductive to confine rhetoric to a sheer 
appeal to passions because it is actually the reference theoretical frame-
work of any persuasive discourse. In a deliberative setting, the persua-
sive purpose combines both arguing and bargaining and eventually the 
appeal to emotions. As a technique of persuasive discourse, rhetoric 
expands its scope well beyond a mere appeal to the audience’s passions. 
The point is not even the strategic use of arguments but, more generally, 
strategic arguing as a discourse technique whose purpose is to persuade 
 
47 WALTON, MACAGNO 2007: 75. More in general on the topic, see WALTON 
2002.
48 EISENBERG 1984: 231.
49 SUNSTEIN 2007.
50 EISENBERG 1984: 238.
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the audience. Therefore, Elster’s hierarchy should be overturned since 
both strategic arguments and bargaining could develop in a deliberative 
framework and resort to persuasive (rhetorical) discourses. 
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III – Ethics and Aesthetics: 
Implicit and Explicit Conections

‘I’m beginning to know myself. I don’t exist.’  
The Interval of Álvaro de Campos
Bartholomew Ryan
Começo a conhecer-me. Não existo. 
Sou o intervalo entre o que desejo ser e os outros me fizeram, 
ou metade desse intervalo, porque também há vida … 
Sou isso, enfim … 
Apague a luz, feche a porta e deixe de ter barulhos de chinelos no corredor. 
Fique eu no quarto só com o grande sossego de mim mesmo. 
   É um universo barato.1
Introduction: Navigating between Philosophy and Poetry 
As both an exercise in navigating between philosophy and poetry and 
what can be gained from doing so, I analyse Álvaro de Campos’ seven- 
line poem displayed above. This poem not only highlights Fernando 
Pessoa’s classic treatment of tedium, masks, the issue of the self and 
identity, insomnia and the theatre of existence, but also emphasises the 
concept of the ‘interval’. I argue that the interval here has three inter-
connected aspects when philosophy and poetry come together: the mo-
tifs of ‘between’, the ruin and the creative act – which together locate 
the nomadic writer. As much a fragment as it is a poem, these lines by 
Pessoa’s heteronym Campos have no title or date. It was published for 
the first time by the Ática publishers in Lisbon in 1944, nine years after 
1 Pessoa (2002: 433; 1998: 200). Translation: ‘I’m beginning to know myself. I 
don’t exist. / I’m the gap between what I’d like to be and what others have made 
me, / Or half of this gap, since there’s also life … / That’s me. Period. / Turn off 
the light, shut the door, and get rid of the slipper noise in the hallway. / Leave me 
alone in my room with the vast peace of myself. / It’s a shoddy universe.’
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Pessoa’s death. The whereabouts today of the original text is unknown. 
This essay is a part of my ongoing conversation between philosophy 
and poetry, on the journey by way of response to Alain Badiou’s com-
ment on Pessoa as situated somewhere in between or out of reach of 
Western philosophy’s comprehension:
If Pessoa represents a singular challenge for philosophy, if his modernity is still 
ahead of us, remaining in many respects unexplored, it is because his thought-po-
em inaugurates a path that manages to be neither Platonic nor anti-Platonic. 
Pessoa poetically defines a site for thinking that is truly subtracted from the unan-
imous slogan of the overturning of Platonism. To this day, philosophy has yet to 
comprehend the full extent of his gesture.2
If Pessoa is, as he declared as a young man, a ‘poet animated by philos-
ophy, not a philosopher with poetic faculties’ (Pessoa 1966: 13), then 
Kierkegaard may be the inverse, as a philosopher who is “a kind of po-
et”3, and as a dramatic thinker working against philosophy who wrote: 
‘Life is like a poet and thus different from the contemplator, who always 
comes to a finish; the poet wrenches us out into the middle of life’ 
(Kierkegaard 1993: 73). Perhaps, the conversation between the poet and 
the philosopher – as one who is in the world and one who reflects on 
the world – can still lead us on to new intellectual and imaginary land-
scapes. Campos’ lines encapsulate so much of what we have come to 
experience and understand when entering the labyrinth of Pessoa’s po-
etic imagination, in traversing the fundamental philosophical questions 
such as – what it is to be, what time is, and what it is to see and be seen. 
 
2 Badiou (2005: 36). I have already published elsewhere in exploring the gap be-
tween philosophy and poetry, or philosophers and Pessoa. See, for example: ‘A 
Voyage in Immanence: Alberto Caeiro as an expression of Spinoza’s Ethics’, in 
Immanent Expressions: Literature and the Encounter with Immanence, edited by 
Brynnar Swenson, Amsterdam/New York: Brill (forthcoming 2017); ‘Orpheu e 
os Filhos de Nietzsche: Caos e Cosmoplitismo’, in Nietzsche e Pessoa: Ensaios, 
edição B. Ryan, M. Faustino, A. Cardiello), Lisboa: Tinta da China, 2016; and 
‘Into the Nothing with Kierkegaard and Pessoa’, in Kierkegaard and the Chal-
lenges of Infinitude, edição E. Sousa, J. Miranda Justo, R. Rosfort, Lisboa: Centro 
de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, 2013.
3 See Louis Mackey’s book: Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet, Pennsylvania: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1971. 
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The poem also captures the mystery and welcoming puzzle that still 
remains in the massive body of work after all the confessions, decep-
tions and masks created in the endless shedding of the self. 
The interval can be called a concept as it is a multifaceted idea that 
runs through Pessoa’s work that helps articulate key elements in his artis-
tic strategy as well as his psychology, philosophical perspectives, spirit-
uality, and the fractured cosmology that is at play. Thus, it signifies many 
things, and – as in so much in Pessoa – the unity of its meaning lies in its 
multiplicity. Agreeing with Richard Zenith, I see Pessoa’s aesthetic and 
spiritual pursuits as one and the same quest (Pessoa 2016: 14), which 
is also very much in tune with James Joyce’s ‘eternal affirmation of the 
spirit of man in literature’ (Joyce 2008: 620). The interval is used so fre-
quently in the Pessoa corpus that we might see it now without surprise, 
without thinking, and as something even trivial. But it would be unwise 
to overlook this word as it is a key to the heart of Pessoa’s writing.
In exploring the interval, we could dive into various passages scat-
tered across the Livro de Desassossego, where the word turns up over 
thirty times, some passages beginning with the title ‘Intervalo Doloroso’ 
or simply ‘Intervalo’4. There are also poems from Pessoa which explic-
itly confront the interval in both his Portuguese and English poems – 
most obviously the poem ‘Intervalo’ (Pessoa 2006a: 385) in Portuguese 
from 1935, and ‘Meantime’ (Pessoa 1994: 202–203) in English (trans-
lated as ‘Intervalo’ by Jorge de Sena) which was his only publication in 
England in The Athenaeum in 1920, and another English poem called 
“The King of Gaps” from his magical, pantheistic collection under the 
title The Mad Fiddler. The interval was also of interest to Pessoa’s clos-
est friend and fellow poet Mário de Sá-Carneiro who is important for 
the formation of Pessoa’s art, especially in his poem “Inter-Sonho” from 
1913. Sá-Carneiro ends the poem with explicit reference to the interval: 
‘Pressinto um grande intervalo, / Deliro todas as cores, / Vivo em roxo e 
morro em som…’5. In this poem we see the obvious connection that the 
interval has not only to dreams but also to music, and the role that it has 
4 See especially Pessoa (2012: 76, 98, 113, 196, 199, 227, 286, 347, 373 / 39, 62, 
78, 163, 166, 194, 255, 318, 345).
5 Sá-Carneiro (1978: 57) ‘I envision a great interval / I go wild in all the colours / I 
live in purple and die in sound’ (my translation).
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for the structures in music which is important to the interval for literary 
usage and dreamscapes in Livro de Desassossego.
There are other poems from Campos which incorporate the inter-
val such as ‘Saudação a Walt Whitman’ (‘Não quero intervalos no mun-
do!’6); an untitled poem with no date where he writes: ‘E é no intervalo 
que existo’7; and in one of his greatest poems ‘Lisbon Revisited (1926)’: 
‘Compreendo a intervalos desconexos; / Escrevo por lapsos de cansaço; 
/ E um tédio que é até do tédio arroja-me à praia.’8 Even earlier in the 
epic ‘Ode Marítima’, the interval is implicit throughout the poem, begin-
ning with the dramatic opening verses in the image of the gap between 
the wharf (cais) and the ship (navio) that set the scene and allusions for 
his epic, imaginative adventure in piracy, homoeroticism and the reck-
less life of a seafarer. Campos’ seven-line poem appears on the page like 
a philosophical shipwreck long after his greatest ode has been published 
in Portugal’s greatest modernist moment and magazine Orpheu.
1. Aspects of the Interval in the Poem
What is the interval? There are five key components and/or words all 
turning up in different texts of Pessoa that belong to the family of the 
interval: interlúdio, intervalo, lacuna, entreacto, and English word gap. 
We can see that the interlúdio derives from ‘inter’ signifying ‘between’ 
and ‘ludus’ – signifying ‘play’; ‘gap’ comes from gape, which can be 
a hole in a wall or ledge and which can also signify the yawn; ‘lacuna’ 
from Latin, which means hole or pit; and the entreacto, as intermission, 
literally ‘between’ the ‘act’ in the theatre. The interval itself stems from 
the Latin intervallum – ‘between’ the ‘vallum’ which signifies ‘rampart’ 
or ‘wall’. There can be three simple definitions of the interval: as the 
space between two points or two objects; as the space of time between 
 
6 Pessoa (2002: 170): ‘I want a world without gaps!’
7 Pessoa (2002: 265): ‘It is in the interval that I exist’ (my translation). 
8 Pessoa (2002: 300 / 218): ‘At intermittent intervals I understand; / I write in re-
spites from my weariness; And a boredom bored even of itself casts me ashore.’
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events, artistic shows, dates or epochs; and even as a temporary mes-
sianic interruption found most powerfully in Western thought in Saint 
Paul’s rhipé [twinkling of the eye], Kierkegaard’s Øieblikket [the mo-
ment] and Luther and Heidegger’s Augenblik [moment of vision].9
As mentioned above, I would like to introduce three aspects of the 
interval in this particular poem. First, the interval includes the standard 
motif of ‘between’ – as ‘inter’, which points to the space between wak-
ing and sleeping (insomnia), between sexualities especially in the case 
of Campos who is inclined towards both sexes, between physical space 
made metaphorical – such as the water between a wharf and a ship, and 
in the space between philosophy and poetry. 
Second, the interval contains the motif of the ‘ruin’ – as fragment, 
disaster, garret, collapse or cracked cosmos. It is that ‘man from Por-
lock’10 who interrupted one of English literature’s greatest unfinished 
poems ‘Kubla Khan’. The interval in this poem is that which is not 
written, what was going to be written. Instead the reader only has the 
beginning and end of this magical poem, and the middle part – the in-
terval – is now only in our imagination to discover or recover. It is no 
wonder that Pessoa obsessed over Coleridge’s poem. Like other philos-
ophers and poets, the ruin becomes Campos’ place for spiritual renewal, 
as a ‘ruin of all space’ (Joyce 2008: 24) to begin again. There is a word 
coined by Joyce in Finnegans Wake that might well fit Campos which is 
the paradoxical ‘chaosmos’ (Joyce 1992: 118) – combining chaos and 
cosmos, encompassing disorder and order, or ‘thisorder’ (Joyce 1992: 
540). The literary theorist Kuberski defines chaosmos as such: 
a unitary and yet untotalized, a chiasmic concept of the world as a field of mutual 
and simultaneous interference and convergence, an interanimation of the sub-
jective and objective, an endless realm of chance which nevertheless displays a 
persistent tendency toward pattern and order. (Kuberski 1994: 3)
9 Kierkegaard (1980: 82–90); The Bible (1997: ii. 221) [I Corinthians 15:52]; 
Heidegger (1963: 338).
10 ‘A man from Porlock’ is the title of a piece that Pessoa wrote and which was pub-
lished on the 15th February 1935 in Fradique in Lisbon. It discusses the enigmatic 
figure who supposedly interrupted the writing of Coleridge’s ‘Kubla Khan’. Pessoa 
calls this man from Porlock ‘the unknown interrupter’ who showed up and obstruct-
ed a communication between the abyss and life’ [esse interruptor incógnito, a es-
torvar uma comunicação entre o abismo e a vida]. Pessoa (2000: 491; 2005: 54).
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Pessoa comes close to expressing this idea of ruin, cosmos and chaos in 
a poem in 1934 one year before he dies: ‘No intervalo cresce o mundo / 
Com sóis e estrelas sem fim’11. Campos is the ‘man in the garret [o da 
mansarda]’ (Pessoa 2002: 322; 1998: 175) who lives in the symbolic 
ruin of things, as a man on the margins, the defeated one who keeps 
going, whose life is a shipwreck but which allows for new beginnings. 
The third aspect is the act of creativity. It is in the interval where 
creative energies can be unleashed. The creative, self-conscious writer 
thus is locating him or herself in the interval – that space that is vacated, 
forgotten, or seemingly frivolous. Thus, the writer of the interval can 
be an ironic nobody writing for no one, acting as the immature child 
or supplementary writer in the basement or attic. For Whitman, a great 
inspiration for Campos, the great poets emerge from the intervals and 
he describes them thus: ‘How they are provided for upon the earth, (ap-
pearing at intervals,) / How dear and dreadful they are to the earth’.12
With these three aspects, the interval implies something physical (in 
insomnia, sexuality, material space), interdisciplinary (between philoso-
phy and poetry), spiritual and cosmic (in the ruin), and elusively aesthetic 
and creative (as transitional, marginal, ironic and iconoclastic). 
2. A Philosophical Reading of the Poem
Let us read the poem. A few years earlier, Campos wrote that it is in 
the interval that he exists.13 Now he goes one step further. The first line 
‘Começo a conhecer-me. Não existo [I’m beginning to know myself. I 
don’t exist]’ relates to the third aspect from above – in the heightened 
self-consciousness and an awakening and self-knowledge. It is also a 
self tired of itself which is brilliantly expressed in a poem later in the 
 
11 Pessoa (2006a: 235; 2006b: 329): ‘In that gap is born the universe / With suns and 
stars past counting.’ 
12 Whitman (2004: 44). This poem, called ‘Beginners’, was first published in the 
third edition of Leaves of Grass in 1860.
13 See note 7.
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twentieth century by Patrick Kavanagh in ‘The Self-slaved’: ‘Me I will 
throw away / Me sufficient for the day’ (Kavanagh 2005: 227). Cam-
pos’ opening sentence is a sudden spark of self-awareness and a perfect 
way to start this concise poem full of melody for a poem without much 
rhyme. We have the modernist figure of the interval declaring himself as 
not existing. Bernardo Soares asked the questions: ‘… a quem assisto? 
Quantos sou? Quem é eu? O que é este intervalo que há entre mim e 
mim?’14 Here Campos tries to tell it straight. As a follower of Caeiro, 
knowing oneself is to no longer exist. If the ancient Sanskrit epic – The 
Mahabharata – views the self as one’s opposite, then Campos has come 
to understand not only this but that the beginning of knowledge is to be 
nothing. And his reality in knowing is that he does not exist. Then Cam-
pos tries to unravel this teasing declaration in the first two sentences 
with the second and third line: ‘Sou o intervalo entre o que desejo ser 
e os outros me fizeram / ou metade desse intervalo, porque também há 
vida … [I’m the gap between what I’d like to be and what others have 
made me / Or half of this gap, since there’s also life]’. ‘I am’ (Sou) or 
his being is the interval, but an interval that is between what he desires 
to be and what others have made him. These ‘others’ leave open for the 
reader and spectator to see them as Campos’ own creator Pessoa, or 
in the narrative itself of those who see and meet Campos, or us as the 
readers of today. In this extreme self-reflection, there is the obvious nod 
to heteronymity but also to the concept of ‘inter’ itself and the process 
of creativity. The second part of this sentence in the third line deepens 
the mystery. He could be half of this interval because there is also life. 
This is the present and future cosmos, revealing the indifference of the 
cosmos, the stars or the universe to Campos and man’s plight. He can’t 
even be all of this interval. Kant’s dark night of cognition grows longer 
and the stars more distant.
‘Sou isso, enfim …[That’s me. Period].’ This line is the first of four 
attempts to conclude the opening declaration, but of course (like his 
much longer, unfinished poems such as Saudação a Walt Whitman and 
A Passagem das Horas) he cannot and will not conclude so easily – 
being that interval, the between, the transition. Even the three dots that 
14 Pessoa (2012: 222; 2015: 189): ‘… who am I watching? How many am I? Who is 
I? What is this gap between me and myself?’
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follow ‘enfim’ already show the uncertainty of finishing. Pessoa and 
Campos cannot remain silent; instead the repetition unfolds where he 
tries to write the same poem again and again. And so in not being able 
to be silent (and Campos is always talking), he gives the order: ‘Apague 
a luz, feche a porta e deixe de ter barulhos de chinelos no corridor [Turn 
off the light, shut the door, and get rid of the slipper noise in the hall-
way]’. This is a very vivid image of solitude and call for closure. There 
is the desire for a return to darkness which alludes to points two (the 
ruin) and three (creation). He is ordering someone to close the door, to 
finish it for him, to make the closure for him, and to get rid of that irri-
tating noise in the empty hallway. This hallway is the image of a lonely 
passageway to nowhere, and the noise of the slippers would be enough 
to drive one mad. Who is he speaking to? And why the order, or is this 
an order at all? Is he trying to convince himself of something or to 
motivate himself? Or is it the ghost of Pessoa – Campos’ creator – who 
speaks? Or is Campos speaking to Pessoa? Or perhaps the order is to 
everyone he has ever met, and all the sensations that have emerged from 
these encounters, the ghosts from the past, or perhaps to us the readers. 
The starry firmament ‘no longer lights the solitary wanderer’s path,’ 
(Lukács, 1971: 36) and a man in this new world is to be solitary here. 
The full stop between lines five and six, between the two orders, 
reveals the pause, the breath, the silence, and the loneliness and soli-
tude. There is an attempt to end the poem again, which could end here. 
But he continues, with the order to leave him alone in the room with 
the vast peace of himself (‘Fique eu no quarto só com o grande sossego 
de mim mesmo’). In the imperative of the verb ficar, again we may ask 
to whom is he speaking? To which we, as readers, may answer with 
another question: ‘Who am I reading?’ The question – ‘To whom am I 
speaking?’ – has a profound significance for the poet. It is the reflection 
on the posterity of the word, writing for the dead and for those in the 
future with the abiding hope that the writing lives on with future read-
ers. With Campos’ declaration of isolation and the ambiguity of whom 
he is speaking to, the motif of writing for nobody which I will mention 
again in my conclusion comes to the fore and is linked to the self-ap-
pointed ‘man in the garret’. This is the chosen isolation and Campos’ 
repetitive call and cry for attention as the poet who cannot keep quiet 
or remain still. The ‘grande sossego de mim mesmo’ could be related to 
the sudden access he has been given or given himself to the knowledge 
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that he does not exist. The cosmos, which signified order, is now for 
the modern mind paradoxically full of chaos indicating the ruin of all 
things where these lines of Campos reside. And what ‘room’ is he in? 
The beauty of this line is its openness to prod the reader’s imagination. 
Each line is an attempt to end and to start, like a warming up to the main 
part which never comes. Again he is finished, reminding me of Beck-
ett’s last words in his formidable prose trilogy: ‘I can’t go on, I’ll go on’ 
(Beckett 1994: 418). Beckett, Campos and Pessoa do go on, continuing 
again – as is the calling of the one from the mansarda, that one from the 
margins, like Nietzsche’s posthumous writer15 or Kierkegaard’s Extras-
kriver (Kierkegaard 1983: 7); in sum, the one at the interval.
The last line makes another concise, complete declaration: ‘É um 
universo barato [It’s a shoddy universe].’ This reveals Campos’s pes-
simism and realism, but also the ruin and chaosmos of all things. In 
our modern world and life, anything can now be had, anything can be 
bought and sold, everything has a price, which devalues the whole uni-
verse. And, as Campos told himself and the world a few years previous-
ly with the publication of ‘Tabacaria’, he failed in everything.16 And yet 
precisely in this state of failure and ruin, and even paralysis and petrifi-
cation, in his chaos of feeling, the affirmation of art emerges in the cre-
ation of form in the attempt to express sensations. The sad, confessional 
poem under scrutiny here also reveals the continuity and repetition in 
the face of disaster and not even existing. And at the same time, final-
ly, this is Campo’s spiritual renewal, his survival and his conviction – 
which is never giving up on the creative force.
Conclusion: The Nomadic Life
In conclusion, Campos – as writer of the interval – is always repeating 
himself, refusing to settle, refusing to be tamed and to be pinned down, 
and always revealing the crisis of human communication – much as 
15 Nietzsche (1976: 566): ‘Some are born posthumously.’ 
16 Pessoa (2002: 320; 1998: 174): ‘Falhei em tudo [I failed in everything].’
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Kierkegaard and Nietzsche have done for philosophy. He is a nomadic 
writer17, floating between two worlds, exemplified in this poem: ‘I’m 
beginning to know myself. I don’t exist.’ It is no coincidence that Sar-
amago later makes Pessoa show up from the grave in his great novel O 
Ano da Morte de Ricardo Reis to tell Ricardo Reis that he is ‘floating, 
in other words, in midocean, neither here nor there. Like the rest of the 
Portuguese [você anda a flutuar no meio do Atlântico, nem lá, nem cá, 
Como todos os portugueses]’ (Saramago, 1999: 312; 1998: 353). Dur-
ing his own myth-making and propaganda writings for Orpheu, Pessoa 
wrote a letter in English (which was never sent) describing the Portu-
guese as having an ‘indefiniteness of soul’ and a ‘temperamental nonre-
gionalism’ (Pessoa 1966: 143).
Campos’ poem brings up the figure of the nomadic writer who 
claims to be writing for nobody. This is something that Campos has in 
common with a particular kind of modern European writer of the inter-
val that continues to unleash an uneasy feeling, who creates mask upon 
mask displacing identities, and whose wanderings are unfolding rather 
than progressing with purpose.18 Nomadic writers of the interlude such 
as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Benjamin, Kleist, Kafka and Beckett are all 
attempting to write for that ‘nobody’ – as the invisible, disrupting other 
who may not fit in with the narrative that history would like to write. 
These are the most compelling and penetrating philosophers and poets 
17 Zbigniew Kotowicz wrote a monograph on Pessoa presenting him as a nomadic 
soul. See Kotowicz (2008).
18 I think of Pessoa’s writings as a method that Benjamin describes: ‘Method is a 
digression. Representation as digression – such is the methodological nature of 
the treatise. The absence of an uninterrupted purposeful structure is its primary 
characteristic. Tirelessly the process of thinking makes new beginnings, returning 
in a roundabout way to its original object. This continual pausing for breath is the 
mode most proper to the process of contemplation. For by pursuing different levels 
of meaning in its examination of one single object it receives both the incentive to 
begin again and the justification for its irregular rhythm. Just as mosaics preserve 
their majesty despite their fragmentation into capricious particles, so philosophical 
contemplation is not lacking in momentum. Both are made up of the distinct and 
the disparate; and nothing could bear more powerful testimony to the transcendent 
force of the sacred image and the truth itself. The value of fragments of thought 
is all the greater the less direct their relationship to the underlying idea, and the 
brilliance of the representation depends as much on this value as the brilliance of 
the mosaic does on the quality of the glass paste’ (Benjamin, 2003, 28).
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of modernism. They are always at the interval between what has been 
lost and what may be discovered or rediscovered in a transformed way 
in the future. Thus, they are inviting the reader to spend more time at the 
frontiers, which, as the poet well knows, is the key to transformation. 
Deleuze and Guattari follow the nomad as the writer of the interval dis-
rupting the nomos of appropriation, distribution and production and that 
which designates the law: ‘A path is always between two points, but the 
in-between has taken on all the consistency and enjoys both an autonomy 
and a direction of its own. The life of the nomad is the intermezzo […] 
The nomad knows how to wait, he has infinite patience. Immobility and 
speed, catatonia and rush […]’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 380). Thus, 
Deleuze and Guattari state at the very beginning of their work A Thou-
sand Plateaus that their ‘rhizome’ – which grounds their whole thesis of 
nomadology – is in the interval: ‘A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is 
always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo […] Kleist, 
Lenz and Büchner have another way of traveling and moving: proceeding 
from the middle, through the middle, coming and going rather than start-
ing and finishing. […] The middle is by no means an average; on the con-
trary, it is where things pick up speed’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 25). 
I end here with a revealing explanation by Pessoa on what a poem 
is and on his own aesthetic and spiritual position and journey. The 
paragraph presents the written word as an activity and the creative mind 
that is always in flux, elusive and plural, flying by the nets of conven-
tion, authority and temporality. Written in English probably in 1916, 
this paragraph provides more clues to understanding the chaosmos at 
play and the ever-shifting dissolution and plurality of the self that is 
evident in the seven-line poem that I chose for this short essay:
I sometimes hold that a poem […] is a person, a living human being, belongs in 
bodily presence and real fleshly existence to another world, into which our imagina-
tion throws him, his aspect to us, as we read him in this world, being no more than 
the imperfect shadow of that reality of beauty which is divine elsewhere. I hope 
some Day, after death, I shall meet in their real presences the few children of these I 
have as yet created and I hope I shall find them beautiful in their dewy immortality. 
You may perhaps wonder that one who declares himself a pagan should subscribe 
to these imaginations. I was a pagan, however, two paragraphs above. I am one no 
longer as I write this. At the end of this letter I hope to be already something else.
I carry into practice as far as I can that spiritual disintegration I preach. If I am ever 
coherent, it is only as an incoherence from incoherence. […] (Pessoa 1966: 133)
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Rational Landscape: Spatial justice, politics and 
aesthetics: The city of Lisbon as a case study 
Diana Soeiro
In recent years, a new paradigm has emerged to counterpoise the old 
paradigm where the social and the historical are privileged. In this new 
paradigm social, historical and spatial perspectives are in balance, ‘with 
no one of the three ways of looking at and interpreting the world inher-
ently privileged over the others’ (Soja 2010: 3). This movement, which is 
still in its formative years, we call spatial turn (Schlitte et al. 2014) and 
this chapter adopts its methodology which we will now briefly describe.
If in the last century historical and social aspects were highlighted, 
it is now claimed that spatial perspective has to come into play. This 
spatial turn was brought forward by geographers and quickly embraced 
by several other research fields with an impact on human sciences (Soja 
2010: 3). In the words of American geographer Edward W. Soja (1940–
2015), the shift is that instead of giving ‘greater stress to how social 
processes such as class formation, social stratification, or racist or mas-
culinist practices shape geographies’, we now focus on ‘how geogra-
phies actively affect these social processes and forms’ (Soja 2010: 4). 
This means going beyond a conservative understanding of space where 
it is seen as a receptacle, where things happen to it and in it. 
Adopting a critical spatial perspective, we will dwell on the relation 
between philosophy and urban planning, taking both a theoretical and 
practical approach, strengthening the symmetry between social and spa-
tial explanation. As Ferrão reminds us (2012: 67), in urban planning, the 
academic domain (basic training) and professional domain (spatial plan-
ning practice) do not coincide, requiring the contribution of several other 
disciplines. The city of Lisbon (Portugal) will be used as a case study re-
lying mainly on the latest report issued by the Lisbon City Council (CML) 
this year. This chapter therefore gives a description of the method, which 
highlights spatial dynamics, acknowledging it as an active element. 
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By putting forward the explanatory power of spatial thinking, we 
can better assess both affectivity and the impact of decision-making on 
spatial dynamics. History and sociology reflect on space and spatial 
dynamics as a consequence of what happens historically and socially, 
making space a secondary element, an aftermath. A critical spatial per-
spective understands space as an element that can be the cause of so-
cial and historical transformations. Space is acknowledged as an active 
component and not exclusively as passive (where social and historical 
transformations are simply reflected). 
Adopting a negative description, says Soja, space is actively in-
volved in sustaining ‘inequality, injustice, economic exploitation, rac-
ism, sexism, and other forms of oppression and discrimination.’ (Soja 
2010: 4) The positive formulation of this statement is that the way we 
shape space can play an active role to help us achieve a more just socie-
ty. In order to help us achieve that, urban planning and the highest prin-
ciples by which the city is sustained play a leading role. The exercise of 
identifying these, which includes detecting specific elements that lead 
to specific urban planning measures and their implementation, is what 
Soja called spatial justice. 
1. From politics and aesthetics to spatial justice
When it comes to spatial planning, if we adopt a critical spatial perspec-
tive, this enables us to throw a new light on the relation between two 
traditional areas – politics and aesthetics. The relation between the two 
is known to be strong with politics frequently making use of aesthet-
ics in order to affirm and sustain power (Adorno et al. 2006; Rancière 
2013; Benjamin 20021). In order to move on from this dialogue between 
politics and aesthetics (whether claiming that the relation is beneficial, 
 
1 According to Walter Benjamin (1892–1940), the first to significantly reflect on 
the relation between politics and aesthetics, right-wing fascism practised the aes-
theticizing of politics while communism politicized art (Benjamin 2002: 122). On 
this topic, see also Hillach et al. (1979).
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dreadful or inevitable, or claiming that they both should be independent 
and follow separate ways), spatial justice is a useful approach. Through 
the methodology of spatial justice, justice is highlighted as the main 
foundation on which the city stands, allowing us to find a new way of 
rationalizing the urban landscape. To the power of politics we counter-
poise the power of place (see De Blij 2010). 
Cities are growing at a very fast rate, rapidly increasing their com-
plexity and therefore demanding not only material but also contempla-
tive resources in order to better help us plan the future.
In 2014, for the first time more than half of the world’s population 
became urban. It is expected that in 2050, 66 per cent of the world 
population will live in urban areas. In developed regions the number 
will reach 85 per cent. In Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
North America and Oceania the growth is expected to be minimal since 
a large number of people already live in urban areas – in 2050, many 
countries are expected to reach almost 100 percent. The fastest growth 
rate will take place in Africa (rising from 40 per cent in 2014 to 56 per 
cent in 2050) and Asia (from 48 to 64 per cent). In 2010–2015, the high-
est average growth rates in Africa were in Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, 
Uganda, Tanzania, Angola, Lesotho, Namibia, Burkina Faso, Mali and 
Nigeria. In Asia: in China, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, Thailand, East Timor and Vietnam.
By 2050, most countries in Africa will have reached between 60 and 
70 per cent living in urban areas, with Ethiopia (38 %), Kenya (44 %), 
Madagascar (30 %) Angola (64 %), Congo (60 %), Morocco (74 %), 
South Africa (77 %) and Nigeria (67 %) being the countries most re-
sponsible for this due to a combination of the size of their population 
and the growth rate. In Asia, already 100 per cent of the population of 
Hong Kong and Macau live in urban areas and the outlook for Japan is 
that by 2050 the figure will reach 98 per cent. The countries that will 
have a bigger impact between 2014 and 2050 by creating a prevailing 
urban population as a result of their large population and the growth 
rate are Southern Asia (from 34% to 52 %), India (from 32 % to 50 %), 
Indonesia (from 53 % to 71 %) and China (from 54 % to 76 %) (United 
Nations 2014, 20–25). In Portugal, the urban population was 48 per cent 
in 1990, 63 per cent in 2014 and it is expected to rise to 77 per cent in 
2050. In absolute numbers, this means that around 7 564 million people 
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will live in an urban environment and 2 279 million in a rural environ-
ment (United Nations 2014: 23).
Looking at these numbers, we quote Lewis Mumford, who back 
in 1961 sagely predicted: ‘Will the city disappear or will the whole 
planet turn into a vast urban hive? – which would be another mode 
of disappearance.’ (1966: 3) The question is: if we are on the verge of 
globally becoming fully urban, what sense can we make of ‘the city’ 
as we know it?
The prospect of our planet becoming a global village is not a futur-
ist scenario anymore and the likelihood of the whole world becoming ‘a 
city’, literally, is closer than we perhaps anticipated. Assuming that sus-
tainability is always a relevant criteria to apply to existing cities, as it is 
a concept that embodies the effort to continue to promote growth while 
assuring the population a quality living standard that allows them to 
prosper, the criteria truly becomes indispensible in new cities, particu-
larly in those countries which are experiencing an accelerated growth 
rate. 
But what does a country’s population becoming increasingly ur-
ban means to a country? Construction is one of the most significant 
actions to increase a country’s GDP. This means that if on one hand 
the creation of cities and larger cities that progressively attract more 
people reflects positively and immediately on a country’s economy, 
on the other hand, they may not be assuring sustainability because 
they are being created rapidly, which reflects negatively on the pop-
ulation in the short term and on the economy in the mid and long 
term. We highlight three main reasons that contribute t a lack of sus-
tainability in the urbanization process: (1) economically and polit-
ically, urban rehabilitation proves to be less profitable in the short 
term than new construction, which may hinder access to investment; 
(2) countries where urban areas are already extensive will have to 
have more robust economic strategies in order to be sustainable since 
they are not able to rely on new construction to increase their GDP; 
(3) countries that offer the possibility for new construction due to 
easy access to investment, which immediately benefits the country’s 
GDP but does not assure sustainability, can experience faster growth 
than is desirable. Though sustainability has become an over-used 
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word that may sometimes have a blurred meaning, a significant crite-
rion to assess what is urban sustainability is spatial justice. 
We present here a brief description of what spatial justice may re-
fer to: ‘On the level of culture and society, there are four broad catego-
ries of spatial strategies of power: (1) the construction of hierarchies, 
(2) segregation, (3) marginalization, and (4) long-term, large-scale 
mechanisms of spatial transformation like apartheid, colonialism and 
globalization. Each of these has a particular paradigm of operation, and 
each impacts at various scales of physical space. From the scale of the 
body, up through the scale of buildings and cities to the scale of the 
landscape, power exercises explicit and implicit control over the shap-
ing and occupation of space’ (Findley 2005: 7). In developing countries 
these strategies are more visible but this does not mean that they do not 
exist in developed countries. They do exist but are usually more subtle. 
Considering what has been said perceptively, we observe that all 
over the world cities are being created, renovated and expanded. It is 
not our goal to discuss here how aesthetically appealing the options 
being taken in each case are because that would be to express an under-
standing of aesthetics in its most superficial sense. In adopting a higher 
sense of what is at stake in the aesthetic experience, spatial justice can 
be useful and it does concern aesthetics because the fact is that, per-
ceptively, cities (taken as an object able to be conceived, moulded and 
experienced by the human mind) are appearing at a fast pace before our 
eyes, changing the way we move around space, constricting the way we 
move our body, the way we relate with our family, with the work place, 
the way we eat and our access to food, and so on. It is not only the case 
that cities look different, we experience them differently. As much as 
we shape them, they shape us. Space is a topic that simultaneously con-
cerns aesthetics and ontology and the two are truly inseparable when we 
discuss spatial planning. 
As we have seen, an increase in built area benefits a country’s 
economy, which at first sight may be considered as something having a 
positive political impact. But only if we reflect on how, why and under 
what principles these cities are being built, will we be able to then truly 
assess if their political and economic impact is positive. 
Being the state of affairs the one we have described above, adopt-
ing a critical spatial perspective and acknowledging the methodology 
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of spatial justice as an effective approach strategy, we ask: how can we 
better rationalize landscape? We will take Lisbon as a case study. 
2. Spatial strategies of power: on borders 
We tend to dislike the word ‘power’ – though some tend to like it pre-
cisely for the exact same characteristics we will describe below. Behind 
it seem to lie obscure secrets, blackmail, bribery, deceit, betrayal and 
corruption. But power is not always a bad thing. Someone will always 
have power and, as Plato said in the Republic, each one of us exerts 
power in a specific realm2 – whether we like it or not, whether we do 
it well or badly. 
Power exists and the question is how to deal with it and manage 
it better in order for it to be as beneficial as possible for the majority 
of people. Spatially, one of the main elements that allows us to define 
power strategies are borders. From the Great Wall of China (206 BC) to 
the current European refugee crisis (2015) and Donald Trump’s wish to 
build a wall across the Mexican border (2016), there are many examples 
of how borders are one of the most basic elements used to sustain pow-
er. It is a way of preserving territory. 
As Paquot tell us: ‘Animals’ territory does not correspond to a per-
fectly delimited portion, protected and protective. It is mobile, elastic 
in its outline, variable according to ‘seasons’, hours, activities and dan-
gers. … It is mostly at the moment of reproduction that animals delimit 
their territory.’ (Paquot 2009: 14, 15) But among men, territory easily 
becomes about exact delimitation. Sometimes this delimitation is spa-
tially visible; sometimes the delimitation is artificially created on paper 
with no sense of discontinuity existing in the landscape. Either way, de-
limitation is always about distance. In Deleuze’s words: ‘The territory is 
 
2 That is why he then describes how can we exert power in the best way possible, 
which implies understanding what are the characterises of a virtuous city, among 
them justice which in its turn can only be found in the city if, and only if, it can be 
found in each of its citizens. (Plato 1930, 1935)
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first of all the critical distance between two beings of the same species: 
Mark your distance. What is mine is first of all my distance; I possess 
only distances.’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 319)
In 2012, a new administrative reform of Lisbon’s spatial structure 
policy was implemented through Law 56/2012 (November 8) setting 
out a new city map. The Mayor of Lisbon at the time, António Costa3, 
implemented the new plan which had started being drafted in 2008 by 
Augusto Mateus and João Seixas. (CML 2012) The new map consisted 
of establishing new boundaries and merging several parishes. Instead 
of the 53 that had existed since 1959, there were now 24. According 
to the new administrative plan, as Lisbon is a coastal city with a river 
waterfront to the south, the delimitation of parishes does not coincide 
with the land margin itself but instead with one of the river’s thalwegs 
(one of the deepest parts of a river), thereby adding 15.7 km2 to the area 
of Lisbon. Out of the 24 parishes, ten are located on the riverfront (Pais 
2016: 6, 7, 10).
This new administrative reform means that when the time for local 
council elections comes (every four years), a team is elected to repre-
sent each parish. This may seem an obvious statement but it is particu-
larly relevant to mention it because, parallel to the plan that established 
new boundaries for the parishes, a second map with different boundaries 
called the Operational Units for Planning and Management (UOPG) 
co-exists. The UOPG divides Lisbon into nine administrative areas and 
it is part of the 2012 Municipal Director Plan (PDM) that established 
the boundaries. Each area is managed according to a specific program 
defined and regulated by the PDM which translates into specific execu-
tion and financing strategies (Pais 2016: 12).
This means that two administrative reforms took place in parallel 
and that both established different boundaries on paper. One is legally 
binding when it comes to electing representatives, and has some auton-
omy (24 parishes), while the other is legally binding when it comes to 
bigger management options and distributing financing (nine operation-
al units). There are units which include two or more parishes and there 
are units that cut through parishes, thus making one parish belong to 
two different units. It is clearly assumed in the latest report on Lisbon 
3 Currently Prime Minister of Portugal, in office since 26 November 2015.
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that these two systems co-exist and that their boundaries do not coin-
cide (Pais 2016: 13).
In an effort to get closer to the population by practising ‘good gov-
ernance’ (Pais 2016: 14), Lisbon City Council decided to create five 
management areas called Territorial Intervention Units (UIT), thereby 
establishing a third set of boundaries in Lisbon. Each UIT is managed 
by a multidisciplinary team that helps identify and solve problems relat-
ed to public space and public equipment, thus creating an intermediate 
structure between parishes and City Council. In the case of UITs, which 
were established in 2011 and have been officially working since 2015, 
the boundaries coincide with the 2012 parish boundaries (and not with 
the PDM’s boundaries). Each UIT includes between three and six par-
ishes (Pais 2016: 14).
When it comes to mainland Portugal, there are a total of 18 dis-
tricts, among them Lisbon. Setúbal, however, is also an important dis-
trict. When we look at the boundaries of the Lisbon Metropolitan Area 
(AML), which includes an area both north and south of the river, the 
north area lies within the district of Lisbon but the area south of the 
river is part of the district of Setúbal (according to the country’s districts 
map). As a result, this means that there is a fourth set of boundaries that 
comes into play when we consider Lisbon’s spatial planning. 
The co-existence of these four sets of boundaries brings an addi-
tional challenge to synchronized action among all parishes and between 
the districts of Lisbon and Setúbal, disempowering the spatial dynamics 
and consequently their representatives and citizens. Why and how this 
power structure came to be is not relevant at the moment, but the fact 
is that two different systems co-existed, a third was created in order 
to build a bridge between parishes and the City (which may perhaps 
have been an attempt to solve the conflict between the two previously 
existing ones which had different boundaries), and a national spatial 
planning framework established a fourth one. This leads to excessive 
bureaucracy, population disempowerment and bad governance since it 
becomes hard to understand how the system works (and therefore how 
to access and manage it), making it harder to understand how a specific 
budget is managed, who manages it, and consequently to identify whose 
responsibility it is to assure specific structures or services. 
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Boundaries can have a positive effect, bringing about positive so-
cial outcomes, but to simultaneously use four different sets of bounda-
ries seems excessive, confusing and detrimental to promoting a simple, 
intelligible, straightforward system that creates a fluid and easily adapt-
able spatial dynamic. The excessive superimposed sets of delimitation 
are administratively too heavy and they promote lack of flexibility and 
mobility to the city’s inhabitants – the lack of an elastic outline that 
Paquot referred that is natural to animals. This spatial dynamics makes 
Lisbon, territorially, vulnerable to have social and economic fissures. 
The current system does not promote social justice, neither for the citi-
zens nor for their representatives. 
3.  Design and decision support systems in architecture  
and urban planning
An understanding of what governance actually means is sometimes 
confusing. But whenever the word is used it is meant to imply a close 
connection with democracy, also referring to the wide participation of a 
majority (Fung & Wright 2003). When applied in the context of urban 
planning, governance therefore aims to stress democracy’s essence by 
highlighting the relevance of participation in the spatial dynamics so 
that space can be a true democratic experience, i.e. a shared exercise of 
power. With no community involvement there is no participation and 
consequently no governance at play (Haus et al. 2004).
In Lisbon, participation in public discussion on urban-related is-
sues (Territorial Management Instruments (IGT)) is still very low (Pais 
2016: 362). Since 2008, Lisbon City Council has implemented a Par-
ticipatory Budget, an instrument where part of the budget available is 
spent on projects that citizens themselves propose and, subsequently, 
vote for. The ones with more votes are the ones going forward. For the 
last five years now, we can observe that the number of proposals has 
been slowly decreasing though we can see that the number of voters has 
been increasing. In 2015, the Participatory Budget had around 36 000 
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voters (Pais 2016: 364, 365). As Lisbon has around 500 000 inhabitants, 
we can conclude that only around 7.2 per cent of the population votes. 
This number is not very expressive though it can be argued that 
the instrument is recent. However, since both proposal submission and 
the voting process take place online, the population that is being target-
ed has to be IT savvy and have access to a computer and the internet. 
Furthermore, the way in which the Participatory Budget is publicized 
(mostly online and on very specific websites) only reaches a small num-
ber of people and, above all, a very specific demographic.
Even excluding the obligatory computer and internet use of the Par-
ticipatory Budget, if we look at the participation in public meetings, we 
conclude that there is some alienation on the population’s behalf when it 
comes to actively participating in the decision-making process as a result 
of low attendance. Participation though increases as we move away from 
the historic centre towards the periphery (Pais 2016: 368). The population 
and the elderly follow a similar pattern, with the centre having a lower 
population but a high elderly rate. We can therefore conclude that those 
over 65 years old, although they represent around 23.9 per cent of the pop-
ulation, have little or no participation (Pais 2016: 25). Since 2009, the ma-
jority of proposals have shown a greater concern and need for intervention 
in public and green spaces followed by mobility issues (Pais 2016: 364).
When it comes to explain low citizen participation in urban plan-
ning, we think that more than forty years of dictatorship (1926–1974) 
still weighs on free speech and publicly taking a stand. In addition, in 
an effort to make a positive contribution to help the population heal this 
cultural scar, community and proximity structures should be encour-
aged to play a more active role, thereby allowing more segments of the 
population to be represented in the participation process. 
4. On scale
In 2011, around 2.8 million people lived in the Lisbon Metropolitan 
Area (AML) out of which around 500 000 in the city of Lisbon (Pais 
2016: 17). Portugal has a total area of 92 200 km2, the AML has around 
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3 000 km2 and Lisbon 84.97 km2 (OECD 2011: 23; AML 2016). This 
means that out of the overall urban population in Portugal, around 37 
per cent live in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area (which represents 3.3 per-
cent of the country’s territory), out of which 6.6 per cent in Lisbon 
(representing 0.09 percent of the country’s territory). 
If we consider that mainland Portugal has a total of 18 districts, 
each with their respective district capital, we have around 63 per cent of 
the urban population living in 17 districts. (Let us not forget that when 
referring to the Lisbon district we are only referring to the area north 
of the river.) Portugal is therefore, a macrocephalic country, having one 
big city, densely populated when compared to any other city of the rest 
of the country, where a large majority of the population is concentrated. 
As in many other countries, the primacy of capital cities is not perceived 
as a positive phenomenon. A macrocephalic growth of capital cities in-
dicates ‘a high concentration of elites and a monopoly of the institutions 
of modernization’ (Aveline-Dubach et al. 2014: 28).
Such a high concentration of population in such a small area also 
exposes it to higher risks when it comes to natural hazards, which are 
unpredictable events. In Portugal it is well known that there are several 
seismic flaws. Back in 1755 the country suffered a violent earthquake 
(of an estimated 8.5–9.5 magnitude on the Richter scale) and ever since 
then we believe we are particularly vulnerable to a similar kind of event. 
If that were to happen, there is a 39 per cent likelihood of Lisbon crum-
bling, with all its parishes affected. Knowing that seismic prediction can 
be a difficult science (Hough 2009), it is positive to know that a project 
(Geo SIG) is underway to produce a better cartographic map of Lisbon. 
By looking at a recent map that assesses seismic risk, we can observe 
that the river coastal area, the historic centre and the eastern part of the 
city are the most susceptible areas (Pais 2016: 92–95). It is also known 
that 85 per cent of Lisbon is extremely vulnerable to earthquakes, there-
by exposing 68 per cent of the population to high risk and potentially, 
almost certainly, destroying 57 per cent of existing buildings. 
The situation sounds dramatic and it is even more so considering 
that the biggest concentration of empty houses is precisely in the histor-
ic centre (over 35 per cent), then in the area surrounding it with between 
15 and 35 per cent, and then in the outer area of the city with less than 
15 per cent (Pais 2016: 116). On one hand, we can assess this as positive 
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since fewer people would be hurt but the historic centre is also where 
the majority of people work (Pais 2016: 109, 265).
Another area where a massive macrocephalic imbalance occurs is 
in culture. Most museums and cultural activities take place in Lisbon. 
Yet when it comes to art galleries and temporary exhibition spaces, there 
is a tendency for these spaces to decrease in Lisbon but to increase in 
the rest of the country (Pais 2016, 177–180). This is perhaps one of the 
few areas that demonstrates a resistance to the excessive concentration 
of resources and activities in Lisbon. 
From an Economy perspective, which also confirms the country’s 
macrocephaly, 37 per cent of GDP in 2014 was generated in the AML, 
which hosts 29 per cent of all jobs (Pais 2016: 254, 256). 
The primacy of capital cities should be discouraged at a national 
policy level and Lisbon should invest in prospering instead of growing 
(Jackson 2011). 
5. Urban planning and cultural identity 
When it comes to the existence of green spaces in Lisbon, it is hard to 
understand how their area is calculated although a lot of them are iden-
tified as having a quite extensive ‘area of influence’ (Pais 2016: 40–46). 
There is a general feeling of the lack of green spaces in the proximity 
and these, as we have seen, are among the main concerns when it comes 
to citizen participation. Green areas are essential to ensure a high qual-
ity living standard as they have a positive effect on stress, mental and 
physical health, and air quality (Gilbert 2016).
Different types of green areas are urban farms, which have only 
recently started to be promoted around the city by the City Council. 
Just like the chapter on investment in solar power, whose high potential 
is acknowledged (Pais 2016: 81), the chapter on urban farms is still too 
short (Pais 2016: 48–51). What is more, the use of renewable energies 
is a key element to promote a sustainable city, especially in a city where 
almost 50 per cent of energy certificates are C or G in services and 
around 55 per cent of dwellings are C and D (Pais 2016: 83, 84). There 
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is a still long way to go in planning more green spaces and creating a 
culture that envisions its future as mostly relying on renewable energy 
sources. 
Culturally, although the risk of an earthquake (and tsunami) is 
high, Lisbon is characterized by old buildings with more than 20 per 
cent built before 1919, 19 per cent between 1919 and 1945, 25 per cent 
between 1946 and1960, 21 per cent between 1961 and1980 and 15 per 
cent between 1981 and 2011 (Pais 2016: 106, 107). Most new buildings 
have been built in the north and northeast of the city. The centre and the 
historic centre contain 63 per cent of buildings considered to be struc-
turally ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ (Pais 2016: 109). Curiously enough, these 
are also the areas where most businesses are located (60 per cent) and 
where most people in Lisbon work (65 per cent) (Pais 2016: 265). Even 
co-working spaces and start-ups are located in these areas (Pais 2016: 
274, 275).
Speaking of businesses, in 2015 the number of companies formed 
exceeded the number of bankruptcies for the first time since 2008 (Pais 
2016: 274). However, this number should not cause immediate opti-
mism since less than one in three business start-ups survive for five 
years, half may last two to three years and 20 per cent close within a 
year (Stokes & Wilson 2010: 86). Still, it is noticeable that there is a 
will to create new business. Is that will being supported and encouraged 
by national and city-level measures? Healthy, small and medium sized 
business are vital for a sustainable economy and a carefully strategy 
should be in place to support these activities, short, medium and long-
term. Only then, this recent entrepreneurship impulse will fructify.
Family wise, following the impact of the 2008 crisis, in 2015 each 
woman living in the AML had 1.56 children and Lisbon had the highest 
rate in the AML with 2.03 children (Pordata 2016). It is therefore signif-
icant if we add the information that the average number of residents per 
house in 2011 was 2.3 (Pais 2016: 121). This means that either there are 
a lot of single parents or there are many couples with no children. It is 
common knowledge that the government wants to change this situation 
by encouraging families to have more children (Faria 2014) as tradi-
tionally people in Portugal used to have large families. But what does 
that mean when it comes to house typologies? If families have more 
children, this means that they need to have more space. Is Lisbon’s real 
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estate market ready to offer more square metres and, more importantly, 
can families afford it? If not, that means that more people will move 
from the city centre to the outer crown of the city, or even perhaps to the 
AML or a different district (which we can observe has been a growing 
tendency in the last few decades). This brings us to the topic of mobility 
and transports. If people move away from the city centre: 1) do they, 
necessarily, have to get into the city daily?; 2) if so, how will they get 
to the city?
Since 1991 the use of individual transportation (car) has tripled, 
parking spaces are rarely sufficient and there is a great discrepancy be-
tween night and daytime use of parking spaces (lack of spaces during 
the day and a large majority empty at night). Most buildings inside the 
city do not have private parking and so those that do are usually prized 
(causing a great impact on rents or sale prices). Consequently, it comes 
as no surprise that collective transports (metro, bus and boat) have ex-
perienced a decrease in the number of passengers (Pais 2016: 204, 220, 
221–224). An alternative option was created recently and, since 2008, 
there has been a 500 per cent increase in cyclable areas. To date, 79 km 
are already open and there is a total of 148 km of cyclable routes (Pais 
2016: 225).
The culture of car use seems to be on the rise and despite measures 
being taken to discourage it, these do not seem to be effective. Bike 
lanes are a positive investment but because the city has many hills it is 
not an option that is possible for everybody, particularly for the elderly. 
However, car culture is not fully responsible for the rise of individual 
transportation. While urban planning discourages car use, reducing and 
limiting circulation space in particular parishes, it is known that when 
compared with 2010, buses (Carris), metro (Metropolitano de Lisboa) 
and boat (Grupo Transtejo) have reduced their offer in 25%-30%. Since 
2010, Carris lost 26.5% of its workers and Metropolitano de Lisboa, 
18.2%. (Saraiva 2016) The metro system has little or no maintenance 
and the material is either in bad shape or in need of replacement. Most 
trains are from the 1990s and are in need of a deep revision so they 
continue to run in the next twenty years. Still, due to budget restrictions 
imposed both by the Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Finances 
that is due to take place. Maintenance engineers, conductors and ad-
ministration are at a breaking point and the situation leads, inevitably, 
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to a bad service. (Cipriano 2016) As for Carris, the current City Council 
President, Fernando Medina, has recently admitted that he expects that 
a solution will be effective in ten years, due to the current chaotic state 
of the company. There is a strategy being outlined, that aims to integrate 
all available means of transportation in order to bring back mobility to 
Lisbon, and part of the solution encompasses that the Carris manage-
ment starts being done by the City Hall itself. In Medina’s own words, 
both Carris and Metropolitano de Lisboa do not currently provide a 
public service due to its quality standards. (Boaventura 2016)
We now understand better why car use has increased but cannot 
help wondering how the disappearing space for car circulation, being 
currently implemented around city, will articulate with a bad transpor-
tation service in the next ten years (assuming that that will be the gap 
until the situation is solved). It is expected that the city will experience 
a low mobility capacity during these years, with heavy traffic associated 
to a poor quality public transportation service, unless either a wide mass 
of people start using the bicycle lanes (which due to the city’s topogra-
phy is not for everybody) or move away from the city centre (which is 
contradictory with the plan that has among its goals to be able to attract 
more people to live in Lisbon). A large part of the population uses the 
car to move around the city due to poor public transportation service 
but also those who come to work in Lisbon, living in the outskirts, are a 
vast majority because Lisbon’s centre is macrocephalic when compared 
to AML or its district. It would be beneficial if, also in this sense, the 
macrocephaly would be smoothed allowing to revitalize not only the 
city centre but also its outskirts. If livelihood in the outskirts was more 
sustainable, citizens would not need to go to the city centre and many 
would choose to move from the city centre to the outskirts. 
Tourism seems to be an activity that many identify with Lisbon’s 
future due to the city’s inviting weather, varied landscape and friendly 
people. The city was awarded Best Tourist Destination for Cruises by 
the World Travel Awards (2014), 2nd Best European Destination 2013 
and 9th Best World City for Company Events (ICCA 2010) (Pais 2016: 
298). Lisbon offers mostly 4-star hotels clustered in the centre (Pais 
2016: 302) but alternatives like Airbnb, which have become increasing-
ly popular, are not mentioned in Lisbon’s latest 2015 report. Since 2013 
there has been an increase of 53 per cent in Lisbon’s hosting capacity 
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(beds) (Pais 2016: 298). This massive commitment to tourism is a sharp 
reaction to the 2008 financial crisis by allowing many businesses to 
access quick money in order to survive. How sustainable is it? Again, 
we wonder. How many hotels does a city need? Truly that is a question 
that requires an urgent answer. We may end up with many hotels on our 
hands, particularly in the centre and historic centre which is the area the 
Lisbon City Council considers to be the most promising to revitalize by 
increasing the population living there (Pais 2016: 22). But if hotels con-
tinue to be built, where will people live? Is the goal to attract temporary 
inhabitants or permanent residents to these areas? 
A key element in traditional construction and a significant part of 
our culture are azulejo tiles, which are found on many buildings around 
Lisbon. In order to preserve and identify them properly, a program 
called the Lisbon Program for Tile Research and Conservation (PISAL) 
has recently been created (Pais 2016: 190, 191). The value of this build-
ing material is not exclusively aesthetic. It is an object that reminds us 
of the Arab presence and influence in Lisbon and lacking a very impor-
tant function in cooling buildings by protecting them from excessive 
heat. There should be incentives given to use this traditional element 
more often in architecture instead of making it just a vague memory, 
shown exclusively in museums instead of on the streets.4
6. On inequality
Out of all 18 municipalities that are part of the AML, Lisbon is the mu-
nicipality with the highest Ageing Index, with 185.8 elderly people for 
every 100 youngsters (under age 14). From 1990 a tendency can be seen 
for the number of adults and youngsters to decrease while the number 
of elderly people (above age 65) remains steady (Pais 2016: 25). This 
 
4 Portuguese architect Álvaro Siza Veira (b.1933), Pritzker Prize honouree in 1992, 
used tiles in the metro station in the heart of the historic centre, Baixa/Chiado, in 
1998 (featuring art work by Ângelo de Sousa (1938–2011)) and also in Terraços 
de Bragança, also located in Lisbon’s historic centre in Rua do Alecrim (2004).
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makes us predict that infrastructures for the elderly are urgent since the 
population is getting older. Moreover, elderly tourists have been iden-
tified as one of the segments who are most attracted to Lisbon (Pais 
2016: 298). How is this segment of the population being integrated in 
the city’s planning? How can the city be experienced by the elderly?
It is therefore puzzling when we look at the social equipments that 
were being proposed for the city in 2015. We can see that many daycare 
centres are planned, with land already assigned, but only four assisted 
residences in the centre and historic centre and two more in the outer 
crown (Pais 2016: 169). Let us remember the following: most house 
typologies in Lisbon have two to four rooms. As a result of high rents 
or the desire to have more children (which the government encourages), 
people move out of the city. Yet the number of daycare centres in Lis-
bon will drastically increase. Why? It is known that mainly in the outer 
crown of the city a large number of children attending daycare centres 
do not live in Lisbon (Pais 2016: 151, 152). We can then understand 
that what happens is that people use the car to go into Lisbon, drop off 
their children at the daycare centre in one of the outer parishes and then 
go to work in the centre. Yet overall, when we look more closely at the 
capacity of daycare centres, homes, home support services, residences 
and meeting centres, it is underwhelming, with some parishes having 
close to zero capacity (Pais 2016: 174). This is an area where much 
needs to be done. 
Education is also an area that shows inequalities. Portugal’s illit-
eracy rate now stands at 5.2 per cent and in Lisbon it is 3.2 per cent. 
Although there is not much difference between these figures, when it 
comes to publishing, 55 per cent of books published are done so outside 
Lisbon but in terms of reading habits, 70 per cent of newspapers and 
magazines are sold in the AML (out of which 48 per cent in Lisbon) 
(Pais 2016: 181, 182).
In the AML, out of its 18 municipalities only three have a popula-
tion with a college degree, between 20 and 27 per cent. And as for num-
ber of years of schooling, Lisbon has 42 per cent with 9 years schooling, 
32 per cent with a college degree, 16 per cent with 12 years of schooling 
and 7 per cent with no schooling at all (Pais 2016: 33). 
Numbers of Erasmus students, particularly from Italy, Spain and 
Germany, are on the rise but the majority are from Portuguese-speaking 
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African countries (PALOPs). Foreign students comprise 10 per cent of 
the total of students (around 13 000) (Pais 2016: 283–286) and numbers 
seem to be on the rise showing a growth potential that can be relevant to 
embrace in order to promote a sustainable city growth.
Education is therefore an area that offers a huge potential for the 
Portuguese, with room to create a more appealing offer to those who 
wish to attain twelve years of schooling. Also, in universities, there is a 
move to attract both Portuguese and international students that should 
be utilised. Hopefully, this double call will not lead to changes that 
somehow increase inequality between national and foreign students.
Acoustics can also be an element of inequality. For the first time in 
2012, Lisbon created a Noise Map that aimed to implement legal meas-
ures to reduce noise that had been compulsory since 2007. If we look at 
a General Noise Map of the city made in 2010, we can easily conclude 
that more than half the population is exposed to levels higher than 60 
Lden (Pais 2016: 57, 58). In order to tackle this problem, a strategy is 
being implemented between 2014 and 2029, representing an investment 
of 9 million euros, to replace the city’s road pavements in order to pro-
vide better noise absorption, to lower the speed limit in some areas and 
to erect acoustic barriers (Pais 2016: 61). Even so, when it comes to 
areas with an active nightlife or which are frequently used for tempo-
rary events that emit loud noise, although regulations are being slowly 
introduced, better fiscalization methods need to be implemented. Local 
residents should be entitled to their rest and a city that is ‘alive’ does not 
always imply being a ‘loud city’.
Having considered acoustics and the impact it can have on the 
population, we may wonder why if a specific population is bothered 
by excessive noise in their area, they do not move. The fact is that in 
Lisbon ownership accounts for the main occupation of houses (50.9 per 
cent), which makes moving a less viable option. Renting is an option 
for 42.3 per cent and only 0.8 per cent are in a co-operative or collective 
property regime (Pais 2016, 119). Though renting is a more flexible 
system when it comes to facilitating relocation, high rents, associated 
to low salaries and a precarious job market contribute to a lower flexi-
bility than expected. The average salary is 1383 euros, 300 euros more 
than in the rest of the country, the unemployment rate in 2014 at 14.9 
per cent, associated to a house market highly subjected to speculation, 
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confirm this (Pais 2016: 263, 264). Taking into account the real estate 
market and salaries, co-ops and collective property regimes should be 
encouraged.
As for access to healthcare in Lisbon, at best one could say that it is 
undergoing a transition phase. We can see that several proximity struc-
tures are being planned, but five central hospitals are closing and the 
situation is confusing. What we know, from observing the current map 
of health facilities we can conclude that the centre and historic centre 
are currently deprived of proximity health structures (Pais 2016: 142).
Conclusion
Spatial justice, proposed by Soja, is an extension of the concept of ‘right 
to the city’ first proposed by Henri Lefebvre (in 1968) and defended 
nowadays by one of the most renowned geographers, David Harvey 
(Harvey 2013). As Harvey says: ‘The right to the city is far more than 
the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change 
ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a common rather than an 
individual right since this transformation inevitably depends upon the 
exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization. 
The freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is, I want to 
argue, one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights’ 
(Harvey 2008: 23).
Here, space as an indispensible relation between aesthetics and on-
tology is clear. The city, just like Plato said, shapes us but we are the 
ones shaping it. It is also relevant at this point to remember Husserl and 
the phenomenological school for whom there only exists lived space 
and never ‘pure’ space in the sense that ‘we are space’. In that sense, 
‘right to the city’ and ‘spatial justice’ connect, philosophically, with a 
phenomenological approach. 
We have presented a detailed analysis of the data available in the 
latest report on Lisbon (Pais 2016) bearing in mind the right to the city 
and spatial justice. The report was made in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis, a situation that always represents a time when money 
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and properties change hands. In Lisbon, one of the best examples to 
illustrate this was the sale of a state fund called ‘Sete Colinas’5 to a 
German investor. The fund consisted of several historical buildings and 
large plots of land inside the city (70 thousand square metres and 72 
million euros) (Antunes 2016).
Even before that though, as João Ferrão6 shows in his eloquent 
evaluation of Portugal’s spatial planning policy (2012), there were al-
ready problems which he analyses in detail. His conclusion is that when 
it comes to spatial planning in Portugal, the main problem is cultural. 
There is a lack of territorial culture in society, common to both citizens 
and institutions, and also a prevailing spatial planning culture that is 
stuck in the old modern paradigm where bureaucracy is excessive and 
the administrative process too complex (Ferrão 2012: 117).
In order to change this situation it is necessary to reveal society’s 
shared beliefs and values as these are the key to linking institutions and 
citizens (Ferrão 2012: 125). For this to happen, the spatial planning 
community should take more initiatives and play a more active role in 
discussing the country’s issues. Decision-makers should make spatial 
planning a priority, invest in further training and encourage the partici-
pation of the many intervening actors in society that lead to successful 
urban planning; and citizens should be taught to demand more from 
spatial planning and take a more active role (Ferrão 2012: 131–134).
As much as it is aesthetically appealing to see investment take place 
in the city of Lisbon, thus making the city look better, the question is: who 
will this investment benefit? Is the investment creating stronger founda-
tions for the population living there to become more secure and sustained? 
According to what values is Lisbon’s landscape being rationalized? 
From the analysis we have just carried out, we conclude that the in-
vestment orientation, supported by public policies, has created a spatial 
 
5 Among the properties included in the Sete Colinas Fund were the Almada-Car-
valhais Palace, a national monument since 1920 (Largo do Conde Barão), the 
Portugália building (Avenida Almirante Reis), the São Paulo building, several 
buildings in Praça de São Paulo and Avenida 24 de Julho, and a building in Portas 
de Santo Antão (next to the Coliseu dos Recreios theatre) (Antunes 2016).
6 João Ferrão (b.1952) is a Portuguese geographer who was Secretary of State of 
Spatial Planning and Cities in Portugal’s 17th Constitutional Government (2005–9).
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dynamic that encourages an easy way in and an easy way out of the 
city, where cruise passengers are on the rise especially since 2008 (Pais 
2016: 234), where the airport increased the number of passengers by 
71 per cent between 2002 and 2013 (Pais 2016: 388), where accommo-
dation is widely available and Erasmus students make up 10 per cent 
of university students. Lisbon is a good city for temporary visitors and 
in recent years the city seems to have worked hard to make them feel 
welcome. That has been achieved. 
But what about Lisbon’s inhabitants? There has been a loss of jobs, 
a loss of inhabitants, a GDP decrease and a large loss of businesses. 
We can say that this has happened as a result of the 2008 financial cri-
sis. But the question is whether the recent investments being made will 
enable us to recover from it better, creating a more resilient economic 
structure that allows our growth to be sustainable. How is territorial 
culture being promoted by recent investments and construction work in 
the city? Is a dialogue with the city’s actors taking place? What are so-
ciety’s shared values so that the city we envision is a shared, democratic 
exertion of power?
It is important to reflect on the fact that Lisbon is not Portugal 
and that macrocephaly should not be encouraged, meaning that Portugal 
should make an effort to stop conceiving its territory as ‘Lisbon, and the 
rest of the country’, which is culturally a much embedded attitude that 
strengthens the country’s macrocephaly. This cultural attitude becomes 
a major obstacle to changing one of the most visible national spatial 
problems, the primacy of its capital. Ultimatley, it also affects nega-
tively the capital itself putting excessive weight on social equipments, 
urban structures and administration, lowering living standards and ex-
pectations for the population. 
A slow, carefully planned and progressive effort in the direction of 
distributing power and resources to other districts should take place. But 
for this to happen as successfully as possible, not only Lisbon but also the 
rest of the country would need to take significant steps to change the way 
they conceive spatial planning (and acknowledge its usefulness), which 
implies the cultural change that Ferrão rightfully calls for. It would also 
require coherent articulation among all the districts where all society’s 
actors would have to be aware of their role and contribution towards the 
successful planning and implementation of a national spatial planning 
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policy. Cultural changes are usually slower than we would wish but this 
would be a beneficial move in the right direction. 
Coming back to where we stand now, when it comes to the city of 
Lisbon, we consider that an excessive focus on tourism, along with the 
recent changes in the main arteries of the city that aesthetically made 
the city look better, can create an illusion of prosperity for those who 
visit the city but not for those who inhabit it. The question is: to whom is 
the city being shaped for? How is it shaping its inhabitants? Moreover, 
if the idea is that Lisbon should ‘hang on to’ tourism (as if it were the 
city’s only resource for keeping the economy going), and if the num-
ber of beds available is rapidly on the rise, such cultural attitude not 
only promotes an economy with low sustainability (highly dependent 
on the tourist flow) but greatly contributes to cultural disempowerment 
by turning the city’s inhabitants into hosts with no life of their own, 
living in the limbo of those who come and go, experiencing space as a 
living paradox where they see themselves excluded from the place they 
inhabit. Lisbon demands more from all of us and an adequate spatial 
strategy, politically endorsed, is key in order to shape the city’s social 
and economic success. Only then the city’s landscape will be rational 
embodying simultaneously, spatial justice, politics and aesthetics. 
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Technology and urban space: on the relation  
between the historical approach and the  
transformation of aesthetic values in Walter Benjamin
Nélio Conceição
Introduction
The aim of this text is to bring to light some features of Walter Ben-
jamin’s philosophy that could contribute to a discussion on aesthetic 
values. This contribution can be regarded from a direct and an indi-
rect point of view: direct in relation to the texts where he explicitly 
tackles the concept of value; indirect in relation to the historical and 
critical background of his thought, which forms a constant evaluation 
of the transformations occurring in the conditions of human experi-
ence in modernity. These two elements often interweave. For instance, 
in the well-known essay “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technolog-
ical Reproducibility”, the historical perspective – the understanding of 
the changes in our relation to aesthetic phenomena resulting from the 
increasing reproducibility of works of art – is grounded on the distinc-
tion between cult value and exhibition value. We can also say that the 
second element, the historical and critical task of Benjamin’s thought, 
is scattered throughout his entire work. I will focus my attention on two 
themes that involve this interweaving of aesthetic values and historical 
thinking, technology and urban space. By doing this, I have no intention 
of being exhaustive, but I am just bringing up fundamental features 
and interrogations in order to prepare further developments in regard 
to aesthetic values and their relationship to artistic, political and ethical 
questions.
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1. History, art and technology
Prolonging the critical approach on modernity inherited from Nietzsche, 
Max Weber and Georg Simmel, and confronting this approach with as-
pects deriving from Messianism, German Romanticism, Marxism or 
avant-garde artistic practices, Benjamin’s texts thoroughly evaluate the 
transformations, often contradictory, that occur in modern capitalist 
societies. The weakening of tradition as a condition for the formation 
of human experience (Erfahrung) and its substitution by new forms of 
lived experience (Erlebnis) is a central thread of this evaluation. This 
pair of concepts is fundamental in the texts written on Baudelaire, in 
“The Storyteller”, in “Experience and Poverty” and, explicitly and im-
plicitly, in the majority of his texts that combine critique of art and so-
cial and political analysis. They perfectly illustrate the distinctive work-
ing of Benjamin’s dialectics by combining destructive and constructive 
elements, thus maintaining a historical tension between that what is lost 
and that what is gained in the periods of transformation.
Benjamin is one of the first authors to have studied the implications 
of the new technologies of recording/reproduction, such as photography 
and cinema, for the understanding of the artistic transformations in mo-
dernity. Nevertheless, his insightful remarks do not constitute a phi-
losophy of technology with clear-cut principles; on the contrary, they 
are disseminated in a manifold of texts, often as remarks focusing on 
concrete objects and particular historical situations. If we understand 
the aesthetic values as axes around which the production and critique of 
aesthetic phenomena circulate, giving them meaning and feeding their 
practices, we can therefore investigate the role technology has had in 
the transformation and creation of artistic values. It is in this sense that 
Benjamin’s thought reveals all its relevance. But defending its actuality 
in a straightforward way is perhaps less important than clarifying its 
complexity and making the effort to understand why today, while read-
ing his texts, we can still have a sense of contemporaneity and why his 
concepts still prove to be fertile – the more we are able to detour them 
in order to answer the demands of our present time, the more fertile 
they are.
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In “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire”, published in 1940, Benjamin 
states that Baudelaire was the first poet to embrace the experience of 
shock as a core element of his artistic work.1 This embracement was 
not merely an individual stance; on the contrary, it corresponded to the 
experience of his readers, a trait that justifies the successful reception 
of his work at the time. More forcefully than ever, lyric poetry was inte-
grating social elements directly related to the transformations occurring 
in urban societies, with the shock effect being the most important of 
them all. The shock effect is closely tied to the perceptual, bodily and 
mnemonic transformations taking place in urban life, characterized by 
immersion in the crowd and the new sensory stimuli arriving from dif-
ferent objects and situations, often related to the new technologies and 
an increasingly mechanized world.2 Also photography, states Benjamin, 
while fixating an event for an undetermined period of time, achieves it 
by imposing a shock on the event, freezing it and giving it a posthumous 
character. This idea is developed in the context of the analysis of the 
small-scale gestures unfolding a complex process which involves haptic 
and optical experiences. The perception conditioned by shock, on the 
other hand, is for Benjamin a formal principle of cinema: 
Thus, technology has subjected the human sensorium to a complex kind of train-
ing. There came a day when a new and urgent need for stimuli was met by film. In 
a film, perception conditioned by shock [chockförmige Wahrnehmung] was estab-
lished as a formal principle. What determines the rhythm of production on a con-
veyor belt is the same thing that underlies the rhythm of reception in the film3. 
1 Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire”, in Selected Writings, Vol. 
4, Cambridge/Massachusetts/London, The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2003, p. 319.
2 In his interpretation of the urban element in Benjamin’s writings, Graeme Gilloch 
sums up this idea as follows: “The hallmark of modern experience is ‘shock’. This 
in turn engenders forgetfulness and a distinctive form of memory, the mémoire in-
volontaire. In addition, the accelerated tempo and new, machine-based rhythms of 
metropolitan life lead to a distinctively modern temporal sensibility rooted in the 
commodification of time (equation of time and money) and repetition (fetishism 
and fashion)”. Graeme Gilloch, Myth and Metropolis. Walter Benjamin and the 
City, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996, p. 8.
3 Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire”, p. 328.
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This line of thought, affirming the worthlessness of approaching the 
experience of shock from a strict negative perspective and suggesting 
that the best attitude is to find a way of adapting to it, turning it into 
something productive, giving it a social and political task, runs through 
many of Benjamin’s texts. For instance, in the various versions of the 
“Work of art” essay, the shock experience encompasses not only film 
and photography, but also Dadaism, a movement which destroys the 
traditional forms of relating to painting, such as contemplative immer-
sion (contemplative Versenkung).4 It is also the persistence of tradition 
that is questioned in the destructive gesture of the Dadaists, particularly 
in regard to the transmission of former experiences with art and, if we 
want to add, of enduring aesthetic values.
The experience of shock is thus a transversal notion running 
through the strictly poetic elements (both in the sense of production and 
reception), the new technologies and also the sensorial and psycholog-
ical factors. Psychoanalysis and the question of trauma, memory and 
remembrance are also part of Benjamin’s reflection on remembrance, 
and they can be read alongside the texts where he combines the experi-
ence of the city with the experience of his own childhood, as in Berlin 
Childhood around 1900.
The issue of technology is also a gateway to Benjamin’s particular 
historical materialism. The text “Eduard Fuchs, collector and historian” 
develops one of the most detailed presentations of the task he ascribes 
to the historical materialist. Though focusing on the nineteenth century, 
some of his remarks also clarify his perspective regarding technology. 
These remarks emerge in the context of his critique to “the bungled re-
ception of technology”5, a process sustained by a series of enthusiastic 
efforts incapable of confronting the fact that technology is intrinsically 
attached to the production of commodities, therefore serving the princi-
ples of capitalism. “Technology, however, is obviously not a purely sci-
entific development. It is at the same time a historical one.”6 According 
4 For the third version, see Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its 
Technological Reproducibility”, in Selected Writings, Vol. 4, p. 266.
5 Walter Benjamin, “Eduard Fuchs, Collector and Historian”, in Selected Writings, 
Vol. 3, Cambridge/Massachusetts/London, The Belknap Press of Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 2002, p. 266.
6 Idem, ibidem.
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to Benjamin, the historical constitution of technology should drive us 
to question the positivistic and undialectical separation between natural 
sciences and humanities. It should force us to examine its destructive 
elements and by the same token rescue it from the narratives based on 
the sheer idea of progress. This means: opening up the possibility of 
blasting the historical continuum by pinpointing the destructive charac-
ter of its energies – when adopted, for instance, by war and propaganda.
In what follows, Benjamin adds some critical remarks to the his-
tory of culture conceived as a discipline. His critique focuses on the 
attempt to see historical materialism as a history of culture, grounded 
on the possibility of presenting its content from a non-binding distance, 
by throwing them into relief. This model is based on illusion and false 
consciousness. It neglects not only the fact that there is no such thing as 
a dialectical historical approach without a dialectic between the present 
and the past, but also the fact that “the products of art and science owe 
their existence not merely to the effort of the great geniuses who created 
them, but also, in one degree or another, to the anonymous toil of their 
contemporaries. There is no document of culture which is not at the 
same time a document of barbarism. No cultural history has yet done 
justice to this fundamental state of affairs, and it can hardly hope to do 
so.”7 This means that the task of the historian is also to give voice to 
the anonymous of society, those forgotten ones who are the invisible 
counterpart of humanity’s great cultural achievements.8 
7 Idem, p. 267. In Das Passagen-Werk, the relation between barbarism and culture 
is mentioned again, in this case with a reference to the way it manifests in the sur-
vival of values: “Barbarism lurks in the very concept of culture – as the concept 
of a fund of values which is considered independent not, indeed, of the production 
process in which these values originated, but of the one in which they survive. In 
this way they serve the apotheosis of the latter <word uncertain>, barbaric as it 
may be.” Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, Cambridge/Massachusetts/Lon-
don, The Belknap Press of University Press, 1999, [N5a,7], pp. 467–468.
8 We can also say that while examining the city Benjamin pays attention to peripheral 
figures like the prostitute or the rag-picker. Alongside “marginal” figures belonging 
to the bourgeoisie, like the flâneur or the collector, they are part of the micrological 
analysis of modernity which reveal the contradictions of progress and the phantas-
magorical character of the narratives, often mythological, sustaining the capitalist 
world. By giving them voice, he is putting in motion his own critical thinking and 
allowing for a different, often detoured, manner of understanding historical time.
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Without disregarding the weaknesses of Eduard Fuchs’ ideas, Ben-
jamin nevertheless recognizes that he was capable of disrupting the 
principles of history of culture, coming closer to the dialectical task. 
Driven by his character of collector, he stepped into fields on the edge 
where the traditional concepts of art could only fail. “The order of val-
ues which determined the consideration of art for Goethe and Winck-
elmann has lost all influence in the work of Fuchs”9. It is in this con-
text that Benjamin refers to the three main dialectic elements in Fuchs’ 
oeuvre: the interpretation of iconography, the contemplation of mass 
art, the examination of the techniques of reproduction. These three mo-
tifs have in common the fact that “they refer to forms of knowledge 
which could only prove destructive to traditional conceptions of art”10. 
They accentuate the importance of reception in art and, within certain 
limits, also contribute to correct the process of reification occurring in a 
work of art, obliging a revision of the concept of genius and to prevent 
the excesses of formalism.
We can transpose these remarks, which directly articulate the 
changes in aesthetic values with technology and mass art, to the cri-
tique and the history of reception of other objects, whether from litera-
ture, cinema, photography or, more recently, digital art. They are part of 
the historical materialist approach and therefore they are apt to reveal 
new tasks and new social and political functions in art. It is impor-
tant to mention that the ideas raised by Benjamin regarding the relation 
between art and technology should not be reduced to the question of 
reproduction/reproducibility, a question that was already examined by 
Eduard Fuchs and that guides one of Benjamin’s most well-known and 
discussed essays. The connection between art, technology and history 
is all the more fertile when it encompasses a model of thought capable 
of weighing the processes of transformation, the destructive and con-
structive elements of culture, the dialectical relation between the What-
has-been (Gewesen) and the Now (Jetzt) that forms the constellations 
showing new possibilities of reading.11 And such notions as optical un-
conscious and innervation, which belong to a wider understanding of 
 
9 Walter Benjamin, “Eduard Fuchs, Collector and Historian”, p. 269.
10 Idem, ibidem.
11 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, [N3, 1], p. 463.
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the relation between perception, human body and technology, prove not 
only the complexity of his ideas, but also the capacity of his thought to 
envisage a productive task in the midst of the historical tensions.
2. Cult value and exhibition value
The “Work of Art” essay focuses on the manifold consequences orig-
inated by the mechanical reproduction of works of art. It analyses its 
impact on artistic processes, on the function of art and on its relation 
to society and politics; at the same time, it reflects upon the existence 
of forms of art such as photography and cinema which can reach the 
masses in an unprecedented manner. One important idea behind the 
essay is the transition from a historical period in art defined by the cult 
value to a period defined by the exhibition value of works of art. Cult 
value is based on authenticity and uniqueness. These are attached to the 
notion of the original, to the here and now of the original. By liberating 
the hand and allowing infinite and fast multiplications, mechanical re-
production dissolves the importance previously ascribed to the original 
and weakens its authority.
The reason is twofold. First, technological reproduction is more independent of 
the original than is manual reproduction. For example, in photography it can bring 
out aspects of the original that are accessible only to the lens (which is adjustable 
and can easily change viewpoint) but not to the human eye; or it can use certain 
processes, such as enlargement or slow motion, to record images which escape 
natural optics altogether. This is the first reason. Second, technological reproduc-
tion can place the copy of the original in situations which the original itself cannot 
attain. Above all, it enables the original to meet the recipient halfway, whether in 
the form of a photograph or in that of a gramophone record.12
In order to characterize this loss of authenticity, Benjamin uses the term 
aura, previously introduced in his “Little History of Photography”, and 
 
12 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibil-
ity” (third version), p. 254.
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links it to a general process concerning important changes in the value 
of tradition engendered by photography and film.13 He then recalls the 
fact that the earliest works of art were at the service of cult and rituals – 
first magic, then religious. In this regard, even the secular worship of 
beauty which started in the Renaissance and lasted three centuries is 
said to have a cult character. “With the emancipation of specific artistic 
practices from the service of ritual, the opportunities for exhibiting their 
products increase”14. This liberation accentuating the exhibition value, 
exponentially increased by mechanical reproduction, allows works of 
art to acquire different functions, especially political.
Cult value is thus correlated with aura; consequently, with the 
vanishing of the cultic function the aura of works of art tends to 
disappear. We can of course put this idea into question by asking if 
our contemporary experiences with art are completely freed from 
these “tissues of space and time” that maintain an unapproachability. 
Didi-Huberman, for instance, challenging the canonical readings, 
brings the notion of aura and its constitutive distance to a secular con-
text in art in order to understand the minimalist movement.15 In the 
case of photography – and it is not by chance that the decay of aura 
is associated with the pioneering work of Atget, for whom the human 
figure lost its privilege – the cult value resides quite obviously in the 
human face, particularly in the cult of remembrance which is so char-
acteristic of the familial milieu. 
13 The aura is firstly defined according to spatiotemporal categories: “the unique 
apparition of a distance, however near it may be” (Idem, p. 255). In a note, Benja-
min explains that this distance is also the property of cult value: “The essentially 
distant is the unapproachable. Unapproachability is, indeed, a primary quality of 
the cult image” (Idem, p. 272). This is not the place to go deeper into the charac-
terization of the aura (also in other texts) nor to question the reach of Benjamin’s 
proposal, but it is nevertheless important to add that the usage of the term aura 
is far from knowing a stable meaning in his texts; instead, it seems to lead to a 
complex network of problems regarding human perception, our experience with 
objects and the mutable understanding of works of art.
14 Idem, p. 257.
15 Georges Didi-Huberman, Ce que nous voyons, ce qui nous regarde, Les Éditions 
de Minuit, Paris, 1992, pp. 103–123.
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3. Notes on urban issues
The question of aesthetic values in Benjamin, as in several of his con-
temporaries who analysed the new technical means like photography 
and cinema, is closely tied to the study of mediated perception and the 
consequences resulting from changes in the conditions of perception. 
As mentioned before, the experience of shock, increased by the urban 
modern life, comprises an obvious perceptual dimension, often related 
to bodily-rooted reactions to technological stimuli. Used as a principle 
for understanding cinema, as Benjamin sometimes suggests, it might 
lead to an excessively narrow approach, but regarded as a conflation of 
key elements accounting for the changes of human experience in mod-
ern societies, it can still prove its fecundity.
In Malerei, Fotografie, Film, published in 1925, Moholy-Nagy, 
while commenting upon the new perspectives allowed by photography, 
and particularly upon a photograph where the distortion of the human 
figure is an appeal to experiment with different ways of looking at the 
picture (and at reality), talks about an “invitation to re-evaluate our way 
of seeing [Aufforderung zur Umwertung des Sehens]. This picture can 
be turned round. It always produces new vistas”.16 In fact, in this re-
valuation (or transvaluation, to recall Nietzsche’s motto of the “trans-
valuation of all values”) we can detect a bond between perception and 
value, nourished by technology. Seeing differently as a possibility of 
revaluating phenomena is a sort of perspectivism, naturally not a rig-
orous Nietzschean one, but one that nevertheless breaks the fixed and 
longstanding images of the world and accentuates the multiplicity of 
points of view.17 In this sense, it is also noteworthy that many of the 
avant-garde artists who explored photography and film as technologies 
 
16 Lázsló Moholy-Nagy, Painting, Photography, Film, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
The MIT Press, 1987, p. 61.
17 Is this just a metaphor? Is there any connection between the changes in perception 
mobilized by the new techniques of reproduction and the questioning of true and 
one-sided objectivities operated conceptually in the philosophical realm? We can 
perhaps talk about a simultaneous process here, a process of fragmentation which 
also occurred in other fields of knowledge: in science, in literature, in art.
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capable of creating a new vision of the world, such as the circle around 
Bauhaus, Rodchenko or Dziga Vertov, did it by constantly addressing the 
urban landscape, exploring perspectives and rhythms, recreating reality 
by means of montage.18 In the case of Moholy-Nagy, there is a clear rela-
tionship between the changes in the visual realm and social change, and 
throughout his practice, his teaching and his writings, we can discern a 
utopian element dealing with the complex political situation of the time.19
According to Benjamin, seeing differently has also a destructive ele-
ment. In the second version of the “Work of Art” essay, the one discussed 
with Adorno and Horkheimer, the one that served as a basis for the French 
translation, Benjamin introduces the element of play as a counterpart 
to the decay of cult value. Play belongs to the cultural context of what 
Benjamin calls the second technology and is closely tied to the notion of 
experimentation. The distinction between first and second technology un-
folds, respectively, the distinction between cult and exhibition value. The 
passage from the first to the second technology implicates the decreasing 
of beautiful semblance (of the “object in its veil” – in this second version, 
an equivalent to aura). “That what is lost in the withering of semblance 
and the decay of the aura in the works of art is matched by a huge gain 
in the scope for play [Spiel-raum]”20. According to this analysis, which is 
also a utopian projection on the future of art, cinema is in a privileged sit-
uation. Before describing the characteristics of the optical unconscious, as 
well as its technical components – close-up, slow motion or enlargement 
– Benjamin makes use of the dialectic ideas of destruction and Spielraum:
On the one hand, [cinema] furthers insight into the necessities governing our lives 
by its use of close-ups, by its accentuation of hidden details in familiar objects, 
and by its exploration of commonplace milieu through the ingenious guidance of 
the camera; on the other hand, it manages to assure us of a vast and unsuspected 
field of action [Spielraum].
18 The last chapter of Malerei, Fotografie, Film is exactly the presentation of a proj-
ect entitled “Dynamic of the Metropolis”, dating from 1921–22, a purely visual 
experiment with filmed events in space and time. Idem, pp. 122–137.
19 See Victor Margolin, The Struggle for Utopia. Rodchenko, Lissitzky, Moholy- 
Nagy, 1917–1946, Chicago, London, The University of Chicago Press, 1977. 
20 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibil-
ity” (second version), n. 22, p. 127.
Technology and urban space 303
Our bars and city streets, our offices and furnished rooms, our railroad stations 
and our factories seemed to close relentlessly around us. Then came film and ex-
ploded this prison-world with the dynamite of the split second, so that now we can 
set off calmly on journeys of adventure among its far-flung debris.21 
Not only does this section describe a “revaluation of seeing”, but it also 
adds that this description can promote the destruction of the images 
encapsulating our cities. The process of destruction leads to the crea-
tion of a free scope, which is however not an absolute emptiness but a 
utopian social space characteristic of the second technology. In order to 
become revolutionary, the goals of this space should be sustained by a 
collective innervation.22
Benjamin soon understood the pertinence of the connection be-
tween photography, cinema and the city. Without belonging to any 
avant-garde movement, Atget is nevertheless a good example of this 
connection and of the capacity of photography to clear the stereotyped 
atmosphere of urban space, in this case, of Paris. Nowadays, the Spiel-
raum is necessarily different. In fact, more than to the creation of uto-
pias, many photographers, film and video makers dedicate themselves 
to the study of architectonic and urban utopias set in motion a long 
time ago. In the work of Portuguese artists such as Paulo Catrica or 
Nuno Cera, photography and film (video) are used in order to deepen 
this study. They can be said to evaluate either the post-war utopias, or 
the complex tissues of modern cities, their peripheral areas and contra-
dictions. And in both cases the evaluation is less concerned with final 
judgements and more with the issue of visibility, of presenting cities in 
a rigorous but manifold way, thereby allowing comparisons. This is per-
haps the best method of dealing with the complexity of contemporary 
urban life. 
Walter Benjamin’s thought about the city encompasses several in-
terests and approaches: 1) urban “pen-pictures”, such as his descriptions 
 
21 Idem, ibidem, p. 117.
22 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibil-
ity” (second version)”, p. 124. For a reading of the relation between technology 
and architecture in the context of this version of the essay, see Diane Morgan, 
“Spielraum et Greifbarkeit: un acheminement vers une architecture utopique”, in 
Libero Andreotti, Spielraum: W. Benjamin et L’architecture, pp. 291–301.
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of Naples and Moscow; 2) descriptions and analysis of the urban set-
ting in the Passagenarbeit (the Paris writings); 3) autobiographical 
texts: “Berlin Chronicle” and “Berlin Childhood around 1900”; 4) 
radio broadcasts; 5) reviews of books dealing with the city (e.g. Franz 
Hessel’s On Foot in Berlin).23 If we agree on the constellational nature 
of the knowledge of the city enabled by his texts24, we can find inter-
esting parallels with the functioning of technological apparatus. In this 
sense, Graeme Gilloch argues that
the shifting vantage-point of the film camera is also important. Benjamin’s con-
cern with the depiction of the urban is interwoven with a conscious refusal of or 
resistance to the presentation of an overarching, integrated, coherent view of the 
city as a whole. The imagistic approach highlights the fleeting, fluid character of 
modern metropolitan existence. It denies a systematic, stable perspective.25
Hence, besides the idea of constellation, technology increased an el-
ement which is fundamental in Benjamin’s relationship with the city: 
physiognomy and, implicitly, the idea of decipherment. The city as a 
monad can be conceived as an “entity that encapsulates the character-
istic features of modern social and economic structures, and is thus the 
site for their most precise and unambiguous interpretation.”26 There-
fore, not only is it important to see differently, but also to be able to 
decipher. 
23 Graeme Gilloch, Myth and Metropolis. Walter Benjamin and the City, pp. 1–20.
24 While trying to circumscribe Walter Benjamin’s pertinence to urban studies, Mi-
chael Keith focuses not only upon some of his constellatory thematics, but also 
upon the analytical and political value these thematics still have today. They run 
as follows: the culture of money and the cultural production of economic value; 
problematizing the real and the production of space and time; the city as text and 
emblem; aura, distance and closeness and the problem of the city view; authentic-
ity and urbanism as corporeal experience. Michael Keith, “Walter Benjamin, Ur-
ban Studies and the Narrative of Everyday Life”, in A Companion to the City, (ed. 
Gary Bridge and Sophie Watson), Malden, MA, Blackwell, 2000, pp. 410–429.
25 Graeme Gilloch, Myth and Metropolis. Walter Benjamin and the City, p. 18.
26 Idem, pp. 5–6. On this topic, see also Willi Bolle, Fisiognomia da Metrópole 
Moderna. Representação da História em Walter Benjamin, São Paulo, Edusp, 
1994.
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Final remarks
The ideas outlined allow us to consider the city – understood as a re-
search field ranging from philosophy to the arts – as a privileged space 
where the values of the present are discernible, where the historical 
tensions with the past can be measured, where we can project the ex-
pectations and challenges of the future. Nowadays, the way we live 
and experience urban space is certainly different from the nineteenth 
century way brought forth by the quotations and observations of Das 
Passagen-Werk. It is necessarily different from the political and cultural 
context of the Weimar Republic and the years that culminated in the 
Second World War. Nonetheless, the purpose of this text is to stress the 
fact that the complexity of Benjamin’s historical thought, the interweav-
ing of political, technological or aesthetical questions, may provide us 
with “methods”, concepts and insights that prove to be contemporary. 
Ethical and political questions arise constantly while reading his texts. 
Though in a detoured and disguised manner, we are heirs of his evalu-
ation of modernity, of the difficult relation to tradition, of the ever-in-
creasing blind discourse on technological progress, often unacquainted 
with the destructive counterpart of the new. What is interesting in Ben-
jamin, as in contemporaries such as Moholy-Nagy or Kracauer, is not 
a plain belief in technological progress and modern urban life, but the 
ability to simultaneously understand the destructive and constructive el-
ements of the transformations they encompass, which confront us with 
axiological questions. 
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Thinking about aesthetic values, as often happens when we think about 
aesthetic concepts, properties or experiences, gives us the opportunity 
to question the term aesthetic1 that progressively entered philosophi-
cal discourse during the eighteenth century. What makes it difficult to 
answer, though, is the fact that its meaning has oscillated over time and 
generated various misconceptions and ambiguities. These have been 
very common even among professional philosophers and one of them 
results in the reduction of the subject area and confusion between one 
field – Aesthetics – and another – Philosophy of Art. The reasons for 
this simple, and to many philosophers almost unproblematic, confu-
sion are linked not only to historical, sociological or cultural reasons, 
but also to strong conceptual affinities between the ‘aesthetical’ and 
the ‘artistic’ to the point that some, who are consciously aware of 
the problem, argumentatively admit its inevitability and legitimacy, 
particularly in respect to the question of values. Aesthetic value and 
artistic value could, according to some, be equivalent since the value 
of artworks could lie in their ability to produce aesthetic experiences, 
and symmetrically, for others the aesthetic qualities of an experience 
1 And let us not forget that the term has been used over the years in several different 
ways, sometimes simultaneously, to designate a kind of object, a kind of attitude, 
a kind of experience, a kind of judgement, a kind of value.
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of a non-artistic object – such as a natural landscape for instance – 
could derive from the fact that we look at it as if it were an artwork.2
One of the main purposes of this chapter is precisely, as an endeav-
our to determine the meaning and scope of the expression ‘aesthetic 
value’, to argue that aesthetic and artistic values are not exactly the 
same even though the artistic value of an artwork may result in part 
from its aesthetic value. Moreover, other types of values such as cog-
nitive, ethical, political and social shall every so often be taken into 
account in the evaluation of artworks. And one of the consequences of 
that distinction – between the aesthetic and the artistic3 – is the fact that 
the range of consideration of aesthetic values goes way beyond the eval-
uation of artworks insofar as aesthetic experience is not an exclusive 
business4 of the artistic domain.
Another important aspect for the clarification of the notion of ‘aes-
thetic value’, mostly in the context of our main line of research, is tied 
to the concept of value and to the close affinities between aesthetic val-
ues, on one hand, and ethical and cognitive ones on the other. This is 
precisely where I must now begin.
2 Berys Gaut clearly defends this point of view in Art, Emotion, and Ethics (Gaut 
2007: 35).
3 More recently, this separation of the aesthetic and the artistic has been gaining 
some philosophical consideration among contemporary authors and even becom-
ing a standpoint for analysis of aesthetic experience as in the recent book by 
Jean-Marie Schaeffer, L’Expérience Esthétique. See Schaeffer (2015: 40–45), and, 
more generically, the concluding chapter of Talon-Hugon (2004).
4 And ‘business’ might even be a good word here since the aestheticization of our 
daily activities, our social exchanges, communication, even politics and economy, 
has become an overwhelming fact in contemporary society. Some authors, among 
whom the French theoretician of hypermodernity, Gilles Lipovetsky, and his asso-
ciate aesthetician, gastronome and film critic, Jean Serroy, even identify a global 
process of ‘aestheticization of the world’, with aesthetic values informing most 
aspects of culture, be they leisure activities, entertainment, industry, commerce or 
lifestyle in general. See Lipovetsky & Serroy (2013). 
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1. Values: aesthetic, ethical and cognitive
Aesthetics as a philosophical discipline is relatively young – with no 
more than three centuries of academic existence – and closely linked 
to philosophical modernity. On the other hand, the modern theory of 
value and the philosophical discussion of ‘values’ is even younger, hap-
pening solely during the nineteenth century, eventually reassigned from 
the doctrines of classical economy. Nevertheless, as may easily become 
obvious, many of the topics that came to occupy modern aestheticians 
and also many of the main problems of a modern philosophical con-
sideration of values are as timeworn as Philosophy itself. In fact, the 
modern themes of Aesthetics and Axiology partly inherited there ‘pre-
conceptions’ – how could it be otherwise? – from the ancient discus-
sion over Beauty, Goodness [and Justice] or Truth. This is not the place 
for a history of philosophy or a history of ideas, but it is not inappro-
priate to remember that those universal archetypes were inherited and 
transmitted by some medieval Neoplatonist authors and commentators, 
some calling them ‘transcendentals’5, i.e. the metaphysical properties, 
the most general – wider – notions of ‘Being’. In a well-known text by 
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (sixth century), De divinis nomini-
bus, which was the focus of numerous commentators during the whole 
period of medieval thought, those notions are the names of God, His 
characteristic attributes which emanate in all Creation6. In this Chris-
tian conception of those archetypes, the universe was a manifestation of 
inexhaustible goodness, truth and divine supersubstantial beauty. In the 
end, each of these characteristic attributes was a different aspect of the 
same reality. The value of creatures derived from the greater or lesser 
closeness with the metaphysical reality of God.
5 To be accurate, we must say that the inclusion of Beauty in the medieval theory of 
transcendental is not consensual, appearing only episodically in authors of a more 
Neoplatonic inspiration (Hilduin or John the Saracen, for instance).
6 For a brief presentation of the appropriation and evolution of this idea in medieval 
authors, see chapter 2, ‘Transcendental Beauty’, in Umberto Eco’s Art and Beauty 
in Medieval Aesthetics (Eco 2002: 17 ff).
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But even devoid of its religious (Christian) connotations – or, at 
least, those connotations having been sublimated – the discussion of the 
Beautiful, Good and True nonetheless inherited in the dawn of moder-
nity some metaphysical connotations which linked them together. That 
is certainly why in the meditations of the Francophone rationalists, such 
as in Jean-Pierre de Crousaz’s Traité du beau (1715), we can still find a 
concept of beauty as a sensorial manifestation of the true and the good7 
or even why, in the considerations of British philosophers (Shaftesbury 
and Hutcheson) from the beginning of the eighteenth century, we also 
find so many references to the intimate relationships between the no-
tions of taste, virtue, moral and beauty8. [We could also remember how 
the ideal of the “Honnête Homme” in seventeenth century France – the 
perfect courtier, the upright man, who should have refined manners, 
good taste and a virtuous moral character – may have been an influence 
on those British considerations.] 
But, in fact, it is not only due to metaphysical hints still present in 
Enlightenment thought that we can spot topical discussions that oscil-
late between the aesthetical, the ethical and the cognitive. These close 
affinities in philosophical reflection on aesthetics have been present 
since its early origins owing to the ambiguous character of the aesthetic 
field. On the one hand, it has always had an epistemological ground 
where the ambition to rationally understand the domains of the sensi-
tive, the sensible and the imagination9 is unmistakably manifest. This 
means that there is a purpose to find in sensibility an analogon rationis, 
a way of knowing, through sensorial perception (αἴσθησις), the natu-
ral and the human world. On the other hand, there is an intimate con-
nection between taste and the power of appreciating, contemplating 
and/or judging the sensible and the formal qualities of artifacts and/or 
 
7 See Talon-Hugon (2004: 42). 
8 We could simply read, for instance, Lord Shaftesbury’s Characteristicks of Men, 
Manners, Opinions, Times (1711), or Francis Hutcheson’s Inquiry into the Ori-
gin of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725) to find these topics and intercon-
nections.
9 ‘§1 AESTHETICS (as theory of the liberal arts, as gnoseology of the lower fac-
ulties, as the art of beautiful thinking, and as the art of thinking analogous to 
reason) is the science of sensate cognition.’ This was the definition provided by 
Baumgarten in his famous 1750s work Aesthetica.
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natural phenomena – to the point that Kant identified German Aesthet-
ics (Baumgarten) with what other Europeans (mainly British) called 
Critique of Taste10. This means that Aesthetics have always been con-
cerned with evaluation acts and processes.
‘Aesthetic reason’ would thus share with theoretical and practical 
reason some judicative and evaluative inclinations and skills towards 
the phenomenal field, which allows it to consider the world in all its 
heterogeneity and qualitative depth. Aesthetic values, like cognitive and 
ethical ones, allow us to differentiate the world’s objects and states of 
affairs inasmuch as they are neither equivalent nor indifferent in respect 
to their established relations with the subject of perception (αἴσθησις). 
Here, the reference to the subject of perception is surely a trademark of 
modern philosophical aesthetics. As opposed to previous periods where 
the objective character of judgements and evaluations about beauty 
was warranted by a universal archetype, by a (metaphysical or divine) 
transcendental, manifesting itself in the sensorial world at different de-
grees, in philosophical modernity judgement about beauty becomes 
a problem, located between the contingent subjectivity of perception 
(and affection) and the necessary normativity of an objective verdict – 
eventually accompanied by a claim for universality (as in the aesthetic 
judgement according to Kant). To discuss aesthetic values or, to put it 
in a different way, to know what enables us in a particular circumstance 
to say that something is beautiful or not (ugly?) has apparently been one 
of the features of this field since its foundation to the point that, even 
today, we can find many (inevitably simplistic) definitions of Aesthetics 
as the science that investigates the nature of beauty.
For this understanding of Aesthetics, many references have been 
made since the early history of this philosophical field to the principles 
of beauty, to poetic beauty and to the fine arts [Beaux-Arts, Schönen 
Künste, Belas-Artes], topics that have filled numerous pages of aesthetic 
10 ‘The Germans are the only ones who now [1781] employ the word “aesthetics” to 
designate that which others call the critique of taste. The ground for this is a false 
hope, held by the excellent analyst Baumgarten, of bringing the critical estimation 
of the beautiful under principles of reason, and elevating its rules to a science. But 
this effort is futile.’ (Kant 1998: 156).
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doctrines.11 It is also true though that, from an early stage, many other 
aesthetic properties – beyond harmony, unity and formal balance which 
were present in early treaties on beauty – like intensity or excess have 
emerged as well as other possible values for philosophical meditation 
on aesthetic experiences, in particular the ‘Sublime’, to which Edmund 
Burke partially dedicated his famous [A] Philosophical Enquiry into 
the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), followed 
by the unsurpassable ‘Analytic of the Sublime’ (§§23–29) in the Cri-
tique of the Power of Judgement (1790). Although both – the beautiful 
and the sublime – deal with aesthetic experiences, each presents distinct 
phenomenologies and produces different emotions: pleasure – resulting 
from the harmonious interplay between faculties (understanding and 
imagination) in the case of the beautiful, at least according to Kant – 
and a mix of pleasure and pain or even terror and respect in the case of 
the sublime – according to Kant and Burke, respectively. As regards val-
ue, that is, as far as we refer to what makes those experiences worthy of 
desire or esteem, it is not misplaced to talk here about different values. 
In fact, this difference would easily refute the tempting – but too quick – 
hedonistic account of value for aesthetic experiences (the value of each 
aesthetic experience would be assessed by the amount of pleasure that 
it could provide). Later, during the twentieth century, for instance in the 
seminal article by Frank Sibley on ‘Aesthetic Concepts’ (1959), a wider 
and much more varied palette of aesthetic properties was added12 to 
enrich the discussion about pluralism regarding aesthetic values.
11 Even though the whole book by Annie Becq on the origins of French modern 
aesthetics (1680–1814) provides abundant demonstration of this, one might find 
the perfect illustration of this evolution in early European aesthetics by simply 
reading the first part of book III, ‘Towards poetic reason’, which deals with the 
concept of Beauty and how it dominates the French aesthetic writings of the peri-
od, becoming the fundamental basis for the aesthetic value of art. See Becq (1994: 
513–646).
12 In this influential paper, the British philosopher lists several ‘aesthetic terms’ 
while discussing the specificity of aesthetic concepts and how they cannot be 
reduced to non-aesthetic ones. Although his focus is the specific character of aes-
thetic concepts, it is clear that they can be used in the appreciation and evaluation 
of aesthetic objects and experiences and thus serve as a reference for aesthetic 
values. For the list of ‘aesthetic terms’, see Sibley (1959: 421–3).
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Nevertheless, and before going further in the discussion of the plu-
rality of possible aesthetic experiences and the refusal of aesthetic and 
artistic values to amalgamate, something more shall be said concerning 
the distinction between aesthetic, ethical and cognitive values, as until 
now we have mainly pointed towards their affinities and crossings rather 
than to their differences.
Intuitively, it may sound as though it is an easy task to distinguish 
values according to their different fields of influence and the different 
purposes of each type of evaluation. Yet saying that types of values are 
distinguished from each other because they apply to different fields – 
aesthetical, theoretical or practical – and goals – aesthetic apprecia-
tion, cognitive analysis or adequate action – does not seem very in-
formative nor interesting enough, and it definitely begs the question. 
Listing the values of each field can also end up in the discovery that 
the beautiful, the good and the true are equivalent insofar as we try 
to spot what is positive or negative in each evaluating process in such 
a way that the beautiful would be what is good or true in the aesthet-
ic field, and thus the opposite of what is ugly, which would then be 
the bad or false in aesthetic terms. But, yet again, what distinguishes 
the aesthetic from the cognitive or the ethical is what remains unex-
plained. 
With no further delay, we should then say that ethical values gov-
ern or justify actions or behaviours, the practical choices that guide 
each individual in his daily intercourse with states of affairs and other 
individuals; cognitive values are those that manage the possibility and 
validity of knowledge; and aesthetic values are those that condition the 
appreciation, contemplation and evaluation of aesthetic experiences, 
in other words, those which enable the association between sensible, 
expressive and formal – configurational and structural – properties and 
qualities of objects and states of affairs – situations or events – and 
the corresponding affective responses of the subject who experiences 
them.
Nonetheless – and just to make distinctions harder – an aesthetic 
experience, in this simplified description, probably also implies a form 
of knowledge acquisition insofar as any experience will, in one way 
or another, bring new data about the environing world and about each 
person, enriching her as an individual, and for that reason showing 
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how aesthetic experience may have a cognitive value. Similarly, that 
same experience, as long as it implies a vital existential kinship with 
the world and the others, may, eventually, produce some insightful 
intuitions about the best way for action or interaction of that same 
individual with her environment and, therefore, carry some important 
ethical value. This last point is of course arguable since one can always 
object that the eventual ethical value of aesthetic experience will turn 
out to be like an extra, an unexpected surplus relative to the main 
content of the aesthetic experience – an experience that, according to 
tradition, is allegedly disinterested.13 With respect to the cognitive val-
ue of experience, I would risk saying that it belongs inherently to aes-
thetic experience in the sense that this is not simply an experience of 
fruition but always an experience of knowledge, even if resulting from 
confused perception and (un)clear knowledge – to use a Leibnizian 
reference14 – but nonetheless some kind of knowledge. Notwithstand-
ing, what has just been said concerning eventual ethical and cognitive 
values of aesthetic experiences does not dismiss the need and opportu-
nity to distinguish it from specifically aesthetic values, which can only 
emerge from such experiences.
13 The idea of the disinterestedness of aesthetic experience – or, at least, of the plea-
sure derived from it – has a long past, starting maybe with the 3rd Earl of Shaft-
esbury (in his already mentioned Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, 
Times) and having its most famous pleading in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. 
For more details on the origins and development of the idea of disinterestedness, 
see Stolnitz (1961). 
14 In a short 1684 text on cognition, truth and ideas (Meditationes de cognition, 
veritate et ideiis), G. W. Leibniz made a distinction between clear and obscure 
but also between confused and distinct knowledge and then spoke of clear but 
confused knowledge comparing it to what painters understand when looking at 
pictures: ‘Similiter videmus pictores aliosque artifices probe cognoscere, quid 
recte, quid vitiose factum sit, at judicii sui rationem reddere sæpe non posse, et 
quærenti dicere, se in re quæ displicet desiderare nescio quid.’ This ‘nescio quid’, 
which he will later refer to in his own famous Nouveaux Essais sur l’Entendement 
(1704) as the ‘je ne say quoy’ (an expression that was actually in use at the time by 
painters at the Académie Royale de Peinture et Sculpture), might be the epistemic 
specificity of aesthetic experience.
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2. Aesthetic and artistic values
As was initially said, we should not accept the confusion between the 
aesthetic and the artistic. In spite of their obvious affinities and the rel-
evance of the study and consideration of artistic phenomena to under-
stand the aesthetic phenomena properly, to the extent that artworks and 
artistic practices intensify, question, excite, present and represent our 
aesthetic experiences of the natural and human world, it is undeniable 
that we have or may have many aesthetic experiences that go way be-
yond the strict spectrum of the artworld, a world that is culturally and 
historically determined and is not necessarily universal (despite the 
global tendencies to become so). This means that aesthetic values are 
relevant in many non-artistic fields of human experience, such as the 
experience and appreciation of natural phenomena – something that has 
actually been part of aesthetic discussions, at least since the eighteenth 
century. It would suffice to remember one of the most interesting and 
informative accounts of the aesthetic experience of nature in the in-
comparable ‘Cinquième promenade’ of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Rev-
eries of a Solitary Walker (1776–78)15 but we could likewise notice, 
for instance, the importance of natural object collections in herbaria 
 
15 Although Rousseau’s autobiographical and elegant literary rendering of his 
‘rêveries’, which were to some extent his aesthetic experiences while enjoying the 
charms of the beautiful natural environment near the Swiss lake of Bienne, be-
came paradigmatic when discussing the aesthetic experience of nature, Edmund 
Burke had previously devoted, although not very systematically, several pages of 
his Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beau-
tiful (1757) to the aesthetic appreciation of vegetables (plants and flowers) and 
animals (e.g. sections 5 and 20 of Part II or sections 2 and 3 of Part III) and to the 
aesthetic experience of the sublime generated by landscapes, mountains, abysses 
or atmospheric phenomena (lightning and thunder) (section 17 of Part II, sections 
14 and 17 of Part IV, etc.). Later, Immanuel Kant would of course also contribute 
in a significant way to the discussion of the aesthetic experience of nature when 
he addressed the issue in his own Critique of the Power of Judgement (1790), yet 
he frames the aesthetic judgement of natural objects as if they were art objects 
(created by God). For a more detailed consideration of Kant’s aesthetics of nature, 
see Budd (2002: 24–89) and for a systematic account of environmental aesthetics, 
see also Carlson (2000).
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and ‘cabinets of curiosities’, which developed as from the end of the 
sixteenth century, to acknowledge our aesthetic attitude towards natural 
bodies, places, landscapes, and so on. But then again, we can easily 
find a use for aesthetic values and considerations even in intellectual, 
scientific, philosophical and mathematical experiences – which can be 
appreciated beyond their purely cognitive value in an aesthetic manner 
for their elegance, harmony, design, etc.16 – or in interpersonal, social or 
even socio-economic experiences – like ritual, religious and celebratory 
gatherings, object and equipment design, urban and spatial planning, 
just to single out some obvious ones – and obviously in our everyday 
experiences. We may name just a few where there are evident aesthetic 
features, such as sports and leisure games, gastronomy, collecting, hob-
bies, tourism, etc. But then again let us not forget that the simple fru-
ition of ephemeral everyday experiences may contain aesthetic judge-
ments and rewards17, something that had already been noticed in the 
 
16 Once again, since the first modern aesthetic philosophers, we can find consid-
erations of aesthetic features in intellectual experiences like mathematics and 
geometry. See, for instance, chapter 3 of Francis Hutcheson’s The origin of our 
ideas of beauty, order, harmony and design (1725), unequivocally entitled ‘The 
beauty of theorems’. For a contemporary consideration of the aesthetics of math-
ematics, see Montano (2014).
17 In recent years, several articles and books have been devoted to everyday aes-
thetics. For instance, in the book edited by Andrew Light and Jonathan M. Smith, 
The Aesthetics of Everyday Life, among other topics, the aesthetic experience of 
everyday environments, like the unplanned elements of our surroundings, but also 
the way we are affected and influenced aesthetically by the planned configurations 
of urbanism and architecture are some of the issues mentioned. A different topic 
that is addressed is the way contemporary sports can be viewed aesthetically or 
even as art: and here images of Leni Riefenstahl’s Olympia (1938), the German 
documentary film on the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games, might immediately jump 
to our minds. But the fact is that many sports have this aesthetic dimension in the 
eye of the beholder, which can be fueled by the pleasure given to the spectators by 
some elegant gesture, by a high standard and skill displayed for the performance 
of acts requiring a certain prowess, by the presence of a certain ‘disinterestedness’ 
besides the goal of winning (if we abstract ourselves from the professionaliza-
tion of some sports). See Light & Smith (2005). Yuriko Saito, who focuses in 
the same book on the aesthetics of daily weather, offers in her own 2007 book a 
theory on everyday aesthetics, considering as aesthetic different characteristics 
of ambiences, features of transience in day-to-day environments (associating to 
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with Baudelaire’s famous The 
Painter of Modern Life or Walter Benjamin’s accounts of urban flânerie. 
In all these experiences, we can pertinently consider aesthetic values 
and properties such as the beautiful, the sublime, the picturesque, the el-
egant, the stylish, the dexterous, the transient, etc. The fact that some in-
tentional factors or purpose, semantic content or an identifiable creator 
may be absent does not prevent the existence of aesthetic properties that 
can be enjoyed or aesthetic values that should be taken into account as 
factors of consideration and evaluation determining affective responses, 
preferences and choices.
In other words, aesthetic values are only a portion of the values that 
are taken into account in the evaluation of artworks or artistic practices. 
And here it is maybe relevant to recall and emphasize that artistic ex-
periences are, obviously, not reducible to the experiences of reception 
and critique of artworks since they also include creative activities and 
mixed activities of enjoyment and participation in artistic events and 
performances. In all these artistic experiences, performances or events 
but also in the critical acts of appreciation and evaluation, some kind 
of cognitive, ethical, political, historical, sociological or economic val-
ues frequently need to be considered. Art is a cultural phenomenon, 
sociologically and anthropologically complex, which can be evaluated 
according to several criteria, amongst which aesthetic values are not 
even the most important and sometimes are in fact almost absent. In 
the complex but ever-growing world of the art market and the strato-
spheric financial value of some artworks, the valuation of art is not so 
much an aesthetic process of evaluation but instead a multi-agent pro-
cess of (mainly financial) worth estimation, which depends on market 
laws, scarcity or uniqueness, but also on cultural aura, trends, originali-
ty, authenticity, craftsmanship or virtuosity, celebrity and market worth 
of artists, reputation of previous owners and sometimes academic and 
institutional legitimacy given by scholars and experts.18
them aesthetic terms like ‘neat’, ‘messy’ or ‘disorganized’) or the feelings related 
to ageing processes. For more details, see Saito (2007).
18 Recently, a collective book written by several scholars, most of them working at 
the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris and under the direc-
tion of sociologist and contemporary art expert Nathalie Heinich and the already 
mentioned philosophers of art, J.-M. Schaeffer and C. Talon-Hugon, analyses a set 
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Furthermore, when considering art history and contemporary ar-
tistic production, we can easily recognize an avant-gardist tendency – 
a tendency that came after and opposed to the aestheticism of ‘art for 
art’s sake’ for which the value of art was essentially tied to its ability to 
produce aesthetic experiences – a tendency to annihilate the aesthetic 
conditions and the sensorial or expressive effects of art, a drive will-
ing to “de-aestheticize” art. This happened initially with the ready-
mades of Marcel Duchamp, an artist who would assume and himself 
theorize the “de-aestheticization” of his ready-made choices. Indeed, 
in a later text about the ‘ready-mades’, Duchamp wanted to state very 
clearly that ‘[their] choice was not dictated by any kind of aesthetic 
delectation’, but was instead ‘grounded on a reaction of visual indif-
ference, supplemented by a total lack of good or bad taste… actually, a 
complete anaesthesia’ (my translation).19 And subsequently, in the 60s 
and 70s, this attitude was reassumed by the promoters and creators of 
conceptual art. For them, a conceptual artwork should be free of ex-
pressive purposes and of aesthetic or emotional properties.20 It should 
be reduced down to its sole conception or to the mere transmission of 
its idea(s), eventually giving up any kind of object or performance that 
could embody it, any object which might become prone to apprecia-
tion or evaluation.
The value of conceptual art was –so it seemed at least – deliber-
ately condensed in its cognitive aspect. To be fair, conceptual art has 
frequently focused on social and political criticism and, for that reason, 
of art values ‘beyond beauty and ugliness’, as the title says, such as authenticity, 
perenniality, expensiveness, universality and responsibility among others, that 
give a wide and plural perspective on the value of art that goes way beyond the 
traditional view of aesthetic evaluation. See Heinich, Schaeffer & Talon-Hugon 
(2014). 
19 See Duchamp (1961: 191).
20 In a text published in 1967, the conceptual artist Sol LeWitt wrote some paragraphs 
on conceptual art where he declared: ‘In conceptual art the idea of concept is the 
most important aspect of the work. When an artist uses a conceptual form of art, it 
means that all of the planning and decisions are made beforehand and the execution 
is a perfunctory affair … It is usually free from the dependence on the skill of the 
artist as a craftsman. It is the objective of the artist who is concerned with concep-
tual art to make his work mentally interesting to the spectator, and therefore usually 
he would want it to become emotionally dry.’ See Alberro & Stimson (1999: 12). 
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referred mostly to ethical, political or cultural values.21 Therefore, it 
has often been praised (or instead blamed) for its political ideas or so-
cio-cultural criticism rather than for its aesthetic values. Despite its de-
liberate disallowance of aesthetic values, it does not mean though that 
conceptual artworks have been totally exempt from those kinds of val-
ues. As Elisabeth Schellenkens22 argued, even ideas – if conceptual art 
can actually be reduced solely to those23 – can have aesthetic properties 
and be appreciated for the sake of that: in the same way we can ascribe 
aesthetic qualities to intellectual non-artistic phenomena, like an ele-
gant philosophical argument or a harmonious mathematical proof, we 
can assign aesthetic values to conceptual art ideas even more. More-
over, the performative gesture of presentation of conceptual artworks 
gives them – even if allegedly against their author’s will – an aesthetic 
effect that at least virtually modifies (raises?) the value of those ideas. 
In other words, presenting an idea, a concept, with an artwork or artis-
tic performance is not the same as providing a propositional content, 
a scientific or even a philosophical argument in a non-artistic manner. 
Notwithstanding, this is not the same as saying that we can derive aes-
thetic value solely from the fact of its being an artwork – which would 
certainly be a concession to the aesthetic theory of art, a position that I 
repudiate here. Nonetheless and despite presenting itself often without 
object and willingly without the traditional aesthetic properties, which 
we are immediately ready to attribute to an artistic object, this is not 
enough to deprive it of an aesthetic value, nor to forbid the possibility 
of its evaluation, considering its eventual aesthetic values beyond the 
claimed cognitive, ethical or political ones.
21 To be fair, this socio-political dimension of conceptual art is frequently inherent 
to the goals of conceptual artists inasmuch as questioning art, what it is, what can 
count as art and what role art and, therefore, artists play in society are at the core 
of what contemporary conceptual artists are trying to do. 
22 See the chapter ‘The Aesthetic Value of Ideas’ in Goldie & Schellekens (2007: 
71–91).
23 A view that Sol LeWitt advocated in his 1969 Sentences on Conceptual Art: ‘10 – 
Ideas alone can be works of art; they are in a chain of development that may eventu-
ally find some form. All ideas need not be made physical.’ Likewise, Joseph Kosuth, 
in his famous Art after Philosophy (1969), also presents the tautology: ‘the ‘art idea’ 
(or ‘work’) and art are the same’. See Alberro & Stimson (1999: 107, 166).
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3.  Aesthetic values before and beyond the evaluation  
of artworks
At this point it is obvious that since aesthetic and artistic values do 
not coincide, we are allowed to speak of aesthetic values before and 
beyond the evaluation of artworks. Before: since, prior to the evalua-
tion of an artistic object, we must already possess a notion of aesthetic 
values which eventually might be taken – and frequently are taken – 
into account when artworks are considered, appreciated or critiqued. 
Primitive notions, like ‘beautiful’ or ‘ugly’ but also ‘harmonious’, ‘or-
dered’, ‘complex’, ‘integrated’, ‘elegant’, etc.24 – not to mention some 
perceptual notions like ‘coarse’, ‘shiny’, ‘strident’, ‘insipid’ or ‘fetid’ – 
certainly precede the notion of artistic object or even art, but further-
more the essence of the artworks is an intensification, problematisa-
tion, reflection, expression or even a representation/presentation of the 
aesthetic properties and values of natural or everyday experience. It is 
worth noticing that the aesthetic properties of nature have inspired mu-
sicians and painters (landscape painting in general being an obvious 
example, but also symphonic poems or imitative songs) and that even 
the most common and trivial properties of ordinary objects and every-
day experiences have been filtered by the eyes and the bodies of painters 
(in still-lifes and genre painting), writers (in novels and other literature 
formats), filmmakers (and not just in documentary films) and also other 
performance and contemporary artists, who in the last few decades have 
often blurred the frontiers between art and everyday life and addressed 
its most unassuming yet meaningful aspects. Beyond: for the reason 
that, as announced beforehand, we can put aesthetic values to good use 
in very different and non-artistic domains of human experience (sci-
ence, religion, philosophy, mathematics, tourism, gastronomy, interior 
design, sports, eroticism…).
But what specifically are those aesthetic values, where, when and 
how shall we take them into account? That is precisely what we must 
 
24 Some of these ‘aesthetic terms’, but not all of them, might actually be already 
found in the article mentioned by Frank Sibley. See Sibley (1959: 421–3).
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research from this point on whenever we are dealing with specific in-
stances of aesthetic experience and once a clarification of the connota-
tions and critical range of ‘aesthetic values’ – as I hope I have managed 
to provide – has been made.
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Images and Values: a Husserlian perspective
Claudio Rozzoni
1. Works of art neither exist nor do not exist 
Starting with the Husserlian notion of image object which is to be found 
in the Husserliana XXIII, this short text aims to shed some light on a 
concept of image that is both perceptual without being real and iconic 
without being a copy. I do think – and I will try here to sketch out why – 
that this very notion merits all the more attention in a moment when the 
reflection on art has to deal with so-called ‘immaterial’ or ‘ephemeral’ 
works and, from many points of view, is undergoing a ‘crisis of values’. 
Indeed, a renewed inquiry on the Husserlian characterization of images 
can represent an important step to establishing the basis and a possibil-
ity of development for a phenomenological comprehension of the rela-
tionship between facts and values in aesthetics; more precisely, between 
those unreal – yet perceptive – ‘facts’ called artworks and values.
In order to proceed in an orderly fashion, it is very useful firstly to 
pay attention to the way in which the notion of image object is called 
into question in Husserl’s famous lecture course, entitled Phantasie und 
Bildbewußtsein [Phantasy and Image Consciousness] (1904/05) and 
edited in Hua XXIII. On this occasion, the father of Phenomenology 
famously tries to describe the essential characteristics of image distin-
guishing three moments that are supposed to constitute it. That is to 
say, the ‘image thing [Bildding]’, namely the image carrier, the ‘image 
object [Bildobjekt]’ (Husserl 2005: 20) and the ‘image subject [Bildsu-
jet]’, which can be considered as what the image object is a ‘represent-
ant’ for (Husserl 2005: 21). 
Regarding the term representant [Repräsentant], it has to be spec-
ified that by writing that the image object is a representant for an image 
subject, Husserl is not at all saying that it is hereby meant to be a sign 
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of it. The reference lies in the image itself, and this internal reference is 
indeed an essential characteristic that distinguishes an image from signs 
and symbols, which, in turn, refer to something else externally (Hus-
serl 2005: 31). In his text entitled Artificial Presence, Lambert Wiesing 
significantly had recourse to this very background pointing out that on 
the Husserlian basis we can distinguish between ‘the depiction that be-
comes visible’ (Wiesing 2010: 31), that is the image object, and ‘the 
material that makes the depiction visible’ (Wiesing 2009: 31), namely 
the ‘image carrier’ (Wiesing 2010: 30). This consideration of image 
regards the case of ‘physical images’ – distinguished from what Husserl 
in the same course calls ‘phantasy images’ (cf. Husserl 2005: 20) – then 
this subdivision also regards images that we find in works of arts such 
as paintings, photographs, films and theatrical plays as well. The reason 
why I am calling Wiesing’s text into question is due to the way in which 
he characterizes the consistence of the image object, which is that of ‘an 
immaterial, which means exclusively visible, object … brought into ap-
pearance [Erscheinung] by means of a material image carrier’ (Wiesing 
2010: 35). According to such a description, the image object, it could 
also be said, is not the fact, but, at least at first sight, the appearance of 
the fact. We will return to this point later.
Thus, it seems that in perceiving an image, a not-seeing is implied 
in this process in the sense that in order for the image object to appear 
[erscheinen], the physical image does not have to be seen – although 
it is apprehended. What we properly see in addressing the image does 
not appear to be the image as a ‘thing’, that is to say, the very im-
age that, for example, could possibly be broken by, say, an iconoclast. 
What we see in a regime of image consciousness is the image object, 
and the kind of perception we undergo is directed to – or, we could 
add, is addressed by – an ‘immaterial … object’, ‘exclusively visible’, 
an object that is ‘not subject to the laws of physics’. An iconoclast, as 
I said, might destroy the image thing but, properly speaking, cannot 
demolish the image object (although destroying its material condition 
de facto causes its disappearance). In this very sense, it can be stated 
that the factual canvas can be ripped into pieces but not the image object 
appearing on its material basis. As Wiesing puts it, the image object is 
‘an artificial presence’ (Wiesing 2010: 20). Also taking into considera-
tion Fiedler’s and Sartre’s lessons, Wiesing notes that ‘the visibility of 
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a pictorially depicted thing is not attached to a substance that could also 
be perceived by other senses’ (Wiesing 2010: 20).
Let us now return to Husserl in order to specifically address, in his 
phenomenological terms, the issue concerning artistic images. If we 
refer to the case of a work of art, it seems that in experiencing it, we are 
not interested in its existence, or rather in any existing at all. According 
to this, it can be said that the image object appears without existing 
(‘it has no existence at all’ [Husserl 2005: 23]), indeed as a nothing. It 
surely manifests itself – we can see it, even though only see it – but as 
something that cannot be said to be existent.
With regard to this aspect, a document of great significance is a 
Husserlian manuscript dating back to 19061. It is extremely important 
for at least two reasons. First, here Husserl directly refers to aesthetics 
[Ästhetik], not only to the essence of images in general then, but also 
to the essence of ‘works of art’. Secondly, here Husserl introduces the 
question of the value of a work of art, giving us a first clue to defin-
ing his use of the term Wertnehmung in relation to these objects that 
seem not to be considered as existing. Nevertheless, works of art are 
not – nota bene – without existence. They are not ‘non-existent’, which 
would presuppose a negation of their existence and consequently a po-
sition taking toward their existence.
2. Being disinterested
As regards this aspect, another very important document can profita-
bly be brought into play: a famous letter Husserl writes to Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal only a year after this first part of the manuscript I have 
just referred to. Hofmannsthal visited Husserl in December 1906. The 
former was in Göttingen (where the latter was teaching at the time) to 
give a lecture, and on that occasion offered the philosopher a literary 
1 Cf. MS A VI 1 [1906–1918]. Preserved at the Husserl Archive in Leuven. I would 
like to thank the Husserl Archives in Leuven for permission to quote from Hus-
serl’s Nachlass.
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gift, ‘presumably’ his Kleine Dramen [Short Dramas]2. Husserl’s letter 
is the response to that present, but very soon, and very clearly, becomes 
the occasion for him to speak about similarities between two figures, 
that of the phenomenologist and that of the artist. What is the position – 
he asks – the two of them share? The answer to this question interest-
ingly concerns the question of attitude, to be precise, a very particular 
‘attitude towards all forms of objectivity’ (Husserl 2009: 2). As far as the 
artist is concerned, s/he suspends ‘all attitudes relating to emotions and 
the will which presuppose such an existential attitude’ (Husserl 2009: 2).
Furthermore, it is worth pointing out the fact that here Husserl 
de facto also speaks about another precise figure, still an artistic one, 
representing an essential part of the aesthetic experience, that is to say, 
that of the spectator. For the spectator too, no interest in the existence of 
the object observed in contemplating the work of art is involved. If that 
were the case, the spectator would lose the ‘purely aesthetic’ experience 
(Husserl 2009: 2). He would be involved in – he would be concerned 
about – the existence of what he is seeing, he could feel joy at the exist-
ence of something, he could want to desire something, and so on. Here, 
as has already been suggested by other scholars, we can hear a Kantian 
echo insofar as for Husserl ‘art must exclude all influences from the 
intellect and the will’3 (Wallenstein 2009: 4).
Husserl develops this very issue by stating that in the aesthetic atti-
tude we suspend judgment about the things before us. Undoubtedly, we 
can still have feelings before the things we see in this attitude. Never-
theless, these are feelings which do not depend on the existence of what 
we are perceiving. We are not interested in the existence of the work of 
art. Of course, what we feel in aesthetic experience can possibly depend 
on its materiality. However, even in this case, our feelings do not rest 
on the materiality conceived of as something existing, and this holds 
true also when viewing a monochrome artistic image: a Gerhard Rich-
ter grey monochrome painting in this sense becomes an image object, 
‘the grey presenting itself in the image and as an image is not posited 
2 Cf. Husserl (2009: 2, translator’s note 2).
3 Regarding this aspect, ‘in many of his descriptions, Husserl appears to be retriev-
ing the Kantian vocabulary of imagination and beauty in the third Critique, for 
instance when he determines phantasy as the domain of “disinterestedness” … , 
“purposelessness”, and “play”’ (Wallenstein 2009: 3).
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as real’ (Lotz 2010: 178). We do not perceive this object as a real col-
our insofar as we are able to see the image object that the work of art 
makes appear for us, this image object which is not ‘subject to the laws 
of physics’, even though it appears on the basis of something physical.
In fact, Husserl recognizes a similar attitude as peculiar also to the 
philosopher. The parallel he draws in the letter to Hofmannsthal lies in 
the fact that phenomenologist and artist – and spectator, we might add – 
see the world as appearance [Erscheinung]. They are not interested in 
the fact world, but in the sense which makes this fact possible, in its 
ways of appearance. Thus, what both are looking at is this very sense, 
which the phenomenologist tries to give back with ‘concepts’, and the 
artist, who must ‘have genius’ (another Kantian reminiscence), through 
‘intuitions’ (Husserl 2009: 2).
In the very same manuscript of 1906, this particular suspension 
of existence is related to the question of the values of the work of art. 
This issue can also be connected to another regarding the peculiar 
essence of artistic images: what is it that indeed allows an image to 
be a work of art? Not all images are works of art of course, but what 
then makes an image a work of art? Here Husserl calls into question 
two points as simple as they are decisive. He tells us that in aesthetic 
experience we have 1) a ‘value perception’4 [Wertnehmen], we have 
intuition of an ‘aesthetic-axiologic object’, and 2) we experience par-
ticular feelings, specifically those feelings I referred to earlier, that is 
to say, all those feelings which do not have their reason in the exist-
ence of the object we are looking at.
Besides, Husserl makes it very clear that once the relevance of 
these two moments is stressed, we have to face the problem of their 
relationship. In this intricate question, one thing seems at least to be 
certain: value and feelings, in aesthetic experience, are not related to 
the existence of the object, not to the object-thing, to the thing in ‘flesh 
and blood’, as is the case in the perceptual attitude, but to the image 
object, to its ‘way of appearance, in and for itself [Erscheinungsweise, 
an und für sich]’5. In ‘the aesthetic attitude’, Husserl specifies, ‘I do not’ 
4 Cf. Ms A VI 1/2a.
5 Cf. Ms A VI 1/2a. And not only regarding the work of art, seeing that Husserl, still 
in 1906, writes that ‘different appearances of the same object are not equivalent 
in this affective direction. The disposition of vases, ashtrays, and so forth, in the 
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even ‘think about the appearance and do not make it into a theoretical 
object’ or a ‘practical’ one, ‘tak[ing] delight in it as something actual’. 
The existence here is ‘out of play’. Husserl himself, at this very point, 
significantly writes ‘see […] Kant’s theory’6.
3. Perception and belief 
Once made clear that the appearance of the image object is neither 
characterized as existent nor as non-existent, one could ask about the 
existence of values and feelings experienced when viewing it: do they 
exist? It is a very complicated question indeed. We can start off by say-
ing that, for Husserl, value is not something external to the object, but 
something of which I have intuition while looking at the work of art. 
Of course, Husserl, in this manuscript, recognizes more meanings of 
value, among which the technical value of the work of art (the example 
singled out  here as elsewhere is the Madonna by Raffaello) and the 
value of the work in the art market – that, at least on a first level, can be 
seen as something external to works of art. However, the most critical 
point is that concerning the relationship between the originary aesthetic 
pleasure I feel in enjoying the work and my intuition of values brought 
about in this experience.
Husserl himself poses the question in a way that is as simple as 
it is inextricable: ‘Now, how are value perception [Wertnehmen], val-
ue intuition [Werterschauen], and aesthetic pleasure related? […] Are 
they the same thing, or do they coincide?’7. The difference seems to be 
qualitative: appreciating, Husserl affirms, might require ‘no grade’ and 
be independent from the joy: ‘The joy can become 0 (zero), and yet 
I appreciate’8. From this point of view, value does not seem to be an in-
tensive notion, there does not seem to be any gradualness in evaluating. 
drawing-room. “Which arrangement is most beautiful?”’ (Ms A VI 1/12b, in Hus-
serl 2005: 168).
6 Cf. Ms A VI 1/12b, in Husserl 2005: 168, Husserl’s note.
7 Cf. Ms A VI 1/2a.
8 Cf. Ms A VI 1/2a.
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Nonetheless, this case regarding the ‘zero grade’ of evaluating could 
certainly refer to the evaluating moment regarding technical value. In 
other words, I could appreciate a work of art without feeling aesthetic 
pleasure. And yet we have to inquire about a more intimate relationship 
between the moment of the nature of pleasure and the intuition of value. 
Before moving on, however, it can prove very useful to focus on some 
other points that have a correlation with those we have pursued till now.
In a manuscript from 1912, about six years after the one we have 
just discussed, Husserl develops some decisive notions related to the 
issue of the peculiar ‘non-existence’ of the work of art. First of all, one 
point is made clear. While contemplating ‘performances in a stage play’ 
or a ‘painting’, I am experiencing ficta complying with perceptio, and 
that from the very beginning. We live from the very beginning in a con-
sciousness that does not presuppose any statement about the existence 
of what we are experiencing. In this case, we are ‘living in the iconic 
consciousness’ and ‘take the image neither as existing nor as nonexist-
ing’ (Husserl 2005: 457). It should be noted how here we have an inter-
esting name for this peculiar consciousness without existence: iconic 
consciousness. The fact that Husserl chooses to refer also to theatre is of 
particular interest because, six years later, he will linger again on the art 
of the stage in a text that occupies a relevant role in the definition of his 
idea of image. If I am experiencing, as in these cases, artistic images, 
I am not considering the ‘nullness’ of the image object. Surely, ‘I can 
turn toward the image object. I can also carry out an act of disbelief, the 
consciousness of nullity’ (Husserl 2005: 457), but this is not the essen-
tial moment of my aesthetic experience9. The artificial dimension of the 
image object does not seem to concern my intuition of the subject of the 
image10, ‘of which I am conscious in the free iconic exhibiting from 
the beginning, without taking a position with respect to it’ (Husserl 
9 ‘Consciousness of nullity’ does not come about when I turn toward the image 
carrier, the bearer [Träger] of the image object, as Husserl also called it, but rather 
‘toward the image object’ (Husserl 2005: 457).
10 ‘In both cases, further position takings can be built up: Thus, on the one hand, I 
describe the subject of the oil painting. I carry out explications, comparisons, and 
so on, actual “acts of judgment” – actual acts, though modified, since I precisely 
have no belief. But I can also judge about the things, human beings, and so on, 
belonging to iconic phantasy’ (Husserl 2005: 457).
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2005: 457). Also according to what we discussed above then, the sub-
ject is not considered to be existing any more than it is considered not to 
be existing. Thus, echoing the terms of the 1907 letter to Hofmannsthal, 
one could also suggest that we are not interested in its existence. This is 
certainly true if we hold to the fact that ‘when we are living in an aes-
thetic consciousness’, Husserl says, ‘we ask no questions about the be-
ing and nonbeing of what … appears in an image’ (Husserl 2005: 459).
Before we proceed in this direction, let me spend only a few words 
to clarify why, in the last paragraph, I chose to translate the Husserlian 
expression ‘perzeptive Fikta’ with the English translation ‘ficta com-
plying with perceptio’ instead of the more immediate ‘perceptive ficta’. 
The reason why I preferred the first solution is that I sought to high-
light a significant distinction Husserl makes between the two German 
terms that could stand for perception, that is to say, Wahrnehmung and 
Perzeption. It is important to introduce such a distinction because it is 
highly relevant for the characterization of the peculiar consciousness 
that accompanies aesthetic experience. As early as 1912, the notion of 
iconic consciousness entails a vision that is merely complying with per-
ceptio [perzeptive] without being perceptive [Wahrnehmung-]. By pos-
ing this distinction, Husserl tries to distinguish between perception as 
Perzeption and perception as Wahrnehmung. To put it in simpler words, 
we could say that Perzeption is ‘pure positionless’ perception (Husserl 
2005: 556). As Husserl already pointed out in his Dingvorlesung, per-
ceptio, unlike Wahrnehmung, ‘does not hold [nimmt] anything as true 
[Wahr]’11.
Furthermore, in the manuscripts from 1912, significant attention is 
paid to the connection between aesthetic consciousness – namely, this 
iconic consciousness complying with perceptio – and both the axiolog-
ical and sentimental dimension. Husserl states this very clearly: ‘In the 
 
11 Cf. Husserl (1973: 16). This decisive point came to light in all its significance in a 
text from around 1918, which is to be found in the Hua XXIII as well, and which 
we cannot linger on here. In this text, Husserl pays attention once again – and this 
time even more considerably – to the theatrical experience. In order to give a phe-
nomenological account of what we see on the stage as spectators, he underlines 
how even if it can be said that we see actors in flesh and blood, we do not actually 
see them as existing people. We are not at all interested in their existence.
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case of iconic acts’, ‘aesthetic valuation is essentially connected with 
… the object’s manner of appearing’, and through these appearances, 
‘we not only have the feelings of aesthetic valuing but also the feelings 
(or quasi-feelings) awakened in us as “reactions” – fear and pity, and 
so on’ (Husserl 2005: 460–461). What is particularly worth specifying 
here is that ‘aesthetic feeling … does not aim through the appearance 
but aims at it, and aims at the object only “for the sake of the appear-
ance”’ (Husserl 2005: 464). Hence, this aesthetic attitude does not re-
quire ‘that I posit the correlate’. I do not pose ‘what appears as such’: 
I am not living it as existing, rather ‘I live in the appearing’ (Husserl 
2005: 521). We cannot linger too much on this question, but suffice it to 
say that here it becomes clear how the possible interest in the existence 
of the subject ‘shifts back’, as it were, to its ways of appearance, namely 
to artificial presences that are not touched by such an existential issue.
This point deservers particular attention because it would be inter-
esting to ponder whether there is a possibility of finding a moment of 
position taking precisely in this living without position taking, in this 
experience which merely fits perceptio [perzeptive] without posing any 
existence. Such an experience, as we have seen, entails a contemplation 
of the ways of appearance of image objects, which are more impalpa-
ble and ungraspable ‘presences’ than they are facts. A hint for inquir-
ing about this opportunity can be found in Husserl’s effort to attain the 
peculiar quality of ‘as-if ’ feelings thought in relation to the notion of 
value. Husserl seems to point in this very direction when, in another 
manuscript from 1912, while reaffirming that in aesthetic experience 
‘I do not … carry out any position taking with respect to what appears’, 
he envisages the exception of an ‘aesthetic position taking that belongs 
to feeling’ (Husserl 2005: 521), namely the possibility of ‘carry[ing] 
out’ an ‘aesthetic valuing’ (Husserl 2005: 522).
At this very point, we could easily come full circle regarding the 
references to the Kantian aesthetic judgment seeing that Husserl often 
refers to aesthetic value as a value entailing the idea of beauty12, as he 
writes in a text probably from 1917, a ‘beauty-value [Schönheitswert]’ 
 
12 ‘The taking of a position toward what appears when it is valued as beautiful and 
ugly’ (Husserl 2005: 482). ‘Now what appears does indeed stand before me as 
beautiful “by virtue of its mode of appearance”’ (Husserl 2005: 522).
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(Husserl 2005: 649). More precisely, this is in the particular sense of 
a beauty felt as a value insofar as in this case ‘what appears stands be-
fore me in its value-characteristic’ (Husserl 2005: 522). Even though 
in aesthetic experience we do not value the existence of the objectivity 
concerned, it is not for this reason that we cannot ‘value its modes of 
appearance … or we can value it as appearing in such and such a way’ 
(Husserl 2005: 647). If we can experience an ‘object of the beauty- 
evaluation’, ‘we would then … have something beautiful that exists’ 
(Husserl 2005: 649; my italics). Consequently, it seems that we have a 
sort of existence also in the case in which we are not interested in the 
existence of what we are viewing. At least from this point of view, it can 
be said that we have an existence in the non-existence of a ‘mere fig-
ment’, of ‘an “image”’, an existence ‘which is precisely an ideal object 
and not a ‘real’ object’ (Husserl 2005: 649). More specifically, in these 
cases we are dealing with a non-psychological ideality because the val-
ue ‘does not lie’ in my enjoying it because the value can ‘exist without 
being enjoyed’ (Husserl 2005: 649).
4. Interested spectators
This last remark leads us directly to a fundamental point regarding 
the possibilities of experience opened up for us in aesthetic attitude. 
I am going to conclude calling upon a course Husserl repeatedly in-
tended to publish and in which ‘the phenomenological claim of phi-
losophy is presented and developed in all its extent’13. I am referring 
to the course Husserl gave in Freiburg in 1923–1924, and which is 
known under the title of First Philosophy. Here, many of the aspects 
we have dealt with up to this point find an interesting and renewed 
formulation in very intense pages about the nature of images. We have 
already noticed how, in Husserl’s letter to Hofmannsthal, the figure 
of the spectator implicitly arose from the parallel between the artistic 
 
13 Cf. Costa 2007: xi.
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and phenomenological attitude. In First Philosophy, this very figure 
explicitly becomes a theme for the Husserlian reflection on image 
consciousness. It is important to recall that also in the pages we are 
referring to, as in the 1907 Letter, Husserl draws a parallel between 
artistic and phenomenological experience. Once again, echoing issues 
already raised in the previous work, in these pages the way in which 
the notion of value and feeling are concerned is highlighted in order 
to characterize the aesthetic experience. In the letter to Hofmannsthal, 
Husserl concluded by stating, although very quickly, that the artist 
‘follow[s], purely and solely, his daimonion … which drives him to 
an intuiting-blind production’ (Husserl 2009: 2). Interestingly, it could 
be said that in First Philosophy this very ‘intuiting-blind’ dimension 
is brought about by the notion of value, by a dynamis that must have 
the validity of value (cf. Husserl 1959: 100). The artist works value 
through ‘pleasure’ and ‘disgust’ (Husserl 1959: 101). And again this 
validity is something I must feel because the aesthetic attitude is – 
once again bearing in mind Kant’s Third Critique – that of sentiment. 
That is why the art critic cannot be told to operate in aesthetic attitude 
but rather in a theoretical attitude where, of course, he can deservedly 
speak of value, but only in this sense did the 1906 manuscript seem to 
refer, namely, to the sense in which a specific aesthetic pleasure can 
also not be implied.
Above all, it is important to stress here that the paradox regarding 
the relationship between interest and disinterest is finally formulated. 
One decisive point is reached at the moment when Husserl calls upon 
‘affective interest [Gemütsinteresse]’ (Husserl 1959: 194) and when val-
ue becomes the theme of an aesthetic intention. Thus, it can be said that 
a work of art is not judged but valued. Here again Husserl plays, as it 
were, with the German word ‘wahrnehmen’, which, as we have seen, 
as early as in his Dingvorlesung from 1907, he characterizes as ‘hold-
ing as true’, as a perceiving that entails in itself the character of belief 
(in opposition, as we have seen, to the perceptio, that is to say, a pure 
percipere without belief). On this very occasion, he plays with words 
by saying that ‘the value itself, in its value-truth [Wertwahrheit], is not 
perceived [wahrgenommen] but, so to speak, held as value [wertgenom-
men]’ (Husserl 1959: 104). Hence, even though the attitude of experi-
encing a work of art cannot be described in terms of perception (but 
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only in terms of perceptio), nonetheless it can at the same time be stated 
that in the aesthetic attitude we still have an act of position analogous 
to that of perception as Wahr-nehmung (the one in which, as we have 
said, we are interested in the existence of the thing experienced). In the 
aesthetic attitude we suspended the latter and we have no interest in the 
existence of the thing, but only in its ways of appearance. What kind of 
position are we allowed to experience then? Even if we can in reason af-
firm that the aesthetic spectator experiences these non-positional noth-
ingnesses which image objects are – and that he is not at all interested in 
the existence of the things he contemplates – Husserl can now state that 
the ‘aesthetic spectator lives in the interest of evaluation’. And this is 
a positional moment, a Wert-nehmen. (Of course, the art critic can at a 
later stage direct his interest to the object theoretically, but, indeed, only 
subsequently.) The value, ‘as the telos of the sentiment’, has to be, ‘so 
to speak, already available as valued’, ‘valued in itself in the value per-
ception’: that is what finally made possible the perception of a ‘value- 
object’ (Husserl 1959: 104–105).
We can then ‘not be’ interested in the existence of the image object 
(only in its way of appearance), but we are interested in the existence of 
the value-object. Hence, not only in positional perception do we experi-
ence values but also, finally, do we discover values in the nothingness of 
art. These nothingnesses that we have called image objects, these sim-
ulacra, reveal themselves to be endowed with a possibility of opening 
values to us and, according to what Husserl affirms in First Philosophy, 
opening a particular telos to us which we feel and which possesses the 
productive power of the dynamis. As Vincenzo Costa put it so well, 
‘a value can appear in itself as something that attracts’ us insofar as 
we ‘feel it as something whose existence concerns our very existence’ 
(Costa 2014: 140). In this very sense, before works of art and before our 
‘possibilities’ of responding to the values we perceive, we can finally be 
said to be interested spectators.
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The Value(s) of Cinema: Mise-en-scène, Point  
of View and Ethical Problems
Maria Irene Aparício 
‘One need not be a chamber to be haunted,
One need not be a house;
The brain has corridors surpassing
Material place.’
***
‘Delight becomes pictorial 
When viewed through pain,
More fair, because impossible
That any gain.’ 
Emily Dickinson
On April 3rd, 1986, Stanley Cavell delivered a Tanner Lecture1 at Stan-
ford University on the subject The Uncanniness of the Ordinary. In that 
lecture the author returned to some subjects he had already dealt with 
in Must We Mean What We Say? (1969), including the philosophy of the 
ordinary e.g. the subjects of language use, experience, and world, to J. 
L. Austin’s similar questions and also to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations, particularly the issue concerning the relation between 
thought and practice. Cavell underlines the idea of ‘its relative neglect 
in contemporary intellectual life’ (Cavell 1986: 83), and he explains the 
meaning of the ‘Uncanniness of the ordinary’ as ‘… the possibility or 
threat of what philosophy has called scepticism, understood … as the 
 
1 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values were founded on July 1st, 1978, by the 
American scholar Obert Clark Tanner (1904–1993) at Clare Hall, Cambridge 
University. Presented annually, the Lectures reflect upon the scientific and aca-
demic learning related to human values.
338 Maria Irene Aparício
capacity, even desire, of ordinary language to repudiate itself, specifi-
cally to repudiate its power to word the world2, to apply to the things we 
have in common, or to pass them by’3. In a certain way, he considers 
that one has to trust the value and truth of an idea or belief, or one may 
be missing important opportunities and experiences. Previously, writ-
ing about the relation between ‘artwork’ classification and evaluation 
Cavell also emphasizes that ‘works of art are valuable’, but their ‘value 
is inescapable in human experience, and conduct is one of the facts of 
life, and of art, which modern art lays bare’ (Cavell 1976 [1969]: 216).
This time, I will not take these questions any further, but Cavell’s 
concern relates to my point since the purpose of this essay is an attempt 
to understand whether the specific ‘language’ of cinema, as both an art 
and a popular medium, can embody the ‘uncanny of the ordinary’, with 
it being a chance to learn something about the most trivial but fearful 
or (in)significant experiences of life which otherwise would be difficult 
to apprehend. That means to assume that film can describe and shape 
common feelings, and deal with philosophical questions like ethics and 
moral standards. Sometimes cinema’s description or representation are 
even able to change audiences’ opinions and political thinking about 
sensitive issues like otherness or human rights, for instance. Thus, the 
cross-question is: what is the power of film to depict and influence peo-
ple’s decisions throughout the course of their ordinary lives, simply by 
highlighting their dilemmas, gestures and the possible future conse-
quences of every action? For Cavell ‘the magic of Hollywood is that 
it offers us not an escape from the burden of, say, Kant but, precisely, 
engagement with it’ (Melville 1993: 172–192, 173), which means to as-
sume film as philosophy through the connection between art, experience 
and thought. The author distinguishes between ‘language, experience 
and world’, whereas our main objective is to show the relation between 
film, experience, world and moral life. The issue leads us to the cinema’s 
 
2 Our emphasis. 
3 Cavell (1986: 84). Carroll would express a similar idea about the relation between 
art and ethics: ‘There has been … a gap between theory and practice with respect 
to the ethical criticism of the arts throughout the twentieth century – a gap intensi-
fied by philosophy’s silence about the relation between ethics and art’. Cf. Carroll 
(2000: 350, 350–387). 
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connection with intellectual life – since films are related to human per-
ception and thought. Besides, we are interested in understanding the 
relevance of contemporary art’s practices to the discussion of humani-
ties, including their influence on a future ‘way of life’ – a culture. The 
cinematic aesthetic form is an artistic and cultural representation, but 
also a popular one, with a strong effect on behaviours and peoples’ lives.
In short, I will attempt to find evidence of cinema’s link with eth-
ical and moral value(s) by discussing the following subjects: a) what 
kind of values and judgments are represented in films? b) Can we learn 
about human values like freedom, courage, loyalty and honesty by 
simply seeing movies? c) How does the mise-en-scène and the uses of 
points of view shape moral thoughts and bring about ethical decisions, 
leading to the sense that good should prevail over evil? Finally, what 
‘practice’ of value is this about? If some films can raise the vexed ques-
tions of human values, the contrary is also true; ethics and moral issues 
provide the cinema with the substance for its stories and mark the high 
point in contemporary debates on values in the arts and visual culture. 
I am quite sure that Sophie’s Choice (Alan J. Pakula, USA, 1982, 152’) 
is one of those films, and if analysed with reference to the narrative 
historical context it can be very revealing of what humans are capable 
of, and what one can do and think under difficult or extreme conditions.
In order to identify the relevant problems which arise from the 
cinematic mise-en-scène and the film editing, or montage, of Sophie’s 
Choice, I will look at the characters’ performances and their involve-
ment in moral judgment processes. From a philosophical perspective 
there are some important concepts, such as free will and reasoning and 
decision, that we can apply to both the characters’ performances and 
the spectator’s judgment. These concepts will help us to understand the 
problem of showing ethical and moral judgments in cinema and to think 
about the differences between describing a value system and represent-
ing it in cinematic narratives, according to the actions of everyday life. 
In this context, I will consider the mise-en-scène as a multi-lay-
ered process – form and narrative – that includes the general elements 
placed in front of the camera, like settings, props, costumes, the actors’ 
performances, gestures or facial expressions, and camera movements 
and angles, but also cinema’s possibility of breaking the sense of trivial 
‘pictures’ and moments of ordinary life by changing points of view. 
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This way, the mise-en-scène can mirror human experience and life by 
spotting its movements and details that, beyond the camera, have little 
value or no visibility at all. Besides, this is a common assertion that had 
already been transmitted by some philosophers and film scholars; films 
allow us to see life as it has never been seen before. Trivial moments 
of life, once projected, may appear odd, unusual and unexpected expe-
riences. By changing a single point of view, what is normal suddenly 
becomes uncanny, i.e. too close or too far, even difficult or impossible 
to explain.
 In Sophie’s Choice, the characters’ stories appear like real se-
quences of events which they cannot control or interfere with. By sim-
ply using a character’s point of view – which is, in fact, the director’s 
voice – ‘life’ becomes something to look at and to think about: from 
both an aesthetic and an ethical viewpoint. The film’s sense depends on 
the director’s particular vision and system, though decoding its political 
meaning is not difficult if one has particular knowledge about the sub-
ject, or recognizes something related to both history and everyday life. 
With this in mind, it is not difficult to identify the current philosophical 
focus of public debate on film and values. Sophie’s Choice exposes, in-
deed, a common knowledge of principles (i.e. moral rules or standards 
of good behaviour) as well as the consequences of any personal or po-
litical ‘transgression’. In order to perceive the common/moral level of 
the film, I will address to both the description of values and their filmic 
representation in the context of history. Actually, the social and political 
condition surrounding Sophie’s life – the war and its aftermath as one of 
the greatest tragedies the world has ever known – is an important refer-
ence for the mise-en-scène, tracing out the complicated lines of reason-
ing that lead spectators to form their own judgments and conclusions. 
1. Mise-en-scène: pictures and values
The concept of mise-en-scène has been discussed by many authors, 
filmmakers and philosophers. On the one hand, the mise-en-scène is 
connected with the concept of space and the film frame; on the other, 
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it is an ambiguous dimension of cinema because it figures a subjective 
vision influenced by or based on personal beliefs or feelings rather than 
based on facts. Underlining its ambiguity, Adrian Martin refers to the 
concept as a controversial issue and even as an undefined term, but also 
as a kind of ‘pure style’: ‘Mise-en-scène can transform the elements of 
a given scene; it can transform a narrative’s destination; it can trans-
form our mood or our understanding as we experience the film. Style is 
not a supplement to content; it makes content – and remakes it, too, in 
flight.’4 In other words, the mise-en-scène – i.e. the construction of an 
atmosphere, the feeling of a place or situation – is the first motto of the 
film in the sense that it expresses the mood of the characters, their prin-
ciples of good and correct behaviour, etc. The second one is the point of 
view as we will see in our case study.
Sophie’s Choice is Alan J. Pakula’s cinematic adaptation of William 
Styron’s homonymous novel (1979)5. The film tells the story of Sophie 
Zawistowska (Meryl Streep) a Polish Roman Catholic immigrant living 
in Brooklyn with her lover Nathan Landau (Kevin Kline), who is a Jew 
and a rather mad genius diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic, and who 
is obsessed with the Nazis narrow escape from justice. The film is set in 
1947, two years after the end of the Second World War, and it is narrated 
by another character, Stingo (Peter MacNicol), an aspiring young writer 
looking for inspiration for his first novel. He soon becomes Sophie’s and 
Nathan’s closest friend. Stingo is newly-arrived from The South, a detail 
4 Martin writes a brief history of the concept and refers to several different defi-
nitions used by other authors. He also says: ‘… the term seems to mean (a little 
mystically) everything, cinema as an expressive art form becoming synonymous 
with mise-en-scène; … [But] mise-en-scène is nothing very specific’’ and, finally, 
he says: ‘For my part … I want to hold onto Ruiz’s sense of mise-en-scène as 
always potentially transformative – but transformative in ways that refer to the 
entire materiality of cinema, not solely the inspiration of a director on set or the 
phenomenological subjectivity of enraptured viewers. Transformation is not tran-
scendence.’ (Martin 2014: 13, 19–20). However, this controversy is not our point 
here and this matter will not be discussed.
5 In 1980, the American writer William Styron (1925–2006) won the National Book 
Award with the novel Sophie’s Choice. However, the book was very controversial 
and widely criticized. It was banned in Poland and South Africa, and censored in 
the Soviet Union. In the USA, it was forbidden in some high schools, probably 
due to the sexually explicit scenes. 
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which may be seen as an indirect reference to slavery, another ghostly 
reference and itself a tragic episode of history. In his ‘Introduction’ to 
the book The Cunning of History (1978), William Styron would state 
that: ‘If slavery was the great historical nightmare of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries in the Western world, it was slavery’s continuation, 
in the horror we have come to call Auschwitz, which is the nightmare 
of our own century’6. Although we cannot be sure if this detail of the 
story means a fate of inherited guilt for the characters, it is quite clear 
that human rights are the general background of the film and that all the 
characters have to deal with a kind of guilt by descent. 
Following the story we learn that Sophie is a survivor of the 
Auschwitz concentration camp. Her father was an anti-Semitic lawyer7, 
yet he was shot in a camp, just like Sophie’s husband. Sophie’s life is 
a tragedy, full of secrets, lies and hidden details of her past life that 
she will tell only to her friend Stingo in that long flashback in the film, 
bringing back painful memories including the moment when she had to 
choose which one of her children would be murdered to avoid them both 
being killed. Her confession challenges the spectator’s emotions and 
makes possible the audience’s doubts and questioning about the right of 
Sophie – if any – to choose between her son and her little daughter in the 
extreme conditions imagined and depicted by the movie story. 
In the same way as melodrama, the spectator’s point of view is 
eventually based on his (absence of) experience but human common 
knowledge is that ‘right must win over wrong’, which means that ‘evil 
should have lost’. However, this is not a drama but a tragic representa-
tion of a vivid painful event because, in this case, Sophie had to face 
an impossible moral/ethical dilemma; a situation in which a difficult 
choice had to be made between two possibilities, though both would 
have equally devastating consequences. In Aristotle’s Poetics ‘a trag-
edy … is a mimesis of an action – that is, it is [morally] serious and 
purposeful’ (Baxter & Atherton 1997: 67); ‘… tragedy is an imitation, 
 
6 Styron apud Rubenstein (1975: vii).
7 The film is not very explicit about this character, but Oscar D’Amore (2010: 70) 
identifies Sophie’s father, Zbigniew Biégansky, as the ideologist for the ‘final 
solution’ and the mentor of the monstrous project ‘Die vernichtung’ – the exter-
mination of the Jews.
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not of human beings, but of actions and of life. … Story, then, is the 
first principle and like the soul of tragedy, and characters are second’8. 
Thus my decision to include this film in my brief analysis has to do 
with cinema’s ability to tell life’s stories and their dilemmas. Besides, 
the film points out how difficult it might be to make a decision against 
one’s own free will, and how the decision-making process depends on 
reason and emotions. What we know and what we see affect the ability 
to decide under certain circumstances, such as putting lives on the line 
which is exactly the case here.
Dealing with our first question – what kind of values and judgments 
are represented in the film “Sophie’s Choice”? – we are confronted with 
pedagogical issues about what to see and how to ‘read’ that are also 
the basis for the moral approach of our case study. In point of fact, at a 
basic level of practical wisdom, we know that values are the principles 
people have that help them to live in a reasonable and safe way. Values 
are also beliefs, and sometimes they refer to goals to be achieved. But 
in any case it is obvious that human values are connected to both emo-
tions and reason, which influence people’s decisions, and in the case of 
movie pictures, strong feelings arise quickly and easily. Films produce, 
and frequently reflect, emotional pleas and political meaning, and those 
results are achieved with the mise-en-scène and editing techniques – the 
primary features of cinematic representation. This is probably the rea-
son why so many movies are controversial regarding the possibility of 
being a good or bad influence on the audience’s opinion, and even their 
decision-making. However, the process is neither simple nor natural. It 
always depends on the spectator’s experience. 
Analysing the issue of ‘Spectator, audience and response’, Patrick 
Phillips says the relationship between the spectator and the cinema is 
always changing from one film to another. He also states that every 
particular response to a film depends on crucial factors, namely, the 
assumption of different selves, including ‘a cultural self who makes par-
ticular intertextual references (to other films, other kinds of images and 
sounds) based on the bank of material she possesses’, and ‘a private self 
who carries the memories of her own experiences and who may find 
8 Aristotle (2002: 20, 22).
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personal significance in a film in ways very different from others in her 
community of interest’ (Phillips 1996: 119).
The previous question leads us to our second question: Can one 
learn about human values like freedom, courage, loyalty and honesty by 
simply seeing movies? As a matter of fact, it is by the mise-en-scène and 
the uses of points of view that filmmakers influence the audience. Light, 
scale and continuity are precision tools which can be controlled very 
accurately and which can produce very effective results. In Sophie’s 
Choice, light and scale shape the characters’ morals and thoughts and 
lead audiences to the sense that, in those circumstances, it would be 
completely impossible that good prevailed over evil. The flashback to 
Sophie’s experiences in the concentration camp, namely her arriving 
there years before, includes several inserts of her face: close-ups show-
ing her sorrow and pain. This intimate point of view – which Deleuze 
would call an affection-image – creates empathetic spectators and at-
tentive listeners, and the audience really understands how Sophie feels. 
The spectator himself becomes aware of Sophie’s dilemma. People un-
derstand that she could not decide in good conscience how to achieve 
the so-called terminal value: freedom. Likewise, one can perceive why 
Nathan would be unable to find happiness or inner harmony. The film 
arouses a kind of social conscience; somehow audiences worry about 
the Holocaust survivors and their injuries. Annette Insdorf points out 
the contribution of the montage of Sophie’s Choice to the evidence that 
the Holocaust is still a dreadful monster; a ghost haunting both our pres-
ent and the coming future. Sophie and Nathan will never be truly ‘free’. 
Both of them bear the consequences of the war and live in pain.
One can see that, despite Stingo’s true friendship due to his close 
companionship, Sophie would feel always guilty although the ‘choice’ 
she made in her dark past had not been guided by any independence or 
free will, but in subjection to a German agent who restricted her deci-
sions. She was forced to choose. It was not really a free choice; it was 
not a choice at all, but an order she had to carry out, and one that could 
never lead her to any ethical decision.
There is no point hypothesizing about how one would react and re-
spond to an external problem like that since we shall never know, but the 
film clearly shows how Sophie’s particular response had an impact on 
her future (and, indirectly, on our present). Moreover, by seeing the film, 
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people become aware of how life is full of uncertainties, which can be a 
positive quality of experience as an interactive process that demands the 
highest standards of behaviour, but also have a negative effect with trag-
ic results like those at the end of the film. In fact not only the dilemmas 
of the characters but also the clarity concerning their actions and moral 
life make it possible for the harmatia to be seen. 
First used by Aristotle in his Poetics, the idea of hamartia is com-
monly understood to refer to the protagonist’s fatal error or flaw that 
leads to the downfall of a tragic hero or heroine, and culminates in a 
reversal of his/her good fortune to bad. Analysing the Greek Tragedy, 
Aristotle stated:
‘It is necessary, then, for the beautiful story to be simple rather than, as some say, 
double and change not to good fortune from bad fortune but the opposite, from 
good fortune to bad fortune, not because of wickedness but because of a great 
mistake either of one such as has been said or of one better rather than worse.’ 
(Aristotle 2002: 34).
Ari Hiltunen considers it a ‘powerful special effect’ and notes that 
Aristotle ‘places value on hamartia9 probably because it is an excellent 
means of achieving the state of undeserved suffering that in turn cre-
ates an intense emotional impact. Disaster caused by hamartia is the 
consequence of actions performed with the best of intentions and so 
is effective in arousing our sympathy’ (Hiltunen 2002: 17). In Sophie’s 
life the turning point of harmatia is the moment when she arrives at 
Auschwitz. When the German agent is turning his back on Sophie after 
a brutal moment of interrogation, she possibly changes her children’s 
destiny, calling again for his attention and claiming that she is not Jew-
ish but a Christian; she appeals to him, insisting that her presence there 
is a mistake. Of course we can argue that, one way or another, the chil-
dren’s lives were in danger, but Sophie’s desire to save them might have 
speeded up the agent’s hideous decision. And that was the first moment 
of her tragic fall even if she was an “impossible” heroine in the very 
sense of tragedy. The second fateful moment was when Sophie decided 
to renounce a comfortable life with Stingo and go back to her lover, Na-
9 Our emphasis.
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than. The consequences of her final decision could not have been worse 
and the circle of tragedy is finally complete. 
According to Aristotle, the tragic hero is never an evil person. His 
downfall is not a consequence of any vice or wickedness, but brought 
on him by hamartia. In this way, the story best suited to tragedy is the 
one of a man or a woman who falls from a state of happiness to a state 
of misery from some great error and not crime. And that is basically the 
story of Sophie’s life. Julian Young underlines how ‘the meaning of this 
word [hamartia] has been … debated. It has been variously translated 
as tragic “fault”, “flaw”, “mistake”, “fallibility”, “frailty” and “error”’ 
(Young 2013: 35). Young also became aware of the implications in the 
debate of understanding the value of moral judgments since it makes 
clear why the tragic catastrophe cannot occur on account of extreme 
culpability. In short, Sophie could not stop blaming herself for sending 
her child to her death but, as a result of the mise-en-scène, audiences 
can understand her dilemma and forgive her. 
2. Point of View: Is Sophie’s Choice Right or Wrong?
It seems quite clear that the plot line of Sophie’s Choice is not the Sho-
ah. However, from the very beginning the film directs our attention to 
the Holocaust with a simple but effective close-up: the tattooed num-
ber on Sophie’s arm. As a result of television’s massive broadcasting 
of Second World War newsreels and footage, almost everyone imme-
diately recognizes the tragic moment of history behind this picture. By 
representation, and a subjective point of view of the camera identified 
with Sophie’s eyes, audiences are able to call to mind the most hideous 
facts which were beyond all reason and remain very close to the inhu-
man experience of what Kant describes as radical evil. But, despite So-
phie’s Choice dealing with the most disturbing historical events of the 
20th century, the film is not exactly about a transcendental evil; rather 
it relies on the practical question of supporting values with reasons. It 
discusses the difficulty of one’s decisions under circumstances beyond 
one’s control and the probabilities of being right or acting wrongly.
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According to Rokeach (1973), ‘family security’, i.e. ‘taking care 
of loved ones’, is a terminal value and refers to a ‘desirable end-state 
of existence’. Moreover, this concept’s descriptors include ‘present and 
future responsibilities’, ‘rights and wrongs’ as well as ethical and mor-
al standards. Of course the problem of human values is very complex, 
but it seems very clear that there is a difference between describing a 
value and judging the consequences of an action based on values. In my 
opinion that is what this film is about; what kind of principles belong to 
an ethical and/or moral system and how is it possible – if it is possible – 
to put the proposals into practice unconditionally? After all, here is a 
mother who should have taken good care of her children but instead she 
‘let her daughter die’ in a gas chamber just to keep her son alive. Was 
Sophie’s choice right or wrong? Would her life have been different if she 
had not had to make that choice, and both children had died? Could she 
live with her own guilty conscience? Are these the right questions? After 
all, she was unhappy because of something she felt she had done wrong.
At this point, I would like to return to the topic of the point of view 
in film in order to show its relevance to the question of values in cinema. 
The point of view may be physical or moral; as a specific and technical 
rule of cinema it is described as a form, meaning both a quantitative 
and qualitative representation. It refers to what reality is framed and 
how it is framed. Thus, a point of view is always a question of percep-
tion and perspective. That is, it is a matter of scale and position from 
which something is viewed or judged. An object’s dimension and angle 
determines its visibility and relative importance in a specific system, a 
‘landscape’, for instance, but also a story. In Sophie’s Choice, the phys-
ical point of view of the camera shapes the moral points of view of the 
characters: Sophie feels guilty, Nathan can neither forget nor forgive, 
Stingo just wants to be happy and share his happiness with Sophie. The 
historical events are distant enough to give the story its strength. The 
film itself looks at Sophie’s motives, calling into question the mother’s 
reasons and her own judgment.
Using a comparison method, the film makes an explicit and vivid 
analogy between the value that Sophie wanted to achieve – to keep both 
her children alive – and the value she had to sacrifice to keep at least 
one of them: to give up her daughter and ‘send’ her to her death. She 
consented to one child’s murder to save the other. But, at the end of the 
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film, there are still questions without answers because, in actual fact, 
there is no solution to this particular dilemma. All the possible argu-
ments are aporia and become inalienable. In any case, Sophie would be 
dealing with the ultimate sacrifice – her children’s death, both or just 
one. And it would make no difference what decision she came to because 
any decision would go beyond any moral and ethical system. That is to 
say, on the one hand, none of her possible choices or arguments could 
ever be the best, i.e. the true or the right one; on the other hand, the cul-
tural assumptions and ideological premises that inform the common au-
dience’s encounter with this film could never support any consideration 
concerning everyday actions for the reason that, only for Sophie was this 
a matter of life and death. And real death is the only fact in life that will 
never be trivial. In fact, our access to the tragic moments of Sophie’s life 
is only possible by her narrative, which is basically a tacit description in 
the sense of Seymour Chatman: ‘Sentences that tacitly describe … direct 
our primary attention … to the story events’ (Chatman 1990: 38).
‘Films, obviously, are more visually specific than novels, and filmmakers tradi-
tionally prefer visual representations to verbal ones. In other words, the medium 
privileges tacit Description. The choice of certain actors, costumes, and sets and 
their rendition under certain conditions of lighting, framing, angling, and so on all 
constitute what Aristotle called opsis or spectacle’ (Chatman 1990: 38). 
The mise-en-scène is also a tacit description. By remembering past 
events, Sophie gives audiences the right to look at her tormented soul. 
She describes the fateful moments of her past and what the spectator 
sees is not the history, but the story… the film of one mother’s tragedy 
or, quoting Ruth Wajnryb, ‘a space between speech and silence’. Wajn-
ryb suggests that when someone describes events, all judgments depend 
on ‘the mechanics of interpretation [that] are only partially contained in 
the text itself; they are also partially contained in the being(s) who serve 
as audience for the text’ (Wajnryb 2001: 176). Perhaps we might say 
that, with regard to this Holocaust narrative, a post-memory syndrome 
should be considered which affects both the characters and the specta-
tor, and this is definitely another major question concerning values for 
cinema that we cannot discuss here. 
My limited analysis of just one film does not explain all the 
problems of cinema and the representation of values. This is a simple 
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introduction to an issue to be discussed in the near future – a work in 
progress. But there is one obvious foregone conclusion: in Sophie’s 
Choice the spectator stays at the level of description and faces the 
problem of the interpretation of her narrative and its philosophical in-
quiry: the (un)fairness of her decisions, the limits of her freedom and 
free will. Consequently, one could ask if, by expressing more than one 
possible meaning, intentionally or not, films can prepare audiences 
for the dilemmas of life’s ups and downs. Writing about teaching the 
Holocaust, R. Clifton Spargo argues that: ‘“Teaching the controversy” 
has become a pedagogical catch-phrase in certain circles, and it can 
be an artificial exercise, especially if all one intends by it is to illus-
trate how conflicting hermeneutical procedures … necessarily arrive 
at different interpretations of the same text’ (Spargo 2008). Sophie’s 
Choice seems to match this assumption, and that is probably the rea-
son why it was a very much criticized film. However, values like free-
dom and free will, judgments like right and wrong, are frequently ab-
stract, vague, relative or intangible, and cinema can make them ‘real’ 
and ‘vivid’. Filmic narratives as well as pictures of life can engage 
audiences in different values existing in a form that can be seen or 
felt, giving the audiences the necessary concreteness to understand 
their complexity. Thus, Sophie’s story reminds audiences how impor-
tant values are, not only on great occasions and in decisive actions but 
also in every moment of an ordinary life. And the difference between 
the characters’ (and the director’s) points of view and the spectator’s 
conviction is a kind of consideration beyond common sense, which is 
a decisive factor in shaping a philosophical and ethical perspective as 
well as shared experiences that create a community.
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Vivre sa Vie: the décalage between  
language and life
Susana Nascimento Duarte
From early on (even in his debut works where the editing and the mise-
en-scène still convey a certain preoccupation with narrative), Jean-Luc 
Godard’s films not only show a taste for mixing categories, genres, dis-
courses, media and stories, but in them also emerges the problem of the 
relationship between the seeing and the saying as one of its main dispo-
sitions. The array of words, quotations, cuts, images and references from 
various sources that had been with him since the beginning gradually 
loses its subordination to narrative concerns, insinuating itself on its 
own in its fragmentary autonomy. This results in two inseparable lines 
of events that, following the framework of analysis proposed by Jacques 
Rancière1, are justly captured by the idea of the ‘sentence-image’: those 
that belong to the sphere of the iconic evidence of images, where all 
sorts of fragments give themselves as spectacle, irradiating the glow 
of their atomic and a-significant condition; and those that belong to 
the sphere of the articulation of these fragments into a sentence-like or 
discursive plane, combining in a significant way the various fragments 
detached from their initial contexts, stories and narratives. This is why 
we can venture to claim that the Histoire(s) du cinéma are the culmina-
tion of a process in which Godard tried to translate into cinematic terms 
an obsessive inquiry into language.2 Guided by the idea of cinema’s 
 
1 Mainly with his Histoire(s) du cinéma, Jean-Luc Godard is the filmmaker that 
allows Rancière to illustrate the notion of the ‘sentence-image’ within the aesthet-
ic paradigm. Cf. Jacques Rancière, ‘La phrase, l’image, l’histoire’, in Rancière 
(2003: 43–78).
2 This identification/confusion between language and words, though not very rigor-
ous, is consistent with the way Godard uses several terms to name the same thing, 
i.e. everything that he opposes to the image and with which he is at war: words, 
text, language, literature, etc. It is, after all, a question of going back to a belief 
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lost childhood (the medium having, in the meantime, become shack-
led by a subordination to discourse, i.e. stories and narratives), Godard 
uses the ‘sentence-image’ to give film back to what resists language, 
meaning the enigma of life and bodies, thus returning the discourse 
back to them. Only now it is a discourse produced after undoing the 
predictable ties between the seeing and the saying demanded by the 
regime of representation, which means the possibility, as Deleuze said, 
of ‘reaching bodies before words, so that they can produce their own 
words’ (Deleuze 1985: 172, 173).
Regarding the desire to exorcise the model of representation and 
its limiting narratives and stories, found in this Godardian phase of 
reflexive cinema and understood as a retrospective and prospective 
meditation on what film and image are, Rancière draws attention to the 
survival of a discursive dimension whereby several heterogeneous ele-
ments are articulated into sentences, that is, by disfiguring the elements 
of the previous regime of representation, another drama arises.3
Vivre sa vie (1962) is one of the films that comprise the first phase 
of Godard’s work. Here we start seeing the first signs of this disfigure-
ment of the dominant order of representation through the dialectical use 
of editing as a way to link together heterogeneous material, meaning 
that the various fragments summoned by Godard link through shock.4 
This type of editing is influenced by the Brechtian paradigm, which 
intends to free representation from identification and the resulting fasci-
nation and absorption it creates in the viewers. This is achieved through 
in the bodies, which demands, among other things, a work of ‘deconstruction’ of 
language and certainly also includes the matter of words.
3 Conversely, we could point out in this association of images and words, this slid-
ing between them, a similarity with the work of dreams as it is described by Freud, 
more precisely the way in which it serves as a model for the figural and the study 
of art images. In it is emphasized the irruption of the sensory inside discourse and 
words, that is to say, the rupture with any idea of linkage that has the representa-
tive logic of the Aristotelian poem for a model.
4 Rancière identifies two types of editing in Godard: the dialectical editing that 
characterizes the first phase of his work, and the symbolic one, which alongside 
the former, Rancière uses to describe the Histoire(s) du cinéma. For the former, 
the main concern when bringing contradictory images together is the shock of 
opposites. For the latter, what matters, besides this shock, is the community of 
images, their conciliation through the ‘sentence-image’ (Rancière 2003: 43–78).
Vivre sa Vie: the décalage between language and life 353
pedagogical procedures that break with the continuities and progres-
sions of the narrative model.
A major contribution here is the ‘sentence-image’ mentioned 
above – the deviant use of words themselves being an example of it – 
in the way in which it meets/departs from the image to formally move 
alongside the film’s theme: the heroine’s difficulty in apprehending the 
world through language. The film culminates in a kind of tête à tête 
between the protagonist and the philosopher Brice Parain – that is also 
a tête à tête between cinema and philosophy – concerning the rela-
tionship between cinema and discourse in their connection to life and 
the world, in their different ability to externalize thought and express 
the possibilities of thought and life. Therefore, the film represents an 
inquiry into language that is also an inquiry into cinema through the 
means of cinema.
In fact, one can already find in Vivre sa vie a certain ‘anxiety about 
the power of speech,’ ‘about the possibility of expressing those existen-
tial experiences’ – on the one hand, love, on the other, the experience 
of oppression (in this case embodied by a prostitute) – that will mark 
Godard’s later works (for instance, in Godard’s politicized phase it will 
manifest itself in the question of how to represent in film the experience 
of class struggle) (cf. Badiou 2013/2010: 172).
In the case of Vivre sa vie it is important to look at the film right 
from the beginning from the perspective of its structure, as in Godard 
what one wants to show is inseparable from how it is shown, that is, 
from an explicit problematization of the narrative form and its cine-
matic conventions. Godard refers to the twelve episodes that compose 
the film as the stylistic option that most adequately gives visibility to 
the problem at hand, or the film’s investigation – the apprehension of the 
movement of thought.
This deliberate structure echoes multiple references: St. Francis of 
Assisi’s eleven fioretti from Roberto Rosselini’s film (which brings to 
life in a completely novel way the narrative form of sketch-based films 
and to which Godard clearly refers in the script when mentioning the 
use of intertitles), the twelve stations of the cross and Bertolt Brecht. In 
interviews from the time, Godard explicitly ties this division in twelve 
episodes to his desire to emphasize what he calls the theatrical side of 
354 Susana Nascimento Duarte
the film and of cinema in general: ‘This accentuates the theatrical, or 
Brechtian side.’ 5
As a playwright and also a theorist of what he practised, Brecht 
embraced the project of an epic, revolutionary theatre in which the au-
thor took a critical approach, regarding both the forms and the content, 
towards the illusions of a psychologically and narratively oriented theat-
rical drama. To put it briefly, Brecht wanted the audience to critically dis-
tance themselves from what they were watching instead of emotionally 
identifying with the flow of the story and the characters’ psychology. By 
making people conscious of the theatre medium, Brecht sought to make 
them politically conscious. Consciousness about the medium would not 
only allow but also demand that the audience participate in a continuous 
process whereby the images, sounds and other phenomena that they 
were confronted with were examined. This enabled the spectator to pro-
duce constructive political and social critique. According to Brecht, the 
epic form should combine an old tradition with the current techniques 
of film, radio and theatre editing: it was a question of ‘treating the ele-
ments of the real in the sense of an experimental composition through 
which epic theater, instead of reproducing the state of things, discovers 
it. Its discovery is achieved through the interruption of continuities.’ 
This interruption consists in creating discontinuities, ‘in undoing the ar-
ticulations,’ so that the situations can ‘critique themselves dialectically,’ 
that is, ‘shock against one another’. ‘Its main goal is to interrupt action – 
5 Jean Collet, ‘Entretien avec Jean-Luc Godard’, Cahiers du Cinéma 138 (déc. 
1962), revisited in Narboni & Milne (1986: 171–196). Here are some other ex-
cerpts of what was said by Godard in the interview from when the film came out: 
‘I start by the documentary in order to give it the truth of fiction,’ ‘I was trying 
to discover the concrete. The closer I get to the concrete, the closer I get to the 
theater. Vivre sa Vie is very concrete, and at the same time very theatrical,’ ‘By 
being realistic one discovers theater. Behind theater there is life, and behind life, 
the theater. I started from the imaginary and discovered reality [a reference to his 
previous films, described by Godard as films for cinephiles, whose starting-point 
is cinema itself and not life]; but behind reality, there is again imagination,’ ‘Cin-
ema is spectacle (Méliès) and research (Lumière). What I have always wanted, 
basically, was to do research in the form of a spectacle,’ ‘The documentary side 
is: a man in a specific situation. The spectacle comes when one makes this man a 
gangster or a secret agent. In Une femme est une femme the spectacle comes from 
the fact that the woman is an actress; in Vivre sa Vie, a prostitute.’
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instead of illustrating it or making it go forward. It is the retarding 
quality of these interruptions and the episodic quality of this framing of 
action that give epic theater its power’ (Benjamin 2003: 24–26, 22, 27 
and 21). Cut/division, interruption, suspense – terms markedly used in 
cinema – are procedures that create an effect of distantiation in the way 
theatre is apprehended and experienced (Didi-Huberman 2009: 61).
In Vivre sa vie, Godard makes use of similar techniques, directly 
inspired by Brecht, to question the cinematic act and the classic catego-
ries of representation, thus experimenting with the narrative form at the 
same time as he creates a self-reflexive cinema. Like in epic theatre, it 
is the showing itself that is shown, which allows the spectator to become 
conscious of the cinematic form as an element that one has to think and 
feel, as a form that informs reality.
Through the division into episodes and the use of intertitles, at-
tention is drawn from the dramatic unfolding of Nana’s story to focus 
instead on her reaction to each of the events as they happen. This dis-
tantiation from her story also serves as a way to constantly remind us 
that we are watching a filmed reality that despite some similarities with 
current life is a made-up reality nonetheless.6
For Godard, the twelve episodes, in their distance and exteriority 
to Nana’s adventures, are paradoxically what makes it possible to reach 
and touch the opposite of this, meaning the maximum interiority identi-
fied with thought in action: ‘I wanted to show the ‘Adventures of Nana 
So-and-So’ side of it. This division into tableaux corresponds to the 
external view of things that would best allow me to convey the feeling 
of what was going on inside… How can one render the inside? Precisely 
by staying prudently outside’ (Narboni & Milne 1986: 187).
This underscores an important point to understanding both this 
film and Godard’s cinema in general: by recording only the signs and 
external manifestations of beings, cinema becomes especially adept at 
revealing these as well as the existential reality in which they are im-
mersed. That is to say that the fact that the camera superficially captures 
images and sounds, instead of making it inadequate for the apprehension 
 
6 What we have here is a critical realism that supposes a critique of realism. Cinema 
does not give us access to a reflection of reality but to a snippet of reality, one that 
is simultaneously partial and inseparable from it.
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of the interior ‘selves’, is exactly what guarantees its ability to show 
them in a new light. Nevertheless, the access to this interiority of a 
non-psychological nature cannot be confused, in Godard’s case, with 
Antonioni’s project, which proposed non-communication as cinema’s 
fundamental theme.
In any case, something is revealed. This is why Antonioni’s cinema of non-com-
munication isn’t mine. Rosselini told me that I almost fell into the Antonioni 
error, but just escaped. I believe that sincerity is sufficient when one has this kind 
of problem. I think it is wrong to say that the more you look at someone the less 
you understand. Obviously, though, if you look too much you inevitably end up 
by wondering what the point is. If you look at the wall for ten hours on end, you 
begin to ask questions about the wall, and yet it’s just a wall. You create useless 
problems. This, too, is why the film is a series of sketches: one must let people 
live their lives, not look too long at them, otherwise one ends by no longer under-
standing anything (Narboni & Milne 1986: 187).
This exteriority to which cinema, like other visual arts, is to a certain 
extent condemned can be highly suggestive if one believes that interi-
ority is inscribed and manifests itself in actions, gestures and external 
situations that implicate us in our relations to the world and others: ‘A 
painter that tries to render a face only renders the outside of people; and 
yet something is revealed,’ says Godard, in an indirect allusion to the 
oval portrait episode. Or: ‘It’s very mysterious. It’s an adventure.’ Vivre 
sa vie was, then, ‘an intellectual adventure. I wanted to try to film a 
thought in action – but how do you do it? We still don’t know’ (Narboni 
& Milne 1986: 187).
By wanting to cut out a thought in action, Godard identifies the 
thought with the body, overcoming the separation of spirit and body 
of classical philosophy (that is, it is mainly the behaviourist activity, 
which can be apprehended, more than its psychological content that he 
has in mind). In this respect, Godard reminds us of Merleau-Ponty who 
in 1945, in a conference called ‘Le cinéma et la nouvelle psychologie’, 
defended, against classical psychology, that a person’s character is not a 
mysterious essence that reveals itself in time, but is immediately present 
in a person’s acts. The philosopher challenged the notion that emotions 
can only be understood through the way in which they are individually 
experienced. He posited instead that they can be studied through behav-
iour since the only place where they exist in reality is in an individual’s 
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expressions, gestures and acts. Merleau-Ponty added that cinema is 
particularly capable of illustrating this new psychology where thought 
becomes gesture and expression. To bring his point home, he finished 
the presentation with the following words by Goethe: ‘The inside is the 
outside/what is inside is also outside’ (Merleau-Ponty 1996).
Therefore, for Godard, psychology (in the classical sense) prevents 
the probing into the depths of the human being. The opening scene enun-
ciates just that. In the sequence showing a conversation between Nana 
and her ex-husband Paul, the two play pinball while they exchange the 
scene’s last words in a more relaxed tone than what was used previously. 
He mentions the school essays written by his father’s students and how 
surprising some of them were. As we hear him quoting from them, the 
camera reframes Nana, isolating her in the shot in a pensive posture: ‘A 
chicken is an animal with an inside and an outside. Remove the outside, 
there’s the inside. Remove the inside, you see the soul.’
Godard’s philosophical and cinematic program becomes appar-
ent in this sentence (Cf. Sterritt 1999: 60–88): if films are nothing but 
audiovisual material suited for the recording of exteriority and if, de-
spite that, some films risk going beyond these exterior representations 
and attempt to indirectly suggest man’s interiority and psychology, 
Godard, on the other hand, without resorting to psychology and remain-
ing at the surface of things, wants to go beyond to expose ‘something 
else,’ something more profound and enigmatic. This is what he tries to 
achieve in his process of film composition with the meeting of theatre 
and life (spectacle and research) mentioned above. He refers to this 
when he says, about Vivre sa vie, ‘The film was made by a kind of sec-
ond presence’ (Narboni & Milne 1986: 187).
What I am trying to do is to express thoughts rather than tell stories.
It will not be a question of spying on the girl (François Reichenbach), trapping 
her (Bresson), or taking her by surprise (Rouch), but simply of following her; 
thus nothing else but being good and true (Rosselini)… Nana, who is gracious, 
which is to say, full of grace knows how to retain her soul all the while giving 
her body… I would like to try to make palpable what modern philosophy calls 
existence as opposed to essence: but at the same time, thanks to cinema, I want 
to give the impression that there isn’t a true opposition between the two, that ex-
istence supposes essence and vice versa, and that it is beautiful that it should be 
so (Young 1963: 22).
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In order to reach this something more – the soul – Godard disarranges 
the usual relations between word and image, that is, the way in which 
they mirror the articulation between interior and exterior, thus freeing 
them from the rules that have traditionally codified its manifestation 
within the regime of representation. The word is no longer a means 
to access what is hidden inside the soul, or what tells us about and 
describes what is far from the eyes. The dialogues in Vivre sa vie often 
seem like intrusions or interruptions in the storyline, having emanci-
pated themselves from any intention to clarify motives and moods. And 
the visible, the image, is no longer subordinated to the restitution of a 
dramatic order, of an assemblage of actions and their causal logic of 
progression, devoting itself instead to the restitution of the being’s un-
conscious gestures, of the silent words written on the bodies, to borrow 
Rancièrian terms. 
Let us go back to the first episode, this time to its beginning.
Nana and Paul are filmed from the back. We can make out Nana 
in the mirror, but had we not seen her in the opening credits, we would 
have to wait until the end of the scene to actually see her. We will only 
see Paul properly at the end of the scene. By not making the characters 
visible to us, this apparatus of capture makes us focus on what is being 
said instead – what we have here is an extension of the procedures of 
distantiation, now applied to camera work. We find out that they are 
breaking off a marital relationship, that they have a son and, more im-
portantly, that Nana does not know how to express herself. The lines 
revolve around the denunciation of incomprehension, meaning the dif-
ficulty in making oneself understood through language. Later in that 
scene, and afterwards, in the last scene, when talking to the philosopher 
Brice Parain, she says, ‘the more one talks, the less the words mean.’ 
Dissatisfied with words, Nana says she prefers to keep silent. Once 
again the plane of fiction, of Nana’s story, uses the character’s words to 
echo a problem that is not just her own but will also be the film’s. Just 
as this character aspires to silence, the film aspires to be a silent film.
From this first scene then we are in the presence of not only a 
character and a fiction but also of a style – Godard’s – which announces 
itself in the image and enunciates itself in the dialogues.
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If we cannot see Nana, let us hear what she says instead. If she does 
not trust what she says, we will get used to the silence. The film pre-
pares us for what will be its work, foreshadowed by the opening credits 
with the three shots of Nana’s face seen in profile, from the front and 
in profile again: a physiognomic study that registers the human body’s 
sculptural surface and gestures while sacrificing psychological depth 
and character development. The film tells us that we should not expect 
in-depth explanations of moods or ambitions, i.e. dramatic motivations 
in the basic causal sense. After this first scene, where we realize that 
Nana’s breaking up with Paul represents a new start for her, we will 
find out what she does with her freedom and what the obstacles to that 
freedom are. The film will then circumscribe the obstacles that hinder 
the blossoming of this newfound freedom, which could also be called 
happiness. Nana’s interiority is shown to us by a gaze that rests upon 
moments chosen at random from an itinerary.
NANA: So things are not very happy then?
YVETTE: No, it’s sad, but I’m not responsible.
NANA: I think we’re always responsible for what we do. And free. I raise my 
hand, I’m responsible. I turn my head to the right, I’m responsible. I’m unhappy, 
I’m responsible. I smoke a cigarette, I’m responsible. I shut my eyes, I’m respon-
sible. I forget that I’m responsible, but I am. No – it is how I say. To want to avoid 
it is foolish. After all, everything is beautiful. You only have to interest yourself in 
things to find them beautiful. After all, things are as they are – nothing else… A 
face is a face, plates are plates. Men are men. And life, is life.’
She outlines here a kind of ethics, which is also the film’s: ‘I’m respon-
sible,’ ‘A face is a face.’ An ethics that speaks for the film’s aesthetics 
and allows it to be read as an ethics. It is a praise of surface, of a before 
or beyond language, that also reveals the film’s metaphysical dimen-
sion. The difficulties of being, the contradictions and worries that come 
with trying to strike a difficult balance between oneself and the world, 
will be solved by her and the film by eschewing drama and accepting 
life as it is. This means not looking for a meaning behind things. We 
are faced here with a meditation on existence: ‘Nana knows herself to 
be free, but that freedom has no psychological interior. Freedom is not 
an inner, psychological something – but more like physical grace. It is 
being what, who one is. Being free means being responsible’ (Sontag 
1994:205).
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The je suis responsable implies the negation of the notion of fa-
tum, or fate. That does not mean, however, that fate is not omnipres-
ent in every shot and every scene throughout the film as some kind of 
threat (and, when seen retrospectively, it is clear that the film had been 
gathering and collecting evidence that Nana was destined to die in the 
end). Godard wanted Nana to be responsible in the existential sense, i.e. 
by creating her own destiny – and the tragic dimension is not any less 
powerful because of that. Her friend makes destiny responsible for her 
luck; Nana says that we are always responsible.
In the next scene, when Nana accepts to work for Raoul, she is 
responsible.
A ‘normal’ film would try to explore her motives, making us, at 
this point, dramatically conscious of her circumstances (lack of money, 
the separation from Paul) so that we could feel the pressure she was 
under (which is what happens in the case of Yvette, who, in this sense, 
represents that cinema). But Godard, in this scene, suspends the melo-
drama’s usual expectations, the alibis of failure and compromise; in a 
word, the excuses. Godard wants us to feel the film’s epigraph: se prêter 
aux autres et se donner à soi-même. It is through the body, through its 
postures, that Nana and the film reach the soul, reach thought.
The face, and the gaze, emerges as a privileged place for the camera 
to do its probing since it is traditionally thought to serve as a window to 
the soul. Maria Falconetti’s face in the film La passion de Jeanne d’Arc 
(1928) by Carl Theodor Dreyer is a perfect example of just that: a face 
that in its maximum exteriority, in its passivity, shows the interiority; a 
face that is the place of ultimate revelation, with the soul or God pass-
ing through it. Anna Karina’s face is, therefore, invested with spiritual-
ism through its approximation to Maria Falconetti’s. The approximation 
achieved through the editing of the two faces in the cinema gives rise 
to the approximation and the creation of correspondences between two 
far-apart worlds – Nana’s itinerary and Jeanne d’Arc’s passion. Jeanne 
d’Arc’s face is not only the face that, in its absolute nudity, opens itself 
up to transcendence and attests to the passage of God as an invisible 
trace revealed in man. It is also a face that bares itself before threat. It 
refers back to a primordial ground that exists before individuation, to a 
space where all the faces of suffering and martyrdom converge to meet 
once more, (to the presence of the Other and of all humanity, as Levinas 
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would put it). On the other hand, La Passion de Jeanne d’Arc is a film 
that portrays the possibility of the language of the face becoming words, 
as stated by Dreyer himself: ‘Joan of Arc is also words! Whether the 
text predominates, or the image, it is all the same. Each subject implies 
a certain voice. And that must be paid attention. One must find a way to 
express as many voices as possible’ (Delahaye 1965: 15–34). In Vivre 
sa vie, Nana’s true voice is her face and her body.
The face draws the limit between exterior and interior, but at the 
same time it erases that limit in the act of exposing it. Hence the pref-
erence for close-ups, especially after the scene in the cinema which 
introduces Nana’s suffering. Nana’s interior transformation, the meta-
morphosis of her soul, is something that exceeds and escapes her and 
that the camera tries to apprehend in its imperceptible manifestations, 
in the way that a face and a body might reflect it (the face and the body 
as places both of exposure and protection of interiority, producing an 
effect of ambiguity that oscillates between intimacy and distance or de-
tachment: ‘in your gestures there are words… but as silence… and it 
is that silence that I love…’ ( ‘tu vois dans tes gestes, il y a la parole… 
mais sous forme de silence… et ce silence, je l’aime bien…’).
Therefore, drama is destroyed and replaced by the arbitrary obser-
vation of Nana’s body’s attitudes, movements and postures which, more 
than a political and social gestus, evoke a metaphysical, vital and also 
pictorial gestus. In that sense, we do not see Nana as a prostitute in the 
beginning, and in the end we do not either although we know that she 
was one. What interests Godard in prostitution is not the figure of Nana 
‘as already having become a typified character, but the moment when 
a woman like all the others, is driven, under certain circumstances, to 
prostitute herself; the moment of passage, when she is still the one that 
she was before, while at the same time being already different’ (Bergala 
2006: 102).
In Godard’s words, Vivre sa vie ‘is the portrait of a woman during 
a few months and it just so happens that in those months she prostitutes 
herself.’ Godard refuses to turn this circumstantial activity into the fe-
male character’s essence.
He asks the following question: what changes in a woman’s con-
sciousness and life when that frontier is crossed? (Bergala 2006: 102) 
We are not invited to observe a character thrown into a classical tragedy, 
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but to witness a woman in a contemporary situation living her life. Thus, 
prostitution is not an element that particularly defines her as a character 
in this fiction. Like other prostitutes of Godard’s, she resists or seems 
aloof and detached in the sex scenes where she participates, looking out 
the window as she lends her body to men.
In Vivre sa vie, ‘when a door opens into a room where the woman is 
supposed to be prostituting herself, it is always a living, sculptural and 
immobile tableau that is shown to viewers (as if these prostitutes’ clients 
came to these places to satisfy primarily their mise-en-scène’s ghosts, 
more than their crude sexual needs)’ (Bergala 2006: 103).
Godard rejects the presence of sexual images in Vivre sa vie, which 
allows the reality of Nana’s prostitution to go beyond eroticism and its 
visible actions to reach her being more profoundly – prostitution is a 
stage of learning in life. Prostitution’s meaning in the film can be found, 
as pointed out by Tom Conley, in the term’s etymological roots them-
selves – prostatuere: expose to the eyes, the loss of anonymity. There 
is a theological dimension here: this revelation results in the character’s 
fall and transforms her into a kind of cinematic Christ.
The self-reflexive relationship that is established between Nana’s 
movements as she lives her life, the thought of the body and the cine-
matic form is inspired, as we have noted earlier, by (Merleau-Ponty’s) 
existentialist phenomenology. As a consequence, in the film all the 
meanings pass through the body. 
Nana’s presence, which is indistinguishable from the actress Anna 
Karina’s, Godard’s wife at the time, (especially in the last scene where 
Godard himself reads Edgar Allan Poe’s ‘Oval Portrait’),7 is the subject 
of ethological inquiry – Can we go beyond appearances? Can we touch 
 
7 What we see is also that: the study of a face by Godard’s camera. A study that 
looks for the truth in the actress Anna Karina’s face. In the end, the film makes 
it clear that it was also about intersecting with fiction – sometimes emancipating 
from it – a portrait of a painter/filmmaker’s wife, made by him. In that sense, 
three planes meet in the film. Firstly, the fiction one, which deals with Nana’s 
character. Secondly, the documentary/study about the actress Anna Karina’s face 
as she plays Nana, which distances itself from fiction and Nana’s story. Finally, 
encompassing the other two, is the film about the film, where cinema thinks itself 
and the very idea of cinema is taken apart. These three planes infiltrate into each 
other and the borders between them are diffuse. 
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a soul (essence)? It is also the object of plastic celebration – through the 
confrontation with cinema and painting (appearance), and by revisiting 
the division between appearance and essence (cf. Brenez 1998), action 
and thought. At the same time, the film strives to bring these together by 
embodying the character’s journey and destiny, by turning the body and 
its postures into categories of the spirit, as Deleuze would say.
All her interiority pulsates on this exteriority – her face, mainly, 
but also her gestures and her body – that the film explores, showing 
the ambiguity present in the title – ‘what I call mine, what is most per-
sonal to me, is also ultimately unknown, and, therefore, detached and 
impersonal at an ontological level’ (Mathews 2006: 45). The film hap-
pens there, in that paradoxical mix of intimacy and detachment. In fact, 
the creation of a feeling of intimacy is ambivalent as we are constantly 
confronted with the inability to penetrate beyond the opaque surface of 
the words that are exchanged, of the expressions and actions that are 
manifested.
It is worth mentioning here the expression donnez-moi un corps, 
which is for Deleuze the formula of philosophical reversal: ‘the body 
is no longer an obstacle that separates thought from itself, that which it 
has to overcome to reach thinking. It is, on the contrary, that which he 
plunges into or must plunge into to reach the unthought, that is, life.’ It 
is not the case that, for the philosopher, ‘the body thinks, but obstinate 
and stubborn, it forces us to think, and forces us to think what is con-
cealed from thought, life.’
In this sense, for Deleuze, it is not a question anymore of ‘making 
life appear before the categories of thought, but throwing thought into 
the categories of life.’ The categories of life are, therefore, the body’s 
attitudes and postures. ‘We do not even know what a body can do, in its 
efforts and resistances,’ writes Deleuze, quoting Spinoza. ‘To think is to 
learn what a non-thinking body is capable of, its attitudes, its postures. 
It is through the body that cinema forms its alliance with the spirit, with 
thought. Donnez-moi donc un corps is first to mount the camera on an 
everyday body’ (Deleuze 1985).
Brice Parain agrees that it is necessary to introduce the body. The 
philosopher observes that since the introduction of contingency by Leib-
niz – contingent truth alongside necessary truth, that is, everyday truth – 
we have to think with the limitations, the errors of life.
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It is through the contingencies of her life as a prostitute, marked by 
the experience of silence and of the objectified body, that thought can 
emerge, not in terms of its contents but in terms of its own visibility – 
that allows us to read Montaigne’s opening quote (his art of living) as 
a sentence about the urgency of experience, that is, the obligation and 
absolute need to pull life out of death.
On the other hand, in Vivre sa vie the narrative’s usual causal se-
quence is, as we have seen, broken by the arbitrary decomposition of 
the story into twelve episodes – these episodes relate to one another 
serially and not through causality. In each series the film shows us that 
it thinks itself through both its characters and objects, and a collection 
of texts and references that serve as reflexive categories.8 These com-
pose a web of quotations and allusions that define Godard’s morals and 
aesthetics of appropriation: Montaigne’s epigraph; the essay about the 
chicken; the excerpt from a gossip magazine, read by a co-worker in the 
record store; the passage from Dreyer’s La passion de Jeanne d’Arc; 
the shadow of Louise Brooks; Nana’s name, which evokes Émile Zola’s 
novel and Jean Renoir’s film; the song; the dance music record; Brice 
Parain’s reflection; Poe’s text. There is no unified point of view, but a 
series of documents and descriptions that make up an unquantifiable 
body consisting of words, sounds and images. The traditional, unified 
interior discourse is replaced by free indirect discourse. These elements 
are quoted in the film in a way that preserves their difference. They 
might be used with analogical goals but they still keep their specificity, 
which means, for example, that the sentence about the chicken may 
clarify many planes in the film, not only Nana’s story – poule in French 
also means prostitute – but also the film’s program itself as we have 
mentioned. The film allows for relations between various terms to be es-
tablished since these are not made to depend on identity relations. What 
 
8 In Deleuzian terms, which could apply to any film by Godard: ‘Each series refers 
to a way of seeing or speaking, which may be that of current opinion, operating 
through slogans, but equally that of a class, a sort, a typical character operating 
through thesis, hypothesis, paradox. Each series will be the way in which the au-
thor expresses himself indirectly in a sequence of images attributable to another 
or, conversely, the way in which something or someone is expressed indirectly in 
the vision of the author considered as other’ (Deleuze 1989: 183).
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we have here is the pinnacle of Rancière’s ‘sentence-image’ within the 
‘aesthetic paradigm’.9 Through the interaction of the various elements 
and a sensitivity to the gap between words and images, the wealth of 
connections that defines the ‘sentence-image’ in its acme of expressive 
saturation can materialize. Here the singularity of fragments, and its 
rupturing power, is interwoven with a discursive and reflexive density, 
which arises from the connections that those fragments establish be-
tween themselves at multiple levels through editing.
Deleuze hints at a similarity between Godard and Aristotle since 
he finds affinities with the philosopher’s table of categories in the film-
maker’s table of montage. The fact that Godard resorts to categories in 
editing does not make them final answers, but problems that introduce 
reflection into the image itself. They are problematic or propositional 
functions. The question for each film is: what performs the function 
of categories or reflexive genres? For instance, Deleuze mentions that 
Parain fits into a reflexive category (that of language) towards which 
Nana moves (Deleuze 1985: 186). 
In the conversation scene between Nana and Brice Parain, Parain re-
flects on the nature of language. Nana asks him why human beings must 
always talk and cannot live without words. He answers that there can be no 
life without thought and that in order to think one must talk, since speaking 
is the same as thinking, and thinking is the same as speaking. The question 
is not one of speaking compared to not speaking – even if sometimes one 
has to go through silence to speak well – but one of how to speak or think 
well. Parain anchors his position in the story of Porthos, one of the three 
musketeers, who has never thought in his life and who dies when he begins 
to think about how it is possible to put one foot before the other. Because 
he had to stop, to subtract himself from the course of life, the first time he 
9 Rancière dates the ‘sentence-image’ back to Flaubert: ‘if Flaubert ‘doesn’t see’ 
in his sentences, it’s because he writes in the age of clairvoyance (voyance) and 
the age of clairvoyance is precisely that in which a certain ‘view/vision (vue)’ 
has been lost, and saying and seeing have entered a space of community without 
distance, or correspondence’ (Rancière 2003: 58). Thus, Flaubert uses the gueu-
loir (‘one has to listen’) and editing. The ‘sentence-image’ is not a sentence that 
allows meaning to be seen; it is not an image that carries meaning. It is something 
close to, though not totally interchangeable with, film editing – words, sounds and 
images arranged in such a way that they create a certain impact and/or meaning.
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thought it killed him. Parain then concludes that the discovery of truth can 
be painful and that truth can never be reached without erring.
Naturally, this scene illustrates how important the reflection about 
language is for Godard, in general, and in this film, in particular. Brice 
Parain is a philosopher of language, occupying a space between pre- 
analytical philosophy and continental philosophy. For him, sentences, 
or propositions, are not separate from life. ‘According to Sartre,’ his 
work leaves us with the ‘vertiginous feeling of the inexactness of lan-
guage’ and is the product of a man who ‘words hurt and wants to heal,’ 
‘who suffers for feeling that he is in décalage with language’ (Fieschi 
1962: 23; cf. Salanskis n.d.). His attempt is that of an unreconciled man 
who is looking for reconciliation. The same is true of Godard, who uses 
cinema to better understand life.
Central to Brice Parain’s philosophy is the identity between 
thought and language, that is, the way in which the latter moulds and 
gives shape to the former. In fact, for the author, language almost be-
comes a religious experience since the truth of life is indistinguishable 
from the use of language. According to Parain, an instant of thought 
can only be grasped through words, and that is why to talk always 
implies the risk of lying. In this sense, lies too are part of our quest – 
we must pass through error to arrive at the truth, for instance when 
searching for the right word that one cannot find. Therefore, one can-
not ‘live in truth’ without having recognised that truth is in everything, 
even in error (which means that errors and lies, in the above sense, are 
very similar). This emphasis on the importance of language, taken to 
the extreme, is at the heart of his critique of Blaise Pascal. For Parain, 
Pascal fails in trying to understand thought as a dialectical process 
when he identifies it with ‘living in truth.’ Parain does not believe 
that one could live directly in the truth unless one would adopt the 
silence of the medieval mystics, which is not possible in practice: the 
process of thought is inseparable from research, from a dialectical to 
and fro between truths and lies, changing one into the other – truths 
become lies (untruths) as soon as they constitute the premises for new 
truths. From his point of view, language is not something exterior 
to our being, a meta-level from which truth as a correspondence be-
tween meanings and the real world could be expressed. We cannot 
escape being inside language, it is our house, ‘the house of being’. For 
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Parain truth in language is closely related to truth in life because not 
only does thought occur in life, with the servitudes and errors of life 
(cf. Parain 1953, 1972), but also it is inseparable from the elaboration 
of assumptions about life. These assumptions are not founded in logic, 
nor do they stem from factual observation, but come from a mor-
al point of view towards life, from taking a stance towards it, which 
requires commitment. Assumptions are not factual states or states of 
life; they are promises: ‘When I speak, I propose something to life’ 
(Deleuze, 1984–1985: Cours du 22 janvier 1985). At the same time, 
speaking is not living and in order to talk, i.e. to think, one must have 
‘broken up with life,’ that is, been through death, or through a kind of 
death. Nana mentions her difficulty in expressing herself as a result 
of her need to think, to use words to escape the states of life that she 
finds herself in and often oppress her. To this Parain answers, precise-
ly, that renouncing life for a bit is the price to pay for speaking and 
thinking. He says: ‘to live in speech, one must pass through the death 
of life without speech.’ In this sense, to speak is almost like resurrect-
ing to life, which means that speaking is a kind of ascetic exercise 
that makes us look at everyday life, or at too elementary a life, with 
detachment. To speak is to demand something from life, to interrupt 
it and escape from what is terrible about it. This means oscillating 
between silence, i.e. the moments when one has to ‘live life,’ and the 
moments when one ‘gives orders to life’ and demands something from 
it (while at the same time becoming involved in this demanding from 
life) (Deleuze, 1984–1985: Cours du 22 janvier 1985).
Conversely, in Godard, there is not an absolute identification 
between (spoken) language and thought. Like Nana, Godard dis-
trusts words since words can betray you. Like her, the film has to 
pass through silence, through the silent observation of Nana’s life in 
order to touch her truth and essence. Therefore, one has to question 
the meaning of words instead of passively accepting them. If Godard 
uses the dialogue between Nana and Brice Parain to question himself 
about how adequate words (thought) are to describe perceptions (of 
the real) and sensations, it is because he is looking for an answer to 
this problem in life, that is, inscribed in a situation, in a project. To 
find the right words, one has to work at it, that is, to suspend the legit-
imacy of dictionary definitions and language conventions. This is true 
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for cinema as well as for the learning of cinema. If in all of this one 
cannot stop hearing the words spoken by Parain in his dialogue with 
Nana, Godard, however, distances himself from the philosopher. In 
fact, he seems to believe in a manifestation of thought and truth that 
dispenses with language and involves reading through the faces and 
bodies in silence (like Nana thrown into the world and responsible for 
her actions – here we find phenomenology again). And cinema would 
be the place of that manifestation. Also from Godard are the words 
uttered by Nana: ‘But why does one have to always talk? I think that 
sometimes we should just shut up and live in silence. It would be so 
much nicer to live without talking.’
How can we reconcile thought and action, i.e. life, without one 
cancelling the other? The character’s concerns are also the film’s and 
Godard’s. Therefore, the last two episodes retroact on the film’s different 
levels which we have briefly referred to. In the Brice Parain episode it 
is cinema that thinks itself through language and its ability to resurrect 
life, which would otherwise be condemned to silence and death, with-
out a form on which to reflect itself. At the same time, in Nana’s story, 
the conversation with Parain (in agreement with the idea of a thought 
that manifests itself directly in life and that cinema makes visible) de-
termines that the character having acted and lived, by reflecting and 
talking about life, by separating life from thought, would have to die 
afterwards like in Porthos’s story (from Alexandre Dumas’s Vingt ans 
après). Read from this perspective, the episode no longer clarifies what 
brings cinema and language together but shows what separates them, 
what makes them different. It in turn ties in nicely with the oval portrait 
episode, which explicitly introduces, through the analogy between cin-
ema and other arts, a reflection on the relationship between cinema and 
its ability to portray life,10 to literally pull it out of death – the charac-
ter’s, but also the actress Anna Karina’s.
10 Nana’s itinerary allows Godard to live as if he were putting into his creation his 
own obstacles, his own difficulty, albeit transfigured. The difficulty of being is 
solved by Godard through the very being of cinema. By learning about cinema, 
he learnt about life. In an interview about Vivre sa vie, he says, ‘It was cinema that 
made me want to make films, I didn’t know anything about life, except through 
films, and my first efforts were films for cinephiles, the work of a cinema enthu-
siast. What I mean is that I didn’t see things in relation to the world, life, History, 
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It is possible to recognize here the issue of cinematic ontology, 
inherited from André Bazin, as a critical realism that feeds on the 
(also Bazian) idea of an impure cinema. Bazin’s influence, expressed 
as follows, can be felt in all the Nouvelle Vague filmmakers and crys-
tallizes its modernity: cinema is modern when it refuses the old art 
of storytelling and asserts itself through what constitutes its speci-
ficity, meaning its ability to apprehend the spectacle of life without 
needing to resort to Aristotelian drama. Nonetheless, to directly ap-
prehend life means, following Rancière’s arguments, to apprehend it 
before language but after undoing the ties between world and lan-
guage, the visible and the sayable, inherited from other arts and their 
narrative-representative conventions, and to find new ways to tie them 
together, rescuing those disjointed elements into a new non-unified 
configuration. In Godard, the direct capture of life goes hand in hand 
with the problematization of cinema itself in its relation to life. Due 
to its automatism of reproduction of the movement of the world, cin-
ema – as a chaos of signs of variable signification (namely the ones 
produced by other arts and by cinema itself) – is the art that can best 
take in reality. These signs are simultaneously characterized by the 
image’s autonomy and disruptive singularity, and by the potential 
for connection and arrangement found in the discursive logic. Hence 
Godard’s confrontation with painting and literature, not in the sense 
of adapting them or interpreting their works but of using them as raw 
matter that cinema then re-works and re-links in a process that shows 
the possibility of new relationships with them and between them, life 
and history. In this way, cinema proposes itself as a new instrument of 
thought, before and beyond language. 
In Éric Rohmer’s words, ‘Ontologically, film says something that 
the other arts don’t say’ (Rohmer 2004: 25). However, this idea, which 
distances cinema from older models taken, for instance, from litera-
ture and theatre (refusing the imitation of other arts and the narrative 
power of classic Hollywood films to favour a direct acceptance of the 
world instead), is inseparable in Godard from an inquiry into what it 
means to say something else. What follows is an investigation into 
but in relation to cinema. Now I’m walking away from all of that’ Cf. Fieschi 
(1962).
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the way in which cinema says something else, that is, a profound re-
flection on language and on what makes cinema a non-discursive art 
different from others. This is achieved without falling into an essen-
tialism incompatible with the practice of contamination of cinema by 
other arts.
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‘I’d rather be lucky than good.’ Ethical variations  
in Pickpocket and Match Point
Susana Viegas
1. Ethics in cinema: An introduction
‘The man who said “I’d rather be lucky than good” saw deeply into life. 
People are afraid to face how great a part of life is dependent on luck. 
It’s scary to think so much is out of one’s control. There are moments 
in a match when the ball hits the top of the net, and for a split second, it 
can either go forward or fall back. With a little luck, it goes forward, and 
you win. Or maybe it doesn’t, and you lose.’ Match Point starts with this 
off-camera statement by Chris Wilton (Jonathan Rhys-Meyers). Chris 
talks to the viewers (and to the film director) as if he were the Voice 
of God commentator. The movement of a ball hitting the top of a net 
in slow motion is complemented by the Italian operatic singer Enrico 
Caruso, who sings ‘Una furtiva lagrima’ from the Italian Opera L’elisir 
d’amore by Donizetti. Caruso’s dramatic voice and the metaphor of a 
tennis match dictate the tone of the film. 
What are the individual and social consequences of a rational de-
cision that states that to be lucky is more important than to be good? Is 
this a practical and reasonable opposition? Can (good and bad) luck be 
an ethical principle and what is its role in one’s attitudes and decisions? 
These are nothing but some of the ethical and moral questions we pose 
to ourselves every day. In a broader ethical scenario, we may say that 
we must choose the best way of life and we must decide the best way to 
choose it properly. But to what extent can film be a useful tool to scru-
tinize these problems in a philosophical manner? 
Today, film may play quite a relevant role in the philosophical 
study of artistic images and aesthetic thought, but ethics is still a slight-
ly unimportant section of contemporary philosophy of film. Even if 
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the panorama changed during the nineteen seventies and eighties with 
Stanley Cavell and Gilles Deleuze, ethics remains a secondary issue 
when compared with the ontological and epistemological questions. 
What is the ethical value of the aesthetic cinematic experience? How 
do we emotionally, existentially and ethically connect to the cinematic 
plot? Recently Robert Sinnerbrink defended a joint consideration of 
these different sides towards multi-layered artistic practice:
Ethics in cinema (and cinema as ethics) represent much more than a minor branch 
of the philosophy of film. This is arguably the most culturally significant way in 
which cinema can be understood philosophically. It not only makes a contribu-
tion to our philosophical understanding of the world but enhances our ability to 
engage with complex forms of moral experiences.1 
Thus does Sinnerbrink present us with the result of his research on 
the possibility and limits of cinematic ethics. He divided the ethical 
analysis of any film into three parts that, ideally, should be a collective 
reading of the three aspects in any film: 1) the ethics within cinematic 
representation, 2) the ethics of cinematic representation (for instance, 
questioning the decision of whether or not to show explicit scenes of 
violence and the viewer’s response to these), and 3) the ethics of cinema 
as a cultural medium (as a medium for moral values, beliefs and ideo-
logical ideas). For this essay, I will restrict my analysis to the first one, 
analysing ethics in cinema via an analysis of the dilemmas, the themes 
and the film’s plot. The use of verbal rhetoric in a film intrigue can be 
a good starting point to analyse the current debate around moral values 
because together with the visual images and visual (non-verbal) rheto-
ric they organise the film as a whole.
I will not consider film as a privileged medium for philosophis-
ing nor to illustrate someone’s philosophy, whether the filmmaker or 
the main character in the film. Instead, I will look into these two films 
and read them as different fictional thought experiments that present 
us with vivid moral judgements and ethical dilemmas. If not fiction-
alised, some of them would not even be considered. But as fictions we 
certainly envisage and debate them in a different way to how we would 
 
1 Sinnerbrink (2015: 9).
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with a documentary film (maybe because we think that ‘documentaries 
address the world in which we live rather than a world imagined by the 
filmmaker’, as Bill Nichols says2). Besides that, it is important to stress 
that the general idea guiding this essay is not that of knowing if a work 
of art can be limited or criticised by moral values (is Riefenstahl’s Tri-
umph of the Will/Triumph des Willens (1935) a good work of art even if 
it disseminates Nazi propaganda?), or if taste and aesthetic judgement 
should contain other values besides purely aesthetic ones (is a film con-
sidered good only when it is not the medium for the dissemination of 
racist and hateful feelings?).3 Let us recall here Berys Gaut’s definition 
of ethicism: ‘Ethicism is the thesis that the ethical assessment of atti-
tudes manifested by works of art is a legitimate aspect of the aesthet-
ic evaluation of those works.’4 However, as Gaut also notes, it is most 
important to clearly distinguish the effects of a work of art that might 
morally corrupt its viewers from the effects of a particular character 
who represents dishonesty and immorality.5 In this sense, Pickpocket, 
written and directed by Robert Bresson (1959), and Match Point, writ-
ten and directed by Woody Allen (2005), are good works of art that do 
not intend to morally corrupt their viewers with negative, dishonest or 
hateful feelings, even if we may state with certainty that their infamous 
anti-hero protagonists are not ethical role models.
2. Gilles Deleuze: Ethics as ethology
When watching a film we do not just see it and hear it – we respond to 
it emotionally, existentially and ethically. We are not indifferent to what 
we see and hear in a fictional film. We may ‘feel for’ the character’s feel-
ings and actions (because we understand them), or ‘feel with’ the char-
acter’s feelings and actions (we respond to the character’s feelings but 
2 Nichols (2001: xi). 
3 Levinson (1998).
4 Gaut (1998: 182).
5 Gaut (1998: 188).
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we do not share them, we do not feel the same).6 As viewers, art gives us 
an ethical-existential dimension within which we analyse the moral and 
ethical qualities of any work of art. How can a fictional work as a film 
help us with the problem of the intertwining of ethics with aesthetics? 
Gilles Deleuze had an immanent conception of ethics. Although 
he did not write a specific book on ethics, it is possible to find some 
remarks in the books he wrote with Félix Guattari and also in his two 
books on cinema. His ethics is defined as immanent and ethological,7 as 
a divergent path from deontological ethics with normative and universal 
values. In this sense, Deleuze begins by opposing ethics (or moralism) 
to morality: ‘morality presents us with a set of constraining rules of a 
special sort, ones that judge actions and intentions by considering them 
in relation to transcendent values (this is good, that’s bad…); ethics is a 
set of optional rules that assess what we do, what we say, in relation to 
the ways of existing involved.’8 For Ronald Bogue and D. N. Rodowick, 
to talk of a Deleuzian immanent ethics means to talk about cinematic 
ethics, especially the cinematic ethics of the time-image.9 But when con-
sidering film, Deleuze does not have a single ethical view of it. Instead 
he presents us with two different approaches when considering pre- or 
post-Second World War films. In Deleuze’s reading of film, films solve 
the existential crisis and the separation of the world during the post-
war period. In the movement-image regime of the action-image as in the 
films directed by Eisenstein or John Ford, there was an identity between 
the human and the world. In this action-thought the subject of any film is 
not the individual and lonely hero, but the ‘dividual’, the collective sub-
ject. However, we can find in the action-image some films that ‘vacillate’ 
between the certainty of this regime towards the effectiveness and value 
of the actions in the world and some affection-images as in Dreyer and 
Bresson.10 If in the movement-image regime there is a wide range of pos-
sibilities through the character’s dilemmas and choices, in the time-im-
age regime there is only one possible choice to make: ‘to believe in this 
6 Smith (2003: 90 ff).
7 Uhlmann (2011: 154–170).
8 Deleuze (1995: 100). Also in Deleuze (2009: 119).
9 Rodowick (2010: 97–114); Bogue (2007); Bogue (2010: 115–132).
10 King (2014: 59).
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world.’11 The link between the movement-image and the time-image re-
gimes is precisely in the modes of existence of the one who chooses.
A close reading of the two perspectives, although without any evo-
lutionary intention between them, delineates Deleuze’s cinematic ethics. 
‘Affect as immanent evaluation, instead of judgement as transcendent 
value: ‘I love or I hate it’ instead of ‘I judge’.’12 This immanent eval-
uation is a reminder of Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza. The focus is on 
what one can do, on what one might do, and not on what one should 
do. What is the relationship between one’s life as an authentic existence 
and one’s decisions and attitudes? Spinoza’s ethology implies that there 
is a singular connection between ethics and ontology with the way that 
affects (the power to affect someone/something and also be affected by 
it) shape a certain mode of existence. In this sense, first and foremost, 
there is no divorce between human and the world, but there is only one 
substance. This Spinozism perspective was the inspiration for the two 
principles of the Deleuzian immanent conception of ethics: 1) to choose 
to ‘believe in this world’ (and not in another, transcendental, world) is the 
only authentic ethical choice to make after the crises of the action-image 
and the breakdown of the sensory-motor regime (to see and hear replaces 
to act/react). This world in which we should believe is the world of the 
permanent becoming and change that manifests and expresses the power 
of time; 2) this choice is based on the purely intensive criteria of an ethics 
of affect that again has the power of time as a mechanism for change.
The different modes of existence express different types of forces, 
either positive, negative or indifferent. For Deleuze, Michel in Pickpocket 
represents the grey character – someone who is indifferent to his choices, 
who is dominated by uncertainty about the good and evil of a normative 
system. This does not mean that he should become good or evil, but 
that by being indifferent to his spiritual alternatives he has become a 
slave of his first choice. This means that he only had the opportunity to 
choose once and since that moment, he has become entrapped by that 
first choice and has lost the opportunity to choose again. The spiritual 
choice of the grey character is, according to Deleuze, a false choice (as 
it is a false choice to only choose good or evil).13 On the contrary, an 
11 Deleuze (2008: 172).
12 Deleuze (2008: 136).
13 Deleuze (2009: 117–118).
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authentic choice would be the one made by someone who knows that 
a choice can be made and who is able to choose differently each time. 
A true choice is to restart each time and have the opportunity to choose 
again and not be entrapped by a choice made before. An authentic choice 
creates affects, immanent evaluation, and is defined by its power and not 
by its content. Deleuze opposes cinematographic expressionism to lyr-
ical abstraction: if in Murnau there is a clear ‘struggle of the spirit with 
darkness’14, in Dreyer and in Bresson there is a spiritual choice, an alter-
native (either… or…). These alternatives are what Kierkegaard identifies 
as the three stages of the existential dialectic: the aesthetic, the ethical 
and the religious. According to this dialectical progression, the agent of 
the choice is in a permanent becoming. The question is how to choose 
what can be chosen. However, for Deleuze, without a belief in this world 
there are no reasons to choose properly. This will be the irrational point, 
as in Pascal’s wager, and the illogical move of a leap of faith.15
Post-Second World War films do not register the world – they be-
lieve in this world as it is: ‘The intolerable is no longer a serious injus-
tice, but the permanent state of a daily banality.’16 If before the historical 
fact of the Second World War, cinema were able to show us the different 
modes of existence of the one who chooses (through the choices that 
a character must make), in the post-war period this process was con-
veyed by the viewer’s mode of existence. But how did we get to this 
point of not believing in this world? What disconnected humans from 
the world? To believe in this world decides both the original scepticism 
of Stanley Cavell’s philosophy and the state of disbelief that Deleuze 
mentions.17 For Cavell, cinema touches philosophy’s main question: the 
epistemological scepticism about the existence of the world. According 
to Cavell, the photographic origin of cinema allows us to see and to 
think a world that is independent and exterior to any subjectivity. Thus, 
film refutes any metaphysical and subjective isolation. But in order to 
have an ethical experience from this aesthetic experience it is mandato-
ry that a change take place: how to re-establish contact with the world? 
 
14 Deleuze (2009: 115).
15 Deleuze (2009: 117).
16 Deleuze (2009: 164).
17 Rodowick (2010: 99)
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To Cavell this ethical encounter transforms the sceptical subject (moral 
perfectionism), not the world. To Deleuze, cinema also explores new 
modes of existence in a way that interferes with the world. Thus the 
ethical dimension of film is for Cavell an ‘ethics of self-transformation’ 
and for Deleuze it is a ‘belief in this world’ through a leap of faith, as 
in Pascal. But if Cavell does not have a political reading of the moving 
image, Deleuze stresses the political vision with the idea of a ‘people to 
come’. One of the most political and social (collective) consequences 
of this immanent conception of ethics is that becoming (other) is always 
possible. As a consequence, the agent does not have to carry the weight 
of his actions (in the sense that becoming comes from the past into the 
future) but can restart as something new, as something other (the be-
coming comes from the future and falls into the past).
The link between the human and the world is broken and it will 
never be fixed; it is impossible to link them again. However, the link can 
only be the subject of faith. We may decide not to give this leap of faith 
and never restore the connection, making any ethical view of the human’s 
actions impossible. But we may also decide to believe in this world again. 
Just as in Pascal’s wager, everything changes with this move. That way, 
the human (the viewer) can be connected with what he sees and hears.
3. Character Dilemma
According to Robert Sinnerbrink, cinema provides ‘new ways of evoking 
and expressing ethical experience: not only emotional engagement fa-
cilitating moral sympathy and empathy but also emotional estrangement 
through which conflicting, clashing, or incompatible ideas, commitments, 
or beliefs can be revealed.’18 Both Pickpocket (Robert Bresson, 1959) and 
Match Point (Woody Allen, 2005) are films with an obviously ethical 
dimension providing emotional estrangement. Their protagonists can 
hardly be considered heroes in the classical sense of the term, as role 
 
18 Sinnerbrink (2015: 8).
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models that do the right thing, that fight against injustice and that put the 
collective above the individual interest. They are closer to being negative 
heroes, not positive ones. In the classical films of the action-image driven 
by moral judgements, such as those by Griffith, Ford and Eisenstein, the 
true hero is the collective, the community that fights against evil believ-
ing that a better society is possible.19 On the other hand, we should not 
mix up the film’s plot, which might magnify the negative hero’s actions, 
with the filmmaker’s intention and, regarding this issue in particular, it is 
important to bring together the aesthetic qualities and the ethical values 
of films. How do we respond to the character’s fate, such as in Pickpocket 
and in Match Point? What are the implications of Deleuzian immanent 
ethics, the necessity to have faith in this world, in these two movies? Both 
films raise important questions concerning decisions, values and conse-
quences within different ethical backgrounds.
In Match Point Jonathan Rhys-Meyers plays Chris Wilton. Once a 
professional tennis player, he is now a tennis instructor at an exclusive 
club in London. During a night at the opera, La Traviata, he meets the sis-
ter of his new friend Tom Hewitt, Chloe (Emily Mortimer). He admits to 
her that tennis was an easy way to escape poverty in Ireland when he was 
a kid. Their different status is very evident in the film although his genuine 
interest in the arts is a way to overcome the monetary gap between them. 
Hard work is important, but for Chris luck plays an important role in life. 
But then, Chris falls in love with Nola Rice (Scarlett Johansson), Tom’s 
fiancée. Eventually Tom breaks up with Nola but by chance Chris, who 
in the meantime has married Chloe, bumps into her at the Tate Modern. 
They restart their affair. Everything changes for him with a moment of 
bad luck when Nola gets pregnant when Chloe has been trying for years 
without success. However, although he feels guilty about the irony of the 
situation, Chris does not want to do the right thing and so plans to murder 
his lover. That way he would be able to continue with his own life project.
Chris dismisses an ethical life (to be good) in favour of what good 
luck can bring him. He commits two murders, which he disguises as a 
robbery (just like Raskolnikov in Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment), 
but he does not seem to be bothered by any feelings of guilt. He delivers 
his life and actions to the uncontrollable forces of luck (thus presenting 
 
19 Deleuze (2009: 115).
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us with a different version of the literary character of Raskolnikov, who 
had an obvious influence on Woody Allen’s film). At the end Chris is the 
opposite of a man consumed by guilt, a recurrent murderer character in 
Allen’s films such as Peter Lyman (Hugh Jackman) in Scoop (2006), Ian 
(Ewan McGregor) in Cassandra’s Dream (2007) and Abe Lucas (Joaquin 
Phoenix) in Irrational Man (2015). In one of the first scenes in the film, 
Chris is reading Crime and Punishment but he switches his reading to The 
Cambridge Companion to Dostoyevsky. Shahrzad Siassi, who compares 
Match Point with a previous movie by Allen on the same topic, Crime and 
Misdemeanours (1989), argues that this switch is proof of Allen’s existen-
tial atheism and nihilism20: unlike Raskolnikov, the protagonist does not 
believe in the (Christian) redemptive power of guilt, but instead prefers a 
more rational, expository, philosophical and theoretical analysis of these 
moral dilemmas (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2). The aleatory effects of luck replace 
the role of God in this godless and meaningless world.
Image 1 and 2: Chris prefers the Companion.
20 Siassi (2013: 133–146). 
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Chris decides that he would prefer to be lucky than good. Thus he com-
mits a crime and expects that, with this decision, he can fulfil his life 
goal (to be married to a rich wife) without being caught. The film shows 
us the various circumstances in which luck prevails over bad luck thus 
guiding the consequences of his decision and somehow putting them 
beyond his control. He disguises the murder as a failed robbery and 
on several occasions he is not caught just by a fluke. When he throws 
the stolen jewellery into the River Thames, one ring hits the top of the 
railing (a similar visual composition to the ball in the film’s beginning) 
and we imagine that the ring can either fall back and he will be caught, 
or fall forward into the river (Fig. 3 and Fig. 4). The ring falls back. 
Luckily for Wilton, someone finds the ring and picks it up. Later, the 
same person is involved in another crime related to drugs. He is caught 
with the ring and is formally accused of a crime of robbery and murder 
that he has not committed.
Image 3 and 4: If the ring falls back, Chris must lose.
In Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov robs and murders a woman and 
her daughter but, consumed by his guilt, struggling with his most ra-
tional thoughts to justify his actions, he ends by confessing his crimes to 
the police and being exiled to Siberia. To be capable of killing someone 
(as a principle that justifies the crime) does not make that agent either 
superior or extraordinary. With that punishment, justice is established 
and Raskolnikov can finally restore his ethical (and religious) integrity. 
When the spectre of Mrs Eastby, Nola’s next-door neighbour, appears in 
a dream scene to Chris, he says to her that ‘the innocent are sometimes 
slain to make way for a grander scheme. You were collateral damage.’ 
In order to justify killing his unborn child, he adds that Sophocles said: 
‘To never have been born may be the greatest boon of all.’ (The dictum 
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slightly adapts the original one from the Chorus of the Greek trage-
dy Oedipus at Colonus.) The next scene, with Detective Mike Banner 
awaking from his dream and figuring out how Chris Wilton committed 
the two crimes, is one of the few from which Chris is absent. At that 
point, we fear for him; his luck may be over. Although we recognize him 
as the infamous anti-hero of the story, we do not dislike him.
As for Pickpocket Martin La Salle plays Michel, a different ethical 
version of the main character in Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment. 
In Pickpocket Michel, unemployed, also commits a crime – pickpock-
eting. The film also uses first person speech as a tool of persuasion. 
However, Michel’s thoughts (including his fears and joys) are addressed 
to the viewers not as the Voice of God commentator, but in an intimate, 
confessional way. He does not see himself as an ordinary thief but as 
a pickpocket, a superior and extraordinary man, but he is willing to 
change his life and redeem himself. Michel prefers to have good luck 
than to decide his own fate. This decision is not a judgement. He steals 
because doing so he feels superior – Bresson never explains the char-
acter’s true intention in picking the pockets of others, why he never 
visits his dying mother, what his life project or ‘grander scheme’ is. 
His hands, his artful skills and his good luck make him feel superior to 
others: ‘I was in control of the world,’ declares Michel in voiceover at 
the beginning of the film. He knows it is wrong (‘People can know that 
an act is ugly and still commit it,’ he declares to Jeanne (Marika Green), 
his mother’s neighbour, after she becomes aware that he is a pickpock-
et), but he does it because he can do it well. In the final scene, Jeanne 
visits Michel in prison and the two become closer, which seems to be 
the precise opposite of the ending of Match Point. However, Jeanne 
and Michel are apart, divided by the jail bars. The final scene reveals 
that the world is fully restored at the end, even by the strange and par-
adoxical lines when Michel finally understands that he is in love with 
Jeanne: ‘Oh, Jeanne, to reach you at last, what a path I had to take.’ 
But it is restored with irony: it may not be the expected Christian re-
demption of the criminal who accepts his guilt and finds love. In this 
case, Michel’s face remains blank as in another scene (a particularity of 
Bresson’s style). It is a face without affects but where all affections can 
converge. According to Brian Price, the irony relies on the intertextual 
interpretation of the soundtrack of Jean-Baptiste Lully’s Atys, an opera 
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possibly composed as a response to Louis XIV’s attempt to clean Paris 
of all deviant behaviours (vagabonds, homosexuals, those who did not 
work, etc.): ‘As Foucault has shown, the rise of the prison system in the 
time of Louis XIV was predicated on the latter’s antipathy for beggars, 
sexual deviants, idlers, and those who challenged the authority of the 
state more generally.’21 Thus, cinema is the art that makes visible the 
invisible everyday life of the common people, possibly of the infamous 
who are socially condemned and publicly judged: it may be a portrait 
of the life of chance of a murderer who leaves no clues behind, or of the 
daily training of the subtle movements of a pickpocket’s hands. 
Final remarks 
Is Chris Wilton willing the eternal return of his actions (being a liar, 
being a killer)? Is he strong enough to deal with it? We certainly would 
share with Chris his own hopeful words: ‘It would be fitting if I were 
apprehended… and punished. At least there would be some small sign 
of justice – some small measure of hope for the possibility of meaning.’ 
At the end of the film, with Chris moving away from the rest of the 
family welcoming his newborn son, thinking that he is safe from the 
crimes he has committed but that at the same time he is trapped in a 
mere pointless existence, the viewer remains with a lost sense of mean-
ing, of a world without any sign of justice and without any measure of 
hope. His grander scheme is accomplished but still there is no answer to 
his nihilism. He has no faith in this meaningless, intolerable and unjust 
world. From the classical Aristotelian conception of a good tragedy, we 
do not find a complex plot as there is no reversal moment (peripateia) 
that could free the character from his suffering and the viewers from 
their expectation of catharsis.
Is it possible to make an ethical judgement of Chris Wilton’s initial 
statement (‘I’d rather be lucky than good’)? It seems to us that the film 
 
21 Price (2011: 32).
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is a way for Woody Allen to call into question this first premise. It is not 
without irony that Chris and his wife are portrayed. Allen is never sym-
pathetic either to the couple in love or to the deceived wife, who is rep-
resented as being naïve. In the end, to be lucky is not a good, universal, 
ethical principle because it neutralizes all actions. Wilton’s decisions 
about his actions will not become good just because he becomes un-
lucky and is arrested, and they do not become bad because he got lucky 
and escapes punishment. It does not matter if one’s actions are good or 
bad: as long as one is lucky the actions are not qualified as good or bad. 
In this sense, good or bad luck is incompatible with ethics because it 
puts consequences beyond a person’s control. Putting all one’s faith in 
good and bad luck is a way of not being responsible for one’s actions 
because it does not matter if what you decided to do is right or wrong 
as long as you were lucky – and in a deontological system to have luck 
is a totally arbitrary principle over any (im)moral choice. Chance just 
substitutes the role of God in this ethical understanding of actions. To 
be able to succeed with his ambitions (not be caught by the police for 
his crime and to marry his rich fiancée) cannot justify Chris’ decision 
(to kill his lover, Nola).
An immanent perspective on ethics defends that someone’s actions 
are driven by their power and qualities and not by a deontological ori-
entation. That way, someone’s decisions are not judged for fitting or 
not fitting the same deontological system that is at its origin. This is a 
fictional experiment that makes us rethink how we normally judge the 
other’s decisions and the importance we give to them or the disappoint-
ment we feel. Someone’s decisions express the qualities by which those 
actions are inscribed in the world and in the agent. Thus, not to believe 
in the existence of a link between the human and the world becomes 
a real problem and, as Deleuze states, to choose to choose is a way of 
restoring that gap. As we saw, Michel and Chris are cinematic examples 
of the grey character, the protagonist of uncertainty and indifference. 
They have made the first choice but then got trapped in the consequenc-
es that followed. But they certainly hope for some justice in the world. 
Chris never achieves it and is not capable of confessing his crimes to the 
police, accepting the universal injustice of the world and that ‘so much 
is out of one’s control’. He does not believe in inscribing his intensive 
actions in the world. Only Michel can accept the world as it is and he 
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acknowledges his crime by being arrested. That way, Michel knows that 
by choosing to believe some choices are no longer possible; he knows 
that becoming is always possible and a new mode of existence is pos-
sible. To be lucky makes Chris and Michel feel superior, a feeling they 
would not have had if they had decided to do the right thing, to be good, 
because in this case, eventually, they might very well have had to deal 
with the unlucky. They anticipate the risks they are taking by not being 
good and they calculate the best way of not being caught and punished 
for their decisions, but even so they decide to go that way. Ethics does 
not apply to a pure luck-driven decision but, however, it can apply to 
Chris’ initial statement (‘I’d rather be lucky than good’). That statement 
makes us rethink which values we take for granted in our everyday life 
by exploring fictional different and changeling modes of existence.
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